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2018 DIGILAW 526 (CAL)

Harbans Lal Malhotra & Sons Limited Workmen's Union v. State of West Bengal

2018-07-30

ARINDAM SINHA

body2018
JUDGMENT : ARINDAM SINHA, J. 1. Mr. Soumya Majumder, learned advocate appears on behalf of petitioner union. He submits, claim for relief is consequences of having retrenched union members in spite of appropriate Government having had denied permission to retrench. He refers to order dated 18th August, 2015 passed by the company in which it said, application under section 25N of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 seeking permission for retrenchment of 150 workmen was made on 9th October, 2014. Government did not communicate its order granting or refusing to grant permission by 7th December, 2014 being date on which sixty days from making application expired. Hence, having deemed permission, company went ahead and retrenched. Mr. Majumder then refers to order dated 5th December, 2014 of Government of West Bengal, Office of Labour Commissioner by which permission was unambiguously refused and application rejected. The letter is addressed to Director of the Company. 2. He relies on affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Company to demonstrate from disclosures at pages 25 and 26 therein, order dated 5th December, 2014 of appropriate Government denying permission to retrench was dispatched by India Post at 12.30 PM on 9th December, 2014 being 60th day from date of application made. Track report appearing at page 27 of affidavit-in-opposition confirms the position. He relies on section 4 of Contract Act, 1872 to submit, communication was complete against appropriate Government when it put its denial of permission into course of transmission to the Company so as to be out of its power. So, he submits, the Company in proceeding to retrench members of his client has committed an offence as having had acted contrary to provisions in section 25N. As such, provisions in section 32 become attracted and applicable to the Company. There should be direction accordingly. 3. Mr. Ghosh, learned advocate appears on behalf of the Company. He submits, sub-section (4) in section 25N is what falls for consideration in this case. Said sub-section is reproduced below:- "(4) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government or the specified authority does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days." 4. Fact is on expiration of period of 60 days as on 9th December, 2014 there was no communication made by appropriate Government or specified authority refusing to grant permission to his client to retrench. Definition of when communication is complete against persons given in Contract Act is not applicable since Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a special statute. Based on an order passed without jurisdiction by Civil Court this Court directed continuance of position consequent to such interim order, to continue for a period of three months from date of discharge or variation of order of status quo regarding retrenchment made. Civil Court order was vacated. Yet this overrun of three months became an interim order which petitioners got extended from time to time causing financial impact to his client in being compelled thereby to carrying on paying salaries to retrenched employees. He submits, his client has not committed any offence for attraction or applicability of provisions of section 32. Section 32 provides as follows:- "32. Offence by companies, etc.- Where a person committing an offence under this Act is a company, or other body corporate, or an association of persons (whether incorporated or not), every director, manager, secretary, agent or other officer or person concerned with the management thereof shall, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or consent, be deemed to be guilty of such offence." 5. On reading of the provision this Court finds there is only scope for every accused person concerned with the management of a company to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or consent. That means there has to be a mechanism for finding commission of offence. Petitioners have to resort to initiating proceedings in accordance with law to obtain finding of offence committed by the Company for application of provisions in section 32 and thereafter section 25Q for their remedy. 6. With above observations this writ petition is disposed of. Interim order made is vacated.