JUDGMENT : Shekhar B. Saraf, J. 1. The President and two guardian representatives of the Managing Committee of Garden Reach K.C. Mills High (H.S.) School, have filed this writ petition with the grievance that by an order dated April 13, 2018 the Principal Secretary to the Government of West Bengal has in supersession of the existing Managing Committee of the school appointed an Administrator. 2. The writ petitioners submit that this action of the Government is de hors the principle of natural justice as no opportunity was given to the members of the Managing Committee to represent their side of the story. 3. The writ petitioners further submit that a few of the recommendations of the West Bengal School Service Commission were not acted upon by the Managing Committee as the school was facing a huge scarcity of teachers and therefore there was no deliberate ploy to violate the statutory rules and regulations. 4. It is further submitted that in the year 2014 only 21 out of 42 of the sanctioned strength of teachers were working in the school. It is also submitted by the petitioners that in spite of several representations made by the Managing Committee of the concerned school to the concerned District Inspector of Schools, no action has-been taken till date for filling up the said vacancies. 5. In view of the above vacancies, the Managing Committee was unable to release the teachers that had been recommended for transfer by the West Bengal School Service Commission. 6. Mr. De submits that that the above contentions of the Managing Committee should have been examined by the Government before the notice for supersession of the Managing Committee and appointment of the Administrator. 7. Mr. Arijit De, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners relies on the Supreme Court judgement in case of Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I and anr. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 151 to submit that even if a provision dealing with an administrative action does not contain a specific requirement for affording an opportunity of hearing, the same needs to be read into the provisions to observe the rule of audi alteram partem. Mr. De relies on paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the above judgment that are delineated below:- "17. Mr. De relies on paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the above judgment that are delineated below:- "17. Initially, it was the general view that the rules of natural justice would apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to an administrative action. However, in State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Devi the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions was perceptively mitigated and it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matters involving civil consequences, has to be made consistent with the rules of natural justice. Since then the concept of natural justice has made great strides and is invariably read into administrative actions involving civil consequences, unless the statute, conferring power, excludes its application by express language. 18. Recently, in Canara Banks v. V.K. Awasthy the concept, scope, history of development and significance of principles of natural justice have been discussed in extenso, with reference to earlier cases on the subject. Inter alia, observing that the principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights, the Court said (SCC pp. 331-32, para 14) '14. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a ' given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is field. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.' 19. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.' 19. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the Court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of hearing heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences for the party affected. The principle will hold good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial.' 8. Per contra, Mr. Saugata Bhattacharya, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State submits that Rule 25 of the Rules for Management of Sponsored Institutions (Secondary), 1972, (in short 'the said Rules') does not contain any provision for granting of hearing. In fact, the said provisions state that the action of supersession can be taken by the State Government on consideration of a report by the Director. He further submits that without such a report the action would be held to be non-est in law. He also submits that in the instant case, the action of supersession was carried out only after a report dated August 21, 2017, was filed by the Commissioner of School Education, Government of West Bengal, before the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, School Education Department He further submits that the Commissioner of School Education, West Bengal is the Director as per Rule 25 of the said Rules. 9. Mr. Bhattacharya placed the report of the Director that reveals that the Managing Committee was not adhering to the various recommendations of the West Bengal School Service Commission and was violating the statutory rules and provisions with regard to the management of the school. The report further proposed that necessary penal action by dissolving the Managing Committee as per the Management Rules of Sponsored Schools may be taken to establish the rights of the teachers and to enforce rule of law in the management of the school. 10. Mr. The report further proposed that necessary penal action by dissolving the Managing Committee as per the Management Rules of Sponsored Schools may be taken to establish the rights of the teachers and to enforce rule of law in the management of the school. 10. Mr. Bhattacharya further submits that the report is very clear and leaves no room for doubt that the actions of the Managing Committee were not in accordance with the Rules and accordingly, the decision taken by the Government for supersession was in accordance with said Rules. He further submits that there is no question of any violation of the principles of natural justice as in the present case the administrative decision taken by the Government does not result in any civil consequences whatsoever. To buttress his submissions, he relied on a judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sri Ashutosh Sengupta v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education & ors. And Smt. Kalyani Mondal v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1991 (1) CAL L.T. 298. The relevant paragraphs being paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 and 18 are delineated below for the sake of clarity:- "12. There is a consensus of judicial opinion that the doctrine of natural justice is applicable only to judicial and quasi-judicial proceeding and not to purely administrative proceedings. That is not to say that a statutory authority exercising function which is not quasi-judicial but an administrative one 'has not to observe the rules of fair play.' A public authority as in the instant case is required at all times to act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. 13. It is equally well settled that the doctrine of natural justice has been applied also to purely administrative proceedings which involve civil consequences. 14. Judged in the light of the above principles and keeping in view the provisions contained in Rule 28(9) (viia) as also the purport of the impugned order, it has to be observed that no rights of the petitioner have been decided with any finality, nor has the petitioner been subjected to any adverse civil consequences by the impugned order. The impugned order has thus to be construed as a purely administrative act. 15. As to the requirement to state reasons, suffice it to note that the same has been raised to pedestal of a basis principle of natural justice. The impugned order has thus to be construed as a purely administrative act. 15. As to the requirement to state reasons, suffice it to note that the same has been raised to pedestal of a basis principle of natural justice. This requirement would apply not only to quasi judicial function but would extend to all administrative decisions which would effect civil rights of individuals. 17. The impugned order cannot also be branded as ultra-vires on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice or on ground that no reasons have been stated therein. The Rule in question viz, Rule 28(9)(viia) does not impose any such condition upon the repository of the power either to give a prior hearing or to state reasons. Unless, the statute requires that an administrative action can be taken only after hearing the parties or cast an obligation to state reasons, the administrative act cannot be said to be ultra-vires. 18. In the instant case, the petitioners in the respective writ petitions were afforded an opportunity of hearing before the passing of the impugned order. The contention of Mr. Arun Kr. Sarkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner that having so afforded an opportunity and after having heard the respective parties, it was incumbent upon the authority in question to have stated the reasons in the impugned order, cannot be sustained. Where the function is purely an administrative, nothing more than a right to make a representation before final action may be called for." 11. Mr. Bhattacharya further placed reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and others, reported in (2015) 8 S.C.C. 519 and placed paragraph 35 of the above judgment in support of his argument that the principles of natural justice would not apply to administrative decisions where civil consequences are not flowing. Paragraph 35 of the above judgment is delineated below:- "35. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basis requirement in the Court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other Tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other Tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus; observed in A.K. Kraipak case that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. v. Suvarna Board Mills, this aspect was explained in the following manner: (SCC p. 568, para 3) '3. It has been contended before us by the learned Counsel for the appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one' is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law. All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case'." 12. I have heard the submissions of the learned Counsel for the appearing parties and perused the materials on record. 13. From a perusal of Rule 25 of the said Rules it is clear that the State Government on consideration of a report of the Director wherein it is stated that Managing Committee is not functioning properly, may supersede such a Managing Committee and appoint an Administrator and/or an ad hoc committee to exercise the powers and functions of the erstwhile Managing Committee. No where in the provision is there any mention that hearing is to be granted to the Managing Committee. No where in the provision is there any mention that hearing is to be granted to the Managing Committee. Furthermore, the persons before me in this writ petition are persons nominated by the Government holding an honorary post without any remuneration. Therefore, the question of civil consequences falling on these persons does not arise. In Sahara India's case (supra) placed by the Counsel on behalf of the petitioner the ratio that emerges in paragraph 19 is that the principle of natural justice would apply even in cases of administrative action if the order has adverse civil consequences for the party affected. 14. It is to be further noted that in the case of Ashutosh Sengupta (supra) and in the case of Dharampal Satyapal Limited (supra), the same principles have been enunciated. 15. In view of the above, I have no hesitation to hold that the principles of natural justice would not apply in cases of quasi-judicial and/or administrative decision wherein no civil consequences are flowing. 16. In the present case, it is apparent that the petitioners have not been subjected to adverse civil consequences by the impugned order as they are nominated persons holding an honorary post and accordingly, the impugned decision does not result in adverse civil consequences for them. 17. In light of the above, there is no need to interfere with the impugned order. 18. However, it is to be noted that there is indeed a scarcity of teachers in the present school and the same needs to be addressed by the Administrator in a time-bound manner. I accordingly, direct the Administrator to initiate the process for filling up the vacancies in accordance with law and also direct the State Government to assist in expediting the above process. 19. Needless to mention, the Government shall also take steps for reconstituting the Managing Committee in accordance with law within a reasonable period of time. With the above observations, this writ petition is disposed of without, however, any order as to costs.