JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. 1. This is an Appeal from Order, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which has been preferred by the Insurance Company, questioning the validity of the award dated 13.03.2013, as rendered by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 423 of 2011, Urba Dutt Bhatt vs. Surendra Kumar and Others. Before the Claim Tribunal, the opposite party no. 1 was the owner of the Motor Cycle No. UK-06S/7304, involved in the accident and the same was ridden by Rajeev Kumar S/o Jai Prakash. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the claimant, i.e. Urba Dutt Bhatt, during the pendency of the Appeal from Order has met with the sad demise and later on the heirs of Urba Dutt Bhatt, have been substituted in the present Appeal from Order. 3. The backdrop leading to the entire controversy of the case is that on 2nd October, 2011, when the claimant was going alongwith one Sopal Singh for discharging his official responsibility from Kahipur to Mandi Samiti Guest House, Udhma Singh Nagar, when he reached near Dhela Bridge, he was dashed down by a motor cycle which was coming from the opposite direction, due to which, he fell down and suffered grievous injuries on his head. The first aid was provided to him and he was taken by the Ambulance to the Government Hospital, Kashipur and was found that his condition was serious. 4. The F.I.R. about the said incident was lodged before the Police Station, Kunda, Udham Singh Nagar, which was registered as F.I.R. No. 114 of 2001, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the I.P.C. On finding the condition of the injured Urba Dutt Bhatt to be grievous, he was referred to the Jeevan Rekha Hospital, Kashipur, where he remained admitted for a considerable long time and, according to the pleadings raised by the claimant before the Court below, a handsome amount of money was spent on the treatment/medicines, in meeting the hospital expenses etc. which, according to its approximate calculation, which has been given by the claimant before the Court below, reached to a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-. which, according to its approximate calculation, which has been given by the claimant before the Court below, reached to a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-. He further submitted that on account of the disability which he as suffered on account of the accident which occurred on 2nd October, 2011, he was rendered handicapped and he was not able to discharge his official responsibility to his optimum capacity, besides that, he has also suffered mental agony and pain due to the accident. When the claim was filed, the injurned was alive later he succumbed to his injuries. 5. The Claim Petition which was preferred by the deceased appellant under Sections 166 and 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act was contested by the respondent No. 1, the owner of the motor cycle, the Insurance Company and the Rider of the vehicle. 6. After the exchange of the pleadings, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal framed as many as four issues to be adjudicated by the Tribunal. 7. After giving an ample opportunity to lead the respective evidence, the learned Tribunal, while deciding issue No. 1 to the effect that as to whether the accident chanced on account of rash and negligent driving of the Rider of the motor cycle, came to the conclusion that the cause of the accident dated 2nd October, 2011, was on account of rash and negligent driving of the Rider. Issue Nos. 2 and 3 were decided together and, thereby, it was held that on the date of the accident, i.e. 2nd October, 2011, the vehicle was insured and was driven with all valid documents and the Rider had a valid driving licence which was existing on the date of accident. 8. Up to this stage, there happens to be no controversy pertaining to the adjudication of the Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3. What is the prime bone of contention, which is being raised in the present Appeal from Order is pertaining to the finding which is recorded on issue No. 4, as to what would be the quantum of compensation which the appellant (now deceased) would be entitled for. 9. 1, 2 and 3. What is the prime bone of contention, which is being raised in the present Appeal from Order is pertaining to the finding which is recorded on issue No. 4, as to what would be the quantum of compensation which the appellant (now deceased) would be entitled for. 9. The learned Tribunal by the impugned judgment, after considering the various evidences brought on record, pertaining to the expenditure incurred for treatment in Government Hospital as well as in Jeevan Rakha Hospital, came to the conclusion that taking into consideration the fact that the appellant (now deceased) who was working in the Judgeship at Udham Singh Nagar as a Process Server and was a permanent employee and he used to draw a salary of Rs. 17,161/- p.m. passed the impugned award dated 13.03.2013. 10. In the findings recorded by the Tribunal while adjudicating issue No. 4, it has been the case of the appellant (now deceased) that on account of his ailment and the period in which he was hospitalized, he was not remitted the salary by his employer. He has further submitted that since as a consequence of the injuries which he has suffered, he has been rendered 100% disabled and has been rendered incapacitated for any future employment, hence, he prayed for an appropriate compensation taking into consideration the income which was accruing to him in the light of the provisions contained under Sections 161 and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 11. The learned Tribunal, after taking into consideration the age of the injured appellant (now deceased), who at the time of accident is reported to be of 56 to 60 years of age and taking into consideration the income which was proved by the documents brought on record, particularly, the salary register, came to the conclusion that there happens to be a 100% disability and the income accruing to the appellant, was Rs. 16,941/- and the Tribunal has applied the multiplier of "9" and, thereby, has calculated the compensation payable to the deceased appellant as to be Rs. 18,29,628/- after including in it, the amount payable under various other heads, as referred in para 27 of the judgment. 16,941/- and the Tribunal has applied the multiplier of "9" and, thereby, has calculated the compensation payable to the deceased appellant as to be Rs. 18,29,628/- after including in it, the amount payable under various other heads, as referred in para 27 of the judgment. The total amount as computed by the Tribunal to be payable by the Insurance Company to the appellant (now deceased) has been arrived at to be 22,90,368/- plus interest @ 6% from the date of the award till its actual payment. 12. Heard Mr. Sarvesh Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Harshit Pant, learned counsel for the respondents/claimants. 13. Precisely, the argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the appellant is threefold: Firstly, he submits that no credence could be placed on the report of 100% disability which was one of the factor taken into consideration for determination of the compensation because of the fact that the medical certificate which has been placed on record in support of the contention, i.e. paper No. 27-Ga, does not repose confidence for the reason the same was issued by an ENT who would not be deemed to be an expert to issue a certificate certifying 100% disability of the claimant/appellant (now deceased). He submits that to attach justification to the injuries and its nature and its impact on the determination of the compensation, the certificate ought to have been issued by an expert. The second limb of argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that no compensation was required to be paid for the reason that after the accident, which has occurred and on account of the death of the claimant/appellant (now deceased), his heirs have been appointed under the dying-in-harness Rules. Thirdly, he submits that the amount of compensation, which has been directed to be paid by the appellant is on a higher side because it includes certain slabs of period for which he had already availed the service benefits while working with the Judgeship, Udham Singh Nagar. What he tries to submit is that the said amount received by way of service benefit for the period he worked is required to be deducted from the total amount awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. What he tries to submit is that the said amount received by way of service benefit for the period he worked is required to be deducted from the total amount awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Lastly, he submits that the multiplier of "9" as awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is contrary to Schedule-II of the Motor Vehicle Act, which according to his argument, it ought to have been at "8." 14. While, dealing with the first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants to the effect as to what impact would the medical certificate have in determining the compensation, when it has not been issued by an expert, when it has not been issued by an expert, I disagree with the argument extended by the learned counsel for the appellant for the reason being, that for the purposes of determining the seriousness of the injuries or its nature, the Motor Vehicles Act itself does not contemplate any specified procedure nor does it provide that a medical examination is mandatorily required to be conducted by an expert Medical Practitioner in co-relation to the nature of the injuries which either the injured or the deceased has suffered. On account of fact that the Motor Vehicles Act does not define the term “Medical Practitioner” hence, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down that in that eventuality, to attach sanctity to a medical certificate issued by the Medical Practitioner in favour of the deceased/or an injured person, the definition of Medical Practitioner as provided under Section 2 (i) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, is to be derived to be to made applicable in the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. 15. In that view of the matter, since the definition of Medical Practitioner as given under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, do not classify the nature of Medical Practitioner who would be entitled to issue a certificate, it would be deemed that an ordinary registered Medical Practitioner would be competent enough to certify the injuries and its nature suffered by the victim. 16. 16. Section 2 (i) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act reads as under:- “Qualified medical practitioner, means any person registered under any (Central Act, Provincial Act or an Act of the Legislature of a State) providing for the maintenance of a register of medical practitioners, or, in any area where no such last-mentioned Act is in force, any person declared by the State Government, by notification in the official Gazette, to be a qualified medical practitioner for the purposes of this Act.” 17. The aforesaid observation and the reasoning are supported by the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Satanand Tripathi and Others, (2008) 73 ALR 696. Para 3 and 4 of the said judgment reads as under: “3. It is pertinent to mention that normally we consider the validity of the certificate to be issued by the office of the Chief Medical Officer of the district, if there is signature of more than one medical practitioners by following the principle plurality causes genuinity. Learned Counsel has shown us a circular letter dated 26.8.1986 to that extent. After going through the same, we find that the same is not needed for consideration for these type of cases, but for some other purposes. Moreover, it is purely an Administrative Order. However, by taking notional value of the order now we have to see whether there is any legal force behind it or not, so that the same may be followed strictly. In this context, we have gone to the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but we do not find any definition of medical practitioner. Again we have gone through the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and found reference is available there. It is pertinent to mention here that such an Act is applicable in the case under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Be that as it may, if there is an application under Section 163A or 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, then at least some clue is available before us to analyse the evidentiary value of the medical certificate. 4. Be that as it may, if there is an application under Section 163A or 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, then at least some clue is available before us to analyse the evidentiary value of the medical certificate. 4. Section 2(i) of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, provides a definition of 'qualified medical practitioner' as follows: “Qualified medical practitioner, means any person registered under any (Central Act, Provincial Act or an Act of the Legislature of a State) providing for the maintenance of a register of medical practitioners, or, in any area where no such last-mentioned Act is in force, any person declared by the State Government, by notification in the official Gazette, to be a qualified medical practitioner for the purposes of this Act.” 18. The learned Tribunal, while considering the veracity of the claim vis-a-vis the medical certificate which has been issued in favour of the claimant has also held that the certificate of 100% disability since has been assessed by the Medical Board, which included in it, registered Medical Practitioners, there cannot be any doubt about the opinion expressed in the certificate issued by the Medical Practitioners. Hence, it was held out that the appellant (now deceased) did suffered 100% disability. 19. Another limb of argument which has been referred above was pertaining to the effect of appointment given under the Dying-in-Harness Rules, apart from the fact that the said appointment being contemplated under an independent provisions of law, it will not eclipse by any proceeding drawn under the Motor Vehicles Act for determining the claim of compensation which is altogether independent to one another. Apart from it, it is admitted case of the appellant (now deceased) that subsequent to the appointment given to one of the heirs of the deceased, he is no more in service as his services have been terminated by the employer. 20. Now, what are left to be considered by this Court are the other two issues which the appellant has tried to impress upon before this Court is that when the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was determining the quantum of compensation, the Tribunal ought to have taken into consideration the fiscal benefits which the claimant has derived while rendering his services before the Judgeship at Udham Singh Nagar. For the said purpose, admittedly, according to his version only, he has given the schedule and statement of benefits which has been derived by the claimant which appellant has computed to be totaling to a sum Rs. 1,16,382/-. This computation of benefit and the preposition as pleaded by the appellant to the effect that the claimant cannot derive the monetary benefit from two sources, i.e. by way of the salary emoluments and also by way of a compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, is not disputed by the respondents. 21. In that view of the matter and in the wider interest that a claimant cannot be permitted to abuse the process and adopt the forum of Motor Accident Claim Tribunal as to be profit oriented forum as it only aims at to commensurate the wrath suffered by the claimant due to ill fated incident and it is not a forum which could be adopted by the claimant to generate profit for himself. I feel that the argument as extended by the learned counsel for the appellant on issue No. 3 deserves to be accepted. 22. Accordingly, the amount of compensation as awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to the tune of Rs. 22,90,368/- is reduced by Rs. 1,16,382/-. Hence, the total amount as payable would be as Rs. 21,73,986/-. 23. Lastly, the issue which centers around is on the fourth limb of argument pertaining to the applicability of the multiplier. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the multiplier of "9" taking into consideration the age of the claimant (now deceased) is on a higher side because the Schedule contemplates an applicability of multiplier of "8" only. 24. In response to this argument, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the multiplier as contemplated under Schedule-II of the Motor Vehicles Act, deals with the multipliers which are payable in the present proceedings which are drawn under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and, hence, since the present proceedings happens to be under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and in the light of the pronouncement as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma and Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the multiplier of "9" as awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, was just and proper. I do not find any error in the applicability of the multiplier by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Hence, I maintain the multiplier of "9" as awarded by the impugned award. 25. Accordingly, the appeal partly succeeds and the amount which the claimant/appellant (now deceased) has derived by way of salary as dealt with while deciding the issue no. 3 is to be deducted from the total amount awarded by the Tribunal. 26. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. No order as to costs.