JUDGMENT : The petitioner, who is the registered owner of an autorickshaw bearing registration No.KL-05/AL-2026, was arrayed as the accused in Crime No.56/2015 of the Excise Range Office, Ettumanoor, alleging offence punishable under Section 55(i) of the Abkari Act, 1077 (for brevity 'the Act'). The allegation made against the petitioner was that, on 1.10.2015, at about 12.45 p.m., the petitioner was found engaged in the sale of Indian Made Foreign Liquor near Kuzhithar Hospital Junction and that, he was keeping liquor in his autorickshaw bearing registration No.KL-05/AL-2026. The Excise Inspector, Ettumanoor Range filed final report before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Ettumanoor and the case was committed to Sessions Court, Kottayam, as S.C.No.427 of 2016. After trial, the petitioner was acquitted as he as found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 55(i) of the Act, by Ext.P1 judgment dated 28.7.2017 of the Sessions Court, Kottayam. 2. The autorickshaw owned by the petitioner was confiscated by the 3rd respondent Deputy Excise Commissioner, invoking the provisions under Section 67B of the Act, vide Ext.P2 order dated 24.12.2016. Against the order of confiscation, the petitioner preferred Ext.P3 memorandum of appeal dated 21.9.2017, under Section 67E of the Act, before the 2nd respondent Additional Excise Commissioner (Enforcement). Since Ext.P3 appeal was filed beyond the time limit of 30 days from the date of communication of the order of confiscation, it was accompanied by Ext.P4 interlocutory application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 241 days in filing that appeal. 3. By Ext.P5 order of the 2nd respondent appellate authority dated 10.10.2017, Ext.P3 appeal filed by the petitioner stands dismissed on the ground that though the petitioner was served with a copy of Ext.P2 order of confiscation on 30.12.2016, the appeal was filed only on 18.9.2017. Feeling aggrieved by Ext.P5 order, the petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the said order and seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to release his autorickshaw bearing registration No.KL-05/AL-2026. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 5. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that since the petitioner has already been acquitted by Ext.P1 judgment of the Sessions Court in S.C.No.427 of 2016, the 3rd respondent has absolutely no authority to retain the autorickshaw bearing registration No.KL-05/AL-2026, which was confiscated under Section 67B of the Act in connection with the registration of Crime No.56/2015 of Excise Range Office, Ettumanoor alleging an offence punishable under Section 55(i) of the Act. 6. Section 67B of the Abkari Act deals with confiscation by Abkari Officers in certain cases. Sub-section (1) of Section 67B, which starts with a non obstante clause, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where any liquor, intoxicating drug material, still, utensil, impediment or apparatus or any receptacle, package or covering in which such liquor, intoxicating drug, material, still, utensil, impediment or apparatus is found or any animal, cart, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying the same is seized and retained under the provisions of the Act, the officer seizing and retaining such property shall, without any unreasonable delay, produce the same before an officer authorised by the Government in this behalf by notification in the Gazette, not being below the rank of an Assistant Excise Commissioner. As per sub-section (2) of Section 67B, where an authorised officer seizes and detains any property specified in sub-section (1) or where any such property is produced before an authorised officer under that sub-section and he is satisfied that an offence under the Act has been committed in respect of or by means of that property and that such property is liable to confiscation under the Act, such authorised officer may, whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the commission of such offence, order confiscation of such property and where such property consists of any receptacle or package, the authorized officer may also order confiscation of all contents thereof. The procedure for enquiry is provided under Section 67C of the Act. 7. The procedure for enquiry is provided under Section 67C of the Act. 7. In Shaiju v. Assistant Excise Commissioner and another ( 2008 (2) KHC 952 ), this Court held that the powers of confiscation under Section 67B of the Abkari Act are independent of the penal provisions contained in the said Act and the authorised officer is entitled to proceed with confiscation proceedings, dehors the other provisions of the said Act. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said decision reads thus: “5. Confiscation of a vehicle involved in an Abkari offence is ordered under Section 67B of the Abkari Act. Section 67B(1), insofar as it is relevant provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force, where any liquor, found or any vessel, or other conveyance used in carrying the same is seized and detained under the provisions of the Act, the officer seizing and detaining such property shall, without any unreasonable delay, produce the same before an officer authorised by the Government. Section 67B(2) provides that where the authorised officer is satisfied that an offence has been committed in respect of or by means of the property and that such property is liable for confiscation, such officer may, whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the commission of such offence, order confiscation of such property. 6. From the above, it can be seen that the section opens with a non obstante clause and it also provides that irrespective of whether prosecution is instituted for the commission of such offence or not, the authorised officer may exercise his power of confiscation. Legislature has used the non obstante clause and specifically provided that the section will have overriding effect on the other provisions in the Act, so that the Authorised Officer is entitled to proceed with confiscation proceedings dehors the other provisions of the Act. Thus the powers under Section 67B are independent of the penal provisions contained in the Abkari Act. Therefore, it is evident that irrespective of whether the accused is prosecuted or not for the offence involved and irrespective of its outcome, in view of the non obstante clause contained in Section 67B, a vehicle involved in an abkari offence is liable for confiscation.” 8. Therefore, it is evident that irrespective of whether the accused is prosecuted or not for the offence involved and irrespective of its outcome, in view of the non obstante clause contained in Section 67B, a vehicle involved in an abkari offence is liable for confiscation.” 8. In Shaiju's case (supra), this Court noticed the decision in Sasidharan v. Forest Range Officer ( 1999 (2) KLT 836 ), wherein a similar provision in the Forest Act, 1961, i.e., Section 61A, has come up for consideration before this Court. In that case, this Court held that the power of confiscation by Forest Officers under Section 61A of the Act is independent of the powers conferred on the Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 52 of the Act. This Court held further that, Section 61A of the Act takes care of only civil liability on the offenders and the Magistrate takes care of criminal liability as well. Paragraphs 12 to 14 of the said decision reads thus: “12. Legislature has also employed the non obstante clause in Section 61A in order to see that Section 61A has overriding effect over other provisions of Chapter VIII. In other words, officers exercising powers under Section 61A may proceed with confiscation proceedings de hors any other provision under that Chapter. Section 61A of the Act is independent of the powers conferred on the Magistrate under Section 52(2) of the Act. Therefore the failure on the part of the Authorised Officer to report the seizure of the vehicle and the timber to the Magistrate authorising him to proceed under Section 52(2) of the Act cannot restrict or take away the power of the Authorised Officer to proceed under Section 61A of the Act. Section 61A of the Act starts with a non obstante clause and therefore as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs v. Satyen Bhowmick (1981) 2 SCC 109 , a non obstante clause has the effect of overriding the provisions of a law or the law in which the said clause is inserted. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76 . Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76 . Therefore it is with that purpose that the Legislature has introduced Sections 61A to F so that a separate and independent forum is given power to safeguard the property confiscated under the Forest Act. 13. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had occasion to come across the scope of similar provisions in the Indian Forest (Maharashtra) Amendment Act, 1984, Act VII of 1985, in Kama Laxman Gawali v. State of Maharashtra 1990 Cri LJ 163. While dealing with the same, the Division Bench held as follows : “The object behind the Amendment Act No. VII of 1985 is to more efficiently curb the ever-increasing exploitation of forest wealth by unscrupulous persons in various ways. Machinery of criminal prosecution and forfeiture contained in the Act was found to be ineffective to stop the menace and hence one more separate and independent forum has been provided for and that is of a forest authority, which in appropriate cases is empowered to order confiscation of property used in the commission of forest offence. Such officer performs quasi judicial function. Procedure for enquiry into the relevant facets is contemplated and the order is subjected to revision or appeal.” The dictum laid down by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court also justifies the introduction of Sections 61A to F by Act 28 of 1975 in our Act so as to effectively prevent illegal transportation of timber belonging to the Government from the Forest. 14. Therefore the contention of counsel for the petitioner that the failure of the Authorised Officer in reporting the matter to the Magistrate has affected jurisdiction of the second respondent to proceed under Section 61A of the Act cannot be accepted. It is always open to the Authorised Officer to report the matter to the Magistrate so that Magistrate could also initiate criminal prosecution. Section 61A takes care of only civil liability of the offenders and the Magistrate takes care of criminal liability as well.” 9. Therefore, in view of the non obstante clause in Section 67B of the Abkari Act, the power of confiscation under Section 67B is independent of the penal provisions contained in the said Act. Section 61A takes care of only civil liability of the offenders and the Magistrate takes care of criminal liability as well.” 9. Therefore, in view of the non obstante clause in Section 67B of the Abkari Act, the power of confiscation under Section 67B is independent of the penal provisions contained in the said Act. The authorised officer is entitled to proceed with confiscation proceedings, dehors the other provisions of the Act, irrespective of whether the accused is prosecuted or not for the offence involved and irrespective of the outcome of such prosecution. The power of an authorised officer under Section 67B is independent of the penal provisions under the Act and an order of confiscation passed by such an officer, by performing a quasi-judicial function, can be challenged in an appeal filed before the Deputy Commissioner of Excise under Section 67E of the Act, within 30 days from the date of communication of the order and the order of the appellate authority under sub-section (2) of Section 67E shall be final subject to the provisions of Section 67F of the Act, which provide for a suo motu revision by the Commissioner of Excise, before the expiry of 30 days from the date of order. In the absence of an appeal filed under Section 67E of the Act, within the time limit stipulated in sub-section (1), the order of confiscation shall attain finality. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that once the petitioner is acquitted by the criminal court by Ext.P1 judgment in S.C.No.427 of 2016, the 3rd respondent has no authority to retain the autorickshaw bearing registration No.KL-05/AL-2026, which has already been confiscated under Section 67B of the Act, vide Ext.P2 order, cannot be sustained. 10. As discernible from Ext.P5 order of the 2nd respondent, a copy of Ext.P2 order of confiscation was served on the petitioner on 30.12.2016. As per Section 67E of the Act, the petitioner, if aggrieved by Ext.P2 order of confiscation, has to file an appeal before the 2nd respondent appellate authority within a period of 30 days. However, the petitioner filed Ext.P3 appeal only on 26.9.2017, much after the expiry of the time limit stipulated in sub-section (1) of Section 67E of the Act. As per Section 67E of the Act, the petitioner, if aggrieved by Ext.P2 order of confiscation, has to file an appeal before the 2nd respondent appellate authority within a period of 30 days. However, the petitioner filed Ext.P3 appeal only on 26.9.2017, much after the expiry of the time limit stipulated in sub-section (1) of Section 67E of the Act. A reading of the affidavit accompanying to Ext.P4 interlocutory application would make it clear that only on his acquittal in S.C.No.427 of 2016 by Ext.P1 judgment dated 28.7.2017, the petitioner thought it necessary to challenge Ext.P2 order of confiscation dated 24.12.2016. The grounds taken in Ext.P3 memorandum of appeal would also make it clear that the petitioner is challenging the order of confiscation on account of his acquittal by Ext.P1 judgment of the Sessions Court. 11. Ext.P4 interlocutory application filed by the petitioner is one filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which deals with extension of prescribed period in certain cases. As per Section 5, any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 12. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ (2013) 10 SCC 765 ], the Apex Court, in the context of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which deals with re-determination of compensation by Collector, held that, as the Land Acquisition Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi judicial authority while making an award, the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply and therefore, the application under Section 28A of the Act has to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 28A. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment reads thus: “13. This Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Mangatu Ram and Ors. ( AIR 1997 SC 2704 ) (supra); and Tota Ram v. State of U.P. and Ors. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment reads thus: “13. This Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Mangatu Ram and Ors. ( AIR 1997 SC 2704 ) (supra); and Tota Ram v. State of U.P. and Ors. (supra), dealt with the issue involved herein and held that as the Land Acquisition Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi judicial authority while making the award, the provisions of the Act 1963 would not apply and, therefore, the application under Section 28A of the Act, has to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 28A of the Act. The said provisions require that an application for redetermination is to be filed within 3 months from the date of the award of the court. The proviso further provides that the period of limitation is to be calculated excluding the date on which the award is made and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award.” 13. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane's case supra, the Apex Court held further that, though the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party, but the court has no choice, but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, 'inconvenience is not' a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 14. In the instant case, Ext.P4 appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 67E of the Act challenging Ext.P2 order of confiscation of the 3rd respondent was filed before the 2nd respondent appellate authority much after the expiry of the time limit of 30 days stipulated in sub-section (1) of Section 67E of the Act. The 2nd respondent appellate authority, which is only a quasi judicial authority, cannot entertain Ext.P3 appeal filed by the petitioner beyond the time limit of 30 days stipulated in subsection (1) of Section 67E of the Act, by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The 2nd respondent appellate authority, which is only a quasi judicial authority, cannot entertain Ext.P3 appeal filed by the petitioner beyond the time limit of 30 days stipulated in subsection (1) of Section 67E of the Act, by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In that view of the matter, no interference is warranted on Ext.P5 order of the 2nd respondent. In the result, this writ petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.