JUDGMENT : Ram Prasanna Sharma, J. 1. Challenge in this acquittal appeal is to the judgment dated 5-8-1998 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon (for short “the trial Court”) Session Division Rajnandgaon, (CG) in Session Trial No.47 of 1997 wherein the trial Court acquitted the respondents from the charges under Sections 304-B and 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Facts giving rise to the instant appeal is that name of the deceased is Pushpa Bai who was married to respondent No.1 Rajkumar four years back since the date of incident. It is alleged that respondents demanded dowry from the deceased, therefore, she came to her parental house for fulfillment of the demand and some money was given by the complainant side to the respondents twice or thrice. It is alleged that respondents harassed the deceased due to which she committed suicide on 19-6-1995 by consuming poisonous substance namely Sulphas. On the basis of death information given by Dr. R. Bhattacharya, merg intimation was registered as per Ex.P/16 and the matter was enquired. After enquiry first information report was registered and the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code') were recorded. After investigation, charge sheet was filed against the respondents. The respondents pleaded innocence and thereafter the trial was conducted. After examination of the witnesses, statements of the respondents were recorded under Section 313 of the Code. After hearing the parties, the trial Court acquitted the respondents as aforementioned. 3. Learned counsel for the State submits as under: (i) As per statement of Vasudev (PW/1), who is brother of deceased, Meera (PW/2) who is wife of deceased's brother Heeranand. Heeranand (PW/7) who is brother of deceased and PW/8 Daulatram, who is brother of the deceased, it is established that demand of money was made by the respondents and that is why deceased came to them for fulfillment of demand and that shows harassment by the respondents, but the trial court overlooked this aspect of the matter and the finding arrived at by the trial Court is not in consonance with the factual matrix of the case. (ii) The deceased died in the house of her brother Daulatram (PW/8) which shows the harassment by the respondents, otherwise, she would not have stayed with her brother after marriage. (ii) The deceased died in the house of her brother Daulatram (PW/8) which shows the harassment by the respondents, otherwise, she would not have stayed with her brother after marriage. Minor contradictions and omissions are bound to occur but the trial Court gave much weightage to it and misguided itself in recording the judgment of acquittal. (iii) Re-appreciation of the evidence goes to show that the finding of the acquittal recorded by the trial Court is not justified being perverse, therefore, the accused be convicted properly. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the finding arrived at by the trial Court is based on proper marshaling of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and same is not liable to be disturbed while invoking the jurisdiction of the appeal. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The first question for consideration is whether this Court can disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court and whether any limitation should be placed upon such power. 7. As per law laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of Athley Vs. State of UP reported in AIR 1955 SC 807 , it is held that “In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate Court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. Again in Animireddy Venkata Ramana and Others Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2008) 5 SCC 368 , it is held that when there were very serious infirmities in the judgment of the trial Court both in regard to the legal propositions as also appreciation of evidence and there were non-consideration of material facts and consideration of irrelevant facts, the appellate court's interference with the judgment of acquittal would be warranted. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup Case afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as (I) “substantial and compelling reasons”, (ii) “good and sufficiently cogent reasons”, and (iii) “strong reasons” are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.' 8. From the above principles it is clear that the appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 9. In the instant case, the respondents were charged with offence under Sections 304B and 306 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 10. For commission of offence under Section 304B of the IPC, it has to be proved that the death of a woman is caused by any bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstance within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand of dowry. 11. Now the point for consideration is whether any demand of dowry was made by the respondents and whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death. 12. Definition of dowry as defined in Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 reads as under: “2. Definition of 'dowry'. 11. Now the point for consideration is whether any demand of dowry was made by the respondents and whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death. 12. Definition of dowry as defined in Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 reads as under: “2. Definition of 'dowry'. - In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly – (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before (or any time after the marriage) (in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include) dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Explanation II – The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code.” 13. To substantiate the charge prosecution has not adduced evidence of anyone who was residing near the house of in-laws of the deceased. Case of the prosecution is based on the statement of PW/1 Vasudev, PW/7 Heeranand and PW/8 Daulatram who are brothers of the deceased and Meera (PW/2) who is wife of the deceased's brother Heeranand. As per version of Heeranand, deceased informed him that in-laws were demanding Rs.50,000/- from her. Vasudev (PW/1) and Meera (PW/2) deposed on the same lines. But as per version of Daulatram (PW/8), deceased has not named anyone when Station House Officer enquired as to who actually demanded money. From the statement of Daulatram (PW/8) the theory putforth by other witnesses is rebutted and it is not established as to who actually demanded money. Again Vasudev (PW/1) deposed that Heeranand paid Rs.5,000/- to father-in-law of the deceased, but Heeranand deposed that he gave Rs.5,000/- to his sister Pushpa. Again Vasudev deposed that mother-in-law of the deceased was given Rs. 10,000/- but in his police statement Ex.D/1, it is mentioned that Rs.20,000/- was paid to inlaws. 14. The theory put-forth before the trial Court was contradictory, therefore, it was not possible for the trial Court to conclude at once as to what amount was really demanded by any of the respondents. 10,000/- but in his police statement Ex.D/1, it is mentioned that Rs.20,000/- was paid to inlaws. 14. The theory put-forth before the trial Court was contradictory, therefore, it was not possible for the trial Court to conclude at once as to what amount was really demanded by any of the respondents. All the witnesses cited by the prosecution are not the witnesses of locality of in-laws of the deceased, and therefore, they were not in a position to keep vigil as to what is happening with the deceased and in absence of any evidence regarding harassment by any one of the respondents, the trial Court was not in a position to jump into conclusion that deceased was harassed by any of the respondents. Statement made by all these witnesses is based on what is stated to them by the deceased and same is not trustworthy being contradicting each other on material terms as also being hearsay evidence. 15. Hearsay evidence is not received as relevant evidence. In Kalyan Kumar Gogoi vs. Ashutosh Agnihotri reported in (2011) 2 SCC 532 , Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under: “(a) the person giving such evidence does not feel any responsibility. The law requires all evidence to be given under personal responsibility, i.e., every witness must give his testimony, under such circumstance, as expose him to all the penalties of falsehood. If the person giving hearsay evidence is cornered, he has a line of escape by saying "I do not know, but so and so told me", (b) truth is diluted and diminished with each repetition and (c) if permitted, gives ample scope for playing fraud by saying "someone told me that...........". It would be attaching importance to false rumour flying from one foul lip to another. Thus statement of witnesses based on information received from others is inadmissible.” 16. When second hand evidence is inadmissible then it is difficult for us to hold that any dowry/ illegal demand was made by the respondents and they harassed the deceased. 17. It would be attaching importance to false rumour flying from one foul lip to another. Thus statement of witnesses based on information received from others is inadmissible.” 16. When second hand evidence is inadmissible then it is difficult for us to hold that any dowry/ illegal demand was made by the respondents and they harassed the deceased. 17. In the present case, from the evidence of Daulatram (PW/8), it is established that deceased was brought to his home on 1-4-1995 or 2-4- 1995 and as per statement of Sanjay (PW/5) who was working in the house of deceased's brother Heeranand, he purchased Sulphas from her shop on saying of the deceased for R.15/- and she consumed that poisonous substance and thereafter he admitted her in hospital. As per version of Dr. R. Bhattacharya (PW/16), no definite opinion can be given regarding cause of death. He advised that viscera be sent for chemical examination, but there is no report thereof. From the oral evidence, it can be inferred that the deceased consumed substance of her own and it is a case of suicide. 18. The respondents have been charged with Section 306 of IPC. Now the point for consideration is whether the respondents abetted the deceased to commit suicide. 19. For commission of offence under Section 306 IPC, ingredients of Section 107 IPC i.e. abetment are to be established. Ingredients of Section 107 of the IPC are that instigating a person to do a thing and “instigate” denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or inadvisable action or to stimulate or incite to commit an act. The word “instigate” denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or inadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. 20. For offence under Section 306 IPC there should be a clear mens rea to commit the offence and there should be a direct or active act by the accused which lead the deceased to commit suicide. Intentionally aiding a person to do a thing also includes in abetment, but from the record it cannot be inferred that the respondent instigated or intentionally aided the deceased to commit suicide. It cannot be said that the trial Court has not properly appreciated the scope and ambit of Section 306 of the IPC. 21. Intentionally aiding a person to do a thing also includes in abetment, but from the record it cannot be inferred that the respondent instigated or intentionally aided the deceased to commit suicide. It cannot be said that the trial Court has not properly appreciated the scope and ambit of Section 306 of the IPC. 21. For commission of offence under Section 306 of IPC, there should be live link between the act of the respondents and commission of suicide. In the present case, as per version of Daulatram (PW/8), deceased came to his hose on 1-4-1995 or 2-4-1995 and committed suicide on 19-6-1995 i.e., after 47 days and from the evidence, it is not clear as to what disturbed her mental equilibrium on 19-6-1995. There should be nexus between disturbance and mental equilibrium and act of any of the respondents, but when they are not in touch with the deceased for more than 47 days, it is difficult for us to hold that her mental equilibrium was disturbed by any of the respondents. It is not established that any of the respondent instigated or intentionally aided to her to commit suicide. It cannot be said that the trial Court has not properly appreciated the scope and ambit of Section 306 of IPC and it is not a case where two views are possible. 22. Taking into consideration the cumulative effect of the evidence, it is not a case to reverse the finding of the trial Court. The respondents deserved to be acquitted and the trial Court is well within its jurisdiction to deliver the judgment assailed. 23. In the result, the appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.