JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J —This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) , Court No. 1, Nurpur, on 30.11.2017, whereby she dismissed the application filed by the petitioner for leading additional evidence. 2. The grounds on which the application had been filed was that Shri S. R. Chaudhary, Advocate, who had drafted the Will was necessary witness to be examined for the just and proper adjudication of the case and it was due to inadvertence, the counsel of the petitioner/defendant could not examine the witness at the time when he led evidence. 3. This application was resisted by the respondents by filing reply wherein preliminary objection regarding maintainability was raised. On merit, it was admitted that the Will in question had been drafted by Shri S.R. Chaudhary, Advocate, but that fact was very much in the knowledge of the petitioner/defendant as also his counsel and, therefore, the application at such a highly belated stage was not maintainable. 4. The learned Court below rejected the application by recording following reasons:- "Quite apparently, there is no doubt to the fact that the present case is fixed for arguments since 29.05.2013 and the present application has been filed after a lapse of more than four years. It is very strange fact to put to the court that due to inadvertence the alleged important witness to the Will could not be examined. No reason and no explanation whatsoever, much less sufficient ground has come forth which could entitle the plaintiff/defendant to lead additional evidence at such later stage. There is no explanation why the said witness was not examined when the defendant was leading his evidence and now at this stage, the defendant could not be permitted to fill up lacuna in his case by way of additional evidence, especially when the present case pertains to the year 2007. For the forgoing reasons, I do not find any merit in allowing the application. Accordingly, present application is dismissed. Application stands disposed of. It be tagged with the main case file after due completion and registration. Put up for arguments on 13.12.2017." 5. For the forgoing reasons, I do not find any merit in allowing the application. Accordingly, present application is dismissed. Application stands disposed of. It be tagged with the main case file after due completion and registration. Put up for arguments on 13.12.2017." 5. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order, impugned herein, cannot withstand judicial scrutiny, more particularly, in view of the fact that the petitioner cannot be made to suffer on account of lapse or shortcoming on the part of his counsel and the learned Court should have shown magnanimity and should have been gracious enough to allow the application after all "Every trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest. Truth alone has to be the foundation of justice. The entire judicial system has been created only to discern and found out the real truth." I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record. 6. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and with circumspection that too in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. 7. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee , (1953) AIR(Supreme Court) 58, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere." 8. In Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another , (1954) AIR(Supreme Court) 215, a Constitution Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court has examined the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution and observed as under:- "This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. V. Sukumar Mukherjee , (1951) AIR(Cal) 193 to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors." 9. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquim and others , (1984) AIR(Supreme Court) 38, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the High Court has very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution and even errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review while exercising such power. The powers can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. It was further held that High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of Tribunal etc. has resulted in grave injustice. 10. In Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Chughu , (1963) AIR(Supreme Court) 1895, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, finding of facts recorded by Authority should have found to be perverse or patently erroneous and de hors factual and legal position on record. 11. In Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni and others , (1998) 3 SCC 341 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set the conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could have ever reached them. 12. Similar reiteration can be found in Chandra Bhushan v. Beni Prasad and others , (1999) 1 SCC 70 ; Savitrabai Bhausaheb and others v. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja , (1999) 2 SCC 171 ; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. V. Dyes and Chemical Workers Union and another , (1999) 2 SCC 143 . 13. In Union of India and others v. Himmat Singh Chahar , (1999) 4 SCC 521 , wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter conclusion reached by Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 14. It should not alter conclusion reached by Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 14. In Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd. , (1999) 6 SCC 82 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that there is no justification for High Court to substitute its view for the opinion of Authorities/Courts below as the same is not permissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 15. In Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotiri v. Bhaskar Balwant Aheer , (2000) AIR(Supreme Court) 931, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not appellate but supervisory. It cannot interfere with the finding of facts recorded by Courts below unless there is no evidence to support findings or findings are totally perverse. 16. In Union of India v. Rajendra Prabhu , (2001) 4 SCC 472 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that High Court in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot re-appreciate evidence nor it can substitute its subjective opinion in place of findings of Authorities below. 17. In Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil , (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed that powers of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that wheel of justice does not come to a halt and fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in functioning of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. 18. Similar reiteration can be also found in Kokkanda B. Poondacha and others v. K.D. Ganapathi and another , (2011) AIR(Supreme Court) 1353, and Bandaru Satyanarayana v. Imandi Anasuya , (2011) 12 SCC 650. 19. In Abdul Razak (D) through Lrs. And others v. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle and others , (2010) 2 SCC 432 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court reminded that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227, High Courts should not act as if they are exercising an appellate jurisdiction. 20. In Commandant, 22nd Battalion, CRPF and others v. Surinder Kumar , (2011) 10 SCC 244 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court reiterated that only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Article 226 or 227. 21. 20. In Commandant, 22nd Battalion, CRPF and others v. Surinder Kumar , (2011) 10 SCC 244 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court reiterated that only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Article 226 or 227. 21. From the aforesaid conspectuous of law, it can conveniently be held that the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bound of the jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby the High Court may step into exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. The supervisory jurisdiction is not available to correct mere errors of fact or law unless the following requirement is satisfied:- (i) The error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on ignorance or utter disregard to the provisions of law, and to grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (ii) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscious of the High Court dictates which too act lest gross failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned. 22. Having set out the legal parameters for exercise of jurisdiction, it would be necessary to advert to the facts of the case. 23. Admittedly, the petitioner had closed his evidence on 29.08.2012 and ever since thereafter the case is being listed for arguments and even within four years the petitioner did not choose to move an application for additional evidence. No doubt, in matters of instant kind the Courts normally are required to adopt liberal and not pedantic approach, but then at the same time these matters have to be dealt with in a rational commonsense, pragmatic manner and the Court is required to see whether there are lack of bonafides imputable to a party. It has also to take into consideration the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence while approaching the Court. It has also to take into consideration the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence while approaching the Court. It has further to be ensured that the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed the totally unfettered free play and lackadaisical propensity to exhibit in nonchalant manner and the same is required to be curbed, of course, within the legal parameters. 24. It is then vehemently argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner cannot be made to suffer on account of any negligence on the part of his counsel in moving application and strong reliance in support of this proposition is placed on the judgment rendered by Hon''ble Rajasthan High Court in Lrs. of late Keshar Devi & ors vs. Smt. Vajeera , (2014) 2 WLN(Raj) 257, wherein it was observed: "It is settled principle of law that for the lapse on the part of counsel, the litigant should not be made to suffer." 25. Shri Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents would vehemently argue that there has been no lapse on the part of the counsel, as admittedly herein as many as four counsels from time to time have been engaged by the petitioner and, therefore, the ratio laid down in aforesaid judgment is clearly not applicable to the facts of the present case. He would further argue that the application as moved by the petitioner is nothing but an after thought, wherein a clear attempt is being made to fill in the lacuna in the case and the same, therefore, cannot be permitted. 26. Strong reliance in support of this submission is placed upon the following judgments:- (i) Mahesh Kumar & Anr. vs. Radha Devi & Anr, 2013 2 CCC 380 (H.P.) . (ii) Atma Singh & Anr. vs. Bhupinderpal Singh & Ors , (2011) 2 CivCC 319 (P&H) . (iii) Mukesh Gulati vs. Suraj Prakash Chauhan & Ors , (2015) 225 D.L.T 7 . 27. At the outset, it may be observed that there is no general principle saving the parties from the mistakes of their counsel, if there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or his counsel, there is no reason why the application of the instant kind should be allowed. 27. At the outset, it may be observed that there is no general principle saving the parties from the mistakes of their counsel, if there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or his counsel, there is no reason why the application of the instant kind should be allowed. Each case has to be considered on the particularity or peculiarity of its own special facts. 28. In Mata Din vs. A. Narayan , (1970) AIR(Supreme Court) 1953, the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed that: "There is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient ground for condoning delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely advice to cover an ulterior purpose." 29. Confronted with this, the learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and cannot take away the residuary power of the judges to act ex debito justitiae, but what appears to be ignored is that this Court has further qualified that this principle would be applicable only where otherwise it has found to be wholly inequitable, while this is not the fact situation obtaining in the instant case where indisputably the evidence of the petitioner stands closed as far as back on 29.08.2012 and since 29.05.2013 the case is being listed for arguments. 30. In view of the aforesaid discussion and forgoing reasons, I find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.