JUDGMENT : 1. Crl.A.No.100/2010 is preferred by the accused H.S. Brunda and Crl.A.No.104/2010 is preferred by the accused M.S. Ravindra against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the XXXII Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bangalore in Spl.C.C.No.29/2004 dated 26.12.2009 by holding conviction against accused Nos. 1 and 2 and sentencing them to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year for the offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC, to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year for the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC and shall pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and in default of fine, they shall undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months, to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year for the offence punishable under Section 468 of IPC and shall pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and in default of fine, they shall undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months, to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year for the offence punishable under Section 471 of IPC and shall pay fine of Rs.10,000/- each and in default of fine, they shall undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months, to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year and 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 477A of IPC and shall pay fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, they shall undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months, accused No.1 was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and shall pay fine of Rs.15,000/- and in default of payment of fine, she shall undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months. It was further ordered that the substantive sentences shall run concurrently. 2. The factual matrix of the appeals are as under: It is the case of the prosecution that accused No.1 Brunda being a public servant was discharging her duties as a Special Assistant of Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore during February 1990 to February 1994. She entered into a criminal conspiracy with accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra being her brother-in-law, has agreed to and done illegal activities of forging the documents, making use of forged documents as a genuine, falsifying the accounts, cheating the bank by causing monetary loss. Accused No.2 who was not holding sufficient balance in his Account Nos. She entered into a criminal conspiracy with accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra being her brother-in-law, has agreed to and done illegal activities of forging the documents, making use of forged documents as a genuine, falsifying the accounts, cheating the bank by causing monetary loss. Accused No.2 who was not holding sufficient balance in his Account Nos. 3229 and 6121, even though the same had to be returned after dishonour, accused No.1 had passed such cheques, entered the same in the subsidiary register but not debited the same in the ledger maintained for that purpose. As a criminal conspiracy with accused No.2, accused No.1 had forged the documents as specified in the charge sheet making use of the said documents dishonestly and fraudulently, caused monetary loss to the bank to the tune of Rs.8,77,590/- by abusing her position as public servant by discharging her duties as a Special Assistant of Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. 3. It is further stated that the A/c. Nos. 3229 and 6121 was maintained in the name of accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. Accused No.1 Brunda passed the instrument for cash payment knowing fully well that there was insufficient balance mentioning A/c. Nos. as 2784 and 5555 which cheques were signed by accused No.2 and caused loss to the bank. Further, accused No.1, by abusing her official position, dishonestly and fraudulently debited subsidiary account of the bank but did not debit the ledger account for A/c.Nos.3229 and 6121 which is maintained in the name of accused No.2 who is the brother-in-law of accused No.1 and thereby caused wrongful loss to the bank as mentioned in detail in the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI against the accused persons. The charge that is framed against the accused is based upon the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer of CBI against the accused for which they pleaded not guilty and they claims to be tried. 4. In order to substantiate the case against the accused, prosecution in all examined 57 witnesses as PWs. 1 to 57 and marked 457 documents as Exs. P1 to P4 57. Subsequent to closure of the evidence, the accused have been examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by recording incriminating circumstances against the accused for which accused have denied the truth of the evidence of the prosecution adduced so far. 1 to 57 and marked 457 documents as Exs. P1 to P4 57. Subsequent to closure of the evidence, the accused have been examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by recording incriminating circumstances against the accused for which accused have denied the truth of the evidence of the prosecution adduced so far. Subsequently, one B.N. Bhat was examined as defence witness and got marked two documents as Exs. D1 and D2 apart from filing separate statements. 5. Subsequently, the trial court heard the arguments advanced by the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI and learned counsel for the accused. On evaluating the entire evidence on record along with the oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence, gave finding by assigning reasons point-wise regarding to the charges framed against the accused. It is this judgment which has been challenged in these appeals by urging various grounds. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted a written brief arguments challenging the impugned judgment of conviction urging various grounds. He has taken me through the point-wise recording of the offence in the charge sheet against accused Nos. 1 and 2. 7. Appellant in Crl.A.No.100/2010 accused No.1 was working as a Special Assistant at Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. Appellant in Crl.A.No.104/2010 accused No.2 is the brother-in-law of accused No.1. He has maintained S.B.A/c. in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. 8. It is contended that the charges framed are not only vague but also not in accordance with Chapter 17 of the Cr.P.C. The same requires to be looked into in these appeals relating to the charges framed against the accused. Charge No.1 being conspiracy charge made against accused refers to merely the expressions “cheating” and “falsification of account and forgery” as found in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore during the relevant period between February 1990 and February 1994, without mentioning the particulars of documents. In so far as charge No.2 is concerned, it is the charge of cheating which merely says that the offence of cheating is committed as detailed in para Nos.2 to 6 of the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI. Therefore, in detail it is required to be framing of the charge against the accused as the accused were facing the trial for the serious offence of embezzlement. As regards charge No.3 relating to forgery, it is alleged to have been committed as detailed in para Nos. Therefore, in detail it is required to be framing of the charge against the accused as the accused were facing the trial for the serious offence of embezzlement. As regards charge No.3 relating to forgery, it is alleged to have been committed as detailed in para Nos. 2 to 6 of the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI. As regards charge No.4 regarding the offence punishable under Section 471 r/w. 468 of IPC the accused used forged cheques and withdrawal slips referred to in charge No.2 as genuine and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 471 of IPC as the cheques were not even properly identified. As regards the 5th charge is concerned, it relates to falsification of accounts punishable under Section 477 of IPC as detailed in para Nos. 2 to 6 of the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI. Therefore, it requires in detail substance of charges levelled against the accused. As regards charge No.6 and the last charge refers to obtaining pecuniary advantage by accused No.1 to the extent of Rs.8,77,590/-, which is the total amount mentioned in para Nos. 2 to 6 in charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI against accused and thereby committed offence punishable under Section 13(2) r/w. 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 9. The charges framed by the court are self-contained and for clear understanding of the charges the text of para Nos. 2 to 6 of the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer of CBI must be read along with the charges. But the fact remains that despite any reference to charge-sheet, averments made for imputations against the accused persons remain incomprehensible by any process of reasoning and despite indulging in over simplification, the commissions and omissions attributed to the appellants arrayed as accused Nos. 1 and 2 that has clear criminal purposes are not forthcoming. It is not clear what the accused persons would derive by making an entry in the subsidiary ledger but not in individual account, it is not clear why the first accused Brunda would replace the specimen signatures of accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra and thereby accomplish what criminal purpose. The charges are framed against the accused do not give the necessary content and are completely disintegrated. The charges are framed against the accused do not give the necessary content and are completely disintegrated. The obvious inconsistencies between the charges framed by the Special Court and the averments made in the charge sheet laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI only compounds the problem relating to embezzlement said to be alleged against the accused. The cheques and withdrawal slips referred to in para Nos. 2 to 6 are alleged to have been encashed partly through clearance and partly by encashing at the cash counter in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. Be that as it may, the procedure prescribed for encashment of cheques through clearance is different from encashing cheques at the cash counter and this is known to every constituent or customer of the bank and it does not require elaboration. 10. Para No.2 of the charge-sheet discloses that fraud was alleged to have been committed in respect of 53 instruments totaling to Rs.1,67,190/-, out of them, clearance cheques total comes to Rs.1,47,690/- and cash cheques drawn at the cash counter comes to R.25,500/-. In so far as para No.3 of the charge-sheet is concerned, it discloses that fraud was alleged to have been committed in respect of 7 instruments amounting to Rs.25,070/-, out of which 6 instruments were encashed through clearance amounting to Rs.17,070/- and one instrument was encashed at the cash counter of Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore amounting to Rs.8,000/-. As regards para No.4 of the charge sheet, it discloses that fraud was alleged to have been committed in respect of 36 instruments amounting to Rs.2,56,580/-, out of which clearance cheques total comes to Rs.1,22,580/- and cash cheques drawn at cash counter of Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore at Rs.1,34,000/-. As regards para No.5 of the charge-sheet, it discloses that the fraud was alleged to have committed in respect of 34 instruments amounting to Rs.2,74,750/-, out of which clearance cheques total comes to Rs.1,22,750/- and cash cheque drawn at the cash counter of Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore, amounting to Rs.1,52,000/-. As regards para No.6 of the charge-sheet, it discloses that fraud was alleged to have been committed in respect of 17 instruments totaling to Rs.1,54,000/-, out of which clearance cheques total amount comes to Rs.29,000 and cash cheques drawn at the cash counter of Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore comes to Rs.1,25,000/-. As regards para No.6 of the charge-sheet, it discloses that fraud was alleged to have been committed in respect of 17 instruments totaling to Rs.1,54,000/-, out of which clearance cheques total amount comes to Rs.29,000 and cash cheques drawn at the cash counter of Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore comes to Rs.1,25,000/-. It is thus seen that the total amount pertaining to the clearance cheques/ transfer referred to in para No.2, 36 cheques through clearance amounting to Rs.1,41,690/-, in para No.3, 6 cheques through clearance amounting to Rs.17,070/-, in para 4, 17 cheques through clearance amounting to Rs.1,22,580/-, in para 5, 15 cheques through clearance amounting to Rs.1,22,750/- and in para 6, 5 cheques through clearance amounting to Rs.29,000/-, totaling to 79 cheques amounting to Rs.4,33,090/-. Regarding the total cheques/withdrawal slips encashed at the cash counter of Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore as referred to in para 2, 17 cheques amounting to Rs.25,500/-, in para 3, 1 cheque amounting to Rs.8,000/-, in para 4, 19 cheques amounting to Rs.1,34,000/-, in para 5, 19 cheques amounting to Rs.1,52,000/- and in para 6, 12 cheques amounting to Rs.1,25,000/-, totaling to 69 cheques, amounting to Rs.4,44,500/-. Thus, the total fraud amount comes to Rs.8,77,590/-, clearance cheques Rs.4,33,090/- and cash cheques Rs.4,44,500/-. Thus, the learned counsel for the accused contends that there is a clear arithmetical mismatch even on going through the charge-sheet averments lodged by the Investigating Officer of CBI against the accused. 11. In so far as vague charge which is framed by the trial court against the accused and the charge which has been framed is not in accordance with Chapter 17 of the Cr.P.C., learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of BASAVARAJA vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (2008) 9 SC 329. 12. Nextly, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SARDAR GIAN SINGH vs. EMPEROR reported in AIR 1938 Lahore 828 to contend that notice of manner of committing the offence cheating is essential and must be forthcoming in the charges framed, hence the same shall be construed material irregularity that vitiates trial. In the case on hand, the clear trial faced by the accused for embezzlement as averred in the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer of CBI is found to vitiate the entire trial. In the case on hand, the clear trial faced by the accused for embezzlement as averred in the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer of CBI is found to vitiate the entire trial. Hence contends that the above case is squarely applicable to the case on hand. 13. Nextly, he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.L.V.MURTHY vs. STATE, REP. BY C.B.I., HYDERABAD reported in AIR 2009 SC 2717 wherein it has been held that the charging under the wrong provision and framing of improper charges will result in acquittal of the accused. In the case on hand also he contends that the charges were not properly framed against the accused and hence conviction judgment passed by the trial court against the accused is bad in law. 14. It is further contended regarding the misjoinder of charges. In so far as Section 210 of Cr.P.C., as the period during which the offence is said to have been committed is from 1990 to 1994 and the offences could not have been tried despite the provision of Section 218(2) of Cr.P.C. It is noteworthy to state that misjoinder of charges was urged before the court below. But the court below has not properly appreciated the evidence on record in so far as the charges framed against accused. It has just followed the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI. The sheer volume of materials placed on record and lengthy list of witnesses prejudiced the defence either in the form of practical difficulties that incidentally arises effective cross examination of witnesses or preparing for a proper defence. It is to be placed on record that a specific objection in this regard was taken before the trial court and the same was negated by the trial court without assigning proper reasons on analyzing the law on the point relating to misjoinder of charges and also charges framed against accused in so far as embezzlement to the tune of Rs.8,77,590/-. 15. The next limb of the argument is non-examination of the material witnesses fatal to the prosecution case. 15. The next limb of the argument is non-examination of the material witnesses fatal to the prosecution case. During the course of trial against the accused for the offences relating to the embezzlement, the prosecution did not examine the ledger clerks who were responsible for making credit and debit entries in the ledgers maintained by the concerned clerks in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore and subsidiary ledgers on receipt of instruments at the counter. The prosecution did not examine the bank officials who worked at the cash counters charged with the duty of payment of amount covered by the cheques/ withdrawal slips. The concerned ledger clerks who were required to maintain the ledgers and subsidiary ledgers and also the cashiers who disbursed the cash totalling to Rs.4,44,500/- are not examined in this case to substantiate the case against the accused for embezzlement. Both the ledger clerks and the cashiers are material witnesses for the prosecution and due to the non-examination of these material witnesses, adverse inference has to be drawn under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act. Whereas the trial judge has failed to appreciate the entire evidence on record since the prosecution has failed to examine the ledger clerks CW7-Smt.Chandrika, CW8-Smt.Shubhalakshmi and cashiers CW4-M.S.Umesh, CW6-Narasimha Bharathi and CW9-Vijaya Raghavan to prove that the accused obtained wrongful pecuniary advantage totalling to Rs.8,77,590/-. Adverse inference has to be drawn under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act against the prosecution relating to this issue. In this behalf learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of HABEEB MOHAMMED vs. STATE OF HYDERABAD reported in AIR 1954 SC 51 . 16. The learned Special Judge has failed to appreciate that non-prosecution of other official witnesses along with PWs. 1 and 2, CW3, Durgesh Naik. Ledger clerks and cashiers are fatal to the case of the prosecution in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of BHAGAT RAM vs. STATE OF PUNJAB reported in AIR 1954 SC 621 and the judgment of this Court in the case of KRISHNA MURTHY vs. STATE OF MYSORE reported in 1964 (1) Mys.L.J.440. He contends that these ratios are squarely applicable to the case on hand regarding charges framed against accused, as they were facing trial for the averment made in the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI. He contends that these ratios are squarely applicable to the case on hand regarding charges framed against accused, as they were facing trial for the averment made in the charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI. But the trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record relating to non-prosecution of the other official witnesses along with PWs. 1, 2 and 3. 17. It is further contended that four long years of fraud commencing from February 1990 to February 1994 could not have been committed by these accused without the participation of the other senior officers of the Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. In this connection, it has been highlighted supra that the checks and balances imposed by the bank are such that no official can escape fraud committed on a particular day without detection immediately. When balances are struck on daily, weekly and monthly basis by different persons at different places, it is maintained in the concerned branches but it is impossible that imputations have a grain of truth. So also auditing of bank accounts once in six months and once in a year, undertaken by the bank would have exposed the first accused Brunda if she alone committed the fraud. But the prosecution case is that fraud was detected after four long years on 09.02.1994 only through PW2 cannot be accepted. From the facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the non-examination of the ledger clerks and cashiers as they are material witnesses for the prosecution lead to the only conclusion that the superior officers systematically committed fraud, but the appellant being arraigned as accused No.1 was made a scapegoat. In the absence of arraigning the senior officers like PWs. 1 and 2, Durgesh Naik and CW3 M.S.Vishwanath even if it is held that appellants abetted the commission of fraud, they cannot be convicted. The appellants being arraigned as accused, this submission cannot be construed as admissions of guilt on behalf of themselves. That the appellant accused No.1 being the Special Assistant to discharge her duty in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore and as the work was supervised by PWs. 1 and 2, Durgesh Naik and CW3 M.S.Vishwanath, it is impossible for the accused No.1 to perpetrate the fraud continuously for four years from February 1990 to February 1994 in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore conspiring with her brother-in-law M.S.Ravindra being arraigned as accused No.2. 18. 1 and 2, Durgesh Naik and CW3 M.S.Vishwanath, it is impossible for the accused No.1 to perpetrate the fraud continuously for four years from February 1990 to February 1994 in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore conspiring with her brother-in-law M.S.Ravindra being arraigned as accused No.2. 18. In the case on hand, fraud alleged to have been committed for four long years on relevant fact highly inconsistent to the fact in issue, regarding the perpetration of fraud. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the course of business in a mighty bank such as Canara Bank and explain the state of things by cogent evidence in order to substantiate the case against the accused. But in the present case, given the impossibility of perpetration of fraud for four long years as the first accused was supervised by PWs 1 and 2, Durgesh Naik and CW3 M.S.Vishwanath, it is impossible for the accused No.1 to perpetrate that fraud continuously for four years from February 1990 to February 1994 conspiring with accused No2. who is her brother –in-law. 19. In this case, voluminous documents have been placed such as cash book, cashier scroll, balancing book, manager scroll, tallying book, cheque issue register. Any entry in one of them will have a RIPPLE EFFECT or DOMINO EFFECT, in all the books across the board. A discrepancy of an anomaly will show everywhere. If the closing balance is not struck, there is no opening balance for the next morning and the bank does no business but they say this happened for 5 years all only at the instance of the appellant/accused No.1. Reconciliation daily, weekly (Friday), quarterly and annually should happen. After business hours they sit and tally all the balances before the staff go out from the bank. But no explanation is offered as to how this happened for four long years without being detected by anybody relating to the fraud committed by the appellant/accused No.1 conspiring with her brother-in-aw accused No.2. Audits statutory, internal bank audit, RBI, by Chartered Accountant. It is impossible as to how one person could have perpetrated that this happened for five long years without detection. Durgesh Naik who is the manager for nine tenth periods when these defalcations said to have occurred, is not even interrogated. Accountant Vishwanath concerned ledger clerks were not examined. CW7 Chandrika and CW8 Shubhalakshmi were the ledger clerks. It is impossible as to how one person could have perpetrated that this happened for five long years without detection. Durgesh Naik who is the manager for nine tenth periods when these defalcations said to have occurred, is not even interrogated. Accountant Vishwanath concerned ledger clerks were not examined. CW7 Chandrika and CW8 Shubhalakshmi were the ledger clerks. Cashier, accountant were not examined in court. CW3 M.S.Vishwanath was not examined. 20. The subsidiary register is debited by accused No.1. These subsidiary registers are reconstructed. These reconstructed ones are photocopies and they are neither primary nor secondary evidence. The subsidiary sheets Ex.P25, ExP33, Ex.P118, Ex.P 360. For instance, this Ex.P25 covers 8.2.1990 to 19.1.1993 but ExP33 covers overlapping period from 22.4.1992 to 18.5.1992 and they are loose sheets. 21. No attempt is made to explain these entries viz, debit and credit of subsidiary registers, no explanations are forthcoming, the court is not appraised of how many volumes it maintained for the relevant period and how many running pages relating to these subsidiary registers. This fact is required to be appreciated in these appeals keeping in view the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 relating to the charges framed against the accused for embezzlement, that is to say, as defalcation. Nobody speaks about the book keeping system prevalent in the bank during the relevant time in clear terms. For four long years a fraud has been committed in the Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. The subsidiary registers are the Sheet Anchor of the prosecution case and do not have the best evidence in this regard to prove all the charges levelled against the accused for embezzlement. Subsidiary sheets are not sent to GEQD in any case. It is written from loose slips available. Therefore no purpose is served. The averment made in the charge sheet it is laid by the Investigating Officer, CBI. No endeavour is being made as to explain what are the cancellation entries at Ex.P25(b). 22. In so far as the concept corpus dilicti, whether there was loss to the bank at all itself is not established. None of the constituents of the bank ever complained. The evidence tendered by the prosecution is completely worthless as Investigating Officer makes accused Nos. 1 and 2 imitate disputed writings and signatures. 22. In so far as the concept corpus dilicti, whether there was loss to the bank at all itself is not established. None of the constituents of the bank ever complained. The evidence tendered by the prosecution is completely worthless as Investigating Officer makes accused Nos. 1 and 2 imitate disputed writings and signatures. In this regard, learned counsel has relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of K.VARADARAJA PAI AND ANOTHER vs. STATE BY CBI reported in 2013 (4) AKR 776. The investigation is on a monotrack not to ascertain the truth but evidence against the accused merely because she was discharging her duties as a Special Assistant at Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. 23. The next limb of the argument is relating to sanction accorded to prosecute the case against accused No.1 Brunda. On 22.07.1995 sanction was accorded for prosecuting accused No.1 Brunda by the Assistant General Manager Sri P.N. Narayana Rao who was examined as PW30. As this witness has been examined in order to prove the sanction order Ex.P274, sanction accorded by him is invalid due to non-application of mind and also lack of authority to accord sanction for prosecution against appellant accused No.1 Brunda. PW30 was working as Assistant General Manger at the relevant time. Admittedly, Assistant General Manager does not have power to remove the appellant/accused No.1 Brunda who was working as Special Assistant in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore as PW30 was also acting as Deputy General Manager in Circle Office, Canara Bank. He cannot function as Assistant General Manager and Deputy General Manager simultaneously. The expression used by PW30 that he was acting as a Deputy General Manager is totally incorrect because an officer cannot have dual role as Assistant General Manager and Deputy General Manager. The in-charge official cannot exercise statutory powers and it is held that entrusting additional duties to an officer does not amount to appointment to higher post. PW 30 was working as Assistant General Manager in Circle Office, Canara Bank has no authority to accord sanction for prosecution of accused No.1 Brunda. Hence, Ex.P274 sanction order issued by PW30 is illegal as PW-30 was not competent to remove accused No.1 Brunda from service. PW 30 was working as Assistant General Manager in Circle Office, Canara Bank has no authority to accord sanction for prosecution of accused No.1 Brunda. Hence, Ex.P274 sanction order issued by PW30 is illegal as PW-30 was not competent to remove accused No.1 Brunda from service. The trial court erroneously held that the sanction for the prosecution of the accused No.1 Brunda as at Ex.P274 dated 22.07.1995 accorded by PW30 as Assistant General Manager, Circle Office, Canara Bank, Bangalore is valid in law. Therefore, in these appeals it requires to be deprecated. 24. In the impugned judgment, at para Nos. 15 to 36, as regards the validity of the sanction order, it is totally incorrect as held by the Special Judge keeping in view of the evidence of PW30 who admitted himself that the Assistant General Manager like him is not competent to remove the appellant from service, should not have issued the sanction order. The Special Judge while examining the accused Brunda under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in question No.93 has described PW30 Narayana Rao as incharge Deputy General Manager, ought to have held that PW30 incharge Deputy General Manager is incompetent to accord sanction for prosecution of the appellant/accused No.1 Brunda as he is not a competent authority to exercise statutory powers in view of the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of B.N.DHOTRAD vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS-CUMAPPELLATE AUTHORITY AND OTHERS reported in ILR 2006 Kar.3163 and H.S.GOTLA vs. STATE reported in 2001 (3) Crl.L.J.2695. The Special Judge grossly erred in relying on sub-sections 19(3) and 19(4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for holding that the sanction order as at Ex.P274 it cannot be held invalid merely because there is an error, omission or irregularity in Ex.P274 sanction order as per the above Sections. It cannot be pressed into service at the trial stage especially when the accused Brunda contended before the trial court that sanction order is invalid. 25. It is further contended that the learned Special Judge grossly erred in relying on the decision of this Court in (2004) 7 SCC 763 in the case of STATE vs. T.VENKATESHMURTHY, 2005 SCC (Crl.) 953 in the case of C.S.KRISHNAMURTHY vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA and (2009) 1 ASC (Crl.) 953 in the case of PAUL VARGHEESSE vs. STATE OF KERALA. It is further contended that the learned Special Judge grossly erred in relying on the decision of this Court in (2004) 7 SCC 763 in the case of STATE vs. T.VENKATESHMURTHY, 2005 SCC (Crl.) 953 in the case of C.S.KRISHNAMURTHY vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA and (2009) 1 ASC (Crl.) 953 in the case of PAUL VARGHEESSE vs. STATE OF KERALA. The learned Special Judge has failed to appreciate the contention of the accused Brunda that VENKATESH MURTHY’s case relied upon by the prosecution has been distinguished by the Apex Court in BABU THOMAS’s case reported in 2005 Crl.L.J. 4379 and lack of authority to accord sanction for prosecution and the question of considering as to whether any prejudice is caused does not arise. Ex.P274 sanction order issued by PW30 suffers from the vice of non application of mind and due to that fact that the FIR, statement of witnesses, copies of documents, etc. were sent to PW30 along with investigation report whereas the investigation officer PW57 S.K. Vijay Rajiv clearly deposed that on 06.07.1995 he met PW30 and showed all the relevant documents in original and furnished draft sanction order for according sanction, for the prosecution of the accused No.1 Brunda. Thus, the vital discrepancy in the evidence of PW30 and PW57 relating to Ex.P274 leads to only conclusion that PW30 who is not competent to accord sanction issued the sanction order without proper application of mind. The learned Special Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record regarding to PW30 and the decision of the Apex Court in this connection in AMEER JAN’s case JT 2007 (11) SC 183 which is placed by him in support of his contention. 26. The learned Special Judge has further failed to appreciate the decision rendered in Crl.A.No.873/1997 in the case of STATE vs. RASHEEDA BEGUM dated 06.11.2003 upholding the trial court’s order discharging the accused at the end of the trial on the ground of invalidity of the sanction order due to non-application of mind. In the present case, accused No.1 Brunda was discharging her duty as Special Assistant in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore but they accorded sanction as at Ex.P274, which suffers from infirmities and lack of authority to accord sanction for prosecution issued by PW30. In the present case, accused No.1 Brunda was discharging her duty as Special Assistant in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore but they accorded sanction as at Ex.P274, which suffers from infirmities and lack of authority to accord sanction for prosecution issued by PW30. Therefore, it requires to be revisit the entire judgment rendered by the trial court relating to the sanction order for prosecuting the accused keeping in view of the evidence of PWs. 30 and 57. 27. It is further contended that the relief of non-production of crucial ledgers and other books which are in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore where accused Brunda was working as Special Assistant being a Government servant for charging against her relating to embezzlement, the prosecution ought to have proved its case by placing acceptable primary evidence relating to the charges framed against the accused Brunda. The prosecution has not produced all the necessary books which are the material documents to prove the guilt against the accused. The prosecution relied upon the reconstructed subsidiary ledgers, preparing such ledgers on the basis of slips. These reconstructed subsidiary ledgers are neither secondary evidence nor primary evidence and these ledgers merely are certified under the Bankers Books Evidence Act, does not become admissible in evidence. When these ledgers are the sheet anchor of the prosecution case, it requires to be appreciated in proper perspective. But the learned trial judge has not appreciated the evidence on record relating to these crucial ledgers and other books which were not produced by the prosecution in order to prove the guilt against the accused. The allegation and the charges where accused No.1 Brunda made debit entries in the subsidiary ledgers without debiting the ledger of the account holder, which cannot be proved in view of the admission made by PWs. 1 and 2 that the subsidiary ledgers have been reconstructed as original subsidiary ledgers were found missing and the learned trial judge has failed to appreciate the same and convicted the appellant. Therefore this requires to be reappreciated. 28. Likewise, the balancing books had incomplete pages, duty/roster book which would have disclosed that who was allotted what duties, was not produced. This documentary evidence was essential as in banking practice rotation of duties always takes place. But the prosecution did not produce the cashier’s scroll or the cash payment registers maintained by the cashiers. 28. Likewise, the balancing books had incomplete pages, duty/roster book which would have disclosed that who was allotted what duties, was not produced. This documentary evidence was essential as in banking practice rotation of duties always takes place. But the prosecution did not produce the cashier’s scroll or the cash payment registers maintained by the cashiers. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the appellant accused Brunda received the cash covered by 68 payment cheques totalling to Rs.4,44,500/-. Whereas the defence evidence wanted to place on record the investigation reports and also the inspection reports, but DW1 a bank official had stated on oath that none of these papers are available. 29. In order to vindicate that the accused No.1 Brunda was made a scapegoat, she summoned amongst the other inspection reports of Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore and DW1 S.N.Bhat that the documents summoned on behalf of the accused are not available in the bank. This situation leads to a conclusion that PWs. 1 and 2, Durgesh Naik, and CW2 M.S.Vishwanath are also involved in the fraud or were the only perpetrators of fraud, if any. This aspect requires for consideration in these appeals, keeping in view of the evidence of these witnesses relating to the charges framed against accused Brunda committing defalcation as the charge-sheet laid by the Investigation Officer, CBI. The prosecution has failed to place cogent material evidence before the court that accused Brunda received the amount covered by 79 cheques totalling to Rs.4,33,090/- or the cash payment. The prosecution produced loose sheets though they are required to be bound books and apart from that the individual ledgers accounts too in several cases have not been produced. All these aspects also requires to be re: appreciated on the basis of the entire evidence placed by the prosecution relating to the charges framed against this accused Brunda for committing the fraud and also misappropriation of the amount by conspiring with second accused M.S.Ravindra. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance in the case of STATE OF KERALA vs. THOMAS ALIAS BOBY reported in (1986) 2 SCC 411 and COMMON CAUSE vs. UNION OF INDIA reported in AIR 2017 SC 540 . Para Nos. 13 to 20 of the said judgment reads as under: “13. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India and Mr. Para Nos. 13 to 20 of the said judgment reads as under: “13. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India and Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned ASG have submitted that the material in question with respect to Sahara Group on the basis of which investigation is sought for, have been found by the Settlement Commission, in proceedings under Section 245D of the Income Tax Act, to be doubtful. The documents which have been filed by the Birla as well as Sahara Group are not in the form of account books maintained in regular course of business. They are random sheets and loose papers and their correctness and authenticity, even for the purpose of income mentioned therein have been found to be un-reliable having no evidentiary value, by the concerned authorities of income tax. The documents of Birla Group are also the same. They are not in the form of regular books of account and are random and stray materials and thus the case of Birla also stands on the same footing. 14. Placing implicit reliance of the decision of this Court in C.B.I. v. V.C. Shukla (supra), it was submitted that it is open to any unscrupulous person to make any entry any time against any body's name unilaterally on any sheet of paper or computer excel sheet. There being no further corroborative material with respect to the payment, no case is made out so as to direct an investigation, and that too against large number of persons named in the documents. Such entries have been held to be prima facie not even admissible in investigation and falsity or correctness of the documents has to be seen in course of the investigation. V.C. Shukla's case. He urged that in case investigation is ordered on the basis of such documents, it would be very dangerous and no constitutional functionary/officer can function independently, as per the constitutional imperatives. No case is made out on the basis of material which is not cognizable in law, to direct investigation. 15. Before dilating upon the issue canvassed in the application we make it clear that we have not examined the main writ petitions vis a vis challenge to the appointments of respondent Nos.2 and 3. No case is made out on the basis of material which is not cognizable in law, to direct investigation. 15. Before dilating upon the issue canvassed in the application we make it clear that we have not examined the main writ petitions vis a vis challenge to the appointments of respondent Nos.2 and 3. We are examining only the merit of the I.A. No. 3 supported by I.A. No.4, as to whether a case is made out on the basis of materials which are placed on record, to constitute SIT and direct investigation against the various functionaries/officers which are projected in Annexure A-8, A-9 and A-10 and other entries on loose sheets and further monitor the same. 16. With respect to the kind of materials which have been placed on record, this Court in V.C. Shukla's case (supra) has dealt with the matter though at the stage of discharge when investigation had been completed but same is relevant for the purpose of decision of this case also. This Court has considered the entries in Jain Hawala diaries, note books and file containing loose sheets of papers not in the form of "Books of Accounts" and has held that such entries in loose papers/sheets are irrelevant and not admissible under Section 34 of the Evidence Act, and that only where the entries are in the books of accounts regularly kept, depending on the nature of occupation, that those are admissible. 17. It has further been laid down in V.C. Shukla (Supra) as to the value of entries in the books of account, that such statement shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability, even if they are relevant and admissible, and that they are only corroborative evidence. It has been held even then independent evidence is necessary as to trustworthiness of those entries which is a requirement to fasten the liability. 18. This Court has further laid down in V.C. Shukla (Supra) that meaning of account book would be spiral note book/pad but not loose sheets. The following extract being relevant is quoted hereinbelow :- "14. In setting aside the order of the trial court, the High Court accepted the contention of the respondents that the documents were not admissible in evidence under Section 34 with the following words: "An account presupposes the existence of two persons such as a seller and a purchaser, creditor and debtor. In setting aside the order of the trial court, the High Court accepted the contention of the respondents that the documents were not admissible in evidence under Section 34 with the following words: "An account presupposes the existence of two persons such as a seller and a purchaser, creditor and debtor. Admittedly, the alleged diaries in the present case are not records of the entries arising out of a contract. They do not contain the debits and credits. They can at the most be described as a memorandum kept by a person for his own benefit which will enable him to look into the same whenever the need arises to do so for his future purpose. Admittedly the said diaries were not being maintained on day-to-day basis in the course of business. There is no mention of the dates on which the alleged payments were made. In fact the entries therein are on monthly basis. Even the names of the persons whom the alleged payments were made do not find a mention in full. They have been shown in abbreviated form. Only certain 'letters' have been written against their names which are within the knowledge of only the scribe of the said diaries as to what they stand for and whom they refer to." x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 17. From a plain reading of the Section it is manifest that to make an entry relevant thereunder it must be shown that it has been made in a book, that book is a book of account and that book of account has been regularly kept in the course of business. From the above Section it is also manifest that even if the above requirements are fulfilled and the entry becomes admissible as relevant evidence, still, the statement made therein shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. It is thus seen that while the first part of the section speaks of the relevancy of the entry as evidence, the second part speaks, in a negative way, of its evidentiary value for charging a person with a liability. It is thus seen that while the first part of the section speaks of the relevancy of the entry as evidence, the second part speaks, in a negative way, of its evidentiary value for charging a person with a liability. It will, therefore, be necessary for us to first ascertain whether the entries in the documents, with which we are concerned, fulfill the requirements of the above section so as to be admissible in evidence and if this question is answered in the affirmative then only its probative value need be assessed. 18. "Book" ordinarily means a collection of sheets of paper or other material, blank, written, or printed, fastened or bound together so as to form a material whole. Loose sheets or scraps of paper cannot be termed as "book" for they can be easily detached and replaced. In dealing with the word "book" appearing in Section 34 in Mukundram v. Dayaram a decision on which both sides have placed reliance, the Court observed:- "In its ordinary sense it signifies a collection of sheets of paper bound together in a manner which cannot be disturbed or altered except by tearing apart. The binding is of a kind which is not intended to the moveable in the sense of being undone and put together again. A collection of papers in a portfolio, or clip, or strung together on a piece of twine which is intended to be untied at will, would not, in ordinary English, be called a book. ... I think the term 'book' in Section 34 aforesaid may properly be taken to signify, ordinarily, a collection of sheets of paper bound together with the intention that such binding shall be permanent and the papers used collectively in one volume. It is easier however to say what is not a book for the purposes of Section 34, and I have no hesitation in holding that unbound sheets of paper, in whatever quantity, though filled up with one continuous account, are not a book of account within the purview of Section 34." We must observe that the aforesaid approach is in accord with good reasoning and we are in full agreement with it. Applying the above tests it must be held that the two spiral note books (MR 68/91 and MR 71/91) and the two spiral pads (MR 69/91 and MR 70/91) are "books" within the meaning of Section 34, but not the loose sheets of papers contained in the two files (MRs 72/91 and 73/91). x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 20. Mr. Sibal, the learned counsel for the Jains, did not dispute that the spiral note books and the small pads are "books" within the meaning of Section 34. He, however, strongly disputed the admissibility of those books in evidence under the aforesaid section on the ground that they were neither books of account nor they were regularly kept in the course of business. He submitted that at best it could be said that those books were memoranda kept by a person for his own benefit. According to Mr. Sibal, in business parlance "account" means a formal statement of money transactions between parties arising out of contractual or fiduciary relationship. Since the books in question did not reflect any such relationship and, on the contrary, only contained entries of monies received from one set of persons and payment thereof to another set of persons it could not be said, by any stretch of imagination that they were books of account, argued Mr Sibal. He next contended that even if it was assumed for argument's sake that the above books were books of account relating to a business still they would not be admissible under Section 34 as they were not regularly kept. It was urged by him that the words "regularly kept" mean that the entries in the books were contemporaneously made at the time the transactions took place but a cursory glance of the books would show that the entries were made therein long after the purported transactions took place. In support of his contentions he also relied upon the dictionary meanings of the words 'account' and 'regularly kept'." (Emphasis added by us) 19. With respect to evidentiary value of regular account book, this Court has laid down in V.C. Shukla, thus; "37. In support of his contentions he also relied upon the dictionary meanings of the words 'account' and 'regularly kept'." (Emphasis added by us) 19. With respect to evidentiary value of regular account book, this Court has laid down in V.C. Shukla, thus; "37. In Beni v. Bisan Dayal it was observed that entries in books of account are not by themselves sufficient to charge any person with liability, the reason being that a man cannot be allowed to make evidence for himself by what he chooses to write in his own books behind the back of the parties. There must be independent evidence of the transaction to which the entries relate and in absence of such evidence no relief can be given to the party who relies upon such entries to support his claim against another. In Hira Lal v. Ram Rakha the High Court, while negativing a contention that it having been proved that the books of account were regularly kept in the ordinary course of business and that, therefore, all entries therein should be considered to be relevant and to have been proved, said that the rule as laid down in Section 34 of the Act that entries in the books of account regularly kept in the course of business are relevant whenever they refer to a matter in which the Court has to enquire was subject to the salient proviso that such entries shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability. It is not, therefore, enough merely to prove that the books have been regularly kept in the course of business and the entries therein are correct. It is further incumbent upon the person relying upon those entries to prove that they were in accordance with facts." 20. It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion that loose sheets of papers are wholly irrelevant as evidence being not admissible under Section 34 so as to constitute evidence with respect to the transactions mentioned therein being of no evidentiary value. The entire prosecution based upon such entries which led to the investigation was quashed by this Court.” 30. It is further contended that no reliance could be placed on expert evidence as the opinion was given numerals and initials with seals and overwriting by many others. The entire prosecution based upon such entries which led to the investigation was quashed by this Court.” 30. It is further contended that no reliance could be placed on expert evidence as the opinion was given numerals and initials with seals and overwriting by many others. In support of this contention he relied upon the evidence of PW56 C.H.Gandhi who has been examined by the prosecution. It cannot be relied upon due to the fact that prosecution has failed to prove the admitting writings of the accused Brunda as well as the co-accused. The signatures of the accused are not decipherable and hence her signature cannot be identifiable by hand writing expert though PW 56 has been examined for the prosecution in order to prove the charges levelled against her. The numerals and initials with all the overwritings and seals would make it impossible for an expert to give any opinion conclusively on the charges levelled against accused Brunda. 31. The judgment rendered in O.S.No.58/1997 dismissing the suit filed by Canara Bank for recovery of fraud amount against the accused and her husband wherein the civil court came to the categorical conclusion in its judgment dated 17.12.2009 that PWs. 1 and 2 and other officers of the bank entered into a criminal conspiracy and made the accused Brunda a scapegoat in the alleged offence. The learned trial judge has ignored the ratio placed in the case of M/S.KARAM CHAND GANGA PRASAD AND ANOTHER vs. UNION OF INDIA reported in 1971 Crl.L.J.1072 wherein it is held that the civil court judgments are binding on criminal courts while appreciating the evidence in criminal courts. The said ratio is squarely applicable to the case on hand. 32. It is further contended that the learned trial judge has grossly erred in relying on the admissions made by the accused Brunda and her husband in the letters at Exs. P1 to P4 to the effect that the accused Brunda alone was responsible for the fraud treating the admissions as extra judicial confessions. Therefore, in these appeals, it requires to be re-appreciated by the evidence on record wherein the trial court has not properly appreciated the entire evidence on record in proper perspective for the charges levelled against the accused in so far as extra judicial confessions were simply irrelevant in view of Section 24 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, in these appeals, it requires to be re-appreciated by the evidence on record wherein the trial court has not properly appreciated the entire evidence on record in proper perspective for the charges levelled against the accused in so far as extra judicial confessions were simply irrelevant in view of Section 24 of the Evidence Act. Reliance is placed on PYARE LAL BHARGAVA vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN reported in AIR 1963 SC 1094 . Paras 3, 4, 5 and 6 are extracted hereinbelow: “3. Learned counsel for the appellant raised before us three points, namely, (1) the High Court has wrongly relied upon the confession made by the accused before Shri P. N. Singhal, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Matsya Government at that time, as that confession was not made voluntarily and, therefore, irrelevant under S.24 of the Evidence Act; (2) the said confession having been retracted by the appellant, the High Court should not have relied upon it as it was not corroborated in material particulars; and (3) on the facts found the offence of theft has not been made out within the meaning of S.379 of the Indian Penal Code. Another argument, namely, that the statement made by Pyarelal Bhargava before the Chief Secretary was not a confession in law, was suggested but not pursued and, therefore, nothing need be said about it. 4. The first question turns upon the interpretation of the provisions of S.24 of the Evidence Act and its application to the facts found in this case. Section 24 of the Evidence Act lays down that a confession caused by inducement, threat or promise is irrelevant in criminal proceedings under certain circumstances. Under that section a confession would be irrelevant if the following conditions were satisfied: (1) it should appear to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise; (2) the said threat, inducement or promise must have reference to the charge against the accused person; (3) it shall proceed from a personal authority; and (4) the court shall be of the opinion that the said inducement, threat or promise is sufficient to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable in supposing that he would gain an advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. The crucial word in the first ingredient is the expression "appears". The crucial word in the first ingredient is the expression "appears". The appropriate meaning of the word "appears" is "seems". It imports a lesser degree of probability than proof. Section 3 of the Evidence Act says: "A fact is said to be 'proved' when after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Therefore, the test of proof is that there is such a high degree of probability that a prudent man would act on the assumption that the thing is true. But under S. 24 of the Evidence Act such a stringent rule is waived but a lesser degree of assurance is laid down as the criterion. The standard of a prudent man is not completely displaced, but the stringent rule of proof is relaxed. Even so, the laxity of proof permitted does not warrant a court's opinion based on pure surmise. A prima facie opinion based on evidence and circumstances may be adopted as the standard laid down. To put it in other words, on the evidence and the circumstances in a particular case it may appear to the court that there was a threat, inducement or promise, though the said fact is not strictly proved. This deviation from the strict standards of proof has been designedly accepted by the Legislature with a view to exclude forced or induced confessions which sometimes are extorted and put in when there is a lack of direct evidence. It is not possible or advisable to lay down an inflexible standard for guidance of courts, for in the ultimate analysis it is the court which is called upon to exclude a confession by holding in the circumstances of a particular case that the confession was not made voluntarily.” 5. The threat, inducement or promise must proceed from a person in authority and it is a question of fact in each case whether the person concerned is a man of authority or not. The threat, inducement or promise must proceed from a person in authority and it is a question of fact in each case whether the person concerned is a man of authority or not. What is more important is that the mere existence of the threat, inducement or promise is not enough, but in the opinion of the court the said threat, inducement or promise shall be sufficient to cause a reasonable belief in the mind of accused that by confessing he would get an advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him: while the opinion is that of the court, the criterion is the reasonable belief of the accused. The section, therefore, makes it clear that it is the duty of the court to place itself in the position of the accused and to form an opinion as to the state of his mind in the circumstances of a case. 6. In the present case it was found that certain documents in the Chief Engineer’s Office were tampered with and certain papers were substituted. The appellant was the Superintendent in the Chief Engineer's Office. On April 11, 1949, Shri P. N. Singhal, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Matsya Government, was making a departmental inquiry in respect of the missing documents. The appellant, among others, was questioned about the said documents. The appellant first made a statement, Ex. PL, in which he stated that he neither asked Bishan Swarup to bring file No. 127, nor did he recollect any cause for calling for that file on or about that date. As Shri Singhal was not able to find out the culprit, he expressed his opinion that if the whole truth did not come out, he would hand over the inquiry to the police. Thereafter, the appellant made a statement, Ex. P.L. 1, wherein, in clear terms, he admitted that about the middle of December 1948 Ram Kumar Ram took file No. 127- P. W.48 regarding issue of licence to the Bharat Electrical and Industrial Corporation Ltd., Alwar, from his residence to show it to his lawyers, and that he took the file more than once for that purpose. He also added that this was a voluntary statement. He also added that this was a voluntary statement. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Chief Secretary gave the threat that, if the appellant did not disclose the truth he would place the matter in the hands of the police and that the threat induced the appellant to make the disclosure in the hope that he would be excused by the authority concerned. There is no doubt that the Chief Secretary is an authority within the meaning of S.24 of the Evidence Act, but the simple question is whether the alleged statement by the said authority “appears" to the court to be a threat with reference to the charge against the accused. As we have said, under particular circumstances whether a statement appears to the court to be a threat or not is a question of fact. In this case the three lower courts concurrently held that in the circumstances of the case the statement did not appear to be a threat within the meaning of S.24 of the Evidence Act., but that was only a general statement which any person who lost his property and was not able to find out the culprit would make. It may be that such a statement under different circumstances may amount to a threat or it may also be that another court may take a different view even in the present circumstances of the case, but in exercising the powers under Art.136 of the Constitution we are not prepared to differ from the concurrent finding given by the three courts that in the circumstances of the present case that the said statement did not appear to them to be a threat.” 33. In the case of VINOD SOLANKI vs. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER reported in (2008) 16 SCC 537 at paras 10, 11, 15, 16, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 34, 36 the Supreme Court held as under: “10. Mr. Tarun Gulati, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would, inter alia, submit: (i) The courts below have wrongly placed the burden of proof on the appellant. Mr. Tarun Gulati, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would, inter alia, submit: (i) The courts below have wrongly placed the burden of proof on the appellant. (ii) As the provisions of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act are attracted also in the matter of confession made before the authorities under the Act, the findings arrived at, inter alia, relying on or on the basis of the purported confession made by appellant were wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. 11. Mr.P.V. Shetty, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would contend: (i) The burden of proof has rightly been placed on the appellant as he, in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, had special knowledge as to how he had entered into the transactions of import and on whose behalf. (ii) The very fact that the appellant had given details of the transactions is a clear pointer to the fact that only he and he alone knew thereabout and in that view of the matter no illegality can be said to have been committed in placing the burden of proof on him. (iii) The authorities under the Act having the power of carrying out search and seizure as also issuance of summons on any person and as the person so summoned has a statutory obligation to make a true statement, confession made by him would not be hit by the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act inasmuch as when such a statement was made by him he was not an accused and the officer under the Act was not a police officer. ……… 15. The questions which would arise for our consideration are: (1) whether the appellant had made bald statement at the time of retraction alleging threat and coercion so as to shift the burden of proof from him to the Enforcement Directorate; and (2) whether consolidated penalty could have been imposed only on the basis of such retracted confession. 16. Indisputably, a confession made by an accused would come within the purview of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under: "24. 16. Indisputably, a confession made by an accused would come within the purview of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under: "24. Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding.- A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him." ……… 23. It is a trite law that evidences brought on record by way of confession which stood retracted must be substantially corroborated by other independent and cogent evidences, which would lend adequate assurance to the court that it may seek to rely thereupon. We are not oblivious of some decisions of this Court wherein reliance has been placed for supporting such contention but we must also notice that in some of the cases retracted confession has been used as a piece of corroborative evidence and not as the evidence on the basis whereof alone a judgment of conviction and sentence has been recorded. {See Pon Adithan v. Deputy Director, Narcotics Control Bureau} 24. The question came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Shanti Prasad Jain vs. The Director of Enforcement, wherein, inter alia, it was held that the initial burden would be on the Department. 25. It is interesting to note that both the learned counsel have placed strong reliance upon a decision of this Court in K.T.M.S. Mohd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India. This Court therein made a distinction between the provisions of the FERA and the Income Tax Act, opining: "31. Leave apart, even if the officers of the Enforcement intend to take action against the deponent of a statement on the basis of his inculpatory statement which has been subsequently repudiated, the officer concerned must take both the statements together, give a finding about the nature of the repudiation and then act upon the earlier inculpatory one. Leave apart, even if the officers of the Enforcement intend to take action against the deponent of a statement on the basis of his inculpatory statement which has been subsequently repudiated, the officer concerned must take both the statements together, give a finding about the nature of the repudiation and then act upon the earlier inculpatory one. If on the other hand, the officer concerned bisect the two statements and make use of the inculpatory statement alone conveniently bypassing the other such a stand cannot be a legally permissible because admissibility, reliability and the evidentiary value of the statement of the inculpatory statement depend on the bench mark of the provisions of the Evidence Act and the general criminal law." Holding in categorical terms that Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act shall apply, it was held: "34. ……..But suffice to say that the core of all the decisions of this Court is to the effect that the voluntary nature of any statement made either before the Custom Authorities or the officers of Enforcement under the relevant provisions of the respective Acts is a sine qua non to act on it for any purpose and if the statement appears to have been obtained by any inducement, threat, coercion or by any improper means that statement must be rejected brevi manu. At the same time, it is to be noted that merely because a statement is retracted, it cannot be recorded as involuntary or unlawfully obtained. It is only for the maker of the statement who alleges inducement, threat, promise etc. to establish that such improper means has been adopted. However, even if the maker of the statement fails to establish his allegations of inducement, threat etc. against the officer who recorded the statement, the authority while acting on the inculpatory statement of the maker is not completely relieved of his obligations in at least subjectively applying its mind to the subsequent retraction to hold that the inculpatory statement was not extorted. It thus boils down that the authority or any Court intending to act upon the inculpatory statement as a voluntary one should apply its mind to the retraction and reject the same in writing. It thus boils down that the authority or any Court intending to act upon the inculpatory statement as a voluntary one should apply its mind to the retraction and reject the same in writing. It is only on this principle of law, this Court in several decisions has ruled that even in passing a detention order on the basis of an inculpatory statement of a detenu who has violated the provisions of the FERA or the Customs Act etc. the detaining authority should consider the subsequent retraction and record its opinion before accepting the inculpatory statement lest the order will be vitiated." 26. Submission of Mr. P.V. Shetty that appellant had special knowledge and that burden of proof would be on him in terms of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, in a situation of this nature, cannot be held to have any substance. The initial burden to prove that the confession was voluntary in nature would be on the Department. The special or peculiar knowledge of the person proceeded against would not relieve the prosecution or the Department altogether of the burden of producing some evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It may only alleviate that burden to discharge and very slight evidence may suffice. …….. 28. Yet again in Romesh Chandra Mehta vs. State of West Bengal although this Court held that any statement made under Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act by a person against whom an enquiry is made by a Customs Officer is not a statement made by a person accused of an offence, but as indicated hereinbefore, he being an officer concerned or the person in authority, Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act would be attracted. 29. Reliance has been placed by the Tribunal on the decision of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu, commonly known as the `Parliament Attack case.' Therein also this Court held: "27. We start with the confessions. Under the general law of the land as reflected in the Indian Evidence Act, no confession made to a police officer can be proved against an accused. 'Confessions'-which is a terminology used in criminal law is a species of 'admissions' as defined in Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act. We start with the confessions. Under the general law of the land as reflected in the Indian Evidence Act, no confession made to a police officer can be proved against an accused. 'Confessions'-which is a terminology used in criminal law is a species of 'admissions' as defined in Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act. An admission is a statement-oral or documentary which enables the court to draw an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. It is trite to say that every confession must necessarily be an admission, but, every admission does not necessarily amount to a confession. While Sections 17 to 23 deals with admissions, the law as to confessions is embodied in Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 25 bars proof of a confession made to a police officer. Section 26 goes a step further and prohibits proof of confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 24 lays down the obvious rule that a confession made under any inducement, threat or promise becomes irrelevant in a criminal proceeding. Such inducement, threat or promise need not be proved to the hilt. If it appears to the court that the making of the confession was caused by any inducement, threat or promise proceeding from a person in authority, the confession is liable to be excluded from evidence. The expression 'appears' connotes that the Court need not go to the extent of holding that the threat etc. has in fact been proved. If the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence adduced make it reasonably probable that the confession could be the result of threat, inducement or pressure, the court will refrain from acting on such confession, even if it be a confession made to a Magistrate or a person other than police officer." 34. In CCE vs. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. & ors., this Court opined that an authority under the Act while recording a statement need not follow the safeguards provided in Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Therein also, it was held: "12. In CCE vs. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. & ors., this Court opined that an authority under the Act while recording a statement need not follow the safeguards provided in Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Therein also, it was held: "12. The inculpatory statement made by any person under Section 108 is to non-police personnel and hence it has no tinge of inadmissibility in evidence if it was made when the person concerned was not then in police custody. Nonetheless the caution contained in law is that such a statement should be scrutinized by the court in the same manner as confession made by an accused person to any non-police personnel. The court has to be satisfied in such cases, that any inculpatory statement made by an accused person to a gazetted officer must also pass the tests prescribed in Section 24 of the Evidence Act. If such a statement is impaired by any of the vitiating premises enumerated in Section 24 that statement becomes useless in any criminal proceedings." Yet again it was observed: "17. We hold that a statement recorded by Customs Officers under Section 108 of the Customs Act is admissible in evidence. The court has to test whether the inculpating portions were made voluntarily or whether it is vitiated on account of any of the premises envisaged in Section 24 of the Evidence Act." ………. 36. A person accused of commission of an offence is not expected to prove to the hilt that confession had been obtained from him by any inducement, threat or promise by a person in authority. The burden is on the prosecution to show that the confession is voluntary in nature and not obtained as an outcome of threat, etc. if the same is to be relied upon solely for the purpose of securing a conviction.” 33. The ratio regarding extra judicial confession as given by accused No.1 Brunda has not been properly appreciated by the trial court. It has erred in looking into the admission made by the accused relating to the letter at Exs. P1 to P4 including her husband’s undertaking letter. 34. The ratio regarding extra judicial confession as given by accused No.1 Brunda has not been properly appreciated by the trial court. It has erred in looking into the admission made by the accused relating to the letter at Exs. P1 to P4 including her husband’s undertaking letter. 34. In AIR 1930 Oudh 324 followed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.1698/2006 it is held that the payments made cannot be construed as incriminating conduct of the accused wherein it is held that taking into consideration the evidence given by the prosecution it cannot be inferred that the accused alone is responsible for the fraud as the fraud amounts have been refunded by her sister and other relatives. The mere oral evidence of the prosecution witness who would have obliged the prosecution by looking into their statements made in the course of investigation it cannot prove a thing beyond reasonable doubt and at best it may show the negligence of the appellant Brunda relating to the charges levelled against her. The suspicion was turned to accused No.1 Brunda as her brother-in–law accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra had a current account and S.B.Account in the Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore and conveniently made the accused a scapegoat in the banking fraud. The prosecution seems to rely upon certain money recipient witnesses to prove the guilt against the appellant Nos. 1 and 2. The evidence of these witnesses is inherently defective. As it claims photographic memory, the same is required to be re-appreciated in these appeals in a proper perspective. But the same has not been done by the learned trial judge. Most of these money recipient witnesses fill up the cheques themselves in their own hand and quite surprisingly seems to have accepted a cheque of some stranger third party and discharged a debt due from accused Nos. 1 and 2 and this itself makes their testimony suspicious. On these grounds which are urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, he seeks to consider the written submission made for the accused and accordingly prays for setting aside the judgment passed by the trial court against the accused and prays for acquittal of the charges levelled against them. 35. On these grounds which are urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, he seeks to consider the written submission made for the accused and accordingly prays for setting aside the judgment passed by the trial court against the accused and prays for acquittal of the charges levelled against them. 35. Per contra, learned Special PP for the respondent – State has taken a contention by submitting the written synopsis that accused No.1 Brunda and accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra have perpetrated the offences punishable which are charged against them as in the instance No.1 though accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra was not holding sufficient balance in his S.B.Account bearing No.3229 and 6121 in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore he issued cheques which were to be returned after dishonour. Instead accused No.1 Brunda had passed such cheques, debited the amount from the subsidiary account of the bank and did not debit the corresponding amount in the ledger which reveals at Exs. P23, P170, P231, P230, P177, P204, P65, P179, P175, P220, P233, P234, P237, P232, P152, P153, P171, P207, P208, P187, P174, P61, P182, P181, P178, P115, P59, P185, P186, P183, P205, P184, P67, P180, P169, P172, P202, P168 and P214 totalling to a sum of Rs.1,67,190/-. In so far as the second instance is concerned, accused No.1 Brunda replaced the specimen signature card of accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra with fresh one bearing slightly different signature in S.B.A/c.No.3229 by forging the date and seal purported to be dated 09.10.1986 though such replacement was after 1990 as indicated at Exs.P159, P167, P166, P165 and P164, totalling to a sum of Rs.25,070/-. In so far as instance No.3 is concerned, accused No.1 Brunda passed several cheques by incorporating the wrong account number with an intention to defraud the bank which is indicated at Exs.P148, P173, P53, P113, P117, P188, P74, P143, P75, P145, P124, P128, P136, P137, P139, P131, P112, P109, P108, P106, P105, P116, P27, P144, P130, P135, P55, P120, P121, P122, P125 and P129, totalling to a sum of Rs.2,56,580/-. In so far as instance No.4 is concerned, accused No.1 Brunda forged the signature of customer namely R.K.Belur whose A/c.No.1925 was closed on 08.03.1992 and passed cheques, withdrawal slips through the said account which is indicated at Exs.P196, P197, P198, P80, P76, P77, P78, P79, P201, P81, P190, P82, P83, P84, P85, P86, P87, P88, P89, P90, P91, P92, P158, P155, P142, P199, P192, P194, P195 and P193, in all amounting to Rs.2,74,750/-. In so far as instance No.5 is concerned, accused No.1 Brunda forged the signature of the customers on instruments like cheque, withdrawal slips as indicated at Exs.P38, P36, P47, P41, P40, P39, P37, P35, P49, P52, P48, P50, P51, P46, P34, P32 and P42 in all amounting to Rs.1,54,000/-. The same has been reflected in these exhibits and also the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2. The prosecution has rightly relied upon the evidence of these witnesses coupled with the evidence of PW5, PW6, PW14, PW12, PW13, PW25, PW55, PW11, PW49, PW33 and PW55, respectively. 36. The trial court had given findings on PW1’s evidence as per Ex.P1 letter given by the accused No.1 Brunda to PW1 on 12.02.1994 regarding misappropriation of money and reimbursement of the same to PW1. Ex.P2 is the guarantee letter given by the husband of accused No.1 on 12.02.1994. Exs. P3 and P4 are the letters seeking time to reimburse the misappropriated amount on 14.03.1994 and 17.05.1994 and DDs. and pay orders sent by accused No.1 Brunda. The misappropriated amount have been deposited by the husband of accused No.1 and her elder sister in an amount of Rs.75,059/- as indicated at Exs.P5 to P22. The same has been seen in the evidence of PW1 regarding to this amount which is deposited by the husband of accused No.1 and her elder sister. Accused No.1 Brunda was working as a Special Assistant at Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore between February 1990 to February 1994 whereas accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra being the brother-in-law of the accused Brunda and a customer of the Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch at Mysore. The second accused M.S.Ravindra had drawn in all 53 cheques as indicated and accused No.1 Brunda who passed the instrument for cash payment as she had herself issued cheques in S.B.A/c.No.2784 and 3555. The said cheques were signed by accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra. The second accused M.S.Ravindra had drawn in all 53 cheques as indicated and accused No.1 Brunda who passed the instrument for cash payment as she had herself issued cheques in S.B.A/c.No.2784 and 3555. The said cheques were signed by accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra. Therefore, accused No.1 being Special Assistant at Canara Bank by discharging her duties passed the said cheques, debited the subsidiary account of the bank. Thus accused No.1 Brunda caused loss of Rs.1,67,190/- to the Bank and wrongfully encashed 53 transactions as under instance No.1. In so far as instance No.2, accused No.1 Brunda who replaces the specimen signature card of S.B.A/c. bearing No.3229 of accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra which is maintained therein with slight variation signature of accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra by forging the date as of 09.10.1986 and make it appear that the said specimen signature card was obtained during opening of the account though it was fabricated in the year 1990. The same has been indicated in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. Accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra who signed the 7 different cheques in the same manner in which he had signed in the replaced card. Accused No.1 passed these 7 cheques for payment without debiting the account of the accused No.2 though there was insufficient amount in the account of accused No.2. The same has been seen in the evidence of the prosecution which are placed for the charges levelled against the accused. Accused No.1 had debited the subsidiary ledger of the bank without debiting the S.B. A/c.No.3229 of accused No.2 thereby causing wrongful loss of Rs.25,070/- to the Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore and wrongful gain of the said amount to themselves as specifically indicated at instance No.2. As regards instance No.3 is concerned, accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra signed in all 36 cheques of which his signature in the specimen card was not tallying, were passed by accused No.1 by writing different account numbers on the cheques and accused No.1 did not debit either the ledger account of accused No.2 or account number mentioned in the instrument and she has debited the subsidiary ledger of the bank thereby causing wrongful loss to the bank at Rs.2,56,580/- and wrongful gain to the accused. It is relevant to state that in respect of instance No.4 the account of one R.K.Belur bearing S.B.A/c.No.1925 which was closed on 08.03.1992 itself, accused No.1 authorized issuance of cheque books to accused No.2 who in turn gave those cheques to money lenders. Accused No.1 by abusing her official position fraudulently debited the subsidiary ledger of the bank without debiting the ledger account, thereby causing wrongful loss to the bank to the tune of Rs.2,74,750/- and wrongful gain to the accused persons. In regard to instance No.5 is concerned, where accused No.1 Brunda has forged signature of customers by name Prakash Kumar, on the cheques and withdrawal slips, used them as genuine and passed them for cash payment, she has debited the subsidiary account of the bank but did not debit in the ledger. There are in all 17 cheques totally amounting to Rs.1,54,000/-. 37. In support of the contentions advanced, learned SPP for the respondent has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of VINAYAK NARAYAN DEOSTHALI vs. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION reported in (2015) 2 SCC 553 wherein it is held that the accused misusing his official position as public servant has unauthorizedly transferred the funds of Engineering Export Promotion Council amounting to Rs.7.75 crores to private account. He contends that in the instant case accused No.1 Brunda, conspiring with accused No.2 being her brother-inlaw, committed fraud by debiting the subsidiary account and did not debit the corresponding account and also by passing the cheques, replacing the specimen signature card and forging the signature of a customer. As the charge against accused was that she had committed the acts with dishonest and fraudulent intention, the case on hand squarely applies to the facts of the case referred to above. 38. Nextly, he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.VENKATKRISHNAN vs. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION reported in (2009) 11 SCC 737 wherein it is held that criminal conspiracy can be proved on the basis of circumstantial evidence by necessary implication. Criminal conspiracy is an independent offence. It must be proved by applying legal principles which are applicable for the purpose of proving a criminal misconduct on the part of an accused. Criminal conspiracy is an independent offence. It must be proved by applying legal principles which are applicable for the purpose of proving a criminal misconduct on the part of an accused. A criminal conspiracy must be put to action and so long as a crime is generated in the mind of a criminal it does not become punishable. In the case on hand, the accused No.1 Brunda working as a Special Assistant of Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore, had conspired with accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra being her brother-in-law, and had forged the date and seal purported to be the S.B.A/c.No.3221 which is maintained in that branch even though he was not holding sufficient balance in his account in S.B.A/c.No.3229 and 6121. The learned counsel has also relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NIRANJAN HEMACHANDRA SASHITTAL vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in (2013) 4 SCC 642 , (2015) 6 SCC 185 reported in SHANTI LAL MEENA vs. STATE (NCT OF DELHI), CBI and A.B.BHASKARA RAO vs. INSPECTOR OF POLICE, CBI, VISHAKAPATNAM reported in (2011) 10 SCC 259 to contend that accused No.1 conspiring with accused No.2 has passed withdrawal slips/cheques in order to commit fraud and debited the subsidiary account of the bank and not debited the ledger of the concerned account. The said judgments are applicable to the case on hand. 39. Learned Special PP for the respondent has also relied on the following judgments: (1) 2013 (9) SCC 778 : Sahib Hussain vs. State of Rajasthan. (2) 2010 (8) SCC 775 : Kishan Singh vs. Gurpal Singh & Ors. (3) 1995 SCC Online Kar.128: State of Karnataka vs. Nagappa & Ors. (4) 2005 (5) SCC 194 : Kammalnatha & Ors. Vs. State of TN. (5) 2013 (8) SCC 119 : State of Maharashtra vs. Mahesh G.Jain. (6) 2007 (11) SCC 273 : State of Karnataka vs. Ameerjan. (7) 2015 (9) SCC 35 : State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Anand Mohan & Anr. (8) 1999 (8) SCC 501 : CBI vs. V.K.Sehgal & Anr. (9) (2001) 9 SCC 303 : Shivendra Kumar vs. State of Maharashtra. (10) (2001) 7 SCC 679 : State of M.P. vs. Bhooraji and others. (11) (2007) 14 SCC 783 : Paul Varghuse vs. State of Kerala and another. (12) (2012) 4 SCC 516 : Rattiram and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. (9) (2001) 9 SCC 303 : Shivendra Kumar vs. State of Maharashtra. (10) (2001) 7 SCC 679 : State of M.P. vs. Bhooraji and others. (11) (2007) 14 SCC 783 : Paul Varghuse vs. State of Kerala and another. (12) (2012) 4 SCC 516 : Rattiram and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. (13) (2005) 5 SCC 194 : Kamalanatha and others vs. State of T.N. (14) ILR 1994 Kar.2089: M.S.Sheshappa vs. State of Karnataka. (15) (2012) 10 SCC 256 : Dahari and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh. (16) (1998) 5 SCC 602 : Chacko alias Jacob vs. State of Kerala. (17) (2015) 2SCC 553: Vinayak Narayan Deosthali Vs Central Bureau of Investigation (18) (2009) 11 SCC 737 : R. Venkatkrishnan Vs Central Bureau of Investigation (19) (2013) 4 SCC 642 : Niranjan Hemachandra Sashittal Vs State of Maharashtra (20) (2015) 6 SCC 185 : Shanti Lal Meena Vs State (NCT of Delhi), CBI (21) (2011) 10 SCC 259 : A.B. Bhaskara Rao Vs Inspector of Police, DBI Vishakapatnam 40. It is further contended that the prosecution has established the case against accused by placing the cogent and consistent evidence relating to the guilt against the accused. The evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 being the necessary witnesses have stated in their evidence which is in conformity with the averments made at Exs. P1 to P4 letters issued by the accused Brunda and also the letter issued by her husband at Ex.P2, Ex.P3, Ex.P4 seeking time to reimburse the amount. This evidence is appreciated by the trial court in a proper perspective. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case the court below has come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved guilt against the accused beyond reasonable doubt regarding falsification and forgery. Therefore, the impugned judgment does not call for interference. Hence, the contention taken by the learned counsel for the appellants does not hold any water in effect. The prosecution has placed much reliance on the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 coupled with the evidence of PW56 being the handwriting expert and evidence of PW57 being the Investigating Officer who has laid charge sheet against accused. A1 to A188 admitted handwritings of different individuals. On cross-examination of these witnesses it does not notice anything to discard their evidence. These witnesses have been subjected to cross-examination and no point of infirmity was found in totality. A1 to A188 admitted handwritings of different individuals. On cross-examination of these witnesses it does not notice anything to discard their evidence. These witnesses have been subjected to cross-examination and no point of infirmity was found in totality. He contends that the trial court has rightly come to the conclusion by analyzing the entire evidence of the prosecution and hence the appeals be dismissed as devoid of merit. 41. On hearing the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Special PP for the respondent the point that arises for consideration in these appeals is: Whether the judgment of conviction and sentence held against accused Nos. 1 and 2 by the trial court in Special C.C.No.29/2004 dated 26.12.2009 is justified in law? 42. In these appeals, the entire evidence available on record for the prosecution requires to be scanned pointwise. There is no dispute that Brunda was working as a Special Assistant at Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. PW-1 was the Senior Bank Manager of the said bank from 1993 to 1998. PW-2 was the Manager in the said bank from 1992 to 1997. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended with reference to the validity of the sanction order as per Exhibit P-274. In that, he has disputed as regards the competency of the authority of PW-30 who accorded such sanction to prosecute the case against the accused Brunda. 43. Whereas, the evidence has been placed on record by the prosecution in order to ascertain the validity of the sanction order as per Exhibit P-274. The Trial Court has considered several decisions as regards the point relating to the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is essential for taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant as required under Section 6 of the PC Act, such as in the cases of R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay (1984 Crl.J 613), Jaswant Singh vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1958 SC 124 ), Indu Bhusan Chatterjee vs. The State of West Bengal ( AIR 1958 SC 148 ), Parasnath Pande and another vs. State (AIR 1962 Bombay 205), Hemanta Kumar Mohanty vs. State of Orissa (1973 (1) SLR 1121) and Gurbachan Singh vs. State (AIR 1970 Delhi 102). 44. 44. The learned Special counsel for the respondent in these appeals has taken me through the evidence pointwise as regards the Special Judge coming to the competency of the Sanctioning Authority who accorded sanction to prosecute the case against the Government servant, namely the first accused Brunda who was discharging her duties as a Special Assistant in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore. It is relevant to refer to the judgment referred by the Trial Court in P. Prathap Chandra vs. CBI Ernakulam (1099 Crl.L.J 2002) wherein it is observed that in a case where the power to grant sanction for prosecution under Section 19(1)(c) of the PC Act were delegated by the appointing authority to the subordinate authority and the delegated authority had sanctioned the prosecution, the Kerala High Court has held that the relevant point of time for the competent authority to accord sanction is the time when the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence and merely because the officer was not competent to accord sanction to prosecute the officer on the alleged date, cannot result in the sanction accorded being illegal. This observation in the impugned judgment is challenged in these appeals questioning the validity of the sanction for prosecution against Accused No.1 Brunda. In the case on hand, PW-30 who accorded sanction for prosecution against the accused Brunda has stated in his evidence that from October 1994 to June 1996, he had been working as an Assistant General Manager in Circle Office, Canara Bank, Bangalore. During that period, he was also working as Acting Deputy General Manager in that office. He accorded sanction for prosecution as per Exhibit P-274, which bears his signature. He granted sanction for prosecution against the first accused Brunda who was working as a Special Assistant in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch of Mysore. The DGM had the authority to remove an officer of the grade of Special Assistant. He accorded sanction as per Ex.P-274 on perusing the entire material available on record placed before him which consisted of FIR, statement of witnesses, opinion of handwriting expert, investigation report sent by the Superintendent of Police and other connected documents regarding the allegation made against that accused. He admitted in the cross-examination that he was discharging the function as a DGM at the relevant time when he accorded sanction as per Ex.P-274. He admitted in the cross-examination that he was discharging the function as a DGM at the relevant time when he accorded sanction as per Ex.P-274. He has denied the suggestion made that he did not have any power at the relevant point of time to remove the special assistant from the post as he was the acting DGM at the relevant time and as such he had power to remove the special assistant. 45. The special counsel for respondent/CBI has placed the Canara Bank disciplinary action procedure wherein the relevant Clause 8 (1) of that disciplinary action procedure reads thus: 8(1). The Deputy General Manager of Circle Office / International Division / Inspection Department / the Assistant General Manager of Personnel Wing, Head Office may enquire into any misconduct on the part of any employee and impose on him any of the punishments set out under Regulation 4 or Regulation 6 as the case may be of this Chapter.” Therefore, P.W.30 who has been examined for the prosecution during the relevant period was working as an acting DGM in the Circle Office, Canara Bank, Bangalore and he accorded sanction for prosecution as per Exhibit P-274, against accused no.1 Brunda. Therefore, the accorded sanction was valid to prosecute the case against the accused Brunda. Therefore, the contention as taken by the learned counsel for the appellant in these appeals does not hold any water in effect, to consider relating the validity of the sanction order as per Exhibit P-274 issued by P.W.30 to prosecute the case against accused No.1 Brunda, as P.W.30 was the competent authority to accord sanction. In case of any error or irregularity which has occasioned failure of justice and where such objection regarding the validity of sanction was raised in the Trial Court, as such the Special Judge had made an observation in the impugned judgment by placing reliance in the case of Ramaswaroop Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2000 Criminal Law Journal 1882) and in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Mruthyunjaya Panda (1988 (1) Crimes 109 SC). Section 19 of the PC Act relates to the sanction by competent authority to prosecute a government servant. The effect of Section 19(3) and Section 4 of the PC Act is of considerable significance. Significantly the failure of justice is relatable to error, omission or irregularities in the sanction. Mruthyunjaya Panda (1988 (1) Crimes 109 SC). Section 19 of the PC Act relates to the sanction by competent authority to prosecute a government servant. The effect of Section 19(3) and Section 4 of the PC Act is of considerable significance. Significantly the failure of justice is relatable to error, omission or irregularities in the sanction. Therefore, mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is not considered fatal unless it has resulted in failure of justice. Section 19(1) is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of the jurisdiction. Section 19(3)(c) reduces the rigour of prohibition. 46. In the instant case PW.30 has been subjected to examination relating to according sanction of prosecution against accused no.1 Brunda. Therefore, on referring the evidence in order to ascertain the validity of sanction and competency of the authority who accorded sanction as per Exhibit P-274, it is seen that P.W.30 has specifically stated in his evidence that he had accorded sanction as per Exhibit P- 274 after examining the investigation report and other papers of the CBI placed before him. On looking to the contents of the Exhibit P-274 for according sanction by him, it is seen that P.W.30 whose original designation was Assistant General Manager (AGM), had deposed to the effect that Deputy General Manager (DGM) was the competent authority to remove the accused Brunda who was discharging her duties as a Special Assistant during the relevant period. However, at the relevant point of time since the regular post of DGM was vacant in the said Branch, PW- 30 was the acting DGM during that particular period and therefore, he was the one who was discharging the functions of DGM at that point of time. Though it is true that an AGM does not have the powers to remove a Special Assistant, since he was the ‘Acting Deputy General Manager’ during the relevant period, he had the power to remove a Special Assistant and hence, his act of removing Brunda from the post is justified. He had carefully examined the entire material placed before him and accorded sanction as per Exhibit P-274. Therefore, it is said that before according sanction, he had applied his mind and had gone through the entire material placed before him. Hence, the law is almost well settled relating to the sanction and authority for according sanction. He had carefully examined the entire material placed before him and accorded sanction as per Exhibit P-274. Therefore, it is said that before according sanction, he had applied his mind and had gone through the entire material placed before him. Hence, the law is almost well settled relating to the sanction and authority for according sanction. Therefore, the same is a valid sanction for prosecution against accused no.1 Brunda, as held in the case of C.S. Krishnamurthy Vs. State of Karnataka ((2005 SCC (Cri) 923)). The evidence of P.W.57 also finds place in the record wherein he has placed relevant documents and statements pertaining to the case before P.W.30 for according sanction to prosecute the case against accused No.1. 47. The learned counsel for the appellant insofar as the defence finds justification in submitting that P.W.30 who was in charge or in additional charge, could not exercise statutory power of DGM. The said aspect of the matter was analyzed by the Special Judge by placing reliance on the case of M. Maridev Vs. State of Mysore 1968 (1) MLJ 325. During the course of incriminating statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., question no. 93 had been framed by the Special Court and competency of the authority of P.W.30 regarding according of sanction was put to the accused. They did not challenge the authority except answering that the said sanction would have been accorded which indicates that accused No.1 Brunda was not seriously disputing the competency of the authority of P.W.30. Having regard to the ratio in C.S. Krishnamurthy Vs. State of Karnataka stated supra, the sanction should not be taken as a shield to protect the corrupt or dishonest public servant. Keeping in view the ratio of the said reliance the Trial Court has made an observation and answered Point No.1 in the affirmative by assigning reasons. Therefore, in these appeals, the said question of according sanction by PW-30 as per Exhibit P-274 against Accused No.1 Brunda does not call for interference. 48. Accused No.1 Smt. Brunda had entered into a criminal conspiracy with Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra being her brother-in-law and had committed illegal acts by forging the documents, making use of the forged documents as genuine and had caused wrongful loss to the Bank and also wrongful gain by themselves during February 1990 to February 1994. 48. Accused No.1 Smt. Brunda had entered into a criminal conspiracy with Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra being her brother-in-law and had committed illegal acts by forging the documents, making use of the forged documents as genuine and had caused wrongful loss to the Bank and also wrongful gain by themselves during February 1990 to February 1994. Criminal conspiracy is defined in Section 120-A of IPC as two or more persons agreeing to do or cause to do an illegal act and such an agreement between the persons being the accused is designated as a criminal conspiracy. In this case, there was an agreement between Accused No.1 Brunda and Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra relating to criminal conspiracy for causing wrongful loss to the Bank and wrongful gain to themselves. In that, since Accused No.2 Ravindra was the brother-in-law of Accused No.1 Brunda, both of them have conspired with each other and had defrauded the Bank. Ravindra was holding two Savings Bank Accounts bearing Nos.3229 and 6121 in the Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch. The said Ravindra went on issuing cheques in the names of several persons without even having sufficient balance in his Savings Bank Accounts and Accused No.1 Brunda instead of dishonouring the cheques, went on honouring all such cheques and had either withdrawn the amount herself or had handed over to the said Ravindra. In respect of the same, she had debited in the subsidiary account of the bank but did not debit from the said account nos.3229 and 6121. Using her position as a Special Assistant, she had colluded with Ravindra and even drawn amounts at several instances using withdrawal slips. In so many instances, putting the account no. of some other person in the withdrawal slip but with the signature of Accused No.2 Ravindra on both the sides of the withdrawal slip, Accused No.1 Brunda had passed the withdrawal form for payment and had encashed the amount filled in the withdrawal form. She was to tally the signature in the withdrawal form with the specimen signature of the account holder and then pass the same. However, since both of them held a conspiracy to defraud the bank, she had intentionally passed all the withdrawal slips presented by Accused No.2 Ravindra. She was to tally the signature in the withdrawal form with the specimen signature of the account holder and then pass the same. However, since both of them held a conspiracy to defraud the bank, she had intentionally passed all the withdrawal slips presented by Accused No.2 Ravindra. In respect of this type of transaction also using withdrawal slip, the said Brunda had debited the amount in the subsidiary sheet but had not debited the corresponding amount from the said Account no. shown on the withdrawal slip. The persons whose Savings account nos. were made use of, were not aware of the said withdrawal slip transactions. Accused Nos.1 and 2 went on withdrawing amounts fraudulently by using some other person’s account number and with the signature of Accused No.2 and in some occasions the said Accused No.2 signing in a different way and Accused No.1 passing the said withdrawal forms without debiting the amount from the respective account but debiting the subsidiary sheet. On scanning of the evidence for the prosecution, the criminal conspiracy held between Accused Nos.1 and 2 was ascertained. There is no dispute that Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra was the brother-in-law of Accused No.1 Brunda. The evidence placed by the prosecution by subjecting to examination PW-56 and PW-57 coupled with the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 would clearly establish the circumstance that Accused Nos.1 and 2 had joined their hands in withdrawing the amount from the Bank where Accused No.1 Brunda had passed the cheque of Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra being her brother-in-law, though he was not having any sufficient funds maintained in his account. While passing the cheque, she has effected entry in subsidiary and failed to make entry in the ledger of the account, which would indicate criminal conspiracy between them. At a cursory glance of the evidence both oral and documentary in ascertaining the criminal conspiracy between Accused Nos.1 and 2, PW-1 has given evidence for the prosecution wherein it reveals that Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra had two accounts in the Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch where Accused No.1 Brunda was working as a Special Assistant, wherein she had passed his cheque though he did not have sufficient funds in his Account. She had debited the same in the subsidiary and failed to debit in the account of Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra. She had debited the same in the subsidiary and failed to debit in the account of Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra. Therefore, the evidence of PW-1 for the prosecution having supported the evidence of PW-2 wherein Accused No.1 had passed the cheque of Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra, though he did not have sufficient funds maintained in his accounts bearing No.3229 and 6121. PW-1 and PW-2 have been subjected to examination and also to a thorough crossexamination. Their evidence reveals that there was a conspiracy between Accused No.1 Brunda and Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra being her brother-in-law. In addition to her evidence, there are several supporting documentary evidence placed by the prosecution. As such, the Special Judge has appreciated their evidence relating to conspiracy held between them and has given a finding that the prosecution has proved the conspiracy of the accused. 49. Insofar as Point Nos.3 to 7 raised by the Special Judge, the prosecution was required to prove that Accused No.1 Brunda and Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra forged the documents in connection with S.B. Account bearing No.3229 and 6121 relating to specimen card, signature of Prakash on the cheques, withdrawal slips with an intention to cheat the bank, besides they being made use of as genuine documents. The prosecution also was required to prove that in view of the conspiracy between the accused No.1 Brunda and Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra, she had fraudulently and dishonestly passed the cheques, withdrawal slips and falsified the account making the entry in the subsidiary register without corresponding entry in the ledger and as such falsified the account. The acts of the accused have caused monetary loss to the Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch to an extent of Rs.8,77,590/-. The acts of the accused have caused monetary loss to the Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch to an extent of Rs.8,77,590/-. Out of the said amount, Rs.1,67,190/- was the loss caused to the Bank by means of Accused No.2 Ravindra issuing cheques without any balance in his SB Accounts and Accused No.1 Brunda having passed the same; Loss of Rs.25,070/- having caused by Accused No.2 Ravindra signing differently in the cheques and Accused No.1 having created a fresh specimen signature with the different signature of Ravindra and by passing the said cheques without sufficient balance in the account; A loss of Rs.2,56,580/- caused to the Bank by Accused No.1 incorporating the wrong account number in the cheques but with the signature of Accused No.2; Further loss of Rs.2,74,750/- caused to the Bank by both the accused using the account of one R.K. Belur which was closed on 8.3.1993. By forging the signature of R.K. Belur, cheque book was issued by Accused No.1 in his name and Accused No.2 had forged the signature of R.K. Belur on the said cheques and issued the cheques to repay his money lenders and a further loss of Rs.1,54,000/- by way of using the account number of some other persons in the withdrawal slips and Accused no.2 signing on the withdrawal slips which were passed by Accused no.1. Thus, the total loss caused to the Bank amounted to Rs.8,77,590/- thereby causing monetary gain to themselves by fraudulently cheating the said bank. Thus, they have gained pecuniary advantage by means of corrupt or illegal means by abusing Accused No.1’s position as a Special Assistant in the said Bank. In order to substantiate the case, the prosecution had examined several witnesses as PW-1 to PW-57. The prosecution has placed much reliance on the evidence of PW- 1, PW-2, PW-5 and PW-11 as their evidence fortifies that Accused No.1 was a public servant working as a Special Assistant at Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore from 1992 to 1994. She was entrusted with the work of verifying and tallying the signatures found on the instruments like cheques and withdrawal slips with signatures found on the specimen copy and also to tally the amount in the ledger and thereby to pass the cheques. Ledger Clerk would make the entry in the subsidiary sheets. She was entrusted with the work of verifying and tallying the signatures found on the instruments like cheques and withdrawal slips with signatures found on the specimen copy and also to tally the amount in the ledger and thereby to pass the cheques. Ledger Clerk would make the entry in the subsidiary sheets. The power of the Special Assistant to pass for payment of a cheque was to the limit of Rs.25,000/- according to the evidence of PW-1 who had been examined for the prosecution. 50. According to the evidence of PW-1, the subsidiary sheets were maintained which contained three columns. In the first column, entry was in respect of cash withdrawal, entry in respect of the second column was other than cash credit and third column related to entry of all types of credits including cash deposits. If any transaction is made by an account holder, the same will be reflected in the subsidiary sheet maintained by the bank. If any withdrawal is made by the account holder, it is reflected in the first column of the subsidiary sheet as debit. If any amount is credited to the account holder, the same will be reflected in the second column of the subsidiary sheet. If any cash is deposited by the account holder, it will be shown in the third column of the subsidiary sheet. If there are more than one ledger, then the transactions would be carried to the key register which contained four columns, column-1 for cash debit, column no.2 other than cash debit, column no.3 all credits and column no.4 showing closing balance. In case of single ledger, they would individually tally. By the end of the day, all the three columns of the subsidiary sheet are individually totalled. Hence, the transactions regarding debit, credit and the balance remaining in the account would be tallied by the end of the day. Hence, before ending the day, tallying accounts of each day is the routine work carried out by the bank. The same has been reiterated in these appeals and is borne out in the impugned judgment which has been observed by the Special Judge. Hence, before ending the day, tallying accounts of each day is the routine work carried out by the bank. The same has been reiterated in these appeals and is borne out in the impugned judgment which has been observed by the Special Judge. The said column-wise aspect was admitted by Accused No.1 Brunda wherein it was brought to her notice during the course of her statement which was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. PW-1 has stated in his evidence that interest to the SB account used to be paid half yearly in the month of August and February of each year. The said fact was also admitted by the accused Brunda, while she was subjected to examination by recording her statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. On 10.02.1994, the fraudulent transactions came to light when Mr. Vrushabendrappa and his two clerks conducted preliminary investigation, according to the evidence of PW-1. On 12.02.1994, P.W.1 is said to have contacted accused No.1 Brunda over phone regarding the alterations done by her and at her request he had been to the house of the said accused, wherein she had given a confessional letter as per Ex.P.1 and her husband had also issued a guarantee letter as per Ex.P.2 undertaking to reimburse the misappropriated amounts. She had also sent letters as per Exhibits P.3 and P.4 respectively on 14.03.1994 and 16.05.1994 seeking some more time to reimburse the misappropriated amount. Accordingly, accused no.1 Brunda had sent Demand Drafts and pay orders to reimburse the same. 51. If really Brunda was not involved in such fraudulent transactions, there was no need for her to have issued the letters at Exhibits P.1 to P.4 to PW-1. A cursory glance of the letter at Ex.P.1 would reveal that by the said letter, the accused No.1 had admitted the withdrawal of cash by her fraudulently from various accounts. 52. Loose leaf cheques have been passed by her in the capacity of a Special Assistant and she had misappropriated the amounts. Whereas at this stage, it is relevant to state that the contents in the letter at Exhibit P-1 confirmed that she had done all the above fraudulent acts to serve her own personal needs and she had confirmed that no other employee/officer including the Senior Managers were involved in the acts of misappropriation committed by her. Whereas at this stage, it is relevant to state that the contents in the letter at Exhibit P-1 confirmed that she had done all the above fraudulent acts to serve her own personal needs and she had confirmed that no other employee/officer including the Senior Managers were involved in the acts of misappropriation committed by her. The contents of the letter is borne out in the impugned judgment as observed by the Special Judge relating to extra judicial confession made by her regarding fraudulent transactions. Further, by the letter at Exhibit P-2 as a guarantee letter issued by her husband addressed to the Senior Manager, Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore dated 10.04.1994, he had undertook that accused No.1 Brunda has confessed the misappropriation of the funds of her Bank through her letter dated 12.02.1994 wherein he stood guarantor for his promise by assuring that he would help P.W.1 to sort out the issues amicably. Ex.P.3 is another letter dated 14.03.1994 perhaps in the handwriting of the accused No.1 Brunda, which is in continuation of the letter dated 12.03.1994 Ex.P.1. Through the said letter, she had informed the Manager, Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore to the effect that she had raised Rs.2,70,000/- from her sisters and remitted to the bank. She had also given assurance that she would reimburse the remaining amount by seeking help from her brothers and sisters by selling a joint family property situated in the West of Chord Road, Bangalore. As the property belonged to her mother and since her mother passed away, the property devolved around herself and her brothers and sisters. Insofar as Ex.P.4, the letter dated 16.05.1994 which is in continuation of Ex.P.3 letter which bears the handwriting of accused no.1 Brunda wherein she had requested for some more time from the Senior Manager on the ground that her mother’s property was yet to be disposed of and that she would settle the amount. Therefore, the prosecution has placed much reliance on Exhibits P.1 to P.4 to justify the fact that accused No.1 Brunda had misappropriated funds by conspiring with accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra. Ex.P.1 is the letter of accused No.1 which is an extra judicial confession for having committed misappropriation of the fund to a tune of Rs.8,77,590/-. Therefore, the prosecution has placed much reliance on Exhibits P.1 to P.4 to justify the fact that accused No.1 Brunda had misappropriated funds by conspiring with accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra. Ex.P.1 is the letter of accused No.1 which is an extra judicial confession for having committed misappropriation of the fund to a tune of Rs.8,77,590/-. Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act relates to the confession made by the accused which is the letter issued by accused No.1 Brunda to P.W.1 by confessing that she had misappropriated the amount in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch, Mysore during the relevant period when she was discharging the duties as an Special Assistant. No doubt though the extra judicial confession has been made by the first accused Brunda as per the letter issued by her vide Ex.P.1, it is supposed to be weak type of evidence. Therefore, duty was cast upon the Court to look for corroboration for reliable evidence on record so that the extra judicial confession is corroborated by several other proved circumstances. Therefore, the law is well settled that the extra judicial confession should first of all inspire the confidence of the Court. In this case, Ex.P.1 letter issued by the accused no.1 Brunda to P.W.1 by confessing herself that she has misappropriated the fund by conspiring with accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra, her brother-in-law who was maintaining two SB Accounts namely, 3229 and 6121 with the bank which were not having sufficient funds. However, she had encashed several cheques by debiting the amount from his account even without sufficient balance. Therefore, Ex.P.1 to Ex.P4 have been taken into consideration for justification as corroborative piece of evidence along with other oral and documentary evidence on record. The further circumstance that Accused No.1 Brunda went on making payment to reimburse the amount that was misappropriated, would ensure that accused no.1 acted according to the confession made by her. Therefore, it cannot be said that it was made under inducement or otherwise, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants. Therefore, it does not hold any water in effect. According to the evidence of P.W.1, Accused No.1 had reimbursed Rs. 7,50,000/- by way of Demand Drafts, pay orders and challans as per Exs.P.5 to P.22. The amounts have been mentioned in the respective exhibits. Therefore, it does not hold any water in effect. According to the evidence of P.W.1, Accused No.1 had reimbursed Rs. 7,50,000/- by way of Demand Drafts, pay orders and challans as per Exs.P.5 to P.22. The amounts have been mentioned in the respective exhibits. The evidence of P.W.1 shows that in so many transactions, accused No.1 Brunda while passing cheques had made entry in the subsidiary sheets without making entry in the ground register and without deducting the amount from the Account. Even she did not deny the said facts except indicating her ignorance. There is specific evidence of P.W.1 for the prosecution relating to receipt of cheque for Rs. 8,000/- as per Ex.P.27 in connection with account No. 3249 by the accused No.1 Brunda. The signature of the account holder Shivanna at Ex.P.27 though did not tally with the signature on the specimen signature at Ex.P.28, she passed the cheque and effected entries in the subsidiary sheets and she failed to enter the same in the ledger account as per Ex.P.29. Though there was sufficient balance in the said A/c.3249, she did not deduct the amount of Rs.8,000/- from the said account but passed the cheque. 53. Relating to Exs.P.30, P.31, P.33, P.34 the same is extracted in the impugned judgment at paragraph 51 by the Special Judge, which is shown hereunder: Sl.No. Withdrawal slip or cheque Amount Rs. Specimen card Subsidiary sheet 1. Dated 30.1.1993 as per Ex.P32 A/c No. 1213 8,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet Ex.P30 2. Dated 13.3.93 as per Ex.P34 A/c No. 1213 5,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet Ex.P30 3. Dated 25.10.1993 as per Ex.P36 A/c No. 1213 10,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet as per Ex.P30 4. Dated 30.10.1993 as per Ex.P38 A/c No. 1213 altered as 1218 10,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet as per Ex.P30 5. Dated 17.11.93 Ex.P39 A/c No. 1213 altered as 1218 8,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet as per Ex.P30 6. Dated 20.11.93 as per Ex.P40 A/c No. 1213 10,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet as per Ex.P30 7. Dated 23.1.94 as per Ex.P41 A/c No. 1213 10,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet as per Ex.P30 8. Dated 31.1.94 as per Ex.P42 A/c No. 1213 10,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet as per Ex.P30 On 29.09.1993, accused No.1 Brunda had issued cheque leaves in favour of Mr. Shiva in connection with the account of R.K. Belur, though he was not authorized. Dated 23.1.94 as per Ex.P41 A/c No. 1213 10,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet as per Ex.P30 8. Dated 31.1.94 as per Ex.P42 A/c No. 1213 10,000/- Ex.P31 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet as per Ex.P30 On 29.09.1993, accused No.1 Brunda had issued cheque leaves in favour of Mr. Shiva in connection with the account of R.K. Belur, though he was not authorized. She had effected entry as per Ex.P.43. Accused No.1 had received the withdrawal slips in connection with the said transaction as regards account No.1218. Though the signature found on the specimen card was not tallying with the withdrawal slips, she had passed the withdrawals failing to make entry in the ledger sheet which is marked as Ex.P.45, which is indicated in a tabular form in the impugned Judgment wherein the subsidiary sheets and ledger extracts maintained have been mentioned including the specimen card as well as the amount, as under: Sl. No. Withdrawal slip With date and A/c No. Amount Specimen card Subsidiary sheet and ledger extract 1. Dt. 10.11.93 as per Ex.P46 A/c No. 1218 10,000/- Ex.P45 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet Ex.P48 2. Dt. 10.11.93 as per Ex.P47 A/c No. 1218 10,000/- Ex.P45 Ex.P48 Ledger sheet Ex.P44 3. Dt. 16.12.93 as per Ex.P48 A/c No. 1218 5,000/- Ex.P45 Ex.P33 Ledgersheet Ex.P44 4. Dt. 21.12.93 as per Ex.P49 A/c No. 1218 10,000/- Ex.P45 Ex.P45 Ledger sheet Ex.P44 5. Dt. 21.12.93 as per Ex.P50 A/c No. 1218 10,000/- Ex.P45 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet Ex.P44 6. Dt. 16.1.94 as per Ex.P51 A/c No. 1218 10,000/- Ex.P45 Ex.P33 Ledger Sheet Ex.P44 7. Dt. 19.1.94 as per Ex.P52, A/c No. 1218 10,000/- Ex.P45 Ex.P33 Ledger sheet Ex.P44 8. Dt. 9.2.1992 as per Ex.P55 a/c No. 3229 5,000/- Ex.P45 Ex.P33 Ledger Sheet as per Ex.P26 9. Dt. 5.1.93 as per Ex.P55 A/c No. 3229 10,000/- Ex.P45 Ex.P56 10. Dt. 2.3.92 as per Ex.P58 A/c No. 343/- shown the amount at Rs. 2,343/- Ex.P45 Ex.P56 11. Dt. 1.3.92 as per Ex.P59 A/c No. 6121 - - Ex.P60 12. Dt. 13.6.92 as per Ex.P61 A/c No.- 3,000/- - Ex.P.60 13. Dt. 10.8.92 A/c No. 344 5,000/- - - 14. Ex.P65 A/c No. 6121 15,000/- - Debited Rs. 5,000/- in ledger extract suppressed Rs. 10,000/- 15. Dt. 9.10.92 as per Ex.P67 A/c No. 6121 - - Of A2 debited in another account 16. Ex.P43 Dt. Dt. 13.6.92 as per Ex.P61 A/c No.- 3,000/- - Ex.P.60 13. Dt. 10.8.92 A/c No. 344 5,000/- - - 14. Ex.P65 A/c No. 6121 15,000/- - Debited Rs. 5,000/- in ledger extract suppressed Rs. 10,000/- 15. Dt. 9.10.92 as per Ex.P67 A/c No. 6121 - - Of A2 debited in another account 16. Ex.P43 Dt. 26.10.93 A/c No. 1218 of Miss.Haritha closed on 22.9.1992 10,000/- have passed the said cheque - - P.Ws. 1 and 2 have been examined for the prosecution in order to substantiate the case against the accused, that accused Brunda had issued cheque book containing ten leaves from No. 608231 to 608140 on 13.01.1992 in connection with S.B. A/c No. 3229 standing in the name of accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra, by putting different account no. as 1213 and 1218. The same is seen in their evidence. According to their evidence, though the cheques were missing, accused No.1 Brunda being the custodian had failed to intimate the concerned authorities. It is their further evidence that accused No.1 had withdrawn the amounts by way of 15 cheques as per Ex.P.32, Exs.P.33 to P.42, Exs.P.47 to P.52 alleged to have been signed by S. Prakash Kumar. But the said signature do not tally with the specimen signatures on Ex.P.30 and P.70, whereas, accused no.1 Brunda had passed the cheques. Even she misplaced subsidiary receipts slip bundles, inward register and cash withdrawal bundle and had also made some alterations with an intention to misguide the person in case of checking. Though the said R.K. Belur who had maintained an SB A/c bearing No.1925 had closed his account on 08.02.1993 under the letter as per Ex.P.72, accused No.1 Brunda had issued fresh cheque book in his name by forging his signature and had also passed the cheques as per Ex.P.73 by endorsing her signature though she knew that the signature was forged by Accused No.2 and she had intentionally caused to misplace the ledger sheet. P.W.5, 6, 8 to 15 have been examined for the prosecution to prove the misappropriation done by accused No.1 Brunda along with accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra. P.W.56, the handwriting and fingerprint expert has been examined for the prosecution wherein he had deposed that he had received the documents as per Q1 to Q855 and S1 to S434 which were the specimen writings of different individuals, A1 to A188 which were the admitted handwritings of different individuals. P.W.56, the handwriting and fingerprint expert has been examined for the prosecution wherein he had deposed that he had received the documents as per Q1 to Q855 and S1 to S434 which were the specimen writings of different individuals, A1 to A188 which were the admitted handwritings of different individuals. He has examined all these documents and he has furnished his opinion report as per Ex.P.363. This witness has been subjected to crossexamination. Nothing worthwhile has been elicited to disbelieve his evidence relating to the opinion report issued at Ex.P.363. 54. On looking to the entire evidence of these material witnesses it is clear that accused No.1 Brunda in conspiracy with accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra had forged the documents in connection with the S.B. Account bearing no. 3229 and 6121. She forged several cheques, withdrawal slips and even the account of Belur was closed. She had issued the cheque book of the closed account holder to some other person and there are instances where she had issued cheque books in respect of whom she ought not to. She had incorporated the wrong account no. on the cheques while passing the same intentionally, in order to fraud the bank. Though being a responsible government servant she was expected to discharge her duty as a Special Assistant diligently, since it went unnoticed by the Bank, using her position, she went on misappropriating amounts fraudulently in as many ways as possible. The evidence of the prosecution would disclose that the accused had falsified the accounts, effected false entries on the withdrawal slips and cheques were falsified. Though accused no.1 Brunda made entry in the subsidiary register she did not debit the account regarding the same. 55. At a cursory glance of the entire evidence placed by the prosecution it reveals that the modus operandi on the part of accused No.1 Brunda passing the cheques and making entries in the subsidiary register and failing to make the said entry in the ledger of the account of M.S. Ravindra, was intentional and was done for her personal gain. The said aspect was also analyzed by the Special Judge keeping in view the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 coupled with the evidence of P.W.56 and P.W.57. The said aspect was also analyzed by the Special Judge keeping in view the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 coupled with the evidence of P.W.56 and P.W.57. Therefore, scanning of the entire evidence relating to criminal conspiracy between accused No.1 Brunda and accused No.2 M.S.Ravindra, her brother-in-law between the years 1991 and 1994 reveals that the said accused Brunda had forged documents and made use of the said documents as genuine in order to cheat her employer the Canara Bank by falsifying the accounts in order to obtain herself pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means by misusing her position. In the instant case, it is seen that the accused No.1 Brunda had conspired with Accused No.2 Ravindra being her brother-in-law to commit embezzlement of huge amounts. As the accused Brunda had a criminal intention, she had not made any entry properly in the ledger as maintained in that Branch. Whereas the Special Judge, after meticulously scanning both the oral and documentary evidence and vitality of the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 and so also the evidence of PW-56 and PW-57, has in detail discussed about the misdeeds committed by them and has rightly found them guilty. Therefore, the contention taken by the learned counsel for the appellants in this appeal by referring to several citations which have been stated supra, are found improbable and the evidence adduced at his instance was unbelievable and unfounded. Therefore, keeping in view the stout arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, I find that there is no ground to decide differently to differ from the view taken by the Trial Court in holding that the appellant Brunda - Accused No.1 and M.S. Ravindra – Accused No.2 were guilty of the offences charged against them. Therefore, the Trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt by placing cogent, corroborative and consistent evidence and the same is reflected in their evidence itself as stated supra. The Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record of the offences charged against them on all counts. Considering all the contentions taken by the learned counsel for the appellants, the involvement of this accused in mitigating circumstances of the present case is hereby noted. The Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record of the offences charged against them on all counts. Considering all the contentions taken by the learned counsel for the appellants, the involvement of this accused in mitigating circumstances of the present case is hereby noted. Therefore, under those circumstances, the evidence of the cited witnesses would clinchingly prove the charges levelled against both the accused relating to embezzlement of huge amounts. Therefore, the reliance placed on various propositions by the learned counsel for the appellants to support their case in respect of the embezzlement, would not hold any water, since in these cases, the charges levelled against both the accused have explicitly been proved by the prosecution. Therefore, the contention of the counsel for the appellant in both the appeals are not acceptable, except Exhibit P1 to P4 are the vital documents relating to the accused Brunda who was working as a Special Assistant in Canara Bank, Nanjumalige Branch. In her statement given by her at Exhibit P1, she herself has confessed for having embezzled the huge amount. 56. In these appeals, the counsel for the appellants has brought to the attention of this court that the embezzled amounts have been repaid to the Bank as revealed from Exhibits P1 to P4. But it is seen that the accused Brunda, abusing her position of a Special Assistant, had criminally conspired with Accused No.2 M.S. Ravindra being her brother-in-law, and had forged documents as specified in the charge-sheet, making use of the documents dishonestly and fraudulently caused monetary loss to the Bank to the tune of Rs.8,77,590/-. Therefore, in these appeals, there is no necessity to call for interference the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence held by the Special Judge against the accused, as the Special Judge has rightly convicted the accused by appreciating the entire evidence on record. The evidence on record reveals that Accused No.1 Brunda had indulged in misappropriation along with accused No.2 Ravindra her brother-in-law for embezzlement of huge amounts, which has come to light in the enquiry subsequent to which charge sheet has been laid against the accused. Though several witnesses are examined, P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.56 and P.W.57 the material witnesses for the prosecution are of much significance than the other witnesses in order to prove the guilt against the accused. Though several witnesses are examined, P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.56 and P.W.57 the material witnesses for the prosecution are of much significance than the other witnesses in order to prove the guilt against the accused. The Special Judge for the CBI in this case has appreciated the entire evidence on record along with the documentary evidence placed by the prosecution in a proper perspective and has rightly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt by placing cogent, consistent and acceptable evidence relating to the fraudulent transactions, forging and making use of the forged documents in order to cheat her employer the Canara Bank where she was working as a Special Assistant. Therefore, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmities and there is no perversity committed by the Special Judge in order to call for any interference of the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence held by the Trial Court against these accused. Hence, the appeals are devoid of merits in the totality of the circumstances in respect of the alleged offences which have been charged against these accused. 57. Therefore, the appeals are hereby dismissed as being devoid of merits. The point framed in these appeals is thus answered in the positive. As a consequence, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence held by the XXXII Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge and Special Judge in Spl.C.C.No.29/2004 dated 26.12.2009 is hereby confirmed. The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.