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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 539 (MP)

Jai Narayan Das v. Chhotelal

2018-06-18

SHEEL NAGU

body2018
ORDER 1. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is invoked to assail the intermediate order passed on 4.2.2016 in Civil Suit No. 28A/2015 allowing the application under Order 1 rule 10 CPC preferred by Munnilal and Bhagirath respondents No. 2 and 3 herein by recording a finding that in a suit for eviction the said two persons who are in possession of the suit property are necessary party, thereby compelling the plaintiff to approach this Court. 2. The plaintiff/petitioner preferred a suit for eviction for arrears of rent against the defendant/respondent No. 1, claiming to be owner of the suit property. During pendency of the said suit, an application under Order I rule 10 read with section 151 of CPC was preferred by respondents No. 2 and 3 herein denying the ownership of the plaintiff and claiming impleadment in the suit as party on the strength of being in possession of the suit property since time immemorial. 3. The learned trial Judge, based on the claim of respondents No. 2 and 3 of being in possession of the suit property since long and relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Nemichand Jain v. Ram Baboo [ 1995 (1) MPWN 47 ] allowed the said application and directed impleadment of respondents No. 2 and 3 as defendants. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the factum of ownership is inconsequential in a suit between landlord and tenant. It is further submitted that it is settled principle of law that in a landlord- tenant dispute a landlord even if he is not the owner can legitimately institute and prosecute a suit against the tenant. Every landlord need not be an owner, but every owner is certainly a landlord. 5. The trial Court under Order I rule 10 (2) is vested with discretion to, inter alia, add parties whose presence before the court is necessary to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. Thus, the provision vests discretion upon the trial court to add parties which is required to be exercised for achieving the object as mentioned above. The object is to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate the issue involved in the suit. Thus, the provision vests discretion upon the trial court to add parties which is required to be exercised for achieving the object as mentioned above. The object is to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate the issue involved in the suit. To achieve the said object, it is mandatory on one hand to implead the necessary party without whom adjudication cannot take place but also on the other hand to implead such proper parties who can be instrumental in effectively and completely adjudicating all questions/issues involved in the suit. In a suit for eviction between landlord and tenant, ordinarily, the concept of possession assumes relevance and dominance over the issue of ownership. Thus, the trial Court is vested with wide discretion to implead even such parties who may not be necessary parties but whose impleadment appear to be necessary for complete and effective answering of all the questions/issues involved. This judicial discretion vested in every trial Court cannot be exhaustively defined. There is no straight-jacket formula where any particular kind of proper party is necessarily required to be impleaded. There may be occasions where the trial Court is of the view that a particular party may not be a necessary party or for that matters may not even be a proper party, but still the trial Court may consider it proper to implead such party to achieve the ultimate object of effective and complete answering of all the questions/issues involved in the suit. Thus, a very large and wide discretion is available to the trial Court which ought not to be curtailed, lest situation may arise where the trial Courts despite finding a particular party necessary to be impleaded, is left helpless, thereby failing to achieve the ultimate object of effective and complete answering of questions and issues involved. This, in the considered opinion of this Court is the best way to scrutinize an order passed under Order I rule 10 CPC. 6. In the limited supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, I find that the view taken by the learned trial Judge is a plausible and possible one which could have been taken. Moreso, there is no prejudice shown to be caused to the plaintiff/petitioner herein. 7. In view of above, this Court declines interference as the trial Court while passing the impugned order has not transgressed any of its jurisdictional limits set by law. 8. Moreso, there is no prejudice shown to be caused to the plaintiff/petitioner herein. 7. In view of above, this Court declines interference as the trial Court while passing the impugned order has not transgressed any of its jurisdictional limits set by law. 8. Consequently, the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution deserves to be and is hereby dismissed and the order of stay passed by this court automatically stands vacated. 9. Registry is directed to communicate this order to the trial Court.