JUDGMENT Hon’ble Siddhartha Varma, J.—When the land lady Smt. Champa Devi the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents after determining the tenancy of the petitioner filed a suit being SCC Suit No. 4 of 1978 for arrears of rent and eviction and when the dispute was referred to an Arbitrator an award was passed by him on 6.6.1979. The relevant portion of the award is being reproduced here as under : ^^1- Mk0 vkn'kZ pksiM+k 1 Qjojh 1978 ls 30 twu 1979 rd Jherh pank nsoh dks ,d lkS ipgRrj :0 ¼175½ ekfld fdjk;s ds fglkc ls fdjk;k vnk djsaA 2- 1 tqykbZ lu 1979 ls 31 ekpZ 1980 rd 220@& nks lkS chl :0 ekfld fdjk;s ds fglkc ls fdjk;k nsrs jgsaA 3- blds i'pkr izR;sd o"kZ chl :0 ¼20½ :0 ekfld fdjk;s esa c<+ksRrjh gksrh jgsxh rFkk ;g dke 31 ekpZ 1984 rd pysxk vFkkZr 1 vÁSy 1980 ls 31 ekpZ 1981 rd 240 ekfld fdjk;k gksxk 1 vÁSy 1981 ls 31 ekpZ 1982 rd 260@& ekfld fdjk;k gksxk] 1 vÁSy 1982 ls 31 ekpZ 1983 rd 280@& ekfld fdjk;k gksxk vkSj 1 vÁSy 1983 ls 31 ekpZ 1984 rd 300@& ekfld fdjk;k gksxkA 4- 31 ekpZ 1984 dks ;g fdjk;snkjh lekIr gksxh vkSj mlh fnu Mk0 vkn'kZ pkSiM+k nqdku [kkyh dj nsxsa fdUrq ;fn nksuks i{k vkxs fdjk;snkjh tkjh j[kuk pkgsa rks vkilh le>kSrs ls ,slk dj ldrs gSA^^ 2. In terms of the award a decree was also drawn by the Court on 5.12.1980. When certain amounts as were provided for by the decree were not paid by the petitioner-tenant then Smt. Champa Devi, on 23.4.1982 filed an application for the execution of the decree. In terms of the award a decree was also drawn by the Court on 5.12.1980. When certain amounts as were provided for by the decree were not paid by the petitioner-tenant then Smt. Champa Devi, on 23.4.1982 filed an application for the execution of the decree. The execution application dated 23.4.1982 is being reproduced here as under : U;k;ky; [kyhQk vfr0 flfoy tt xkft;kckn ,l0 lh0 lh0 9@82 Jherh paik nsoh cuke Mk0 vkn'kZ pksiM+k 1- Øekad okn U;k;ky; [kyhQk flfoy tt xkft;kckn okn ua0 123@77 nk;jk 06-12-1977 2- Ukke i{kdkj Jherh paik nsoh iRuh Jh xksfoanjke oekZ fu0 132 ckx HkfV;kjh xkft;kckn &&&&&&&&fMxzhnkj cuke Mk0 vkn'kZ dqekj pksiMk iq= Jh ch-vkj-pksiMk fu0 nqdku ua0 12 xka/kh uxj xkft;kckn ftyk xk0ckn&&enwu 3- fu.kZ; frfFk 10&11&80 4- fMxzh ds f[kykQ dksbZ vihy ifj;kstu th ugha 5- dksbZ lSfud vkifRr Jheku th] en;wu us vadu 4617 :0 fiNys fdjk;s o oklykr ds enns vnk fd;s gSA 6- frfFk vafre btjk; Jhekuth] izFke izkFkZuki= ,Dl 26@81 fnukad 26-03-1982 dks vne ekStwnxh fMxzhnkj [kafMr gqvkA 7- fooj.k fMxzh C;kt lfgr vokMZ 6 lh ifjiq"V fd;k tkrk gSA tks U;k;ky; ds fu;ekuqlkj cuk gSA [kpkZ i{kdkj Lo;a lgu djsaxsA vokMZ 6 lh 1- Mk0 vkn'kZ pksiMk fnukad 01-02-1978 ls 30-06-1979 rd Jherh paik nsoh dks ,d lkS ipgRrj :0 ekfld ds fglkc ls fdjk;k vnk djsaA 2- 01-07-1979 ls 31-03-1980 rd 220 :0 ekfld fdjk;s ds fglkc ls fdjk;k nsrs jgsaA 3- blds i'pkr izR;sd ekl 20 :0 ekfld fdjk;s esa c<+ksRjh gksrh jgsxh rFkk ;g de 31-03-1984 rd pysxkA vFkkZr 01-04-1980 ls 31-03-1981 rd 240 : ekfld fdjk;k gksxkA 01-04-1981 ls 31-03-1982 rd 260 :0 ekfld fdjk;k gksxk vkSj 01-04-1982 rd 280 :0 ekfld fdjk;k gksxk vkSj 01-04-1983 ls 31-03-1984 rd 300 :0 ekfld fdjk;k gksxkA 4- 31-03-1984 ls ;g fdjk;snkjh lekIr gksxh vkSj mlh fnu Mk0 vkn'kZ pksiM+k nqdku [kkyh dj nsaxs fdUrq ;fn nksuks i{k fdjk;snkjh tkjh j[kuk pkgsa rks vkilh le>kSrs ls ,slk dj ldrs gSA 8- okn O;; [kpkZ i{kdkjku Lo;a ogu djsaxsA 9- fdlds fo:) fo:) en;wu [kkrk ua0 2 10- lgk;rk Jhekuth] U;k;ky; }kjk vokMZ 6 lh dUQeZ gqvk rFkk izfroknh en;wu ds vokMZ ds vuqlkj fdjk;k fMØhnkj dks vnk djuk FkkA vFkkZr en;wu dks 01-12-1978 ls 30-06-1979 rd 175 :0 ekgokj ds fglkc ls fdjk;k vnk djuk Fkk o 01-07-1979 ls 31-03-1980 rd 220 :0 ekgokj ds fglkc ls fdjk;k vnk djuk Fkk o 01-04-1980 ls 31-03-1981 rd 240 :0 ekgokj ds fglkc ls fdjk;k vnk djuk Fkk o 01-04-1981 ls 31-03-1982 rd 260 :0 ekgokj ds fglkc ls fdjk;k vnk djuk FkkA fdUrq en;wu us ,slk ugha fd;k gS vkSj fMxzhnkj us iqjkus fdjk;s o oklykr ds enns vadu 4627 :0 tks U;k;ky; esa tek fd;k gS dks mBk;k gS en;wu dh vksj 31-03-1982 rd vadu -------------- cdk;k okftc gd vnk gS og cxSj fxj¶rkjh ds ,d gd Hkh vnk ugha djsxkA vr% izkFkZuk gS fd en;wu ls fuEu eryck ctfj;s fxj¶rkjh o dSn[kkuk olwy djk;k tk;sA fooj.k fdjk;k oklykr 08-07-77 ls 31-11-77 rd 135 :0 ekgokj 620 ^^ ^^ 01-12-77 ls 31-01-78 rd 135 :0 ekgokj 270 ^^ ^^ 01-02-78 ls 30-06-79 rd 175 :0 ekgokj 2975 ^^ ^^ 01-07-79 ls 31-03-80 rd 220 :0 ekgokj 1980 ^^ ^^ 01-04-80 ls 31-03-81 rd 240 :0 ekgokj 2880 ^^ ^^ 01-04-81 ls 31-03-82 rd 260 :0 ekgokj 3120 tek fdjk;k tks Mh0 ,p0 us mBk;k 11845 4837 Ckdk;k 7008 eS Jherh pank nsoh iRuh Jh xksfoan jke oekZ rlnhd djrh gwa fd mijksDr dFku btjk; esjs futh Kku esa lR; gSA rlnhd LFkku xkft;kckn fnukad 23-04-1982 paik nsoh }kjk vkj0 ds0 tSu ,MoksdsV 29-04-1982 3. The petitioner (judgment-debtor) filed an objection against the execution application which was allowed and the revision filed by the respondent-landlord (decree holder) was dismissed. A writ petition being Writ Petition No. 8569 of 1984 was filed in the High Court which was finally decided on 26.9.2003. The operative portion of the order dated 26.9.2003 was as follows : “Accordingly I hold that the judgment and order passed by the revisional Court dated 16.3.1984 and by JSCC dated 23.8.1982 are patently erroneous in law and liable to be quashed. Consequently, the Writ Petition is allowed. Impugned judgement and order are quashed. J.S.C.C., Ghaziabad is directed to proceed with the execution in accordance with law forthwith.” 4. The respondent landlord(decree-holder) on 16.4.2004 moved an amendment application for amending the execution application and prayed for adding of certain reliefs. Consequently, the Writ Petition is allowed. Impugned judgement and order are quashed. J.S.C.C., Ghaziabad is directed to proceed with the execution in accordance with law forthwith.” 4. The respondent landlord(decree-holder) on 16.4.2004 moved an amendment application for amending the execution application and prayed for adding of certain reliefs. They are being reproduced here as under : ^^vr% izkFkZuk gS fd fMØhnkj dks nqdku fookfnr fuEu of.kZr dk fjDr vkf/kiR; ckn csn[kyh en;wu ctfj;s vehu vnkyr fnyk;k tkos vkSj 'ks"k erkyck fMØh fuEu of.kZr vadu 60553@& :0 en;wu ls ctfj;s dqdhZ o uhyke fuEu of.kZr laifRr en;wu vFkok ctfj;s fxjrkjh en;wu olwy djk;k tkos& Hkou la0 125 FkMZ , usg: uxj xkft;kckn dqdhZ o uhyke ryc&iwjc&lM+d if'pe& lfoZl ysu mRrj&Hkou la0 126 ekfyd ,l0 lh0 R;kxh nf{k.k& Hkou la0 124 k'kh dqat 3- ;g fd btjk; izkFkZuki= ds var esa tks 'ks"k eryck fMØh dk fooj.k fn;k x;k gS mlds var esa fy[ks 'kCn o jkf'k tek fdjk;k tks Mh0,p0 us mBk;k & 4837@& cdk;k 7008@& dks dye tn fd;k tkdj fuEu ys[k o rkfydk fy[kh tkos %& fdjk;k cklykr 01-04-1982 ls 31-03-1982 rd :0 280 izfrekg 3360 fdjk;k cklykr 01-04-183 ls 31-03-1984 rd :0 300 izfrekg 75600 ;ksx 90805 tek fdjk;k tks fMØhnkj us mBk;k 4837+25515 & 30352 'ks"k 31-03-2004 rd 60553 4- ;g fd btjk; izkFkZuki= ds var esa fooj.k erkyck mijksDr ds i'pkr nqdku fookfnr dk fooj.k fuEu izdkj ls rgjhj fd;k tk;s& fooj.k o prZqlhek nqdku fookfnr n[ky ryc la0 12 fLFkr u;k xka/kh uxj xkft;kckn%& iwjc& dejk fMØhnkj if'pe&lM+d ljdkjh mRrj &thuk fMØhnkj nf{k.k & [kkyh IykV c'kDy MsjhA uksV & fnukad 01-04-2004 ls nqdku fookfnr dk dCtk izkIr gksus dh frfFk rd ds oklykr dh cqy;kch ds fy;s fMØhnkj ckn esa dk;Zokgh djsxkA vr% izkFkZuk gS fd fMØhnkj dks izkFkZuki= btjkt esa mDr la'kks/ku djus dh vkKk iznku djus dh d`ik djsaA fMdzhnkj paik nsoh eSa fd paik nsoh fMdzhnkj izekf.kr djrh gwa }kjk Jh vk0ih0 feRry fd bl izkFkZuki= dk leLr ys[k esjs Kku ,MoksdsV o Jh uohu feRry esa lR; gSaA izekf.kr LFkku xkft;kckn fnukad 16-04-2004^^ 5. On 20.8.2004, the amendment application was allowed by the Executing Court. The allowing of the amendment application resulted in the filing of a revision by the applicant which was dismissed on 29.9.2004. On 20.8.2004, the amendment application was allowed by the Executing Court. The allowing of the amendment application resulted in the filing of a revision by the applicant which was dismissed on 29.9.2004. The writ petition being Writ Petition No. 44109 of 2004 which was filed against the order allowing the amendment application and the revisional order confirming the amendment order was dismissed on 14.5.2007. Even though there were certain adverse observations in the order of the High Court, the sum and substance was that the amendment to the execution application was sustained and the petitioner was now to avail the opportunity to challenge the execution application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petitioner filed his objection under Section 47 which was numbered as 110 of 2004. This objection was rejected by the executing Court on 18.12.2009. The civil revision which was filed against it and was numbered as 13 of 2010 was also dismissed on 28.1.2010. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner has approached this Court. 6. Sri V.K. Singh, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Swapnil Kumar made the followings submissions : I. The execution application which was filed on 23.4.1982 was only to the effect that rent which was payable by the tenant and was not being paid by him be taken from him. The amendment application which was filed on 16.4.2004 and was allowed on 20.4.2004 would date back to the initial date when the Execution Application was filed. It would be presumed that the execution application with the amended relief, therefore, was filed on 23.4.1982. Learned counsel further submits that on the other hand if it was taken that the execution application was filed on 20.8.2004 i.e. the day when the amendment application was filed then the decree dated 5.12.1980 could not be executed as it would be barred by limitation. II. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on 23.4.1982, the landlord could not get the relief of eviction as eviction was permitted by the award dated 6.6.1979, only after 31.3.1984. If because of the amendment, the Execution Application was taken to have been filed on 16.4.2004 then the execution of a decree dated 5.12.1980 which was always very well known to the landlord respondents could not be pressed after 12 years of the passing of the decree. If because of the amendment, the Execution Application was taken to have been filed on 16.4.2004 then the execution of a decree dated 5.12.1980 which was always very well known to the landlord respondents could not be pressed after 12 years of the passing of the decree. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed before the Court Article 136 of the schedule provided in the Limitation Act. It is, therefore, being reproduced here as under : He also relied on a judgement in Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh and others, 1996 (2) AWC 724 and read out paragraphs No. 5 and 6 of that decision. They are, therefore, being reproduced here as under : “5. We find no force in the contention of the appellant. No doubt, the amendment of the plaint is normally granted and only in exceptional cases where the accrued rights are taken away by amendment of the pleading, the Court would refuse the amendment. This Court in Laxmidas Dahyabhai Kabarwala v. Nunabhai Chunilal Kabarwal, (l964) 2 SCR 567 at 582 held thus: “It is, no doubt, true that, save in exceptional cases, leave to amend under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code will ordinarily be refused when the effect of the amendment would be to take away from a party a legal right which had accrued to him by lapse of time. But this rule can apply only when either fresh allegations added or fresh reliefs sought by way of amendment. Where, for instance, an amendment is sought which merely clarifies an existing pleading and does not in substance add to or alter it, it has never been held that the question of a bar of limitation is one of the questions to be considered in allowing such clarification of a matter already contained in the original pleading. The present is a fortiori so. The defendants here were not seeking to add any allegation nor to claim any fresh relief which they had prayed for in the pleading already filed.” 6. In that case, this Court considered the cross-objections to be treated as a cross suit since no alteration was being made in the written statement to treat it as a plaint originally instituted. The defendants here were not seeking to add any allegation nor to claim any fresh relief which they had prayed for in the pleading already filed.” 6. In that case, this Court considered the cross-objections to be treated as a cross suit since no alteration was being made in the written statement to treat it as a plaint originally instituted. The amendment which was sought to be made was treated to be clarificatory and, therefore, this Court had upheld the amendment of the written statement and treated it to be a cross suit. The ratio therein squarely applies to a fact situation where the party acquires right by bar of limitation and if the same is sought to be taken away by amendment of the pleading, amendment in such circumstances would be refused. In the present case, the gift deed was executed and registered as early as July 28, 1978 which is a notice to everyone. Even after filing of the written statement, for 3 years no steps were taken to file the application for amendment of the plaint. Thereby the occurred right in favour of the respondents would be defeated by permitting amendment of the plaint. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to grant permission to amend the plaint.” His submission, therefore, is that the execution of a decree dated 5.12.1980 for the eviction of the tenant/defendant/petitioner could not be permitted in the year 2004. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that if any proceedings were being pursued by the landlord in the High Court in writ petitions then the time they had spent in the High Court would not be deducted for giving benefit to the landlord while calculating the limitation for filing an Execution Application. He cited a Full Bench decision in Udai Bhan Singh and others v. The Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, AIR 1974 A 202, to bolster his submission and submitted that a writ petition was not a continuation of the original proceedings but were independent of them. Since the learned counsel read out a certain portion of the judgement. The same is being reproduced here as under : “Since proceedings in a writ petition are independent of the original proceedings and not a continuation thereof, it cannot be held that the suit or proceeding giving rise to a writ is pending before the High Court. Since the learned counsel read out a certain portion of the judgement. The same is being reproduced here as under : “Since proceedings in a writ petition are independent of the original proceedings and not a continuation thereof, it cannot be held that the suit or proceeding giving rise to a writ is pending before the High Court. The High Court is not in a position in a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution to render a definitive judgment deciding the questions that were in issue in the suit or proceeding. The fact that a petition under Article 226 puts in jeopardy the orders or decrees passed in a suit or proceeding provides no conclusive test for holding that the suit or proceeding is pending in the High Court till the decision of the writ petition. A suit for cancellation of a decree in another suit on allegation of its having been obtained by fraud does jeopardise the decree but it would be idle to contend that during the pendency of such a suit the suit in which the decree, the cancellation of which is sought, was passed also becomes pending. This is so, for the simple reason that in the subsequent suit the matters that were in issue in the earlier suit cannot be adjudicated upon. Similarly though a writ petition puts in jeopardy the orders or decrees impugned, since the High Court is not in a position in the writ to decide the matters in issue in the suit or proceeding giving rise to it the suit or proceeding cannot be considered to be pending till the decision of the writ.” In the instant case he submits that when the amendment was allowed and a new relief was being brought in by it then a clear bar of limitation would be there. The executing Court should have seen that the decree was, therefore, in-executable. He submits that definitely no fresh execution was filed within the time prescribed. The petitioners further submitted that as per the Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the application which was filed after the prescribed period of limitation had to be dismissed. The executing Court should have seen that the decree was, therefore, in-executable. He submits that definitely no fresh execution was filed within the time prescribed. The petitioners further submitted that as per the Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the application which was filed after the prescribed period of limitation had to be dismissed. Since Section 3 was read out by the learned counsel the same is being reproduced here as under : Section 3.—Bar of limitation—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (2) For the purpose of this Act,— (a) A suit is instituted,— (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; (ii) in the case of pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the Court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator; (b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter-claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted— (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter-claim, on the date on which the counter-claim is made in Court; (c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that Court III. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that as per the award only after 31.3.1984 either the petitioner had to vacate the shop in question or the shop was to remain in possession of the petitioner if the landlord of the petitioner/tenant agreed that the petitioner could continue. IV. Learned counsel submitted that after 31.3.1984, the respondents/landlords accepted the rent sent by money orders and thus, the landlord by his conduct waived his right to get the eviction of the tenant. IV. Learned counsel submitted that after 31.3.1984, the respondents/landlords accepted the rent sent by money orders and thus, the landlord by his conduct waived his right to get the eviction of the tenant. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after 31.3.1984 when the rent was accepted by the respondent tenant then it would be deemed that the petitioners entered into a fresh tenancy agreement with the landlord and thus to terminate the same a fresh notice had to be served on the tenant. V. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that whether the landlord tenant intended to treat the lease as subsisting or intended to enter into a fresh agreement of tenancy was essentially a question of fact and thus had to be deciphered from the conduct of the landlord. He further submits that when the landlord continued to take the rent there was absolutely no doubt that the landlord intended to continue with the tenancy and, thus, as per the award/decree there was a fresh agreement between the parties to continue with the tenancy. Learned counsel placed reliance on Shri Gandhi Ashram, Meerut v. Ram Gupta, 1983 ALJ 300; Shyam Lal v. Murlidhar, 1971 ALJ 476; Smt. A.L. Bose v. Syed Nayyar Abbas, AIR 1967 Allahabad 209; Adyanath Ghatak v. Krishna Prasad Singh and another, AIR 1949 Privy Council 124 (FB) and Sudhir Kumar and others v. Baldev Krishna Thapar and others, 1969 (3) SCC 611 . VI. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that before the executing Court, the affidavit of one Darshan Singh s/o Late Teza Singh was also filed who therein had stated before the Court that the parties intended to continue with the tenancy. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that this affidavit was never rebutted and, therefore, had to be believed. 7. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents, Sri Rahul Jain, however, submitted that : I. Acceptance of rent would not mean that the landlord had waived her right to execute the decree and that she had agreed to the creation of a fresh tenancy. 7. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents, Sri Rahul Jain, however, submitted that : I. Acceptance of rent would not mean that the landlord had waived her right to execute the decree and that she had agreed to the creation of a fresh tenancy. He submitted that in view of the judgement in Sarup Singh Gupta v. S. Jagdish Singh and others, AIR 2006 SC 1734 and in Union of India and another v. Sudarshan Lal Talwar, AIR 2002 A 212, the acceptance of rent would not amount to a waiver of the right to get the decree executed and, therefore, submitted that in the instant case if the respondents had accepted the rent, which she had taken under protest, would not mean that the parties had agreed to continue with the tenancy. Or even that a fresh tenancy had come into existence. II. The decree would not become in-executable because the petitioner was all the time dragging the respondents to the High Court by filing one writ petition or the other and, therefore, the time which was spent contesting the writ petitions in the High Court would be excluded when the period of limitation was to be calculated for the purpose of seeing if the execution application was filed within the limitation prescribed. Further, learned counsel contended that execution would be deemed to have commenced only on 26.9.2003 when the writ petition filed against the execution orders was allowed III. The simple filing an affidavit by the petitioner Darshan Singh would not be of any effect. Darshan Singh was to be cross-examined by the landlord and denial of an opportunity to cross-examine Darshan Singh would result in the violation of the rights of the landlord as has been enunciated in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharastra and others, AIR 2013 SC 58 . 8. Learned counsel further submitted that the scope of interference of this Court under the Article 227 was very limited and it cannot act like an Appellate Court and re-appreciate evidence. 9. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that as per the decree drawn on 5.12.1980, the petitioner could have been asked to vacate on or after 31.3.1984. The execution of the decree could have been enforced had the execution application been filed within 12 years of the passing of the decree. 9. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that as per the decree drawn on 5.12.1980, the petitioner could have been asked to vacate on or after 31.3.1984. The execution of the decree could have been enforced had the execution application been filed within 12 years of the passing of the decree. This not having been done, the execution obviously was barred by limitation. The execution application filed on 23.4.1982 had no prayer for evicting the tenants and it also could not have that prayer as the award had allowed eviction only on or after 31.3.1984. Thereafter the execution was possible till 12 years after 31.3.1984. In the instant case, the execution was sought of the decree after almost 20 years. If the amendment sought was to date back to 24.3.1982 then it can safely be said that on that date there was no relief granted for eviction. If, however, it is taken that it was filed on 16.4.2004 then on that date the application for execution was barred by limitation by almost eight years. The argument that the landlord could not file the amendment as the objections of the tenants against the execution had been allowed and it was contesting those orders in the High Court is also untenable. A writ petition was not a continuation of the execution application. It was only adjudicating on the orders which were passed therein. The execution application could very well have been amended within the limitation provided. 10. Under such circumstances, the execution cannot continue. The orders passed on the objection of the petitioners dated 18.12.2009 and 28.1.2010 are quashed and it shall be deemed that the objections of the petitioner regarding the execution being barred by limitation were allowed. In any view of the matter since the execution application was filed beyond the limitation prescribed it had to be dismissed as per the provisions of the Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 11. Since the writ petition is being allowed on the question of limitation, I do not propose to give any finding on the question as to whether tenancy was renewed by the parties after 31.3.1984. Also as this application is being allowed on a pure question of law and no finding of fact is being interfered with, I also hold that this application under Article 227 is definitely maintainable. 12. Also as this application is being allowed on a pure question of law and no finding of fact is being interfered with, I also hold that this application under Article 227 is definitely maintainable. 12. The application, therefore, stands allowed.