JUDGMENT : A.K.Rath, J - Plaintiffs are the appellants against a confirming judgment in a suit for recovery of Rs.1600/- from the defendants. 2. Case of the plaintiffs is that they and defendant no.1 are in litigating terms since 1965. Defendant no.1, in order to harass and humiliate them, filed ICC No.21 of 1982 before the S.D.J.M., Jagatsinghpur alleging theft of paddy sheaves from the thrashing floor of defendant no.1 on 19.1.1982 at about 4 p.m. During trial, defendants 1 to 3 falsely deposed against the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 are persons of repute. They suffered humiliation and harassment due to false charges. Plaintiff nos.4 to 11 could not work because of false prosecution against them. The plaintiffs engaged lawyers to defend them. They attended the court on several dates wasting valuable time and incurred expenditure. All the defendants are jointly and severally liable to compensate the plaintiffs by way of general and special damages. 3. The defendants besides pleading non-maintainability of the suit and bar of suit on the ground of limitation, had taken specific plea that the facts mentioned in ICC No.21 of 1982 are true. The question of plaintiffs being prosecuted maliciously would not arise. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck five issues. Parties led evidence. Learned trial court dismissed the suit with the finding that the suit was barred by limitation. It cannot be said that the defendant no.1 initiated criminal case without any reasonable and probable cause. Held so, it dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs filed Money Appeal No.14 of 1994 before the learned District Judge, Cuttack. Learned appellate court held that the suit was within the prescribed period of limitation. There was no reasonable cause in instituting the suit for damages. Held so, it dismissed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the appeal, appellant no.9 died, whereafter his legal heirs have been substituted. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law enumerated in Ground Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the appeal memo. The same are - "6. For that the learned appellate judge having held that the suit was not barred by law of limitation, it should have directed remand for fresh hearing. 7. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law enumerated in Ground Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the appeal memo. The same are - "6. For that the learned appellate judge having held that the suit was not barred by law of limitation, it should have directed remand for fresh hearing. 7. For that the learned appellate judge having found that the issues have not been properly framed it should have held that the trial is vitiated and requires fresh adjudication. 8. For that the court below has committed error in holding that the suit against defendant nos.2 and 3 is not maintainable, they having deposed against the plaintiff is the complaint case vide Ext.2. 6. Heard Mr. Ajit Chandra Mohapatra on behalf of Mr. P.K. Sahu, learned counsel for the appellants. None appeared for the respondents. 7. Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned trial court committed an illegality in holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove the initial burden. The plaintiffs were falsely implicated in the criminal case. They were acquitted. The courts below committed an error in holding that there was no reasonable and probable cause in instituting the suit. 8. The Privy Council in Braja Sunder Deb v. Bamdeb Das, (1944) AIR(Privy Council) 1, held : "......In order to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must in the first instance prove two things; (i) that defendant was malicious and (ii) that he acted without reasonable and probable cause. Malice has been said to mean any wrong or indirect motive but a prosecution is not malicious merely because it is inspired by anger. However wrongheaded a prosecutor may be, if he honestly thinks that the accused has been guilty of a criminal offence he cannot be the initiator of a malicious prosecution. But malice alone is not enough; there must also be shown to be absence of reasonable and probable cause. ....." 9. However wrongheaded a prosecutor may be, if he honestly thinks that the accused has been guilty of a criminal offence he cannot be the initiator of a malicious prosecution. But malice alone is not enough; there must also be shown to be absence of reasonable and probable cause. ....." 9. Taking a cue from Braja Sunder Deb, this Court in the case of Kasinath Sahu v. Jagamohan Nandi, (1973) AIR(Ori) 56 held; "It is well settled that in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has to prove inter alia (i) that he was prosecuted by the defendant (ii) that the proceedings complained of terminated in his favour; (iii) that the prosecution was instituted against him without any reasonable and probable cause; and (iv) that it was due to a malicious intention of the defendant and not with a mere intention of carrying the law into effect. The courts in India have held that the entire burden in the matter of establishment of the aforesaid four ingredients rests on the plaintiff in order to entitle him to a decree for damages in an action for malicious prosecution." 10. Reverting to the facts of this case and keeping in view the law enunciated by the Privy Council, the instant appeal may be examined. Under Article 74 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation to institute the suit for compensation for malicious prosecution is one year. Learned appellate court held that complaint case was ended in acquittal on 24.2.1986. The plaint was presented on 23.2.1987. Office registered it as small cause court suit no.19/12 of 1987. Subsequently, the office pointed out that instead of small cause court suit no.19/12 of 1987, the same should be registered as Money Suit No.24 of 1987. Thus the suit was filed within the period of limitation. On a thread-bare analysis of the evidence on record, it came to hold that the prosecution case was that the occurrence took place on 19.1.1982 at about 4 A.M early morning. The defendants in para-8 of the written statement asserted that on 19.1.1982 at about 4 A.M all the plaintiffs dishonestly and forcibly entered into the bari of defendant no.1 and removed paddy sheaves in spite of protest of the defendants. In the plaint, it is stated that the occurrence took place on 19.1.1982 at 4 P.M (not 4 A.M early morning) . In the plaint, it is stated that the occurrence took place on 19.1.1982 at 4 P.M (not 4 A.M early morning) . The same was denied by the defendants. P.W.1 (plaintiff no.1) struck to that time 4 P.M in his evidence. There is no pleading or evidence that the plaintiffs had not committed theft of paddy sheaves on 19.1.1982 at about 4 A.M early in the morning. Initial burden lay on the plaintiffs to establish that the prosecution was not only false and without reasonable and probable cause, but also malicious. It is absolutely lacking in the suit. The finding of the criminal court does not bind on the civil court. The plaintiffs failed to discharge the initial burden. There is no perversity or illegality in the finding of the appellate court. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 11. In the wake of the aforesaid, the appeal, sans merit, deserves dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed