JUDGEMENT Heard finally with the consent of both the parties. 2. In this petition under Article 226/227 of Constitution of India, the petitioner has called in question the legality, validity and proprietary of the order dated 24/12/2013 passed in case No. 13/A/I.D.Act/2012(reference) by Labour Court No. 2, Gwalior, whereby, the Labour Court has rejected the application under section 2 (A) r/w section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (herein after referred to as an 'Act') on the ground that application is not maintainable as the matter has not been referred to by the appropriate Government. 3. The petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs :- i. That part of the order impugned Annexure P/1, whereby, it has been held that the matter has not been referred by the appropriate Government, may kindly be quashed. ii. Respondents may kindly be directed to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages. iii. Cost of this litigation to the tune of Rs. 25,000/- be also awarded to the petitioner. 4. The petitioner was appointed on the post of Nakedar w.e.f. 01/05/1997 under the respondent No. 3/Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Sabalgarh, District Morena. He continued to discharge his duties and on 01/06/1998 he was removed from the service by oral order. 5. The Labour court has held that the application is barred by limitation. The petitioner moved an application under section 2A r/w section 10 of the Act before the conciliation officer on 02/04/2012. Since no decision with regard to referring the matter to the Labour Court was taken, the petitioner preferred an application directly before the Labour Court on 19/07/2012 under section 2A (2) of the Act. 6. The respondent No. 3 filed reply to the said application and submitted that the petitioner worked from 01/05/1997 to 31/05/1997 only, therefore, it cannot be said that he worked for 240 days in a calender year. The dispute has been raised after a period of 14 years, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law and prayed for dismissal of the application. 7. The learned Labour Court dismissed the application on the ground that the matter has not been referred by appropriate Government, therefore, the same is not maintainable. 8. The dispute has been raised after a period of 14 years, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law and prayed for dismissal of the application. 7. The learned Labour Court dismissed the application on the ground that the matter has not been referred by appropriate Government, therefore, the same is not maintainable. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Labour Court has committed error in dealing with the application by holding that the same is barred by limitation in view of the amended provisions of section 2A (2) & (3) of the Act. It is further submitted that amended provisions does not repeal section 10 of the Act and thereby even after the said amendment also, Section 10 remains as it is. The said amendment has been inserted w.e.f. 15/09/2010. Thus the Industrial dispute of the individual workman is otherwise referable under section 10 of the Act for adjudication. The said right of the individual workmen prevailing before the date of amendment has not been snatched away by the amendment, otherwise, the amended provisions would have certainly stated in specific terms that the individual workman can raise Industrial dispute directly to the Labour Court only and cannot raise the dispute under section 10 of the Act. Thus, amended provisions of the Act is providing an additional concurrent remedy to the workman and does not take away the remedy of section 10 of the Act. The Labour Court has dismissed the application as barred by statutory limitation contemplated under section 2A (3) of the amended Act of 2010 and not on the ground of alleged delay or laches or on the ground of stale claim / issue. On these grounds petitioner assails the order of learned Labour Court 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 has opposed the prayer vehemently and submitted that Labour Court has rightly rejected the claim inasmuch as the appropriate Government had not referred the matter to the Labour Court, therefore, direct application under section 2A of the Act is barred by limitation as the same is required to be filed before expiry of three years as provided under sub section (3) from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub section(1). Learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 further submits that provisions of law inserted through amendment shall have prospective effect only. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 11. Section 2A (3) of the Act reads as under :- “(3) An application referred to in sub section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub section (1).” 12. It is pertinent to note that section 2A (2) and 2A (3) of the Act were inserted by Act 24 of 2010, section 3 (w.e.f. 15/09/2010). Section 2A (3) of the Act specifically provides that an application under section 2A (2) of the Act has to be filed before expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub section (1). 13. In the present case, the petitioner was allegedly dismissed from service w.e.f. 01/06/1998. As per section 2A (3) of the Act workman is supposed to file his claim under section 2A (2) of the Act within three years from the date of dismissal from service. The claim has been filed on 19/07/2012 i.e. after 14 years. Earlier, the petitioner had approached the conciliation officer on 02/04/2012, which is beyond the period of three years from the date of termination. Going by specific term of section 2A (3) of the Act, the period of three years is to be counted from the date of dismissal of the workman and not from the date of amendment of section 2A of the Act. Section 3 came into force w.e.f. 15/09/2010. Had the intention of legislature that period of three years is to be counted from the date of aforesaid amendment came into force w.e.f. 15/09/2010, the same would have been specified in section 2A (3) of the Act. Moreover, in the present case, the conciliation officer had not referred the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication and non-reference is not under challenge in the present case, therefore, the petitioner could not have approached the trial court directly under section 2A (2) of the Act. The period of three years has to be counted from the date of dismissal i.e. from 1998 and not from 2012. The petitioner has not even explained the huge delay of 14 years. The period of three years has to be counted from the date of dismissal i.e. from 1998 and not from 2012. The petitioner has not even explained the huge delay of 14 years. Accordingly, the Labour Court has correctly come to the conclusion that claim is barred by limitation particularly taking into consideration the fact that the matter has not been referred by the appropriate Government and secondly the claim is barred by limitation as prescribed under section 2A (3) of the Act. 14. Accordingly, no error having been committed by the Labour Court, this Court is not inclined to entertain the instant writ petition and, as such, the same is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.