JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This petition, under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, has been filed by Sri Krishna Kumar Das for quashing the order the supplementary charge-sheet dated 24.12.2012 filed by the Inspector of Police, CBI/EOW/Kolkata in the Court of Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Additional Court No. 1 in Case No. RC 4/E/2009-Kol dated 24.2.2009 on the basis of FIR dated 15.8.2006 being Titabor P.S Case 79/2006. 2. The petitioner states that the Adjutant, 3rd Assam Police Batellion, Titabor lodged an FIR, dated 15.8.2008, before the Officer in Charge, Titabor Police Station alleging that as per departmental procedure, Sri Lankeswar Das, Subedar Major of the said battalion was entrusted for disbursing the salary for the month of June, 2006 of the battalion headquarters personnel drawn in July 2006 and accordingly, on 17.07.2006, an amount of Rs 26,01,323/-, vide cheque No. 28 dated 15.07.2006 and Rs 14,67,821/- vide payee cheque number 31 dated 15.07.2006, in total of Rs 40,69,144/-, were received by Sri Lankeswar Das and he disbured Rs 22,30,434 and rest amount of Rs 18,38,710/- were wilfully retained by him without reporting the matter to the higher authority. On scrutiny of the disbursement record of the Office, said Sri Lankeswar Das confessed that the balance amount were divided amongst himself, Sri Dadul Ch Borah, AB SI and Sri Jiban Sarmah Pathak in a manner that Sri Lankeswar Das took Rs 5 lakh, Sri Dadul Ch Borah took Rs 7,38,710 and Sri Jiban Sarmah Pathak took Rs 6 lakh. On the strength of the FIR to this effect, a case under Section 409 IPC was registered, vide Titabor P.S Case No. 79/2006. 3. Thereafter, the Commandant 3rd APBn, Titabor, lodged a supplementary FIR dated 20.8.2006 stating therein that in continuation with the earlier FIR dated 15.8.2008, it was found during inquiry that Assam Police Battalion, Sub-Inspector, Sri Jibesh Das was entrusted to disburse the salary of the battalion personnel for the month of June 2006 with an amount of Rs 8,84,156 vide pay cheque No. 17 and he disbursed Rs 4,43,875 and handed over Rs 1,94,818 to the head assistant. The balance amount of Rs 2,45,463 was kept with him without informing the authority and later the said amount which was kept by AB SI Sri Jiban Sarmah Pathak. The balance amount of Rs 2,45,463 was kept with him without informing the authority and later the said amount which was kept by AB SI Sri Jiban Sarmah Pathak. On the strength of this supplementary FIR a Titabor P.S G D Entry 617 dated 20.8.2006 under Section 409/120B/420 IPC was registered. 4. The allegations against the petitioner is that as Commandant of the 3rd APBn, Titabor, he signed inflated bills and drawn Rs 36,480,278 and Rs 34,416,326 against fraudulent bills. 5. The petitioner contends that a supplementary charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner but no sanction under Section 197 CrPC was obtained and as such the prosecution of the petitioner is not tenable in the eye of law. 6. The petitioner, in his petition, has made elaborate statements with reference to materials collected during investigation and the basic premise of the statements is that the petitioner signed the bills in his official capacity as Commandant only when the dealing Assistant had assured him that bills have been properly prepared. 7. I have heard Mr. SP Roy, learned counsel, assisted by Ms. N Rai, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. SC Keyal, learned Counsel for the CBI. I have also heard Mr. PS Lahkar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for the State respondent No. 2. 8. It may be mentioned that learned trial Court has already framed charges against the petitioner for the offences under Section 120B IPC and Section 13 (1) (d), read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 9. The petitioner urges for quashing the supplementary chargesheet 24.12.2012 and also the order dated 24.9.2014 whereby charges were framed against him. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 the Honble Supreme Court had laid down the following illustrative guidelines to be taken into account while considering the quashment of FIR. "102. 9. The petitioner urges for quashing the supplementary chargesheet 24.12.2012 and also the order dated 24.9.2014 whereby charges were framed against him. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 the Honble Supreme Court had laid down the following illustrative guidelines to be taken into account while considering the quashment of FIR. "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 10. Now, it is not denied by the petitioner that during the period of excess drawal of money he was the drawing and disbursing officer in his capacity as Commandant 3rd APBn, Titabor. The plea of the petitioner is that he signed the bills in good faith. It needs to be pointed out here that petitioner has also been charged with entering into criminal conspiracy. The elements of criminal conspiracy are questions of fact and it would not be proper for this Court to come to a finding whether the acts of the petitioner fall within the realm of good faith. Hence, not only the allegations in the FIR and supplementary charge sheet give rise to a cognizable offence the fact that the petitioner had signed the disputed bills gives rise to a suspicion about his complicity. 11. Now, coming to the scope of Inherent as well Revisional jurisdiction of High Court vis-à-vis framing of charges it would be proper to reproduce herein the principles laid down in the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 wherein the Honble Supreme Court has culled out several principles regarding the jurisdictional distinction in the two provisions Section 397 and Section 482. The principles are as follows; 27.1. The principles are as follows; 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. Emphasis supplied 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a "civil wrong" with no "element of criminality" and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173 (2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. 27.16. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. Emphasis supplied 12. In view of the materials on record against the petitioner and the legal principles discussed as above I find no merit in the contention that supplementary chargesheet and consequent framing of charge against the petitioner needs to be quashed. 13. Now, coming to the other plea raised by the petitioner regarding absence of prosecution sanction under Section 197 CrPC, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the cases of N.K. Ganguly vs CBI, (2016) 2 SCC 143 , State of Madhya Pradesh vs Sheetla Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617 , Rajiv Thapar vs Madan Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 . 14. In N.K. Ganguly (supra) the Honble Supreme Court observed that for the purpose of obtaining previous sanction from the appropriate Government under Section 197 CrPC, it is imperative that the alleged offence is committed in discharge of official duty by the accused. It is also important for the Court to examine the allegations contained in the final report against the accused, to decide whether previous sanction is required to be obtained from the appropriate Government before taking cognizance of the alleged offence by the Court. 15. In the present case, sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has already been obtained in order to prosecute the petitioner. Whether the acts of the petitioner are such that sanction under Section 197 CrPC would also be necessary is a question which can be determined at any stage of the trial. It would not to be proper for this Court examining the present application in its inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate this issue of fact. 16. Whether the acts of the petitioner are such that sanction under Section 197 CrPC would also be necessary is a question which can be determined at any stage of the trial. It would not to be proper for this Court examining the present application in its inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate this issue of fact. 16. The case of Sheetla Sahai (supra) is not attracted in the present case as the case pertained to a retired official whereas in the present case the petitioner is still serving. So far as the case of Rajiv Thapar (supra) is concerned it is of no aid to the petitioner since it is not his case that some documents relied upon by him have not been considered by the trial Court at the time of consideration of charge. 17. In the result, this Criminal petition is found devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. 18. Interim orders passed on 12-07-2016 stands vacated. 19. Send down the LCR along with a copy of this judgment.