JUDGMENT : 1. This is a review petition seeking review of judgment and order dated 16.08.2013 passed in arbitration application no.8 of 2009. 2. With a view to understand the controversy in light of which the present review petition has been filed, it is necessary to give in brief the material facts. 3. Arbitration application no. 8 of 2009 came to be preferred by the petitioner before a coordinate Bench of this Court under Section 11 of the Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997, with a prayer that same be disposed of by appointing an arbitrator in the matter. 4. A preliminary objection was raised in those proceedings regarding jurisdiction on account of a clause in the agreement dated 15.09.2008 according to which only the courts at Delhi would have the territorial jurisdiction and that consequently the jurisdiction of the courts at Srinagar had been ousted. 5. According to the facts as were noticed by the court in those proceedings, a tender was issued by IRCON International Limited, respondent herein, on 30.05.2008 at New Delhi. In pursuance to the notice, the petitioner applied and his tender was accepted at New Delhi on 15th September, 2008. The court noticed that the allotment letter signed by the General Manager was also signed at New Delhi. A copy of the allotment letter was endorsed to the petitioner at Srinagar. Even the tender document in original was sent for execution in agreement between the parties. An amount of Rs. 2.17 lakhs as earnest money was also deposited by the petitioner with his application for allotment of tender at New Delhi although the agreement was executed at Srinagar on 15.09.2008 itself. 6. Clause 51 of the General Conditions of the contract executed between the parties envisaged as under: - “Courts jurisdiction In case of any disputes/differences between contractor and IRCON, the jurisdiction shall be of Delhi Courts only.” 7. It was in the light of the aforementioned clause in the General Conditions of contract that counsel for the respondents had raised a dispute with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 8. On behalf of the respondents, it was urged before the Court that if two courts had jurisdiction, the parties could agree that the territorial jurisdiction in case of disputes would be confined to any one such court. 9. 8. On behalf of the respondents, it was urged before the Court that if two courts had jurisdiction, the parties could agree that the territorial jurisdiction in case of disputes would be confined to any one such court. 9. Counsel for the petitioner appearing before the court in those proceedings placed reliance upon A. B. C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another v. A. P. Agencies : AIR 1989 SC 1239 to bring home the point that courts at Delhi would not have jurisdiction at all inasmuch as merely making an offer which emanates from a particular place could not be regarded as a part of cause of action unless it was duly accepted by the otherside. Reliance was also placed upon the Apex Court judgment rendered in the case of Globe Transport Corporation v. Triveni Engineering Works and another : (1983) 4 SCC 707 . 10. The court, however, dismissed the arbitration petition filed by the petitioner on the ground that a part of cause of action had accrued at Delhi and, therefore, assuming that courts at Srinagar did have the jurisdiction, since a part of cause of action had also accrued at Delhi and since parties had agreed in terms of clause 51 that courts at Delhi would have jurisdiction, hence the courts at Srinagar had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Reliance in this regard was placed by the court on the Apex Court judgments rendered in Rajasthan High Court Advocates’ Association v. Union of India and others : (2001) 2 SCC 294 , wherein in paragraph 17, the court held: - “17. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially-settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in cause of action. Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in cause of action. It has to be left to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises……..” 11. While applying the ratio of the judgment in the case supra to the facts of the case before it, the court proceeded on the premise that the courts at Delhi did have the jurisdiction inasmuch as a part of cause of action had accrued at Delhi because of the following circumstances: - (a) That the petitioner had applied to the respondents at New Delhi and deposited a sum of Rs.2.5 lakhs at New Delhi. (b) The letter of allotment dated 15.09.2008 accepting the offer by declaring the petitioner as successful was issued at New Delhi. (c) The allotment of the tender was finalized at New Delhi notwithstanding the fact that agreement was executed at Srinagar on 15.09.2008. 12. Keeping in view the aforementioned facts, the court proceeded to hold that reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner on A. B. C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another v. A. P. Agencies and Globe Transport Corporation v. Triveni Engineering Works and another (supra) would not have any application to the facts of the present case and consequently the petition was dismissed. 13. In the present review petition, Mr R. A. Jan, learned senior counsel urged that the view taken by the court in its judgment and order dated 16.08.2013 of which the review is sought was per incuriam. It was stated that the court had erred in holding that the courts at Delhi did have the jurisdiction inasmuch as the part of action has accrued at Delhi for the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph, was a view which was totally erroneous in law. It was stated that reference to paragraph 15 of the judgment in A. B. C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another v. A. P. Agencies (supra) which is reproduced as under: “15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. It was stated that reference to paragraph 15 of the judgment in A. B. C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another v. A. P. Agencies (supra) which is reproduced as under: “15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the contract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the law of contract. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have (been) performed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits for agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of action arises where money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is pleaded as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to the Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to be invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears. In cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is pleaded as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to the Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to be invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears. The above are some of the connecting factors.” It was urged that Apex Court in so many words and in particular reference to a suit involving damages for breach of contract held that cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the suit could either be filed either at the place where contract was executed or at the place where it was performed where breach occurred. 14. Heard counsel for the parties. 15. The scope of powers exercisable by a court in its review jurisdiction is no longer res integra. 16. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372 , the Apex Court held as under: “………What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.” 17. The above position of law was reiterated in the case reported as Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others, (1997) 8 SCC 715 , by holding as under: “Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. The above position of law was reiterated in the case reported as Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others, (1997) 8 SCC 715 , by holding as under: “Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise” 18. In Board of Control for Cricket, India and another v. Netaji Cricket Club and others, AIR 2005 SC 592 , the Apex Court in paragraphs 89 and 90 of the judgment, held as under:- “89. Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. 90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefore. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words ‘sufficient reason’ in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an Advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine “actus curiae neminem gravabit”. 19. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others, (2013) 8 SCC 320 , while dealing with the issue, the Apex Court detailed the grounds on which a review is maintainable and otherwise. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine “actus curiae neminem gravabit”. 19. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others, (2013) 8 SCC 320 , while dealing with the issue, the Apex Court detailed the grounds on which a review is maintainable and otherwise. In paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment, it was held as under:- “19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties RPPIL No.43/2014 Page 6 of 7 are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the principles 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1992 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 , to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., (2013) 8 SCC 337 . 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but les only for patent error. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but les only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground of review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 20. Again in N.Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria & Ors, (2013)15 SCC 534, the Apex Court held as under:- “A careful look at the impugned order would show that the High Court had a fresh look at the question whether the appellant could be impleaded in the suit filed by the respondent No.1 and, in the light of the view which it took, it recalled its earlier order dated 08.06.2011. The course followed by the High Court is clearly flawed. The High Court exceeded its review jurisdiction by reconsidering the merits of the order dated 08.06.2011. The review jurisdiction is extremely limited and unless there is mistake apparent on the face of the record, the order/judgment does not call for review. The mistake apparent on record means that the mistake is self evident, needs no search and stares at its face. Surely, review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on merits.” 21. Keeping in view the ratio of the aforementioned judgments and applying the same to the facts of the present case, it can be seen that all the judgments relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel in this review petition have already been dealt with in the judgment and order review of which is sought in the present petition. As held in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., (supra) review petition would not be maintainable on the basis of repeated reliance upon judgments relied upon which stood overruled. As held in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., (supra) review petition would not be maintainable on the basis of repeated reliance upon judgments relied upon which stood overruled. Review in the present form, therefore, operates as an appeal in disguise which is not permissible in law. 22. For the reasons mentioned above, the review is found without merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.