JUDGMENT : 1. Admit. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. This is an appeal filed on behalf of the claimant, challenging judgment and order dated 10.08.2015 passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Nagpur Bench, whereby application for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the appellant was dismissed and consequently there was no finding on the merits of the claim application filed on behalf of the appellant. 3. On 6.11.2011, the appellant was travelling from Itwari Railway Station to Gangazari. When the train came to Gangazari Railway Station, while getting down the appellant slipped and fell due to which her left leg was crushed and it had to be amputated. The medical certificate placed on record testifies this fact that the appellant had to undergo amputation of her left leg due to the aforesaid incident. 4. The appellant filed an application for seeking compensation under Section 16 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 read with Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989, on 26.05.2014. In the claim application, the appellant stated the details regarding the aforesaid incident and she placed on record relevant documents including railway ticket bearing ticket No. 57669400 dated 6.11.2011 showing that she was indeed travelling by rail on the date of the incident. But, since the claim application was filed after the prescribed period of limitation of 1 year, it was accompanied by an application of condonation of delay. In the said application for condonation of delay, the appellant prayed for condonation of delay of 2 years and 2 months in filing the claim application. But, a proper calculation of the number of days delay shows that the actual delay in filing the claim application on the part of the appellant was 567 days and not 2 years and 2 months or 2 years, 6 months and 20 days (930 days) on which the Tribunal has proceeded in the impugned judgment and order. This calculation of the number of days of delay, is evident from the document on record and it is not seriously disputed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. Hence this Court is proceeding on the basis that there was a delay of 567 days on the part of the appellant in filing her claim application before the Tribunal. Hence this Court is proceeding on the basis that there was a delay of 567 days on the part of the appellant in filing her claim application before the Tribunal. In the claim application, the appellant has sought compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- with 12 % interest from the date of application till the date of realization. 5. In the application for condonation of delay, it was stated on behalf of the appellant that being a poor and uneducated lady, she was not aware about the fact that she could make a claim under the provisions of the aforesaid Act for compensation and that she got advice for doing so late. It is further submitted in the application that since she suffered serious injuries leading to amputation of her left leg, she was in state of mental shock, resulting in the aforesaid delay in approaching the Tribunal. 6. By the impugned judgment and order, the Tribunal has discussed in detail the law pertaining to what would be sufficient cause for condoning delay in such cases. The Tribunal has referred to a number of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court and the Tribunal itself, while concluding that sufficient cause for condonation of delay was not made out by the appellant, although the Tribunal has power under Section 17(2) of the said Act to condone delay, if the applicant is able to show sufficient cause for such condonation of delay. 7. A perusal of the facts of the present case, particularly the documents pertaining to the injury suffered by the appellant and the medical treatment undergone by her, show that the appellant did suffer extreme physical pain and ultimately there was amputation of her left leg below the knee. This obviously caused mental suffering as well to the appellant and considering that she is a poor and uneducated lady, these factors ought to have been taken into consideration by the Tribunal while passing the impugned judgment and order. The Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that those who sleep over their rights cannot be permitted to knock the doors of the Court at their own sweet will. The aforesaid approach adopted by the Tribunal, in the facts of the present case, does not appear to be proper. The Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that those who sleep over their rights cannot be permitted to knock the doors of the Court at their own sweet will. The aforesaid approach adopted by the Tribunal, in the facts of the present case, does not appear to be proper. It cannot be said that the appellant in the present case deliberately slept over her rights or that there was any mala fide on her part in approaching the Tribunal after a delay of about 567 days. 8. The judgment of this Court referred to and relied upon by the Tribunal which was passed in the case of Saida and others .vs. Union of India (First Appeal No. 919 of 2014), wherein this Court had upheld an order of the Tribunal dismissing application for condonation of delay filed by claimant, shows that the facts in that case were materially different. The delay in that case was about 4 years and 6 months and it was found by the Court that there were certain false statements made in the application for condonation of delay as well as the claim application. This Court also noted the fact that there appeared to be no material to support the claim application as there was no railway ticket or other document to show that the deceased in that case had actually undertaken the railway journey. 9. As opposed to the aforesaid set of facts, in the present case, a railway ticket dated 6.11.2011 was placed on record by which the appellant had travelled on the fateful day, along with documents showing the medical treatment that was given to the appellant for the aforesaid injury that she suffered in the aforesaid incident. Therefore, the facts in the present case are materially different, which the Tribunal ought to have appreciated. 10. Even otherwise, this Court has held in the case of Manoranjan .vs. Union of India – 2017 (1) Mh.L.J. 163 , regarding the approach to be adopted by the Tribunal in such cases where question of condonation of delay is to be decided. It has been held in the aforesaid judgment as follows:- 10. 10. Even otherwise, this Court has held in the case of Manoranjan .vs. Union of India – 2017 (1) Mh.L.J. 163 , regarding the approach to be adopted by the Tribunal in such cases where question of condonation of delay is to be decided. It has been held in the aforesaid judgment as follows:- 10. It is true that illiteracy, poverty, want of funds, ignorance of law cannot be, as of right, held to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay, however, as has been time and again ruled by the Honourable Apex Court, it is imperative for the Courts or the Tribunals that in the proceedings where rights of illiterate, poor, down-trodden are involved, a more humane approach has to be adopted and it should not be the endeavour of the Courts or the Tribunals, or the authorities to dismiss applications or petitions merely on technicalities without looking to the merits of the case. The Railways Act is a beneficial legislation meant for providing compensation to the victims or the legal representatives of the victims of the Railway Accidents. As such, in such matters, the Tribunal is not supposed to take a pedantic or hyper technical view but is expected to adopt a humane and lenient approach. Its approach should be justice oriented. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be a normal course in such matters unless there is some contrary evidence imputing the intention or the bona fides of the claimants making delay in approaching the Court. 11. The material on record shows that the deceased was a bona fide passenger and valid Railway ticket was found in his pocket at the time of inquest panchnama prepared by the Police machinery. Prima facie material is also there on record showing that the deceased suffered death in an untoward incident. When there is a prima facie merit in the application or appeal, the Courts or the Tribunals shall not shut the doors of justice only on the technical ground of limitation. Delay in respect of such cases has to be liberally condoned where there is a prima facie merit in the case brought out before the Court or the Tribunal. Substantial justice must be the criteria in disposing of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and liberal view has to be taken so as to advance substantial justice." 11. Substantial justice must be the criteria in disposing of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and liberal view has to be taken so as to advance substantial justice." 11. Apart from this, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in various judgments about the approach to be adopted by the Tribunals and Courts where a beneficial legislation is involved. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Manoharan vs. Sivarajan -(2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 163 that the purpose of the provision of limitation is not to destroy the rights and that the primary function of the Courts is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. It is further held that the object of providing a legal remedy is to remove a legal injury and that if the applicant shows that delay has been caused due to bona fide reasons and no mala fide is attributable to the applicant, the Tribunals and Courts ought to adopt a liberal approach so as to promote decision of disputes on merits. 12. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, in regard to the approach in cases like the present case, on the facts of the present case, it would be in the interest of justice that the application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant in filing the claim application before the Tribunal is allowed and the delay is condoned. 13. At the same time, the concern of the respondent is to be addressed with regard to the fact that when matters of compensation under the aforesaid Act arise, it is public money that is ultimately involved. Therefore, in order to address the said concern, it would be appropriate to hold that while the delay in filing the claim application deserves to be condoned, the appellant ought not to be permitted to enjoy interest on amount of compensation for the period of delay, in the event the claim application is decided in her favour by the Tribunal. 14. Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed, the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal is quashed and set aside. Consequently, application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant before the Tribunal is allowed and the delay is condoned. The Tribunal is directed to consider the claim application of the appellant on merits. 14. Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed, the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal is quashed and set aside. Consequently, application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant before the Tribunal is allowed and the delay is condoned. The Tribunal is directed to consider the claim application of the appellant on merits. It is further directed that in the event the claim application of the appellant is allowed and it is found that she is entitled to grant of compensation, interest on such amount would not be granted for the period of delay. There shall be no order as to costs. 15. Needless to say, the observations made in the order passed today, are limited to the question of condonation of delay and there is no opinion expressed by this Court on the merits of the claim application of the appellant.