JUDGMENT : SAMBUDDHA CHAKRABARTI, J. 1. The petitioner has challenged an Award dated February 6, 2009 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central Industrial Tribunal at Kolkata, in Reference no. 26 of 1997 directing that the workman, i.e., the respondent no. 4 herein shall be deemed to have been continuing in service as before. The petitioner herein was directed to reinstate him in service as a daily rated mazdoor and pay half of the back wages which might be found to be due to him. So far as the claim for realization is concerned the learned Presiding Officer directed that the management might consider it after reinstatement of the respondent no. 4 herein in the light of the circular i.e. exhibit 4 as in the case of the other workmen. 2. At the instance of the workman, the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, in exercise of its power under Section 10(1)(d) and Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) referred the dispute to the Tribunal relating to whether the action of the management of Calcutta Telephones in not giving employment to the workman from February 3, 1989 was justified. 3. The case of the workman was that he was selected and appointed as a daily rated mazdoor by the Calcutta Telephones with effect from September 1, 1981 initially for 90 days. He joined in 52 Exchange of the Calcutta Telephones. There he worked till November 17, 1987. Then he was transferred to 37 Exchange which he joined on November 18, 1987 and he worked there till November 30, 1988. He applied for leave for his illness which was granted but he had to extend his leave as he was suffering from jaundice and remained on leave till February 2, 1989. On February 3, 1989 when he reported for duty with the medical certificate a senior official of the 37 Exchange, even after taking the medical certificate along with application, did not allow him to join his duties. The workman sent a reminder and visited the said official on many occasions. It is his further case that he was told that the Divisional Engineer (Telephones) had referred the matter to the Area Manager since the leave period had been extended by one month. The workman sent a reminder and visited the said official on many occasions. It is his further case that he was told that the Divisional Engineer (Telephones) had referred the matter to the Area Manager since the leave period had been extended by one month. The petitioner has further alleged that although his case was considered for regularization and he appeared before the Assistant Director (Recruitment) on December 26, 1991 he has come to learn that employees junior to him were made permanent. 4. The workman had alleged that he was not allowed to work on the plea that permission from higher authorities was required as the leave period involved was more than a month which was improper and amounted to retrenchment without payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required under the provisions of the Act, 1947. After the workman had approached the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), conciliation proceedings were held on different dates and the efforts having ended in failure the present reference was made to the Tribunal for adjudication. 5. The management of the Calcutta Telephones in its written statement had taken a point that the reference was already adjudicated by the Tribunal which had attained finality as it had culminated with the passing of a no-dispute Award. The High Court while directing a rehearing of the matter did not set it aside, the respondent no. 4 had worked in different phases and not continuously. He worked for six days in November, 1988 and no leave was granted in his favour. The management did not receive any application or medical certificate after November, 1988. He had worked for only 3 days in the month of February 1989. Thereafter he remained absent without any intimation leaving no room for any doubt that he had left the job of his own. The letter written by the Assistant Director (Recruitment) was not for regularization of the workman but for issuing attestation forms which was done when in advance pending determination of eligibility along with other candidates. The persons mentioned by the workman had been made permanent, but since he continued to remain absent and had left the job he could not be offered any permanent work. Neither regularization nor termination of service of the workman was actually the issue to be adjudicated in this case. And, therefore, the relief claimed by him could not be granted by the Tribunal. Neither regularization nor termination of service of the workman was actually the issue to be adjudicated in this case. And, therefore, the relief claimed by him could not be granted by the Tribunal. 6. The learned Judge of the Tribunal after considering the respective cases and the evidence adduced, both oral and documentary, has passed the Award as mentioned earlier. 7. The petitioner herein has assailed the reference to the Tribunal as bad as it is an admitted position that the workman i.e., the respondent no. 4, was a daily rated mazdoor and it is not the case of either side that the management of the Calcutta Telephones took any action for not giving employment to the workman. A daily rated mazdoor is allotted work when the same is available. It is not the case of the respondent no. 4 that he came to work but was not given any although that was available for him. A daily rated mazdoor does not have any status of employment save and except when the work is available. The management always deploys such persons on no work no pay basis. 8. With reference to the certificate of the doctor submitted by the respondent no. 4 the petitioner submitted that the doctor certified that he was ill from December 1, 1988 to February 2, 1989, but he required two months' time for rest. But on the very next date he reported for work. This prompted the petitioner to allege that the doctor's certificate was incorrect and contrary to dates. 9. It is the further case of the petitioner that the dispute referred to the Tribunal was an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act which means a collective dispute between the employer and workmen collectively. It is not a case of reference under Section 2A regarding individual case of only discharge, dismissal or any otherwise punishment. Even if in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited in its Calcutta office there are five Trade Unions, none of them nor a group of workmen espoused the cause of the respondent no. 4 on the issue of reference. 10. The petitioner has referred to the judgment in the case of Dipak Industries Limited and Another Vs. State of West Bengal and Others,1975 30 FLR 106. In that case the cause of the employees dismissed for misconduct was espoused by the Union. 4 on the issue of reference. 10. The petitioner has referred to the judgment in the case of Dipak Industries Limited and Another Vs. State of West Bengal and Others,1975 30 FLR 106. In that case the cause of the employees dismissed for misconduct was espoused by the Union. The Division Bench held that the Union having no locus standi to represent the dismissed employees no industrial dispute arose within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. 11. The petitioner has also relied on an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court of India, dated January 7, 2014 in BSNL and Others Vs. Koilash Narayan Sharma and Other. In that case the Supreme Court, even after holding violation of Section 25F of the Act, for the reasons mentioned therein granted monetary compensation instead of reinstatement. 12. It is true that the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal had initially passed a "no-dispute Award" as on the date fixed by the Tribunal neither the workman nor his learned Advocate was present. It may be mentioned that in course of that day itself the workman had filed an application for setting aside the order whereby the Presiding Officer had passed the "no dispute Award". 13. The said Award was challenged by workman in W.P. No. 1899 of 1998, primarily on the ground that even if the workman or his learned Advocate was not present when the matter was taken up for hearing, the Tribunal was not absolved of dealing with the grounds taken in the written statement and dispose of the matter. A learned Single Judge of this Court found sufficient substance in the submission and held that it was obligatory on the part of the learned Presiding Officer to deal with the grounds of objection noted in the written statement and answer the reference. But nothing of that sort had been done by the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. Therefore, this Court disagreed with the findings of the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal and remitted the matter for a rehearing. But nothing of that sort had been done by the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. Therefore, this Court disagreed with the findings of the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal and remitted the matter for a rehearing. The order recorded that it had been agreed by both the parties that the case might be taken up by learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal on February 18, 2000 at 11.00 a.m. It was further ordered that in the event either of the party remained absent, the Tribunal would be at liberty to decide the case ex-parte and such decision would not be reversed on that ground. 14. Thus, it was very clear that the initial "no-dispute Award" was practically set aside by this Court. Otherwise, there would not have been any occasion for sending the matter back to the Tribunal for a rehearing or to pass a consequent direction upon the Tribunal as mentioned above. The petitioner herein also went back to the Tribunal, filed written statement, adduced evidence and argued their cases. If such is the stand of the management that the earlier order had not been set aside and, therefore, no fresh Award could be passed, there was no occasion for them to pray before the Tribunal for answering the reference in the affirmative in favour of the management. Now the management cannot really try to make a point out of a technical miss in the order of this Court. The management could definitely understand the spirit of the order passed by this Court in the earlier ground of litigation and had acted accordingly. Now, they cannot be allowed to turn around and take a point that there was no scope for passing a fresh award. Thus, this point taken by the management must entirely fail. 15. The next point taken up by the management in this writ petition regarding the validity of the reference is equally without substance. The petitioner has argued that the dispute referred to the Tribunal was a dispute within a meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, it must be a collective dispute. It has been specifically submitted by the petitioner and also mentioned in the written notes of submission that the reference was not under Section 2A of the said Act. In this connection the petitioner referred to the case of Dipak Industries limited and Another . 16. It has been specifically submitted by the petitioner and also mentioned in the written notes of submission that the reference was not under Section 2A of the said Act. In this connection the petitioner referred to the case of Dipak Industries limited and Another . 16. A more careful reading of the terms of the reference would not have left the petitioner in such a misconceived notion about the provisions of law under which the reference was made. The order of reference specifically mentioned that the Government of India was referring the dispute to the Tribunal in exercise of its power under Section 10(1)(d) and 2A of the Act. Thus, it is not understood why the petitioner has taken the point that it was not a reference under Section 2A of the said Act. An industrial dispute as provided in Section 2(k) of the Act is no longer a dispute to be taken up by the Trade Union or a substantial number of workmen of the establishment. Section 2A of the Act has extended the scope of industrial dispute as the earlier method of raising a dispute proved to operate rather harshly for an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed, retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated and then he could not even get support of the union. In order to mitigate the hardship of such workman Section 2A was introduced by the Amendment Act of 1965. After the incorporation of Section 2A of the Act the dispute of an individual workman connected with or arising out of the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of his service by the employer will constitute an industrial dispute even if no other workman is a party to it. 17. As a matter of fact, the judgment in the cse of Dipak Industries Limited , has also held the same. It has been specifically held that the amended Section 2A makes it clear that when an individual dispute is not sponsored by other workmen or espoused by the Union of the workmen even then it would be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. In that case this Court found the dispute to be bad as the Trade Union which espoused the cause of the dismissed employees was not authorized so to do. In that case this Court found the dispute to be bad as the Trade Union which espoused the cause of the dismissed employees was not authorized so to do. It was because of this lack of authorization and the failure of the union to produce material and documentary evidence to show that it had the requisite authority to represent the workmen that the Division Bench of this Court had held that the alleged dispute could not be said to have been vested with the character of the industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. Thus, the judgment relied on by the petitioner is clearly distinguishable and has no application to the facts of the case. 18. The point taken by the petitioner that the medical certificate given by the doctor was bad also does not inspire any confidence. It was sought to be argued, and it has also been mentioned in the written notes of the submission filed by the petitioner, that the doctor had certified that the workman was ill from December 1, 1988 to February 2, 1989 and he required two months for rest. But on the very next day he reported to work. From this, it has been submitted that the doctor's certificate was not correct and contrary to the dates as the workman had reported to work on February 3, 1989. 19. A careful look of the certificate clearly goes to show that Dr. B. N. Das had certified that the workman was suffering from Jaundice and was under his treatment during the period as mentioned above. But the certificate did not disclose any advice by the doctor for further complete rest for a period of two months. On the contrary, the doctor had specifically certified that the workman was advised complete rest for two months and that he was now fit to resume his duty from February 3, 1989. The submission of the petitioner about the incorrectness of the medical certificate is based on wrong appreciation of the content of the certificate. There is no chronological improbability or impropriety in the certificate produced by the doctor. 20. The submission of the petitioner about the incorrectness of the medical certificate is based on wrong appreciation of the content of the certificate. There is no chronological improbability or impropriety in the certificate produced by the doctor. 20. The workman had submitted that when he had reported for duty on February 3, 1989 with the medical certificate he was not allowed to work on the plea that permission from higher authorities would be required as the leave period involved was for more than a month. It amounted to retrenchment without payment of compensation and notice pay as required under the Act. 21. It is the case of the management that the workman had left the job on his own. MW1 Sri Arun Kumar Ghosh specifically stated that the workman was absent in January, 1989 but he was present for duty on February 1, 2 and 3, 1989. After absence when he appeared no medical certificate was called from him for his illness as he was a daily rated mazdoor and he was only to get his wages for the days he actually worked. His name continued to be in the muster roll till December, 1989 and it was removed from January 1, 1990. He was not given any show-cause nor did the management pay him the compensation before his removal or any notice to that effect. 22. It is a settled position of law that removing the name of a workman from the muster roll is a retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Limited vs. Sambhunath Mukherjee and others, (1978) 1 LLJ 1 , had held that striking off a name of a workman from the rolls by the management is the termination of service. Such termination of service is retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. With reference to the facts that the case, the Supreme Court also observed that there was nothing to show that the provisions of Section 25 F (a) & (b) were complied with by the management. These two provisions were mandatory and any order of retrenchment in violation of these two peremptory conditions precedent is invalid and this is precisely the finding of the Tribunal as well. These two provisions were mandatory and any order of retrenchment in violation of these two peremptory conditions precedent is invalid and this is precisely the finding of the Tribunal as well. The tribunal held that since there has been a noncompliance of the provision of Section 25F of the Act the workman was entitled to get the relief of being in continuous in service and also entitled to get a relief which was available to him as per the relevant circular. 23. In this connection, Mr. Dutta, learned advocate for the workman placed reliance in the case of Mohan Lal vs. Bharat Electronics Limited, (1981) 2 LLJ 70 , where, with reference to the facts of that case, the Supreme Court had held that the appellant had established his qualifications prescribed in Section 25F of the Act for claiming retrenchment compensation. Since his case was not covered by any of the excepted or excluded categories and since he had rendered continuous service for one year, termination of his service would constitute retrenchment. As pre-condition for a valid retrenchment has not been satisfied the termination of service was ab initio void, invalid and inoperative. Therefore, he must be deemed to be in continuous service. The Supreme Court further observed that if the termination of service is ab initio void and inoperative, there was no question of granting reinstatement because there was no cessation of service and a mere declaration follows that the workman continued to be in service with all consequential benefits. In that case the employer submitted that the Court might not grant reinstatement but award compensation. The Supreme Court observed that where the termination is illegal, especially when there is ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither any termination nor cessation of service and the workman concerned continued in service with all consequential benefits. 24. The petitioner has lastly argued that in the unreported judgment in BSNL and others the Supreme Court did not grant reinstatement but awarded compensation to the workmen at a rate depending on their tenure of work. In those cases the Supreme Court had held that in a case of termination in violation of Section 25F of the Act relief of reinstatement may not be the natural consequence. It will depend upon the facts of each case and it is not automatic. In those cases the Supreme Court had held that in a case of termination in violation of Section 25F of the Act relief of reinstatement may not be the natural consequence. It will depend upon the facts of each case and it is not automatic. In the facts of a given case, instead of reinstatement, monetary compensation can be granted. The cases in hand, the Supreme Court observed, clearly fell within that group. 25. Thus, it is obvious that the Supreme Court did not lay down any inflexible and hard and fast rule that in all cases of retrenchment without complying with the provisions of Section 25F monetary compensation would be a sufficient relief and nothing more. On the contrary, the Supreme Court laid down that it must depend upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case. 26. It may be mentioned that in the case of Rubi General Insurance Company Limited vs. P.P. Chopra, (1970) 1 LLJ 63 , the Supreme Court observed that before granting reinstatement the Court must weigh all the facts and exercise discretion properly whether to grant reinstatement or to award compensation. But such a submission on the part of the management did not find favour with the court in Mohan Lal and it was specifically observed that where the termination is illegal there is neither termination nor cessation of service. 27. In the present case the tribunal upon consideration of the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, had clearly come to a finding that the concerned workman had never left the job on his own and after recovering from illness he reported for joining his duties with a medical certificate which he was not allowed. His letters to the appropriate authorities clearly to show that abandoning the job was never his intention. In view of the particular facts of this case the Tribunal thought that the order of termination being bad the workman was entitled to get the relief of being in continuous in service. 28. I find no impropriety in the finding of the learned Judge of the Tribunal and this is a case which does not fall within the category of cases, as observed by the Supreme Court, where monetary compensation would be a sufficient relief. 29. 28. I find no impropriety in the finding of the learned Judge of the Tribunal and this is a case which does not fall within the category of cases, as observed by the Supreme Court, where monetary compensation would be a sufficient relief. 29. The unreported judgment dated March 5, 2013, relied on by the petitioner in the case of Employer in relation to the Management of Calcutta Telephones vs. Sri Debnath Chakraborty and others (FMA 593 of 2013) has no manner of application to the facts of this case. There the Tribunal itself held that instead of granting reinstatement with back wages a lumpsum compensation was sufficient. The Division Bench after considering the facts of that particular case observed that in the facts and circumstances of that case the Tribunal was justified in passing the direction for payment of lumpsum compensation. However, the Division Bench had modified the amount of compensation. 30. As has been observed by the Supreme Court that the relief to be granted in a particular case must depend upon the facts of that case. Where the Tribunal upon consideration of all materials and surrounding circumstances of this case has found reinstatement with back wages is the appropriate relief to be granted to the workman, I find no reason to interfere with the same. Moreover, it must be mentioned that the petitioner has not challenged the award on that ground nor is there is any pleading to that effect. It has also not been the prayer of the petitioner that the award impugned may be modified by payment of compensation to the workman. 31. It may be mentioned that the challenge to the reference was never made by the petitioner before the Tribunal. There is also no pleading to that effect in the present writ petition as well. The petitioner without taking the point before the Tribunal nor assailing the reference in the writ petition cannot be permitted to challenge the reference only at the stage of hearing and that too by verbal submission. 32. The law on the point is very well settled that without pleading a party cannot be allowed to agitate any point as the same would amount to springing a surprise to the other party, particularly when such objection was not taken by the petitioner in the Tribunal. 32. The law on the point is very well settled that without pleading a party cannot be allowed to agitate any point as the same would amount to springing a surprise to the other party, particularly when such objection was not taken by the petitioner in the Tribunal. In the case of Shankar Chakravarti vs. Britannia Biscuit Company and Another, (1979) 2 LLJ 194 , the Supreme Court observed that it is well-settled that an allegation which is not pleaded, even if there is evidence in support of it, cannot be examined because the other side has no notice of it and if entertained it would tantamount to grant an unfair advantage to the first mentioned part. The Supreme Court further observed that the rules of fair play demand that where a party seeks to establish a contention which, if proved, would be sufficient to deny the relief to the opposite side, has to be specifically pleaded and then proved, but there is no question of proving something which is not pleaded. 33. In the case of Narmada Bachao Andolon Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (2011) AIR SC 1989, the Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principle of law that a party has to plead its case and produce sufficient evidence to substantiate the statements made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete the court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. It is a settled legal proposition that as a rule, reliefs not founded on the pleadings, should not be granted. Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The same has also been the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another vs. Bajrang Lal, (2014) 4 SCC 693 . There are any numbers of judgments on the point but there is no point in multiplying them. Therefore In the present case the petitioner's challenge to the reference, over and above its lack of substance in merit, cannot also be otherwise gone into. 34. For the reasons aforesaid, I find nothing to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The points taken up by the petitioner assailing both the reference as well as the Award are without any substance and must fail. 35. The writ petition has no merit and is dismissed. 36. 34. For the reasons aforesaid, I find nothing to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The points taken up by the petitioner assailing both the reference as well as the Award are without any substance and must fail. 35. The writ petition has no merit and is dismissed. 36. There shall be no order as to the costs.