ORDER Rajesh Shankar, J. - The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the award dated 07.02.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Ref. Case No. 43/2010 whereby the reference has been answered in favour of the workman, holding that the dismissal of the workman was not legal and the concerned workman is entitled for reinstatement in service with 50% back wages. 2. The factual background of the case is that one Shyamlal B.P was appointed on 20.11.1974 as casual worker in Tapin South Colliery. A charge sheet was served upon the workman on 08.02.1999, alleging that Shyamlal B.P died on 19.07.1976 and in his place, the concerned workman started working by impersonating himself as Shyamlal B.P. and thereby committed fraud. A domestic enquiry was initiated against him and ultimately he was dismissed from service. The workman raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. The term of reference was as to whether the action of the management to dismiss the service of Shri Shyam Lal B.P was legal and if not, what relief the workman is entitled for. The said reference was registered as Reference Case No. 43 of 2010 and, both, the management and the workman filed their written statements. The learned Tribunal vide award dated 07.02.2012 answered the reference in favour of the workman by holding that the management dismissed the workman without any proper evidence and authentication, as the thumb impression of the workman was not verified by the handwriting expert. Learned Tribunal further held that neither second show cause notice nor the enquiry report was served upon the workman, which is against the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in a judgment reported in 1991 CLR (SC) 61. 3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that once the domestic enquiry was held to be fair by the learned Tribunal, the action of the Management on the basis of the said domestic enquiry should not have been disturbed in absence of any perversity. It is further submitted that non-supply of second show cause notice is not always fatal and the same cannot be a ground for reinstatement if the workman has failed to show any such prejudice caused to him. It is further submitted that non-supply of second show cause notice is not always fatal and the same cannot be a ground for reinstatement if the workman has failed to show any such prejudice caused to him. It is also submitted that the award is absolutely bad in law primarily for the reason that once the Tribunal held that the domestic enquiry was fair and proper, it could not have gone into the merit of the case as if the Tribunal was an Appellate Authority. 4. In support of the aforesaid contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on the following judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court:- (i) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh, reported in (1972) 1 SCC 595 ; (ii) State Bank of India & Ors. v. S.N. Goyal, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 92 ; (iii) State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 ; and (iv) Burdwan Central Cooperative Bank Limited & Anr. v. Asim Chatterjee & Ors., reported in (2012) 2 SCC 641 . 5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2 (concerned workman) submits that no impersonation was made by the respondent no. 2, as alleged by the management. The departmental proceeding was initiated against him on concocted allegation and finally he was dismissed from service in a most arbitrary manner. Thus, the learned Tribunal has rightly directed for reinstatement of the respondent no. 2 with 50% back wages. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal has decided the reference on merit in accordance with law, hence the same does not warrant any interference by this Court. It is also submitted that the learned Tribunal has not committed any error in passing the impugned award, as no evidence was brought on record by the petitioner - Management after the enquiry was declared to be fair and proper. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 puts reliance on the following judgments:- (i) Employers in relation to the Management of Tapin North Colliery v. Their Workman being represented by the Additional General Secretary, reported in 2015 (2) JBCJ 526 (HC) ; and (ii) Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The charge sheet dated 8th February, 1999 was issued against the respondent no. 2 for commission of following misconducts:- "That Shyam Lal B.P., S/o Bhagirathi, village-Taladeori, P.S. Jaijaipur, District Bilaspur (now Janjgir Champa), Madhya Pradesh was appointed on 20.11.74 as a Piece Rated Worker in Tapin South Colliery under the then Coal Mines Authority Ltd. (Central Division) and he expired on 19.7.76 at his native village - Taldeori in Madhya Pradesh. A death certificate issued by the Station Officer, Jaijaipur, P.S.- District Bilaspur, M.P. confirms the death of Shyam Lal B.P. on 19.7.76. It is further confirmed by the statement of the Sarpanch, Taldeori village and elder brother of Shyam Lal B.P., who is still alive. That after the death of Shyam Lal B.P. on 19.7.76 you fraudulently entered into the service of CCL at Tapin South Colliery by impersonating Shyam Lal B.P. and have since been illegally on the pay roll of CCL as Shyam Lal B.P." 8. The petitioner was held guilty in the domestic enquiry and was dismissed from service. However, in the impugned adjudication, the learned Tribunal reversed the finding of the disciplinary authority on the ground that the management dismissed the workman without any proper evidence and authentication as the thumb impression of the workman was not verified through the handwriting expert. On perusal of the order dated 3rd August, 2011, it would appear that the learned Tribunal itself held the domestic enquiry against the respondent no. 2 to be fair and proper. 9. I have perused the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. (Supra.) the Hon''ble Apex Court has held as under:- "61. From the above decisions the following principles broadly emerge:(1) If no domestic enquiry had been held by the management, or if the management makes it clear that it does not rely upon any domestic enquiry that may have been held by it, it is entitled to straightaway adduce evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action. The Tribunal is bound to consider that evidence so adduced before it, on merits, and give a decision thereon. The Tribunal is bound to consider that evidence so adduced before it, on merits, and give a decision thereon. In such a case, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic enquiry as the employer himself does not rely on it. (2) If a domestic enquiry had been held, it is open to the management to rely upon the domestic enquiry held by it, in the first instance, and alternatively and without prejudice to its plea that the enquiry is proper and binding, simultaneously adduce additional evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action. In such a case no inference can be drawn, without anything more, that the management has given up the enquiry conducted by it. (3) When the management relies on the enquiry conducted by it, and also simultaneously adduces evidence before the Tribunal, without prejudice to its plea that the enquiry proceedings are proper, it is the duty of the Tribunal, in the first instance, to consider whether the enquiry proceedings conducted by the management, are valid and proper. If the Tribunal is satisfied that the enquiry proceedings have been held properly and are valid, the question of considering the evidence adduced before it on merits, no longer survives. It is only when the Tribunal holds that the enquiry proceedings have not been properly held, that it derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute and in such a case it has to consider the evidence adduced before it by the management and decide the matter on the basis of such evidence. (4) When a domestic enquiry has been held by the management and the management relies on the same, it is open to the latter to request the Tribunal to try the validity of the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue and also ask for an opportunity to adduce evidence before the Tribunal, if the finding on the preliminary issue is against the management. However elaborate and cumbersome the procedure may be, under such circumstances, it is open to the Tribunal to deal, in the first instance, as a preliminary issue the validity of the domestic enquiry. If its finding on the preliminary issue is in favour of the management, then no additional evidence need be cited by the management. However elaborate and cumbersome the procedure may be, under such circumstances, it is open to the Tribunal to deal, in the first instance, as a preliminary issue the validity of the domestic enquiry. If its finding on the preliminary issue is in favour of the management, then no additional evidence need be cited by the management. But, if the finding on the preliminary issue is against the management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to cite additional evidence and also give a similar opportunity to the employee to lead evidence contra, as the request to adduce evidence had been made by the management to the Tribunal during the course of the proceedings and before the trial has come to an end. When the preliminary issue is decided against the management and the latter leads evidence before the Tribunal, the position, under such circumstances, will be that the management is deprived of the benefit of having the finding of the domestic Tribunal being accepted as prima facie proof of the alleged misconduct. On the other hand, the management will have to prove, by adducing proper evidence, that the workman is guilty of misconduct and that the action taken by it is proper. It will not be just and fair either to the management or to the workman that the Tribunal should refuse to take evidence and thereby ask the management to make a further application, after holding a proper enquiry, and deprive the workman of the benefit of the Tribunal itself being satisfied, on evidence adduced before it, that he was or was not guilty of the alleged misconduct. (5) The management has got a right to attempt to sustain its order by adducing independent evidence before the Tribunal. But the management should avail itself of the said opportunity by making a suitable request to the Tribunal before the proceedings are closed. If no such opportunity has been availed of, or asked for by the management, before the proceedings are closed, the employer can make no grievance that the Tribunal did not provide such an opportunity. The Tribunal will have before it only the enquiry proceedings and it has to decide whether the proceedings have been held properly and the findings recorded therein are also proper. The Tribunal will have before it only the enquiry proceedings and it has to decide whether the proceedings have been held properly and the findings recorded therein are also proper. (6) If the employer relies only on the domestic enquiry and does not simultaneously lead additional evidence or ask for an opportunity during the pendency of the proceedings to adduce such evidence, the duty of the Tribunal is only to consider the validity of the domestic enquiry as well as the finding recorded therein and decide the matter. If the Tribunal decided that the domestic enquiry has not been held properly it is not its function to invite suo motu the employer to adduce evidence before it to justify the action taken by it. (7) The above principles apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal, which have come before it either on a reference under Section 10 or by way of an application under Section 33 of the Act." The Hon''ble Supreme Court in another judgment, rendered in the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (Supra.), in Para-7, has held thus:- "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations." Further in the case of SBI v. S.N. Goyal (Supra.), the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "23. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations." Further in the case of SBI v. S.N. Goyal (Supra.), the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "23. Where the enquiry was found to be fair and proper and the finding of guilt in the enquiry in respect of a serious charge was found to be valid, in the absence of any other valid ground of challenge, the courts below ought to have held that the penalty of removal from service did not warrant any interference and dismissed the suit. Be that as it may. We will now consider the matter on merits on the assumption that the averments in the plaint were sufficient to enable the court to consider this issue." 10. On perusal of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon''ble Apex Court, it may be construed that if the industrial adjudicator finds that the domestic enquiry has been conducted fairly and is valid, the question of considering the evidence adduced before it on the merits of domestic enquiry no longer survives. Once the enquiry proceeding is found to be fair and proper, industrial courts cannot interfere with the finding of facts recorded in domestic enquiry, except where such findings are based on no evidence or if those are clearly perverse or the order has been passed in complete violation of the principles of natural justice or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. 11. In the factual context of the present case, the learned Tribunal has committed an error in appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent no. 2 that the petitioner - Management merely believed the statement of Sarpanch of village Taldeori that the concerned workman was not Shyam Lal B.P. Since the domestic enquiry was held to be fair and proper by the learned Tribunal, no de-novo enquiry on the said issue could have been done during the industrial adjudication. 2 that the petitioner - Management merely believed the statement of Sarpanch of village Taldeori that the concerned workman was not Shyam Lal B.P. Since the domestic enquiry was held to be fair and proper by the learned Tribunal, no de-novo enquiry on the said issue could have been done during the industrial adjudication. The learned Tribunal has also committed an error in observing that Dipak Kumar (MW 1) i.e. the Enquiry Officer, who conducted domestic enquiry, has stated in his cross-examination part of deposition made during the industrial adjudication that the complainant, who alleged impersonation against the respondent no. 2, was not examined in the domestic enquiry. Since the domestic enquiry was already held to be fair, the learned Tribunal should not have gone back to the merit of domestic enquiry and to give a finding that the Enquiry Officer (M.W.1) did not examine the complainant. Learned Tribunal has committed further error in holding that Sarpanch of Taldeori village and the concerned Officer-in-charge of the police station were not examined in the domestic enquiry. Suffice to observe that the impugned award is primarily based on the lapses allegedly committed by the petitioner - Management in conducting the domestic enquiry. The respondent no. 2 (concerned workman) should have substantiated his own case on the basis of the evidence led on his behalf than relying on the loopholes/lapses allegedly committed by the petitioner-Management in the domestic enquiry. 12. Learned Tribunal has committed further error in accepting the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent no. 2 that before passing the final order dismissing/discharging the respondent no. 2 from service, the second show cause notice along with enquiry report was not served upon the respondent no. 2. The written statement filed on behalf of the respondent no. 2 (concerned workman) before the learned Tribunal would reveal that no such factual statement was pleaded inter alia that second show cause notice or the enquiry report was not served upon him by the petitioner - Management. Paragraph No.29 of the written statement filed by the respondent no. 2 would itself indicate that the respondent no. 2 was having enquiry report with himself in absence of which he could not have taken such specific plea on the merit of the enquiry report. 13. Further in the case of Burdwan Central Cooperative Bank Limited & Anr. v. Asim Chatterjee & Ors. 2 would itself indicate that the respondent no. 2 was having enquiry report with himself in absence of which he could not have taken such specific plea on the merit of the enquiry report. 13. Further in the case of Burdwan Central Cooperative Bank Limited & Anr. v. Asim Chatterjee & Ors. (Supra.), the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that if no prejudice is caused to the employee by non-supply of the enquiry officer''s report or the second show cause notice, there can be a little scope to contend that the principles of natural justice have been violated thereby vitiating the proceeding. 14. In the present case, the respondent no. 2 (concerned workman) has not been able to prove as to what prejudice was caused to him, if at all it is assumed that the enquiry report and the second show cause notice was not given to him. The death certificate of Shyam Lal (Ext. ME-17) would clearly disclose that he died on 19th July, 1976. In the said death certificate, the name of Shyam Lal''s father has further been written as "Bhagirathi". Thus, there should not have been any doubt that original Shyam Lal, who happened to be the employee of the petitioner-Central Coalfields Limited, had already died on 19th July, 1976. There also could not have been any doubt that Shyam Lal, whose death certificate was issued on 30th July, 1998 by the competent authority i.e. Station Officer, Jaijaipur, is the same person i.e. Shyam Lal B.P. In fact, Shyam Lal and Shyam Lal B.P. appears to be the same person, who died on 19th July, 1976. The respondent no. 2 allegedly having entered in service of the petitioner - Management by impersonating himself as Shyam Lal B.P. was proceeded with in the domestic enquiry and after observing due procedure, he was dismissed/discharged from service. The respondent no. 2 has never doubted the existence of death certificate (Ext. ME-17) and, thus, it is not open to him to contend that Shyam Lal and Shyam Lal B.P. are two different persons, particularly, in view of the fact that the name of the father (Bhagirathi) is common. 15. The thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 is that the death certificate, which was brought on record, is of Shyam Lal, however, the name of the respondent no. 15. The thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 is that the death certificate, which was brought on record, is of Shyam Lal, however, the name of the respondent no. 2 is Shyam Lal B.P. and, thus, both are two different persons. I find no substance in the said argument of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2. The name of the father of the respondent no. 2 is Bhagirathi, whereas the name of father of Shyam Lal in the death certificate dated 30th July, 1998 has also been mentioned as Bhagirathi. On putting question to the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2, as to how there can be such a similarity not only in the name of the respondent no. 2 as well as the deceased Shyam Lal, but also in their parentage, no satisfactory reply could be given. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 merely submitted that it may be a matter of coincidence. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 puts reliance on the judgment of the learned Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Tapin Narth Colliery (Supra.), and submits that on similar facts, the Division Bench of this Court has held that since the person who was allegedly impersonated did not come forward to prove the fundamental charge against the workman in the domestic enquiry and no criminal case was registered against the workman, the charge of such a grave nature was required to be proved to hilt even in the domestic enquiry. 17. On perusal of the aforesaid judgment it appears that in the said case, the complainant (Sukhdeo Nonia) made an allegation that concerned the workman impersonated him, however, he did not come forward to give his statement in the domestic enquiry. In the present case, a complaint was received by the Management from one M. Singh that the respondent no. 2 impersonated Shyam Lal B.P., who had already died on 19th July, 1976. The said complainant was not examined during domestic enquiry. Even if the complainant was not examined in the domestic enquiry, it would have made no material difference, as in the present case, the person in whose name the respondent no. 2 was rendering service under the petitioner - Management (Central Coalfields Limited) had already died. The said complainant was not examined during domestic enquiry. Even if the complainant was not examined in the domestic enquiry, it would have made no material difference, as in the present case, the person in whose name the respondent no. 2 was rendering service under the petitioner - Management (Central Coalfields Limited) had already died. It would transpire from the content of the charge sheet that the charge against the respondent no. 2 was of impersonation, thus, non-examination of the complainant being a third party in the domestic enquiry was immaterial. Moreover, in the present case, learned Tribunal itself has held the domestic enquiry conducted against the respondent no. 2 to be fair and proper and, thus, it was not permissible to the Tribunal to again go back to the manner of domestic enquiry conducted by the petitioner - Management. The impugned award also does not disclose that any finding was recorded by the learned Tribunal to the effect that the enquiry report submitted against the respondent no. 2 has been found to be perverse. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 further puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors. (Supra.) and submits that the delinquent employee (respondent no. 2 herein) was entitled to a copy of the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority could have taken a decision on the quantum of punishment inflicted upon the respondent no. 2. 19. However in the factual context of the present case, while filing rejoinder to the written statement of the petitioner - Management, the respondent no. 2 himself has indicated regarding receipt of the enquiry report as well as the second show cause. Therefore, the ratio laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad (Supra.) would not be applicable in the present case. Moreover, in Paragraph No. 11 of the written statement, the petitioner - Management has specifically stated that a copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the respondent no. 2 (concerned workman). However, in the rejoinder to the said written statement of the petitioner - Management, it has been averred by the respondent no. 2 that the alleged enquiry report is neither speaking nor a quasi-judicial document. The said averment sufficiently indicates that the respondent no. 2 (concerned workman). However, in the rejoinder to the said written statement of the petitioner - Management, it has been averred by the respondent no. 2 that the alleged enquiry report is neither speaking nor a quasi-judicial document. The said averment sufficiently indicates that the respondent no. 2 was supplied a copy of the enquiry report as well as second show cause notice, in absence of which, the said averment would not have been made. 20. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the discussions made herein above, the impugned award dated 7th February, 2012 passed by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. I, Dhanbad in Reference No. 43 of 2010 cannot be sustained in law and the same is hereby quashed and set aside. 21. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed.