Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 56 (ALL)

MUKESH YADAV v. STATE OF U. P.

2018-01-08

AJAY BHANOT, KRISHNA MURARI

body2018
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ajay Bhanot, J.—An advertisement was published in widely circulated newspapers on 8.7.2017 inviting applications from eligible and interested parties for setting up of MS/HSD, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘BPCL’) retail outlet dealership at SH-83 Etawah to Mainpuri Road between KM Stone 36 to 41. In response to the advertisement the petitioner presented the application alongwith his credentials for appointment as retail outlet dealer. After submission of the applications by interested parties at the behest of the advertisement, the selection process entered the subsequent phases. At the conclusion of the selection proceedings petitioner was awarded the retail outlet dealership of MS/HSD, BPCL proposed to be located at the appointed site. A letter of intent was issued by BPCL on 21.7.2017 to the petitioner advising various terms and conditions of retail outlet dealership. Petitioner was always ready and willing to fulfill his part of the conditions detailed in the letter of intent. The terms of the letter of intent enjoined the petitioner to give full assistance to BPCL for obtaining the requisite No Objection Certificates (hereinafter referred to as ‘NOC’) from appropriate authorities. The BPCL with the assistance of the petitioner submitted the applications alongwith supporting testimonials to various competent and statutory authorities, to take out the NOCs for the subject retail outlet. The aforesaid applications were processed by the competent authorities. Meticulous investigations were carried out by the authorities into the subject-matter which fell in their jurisdiction. The Superintendent of Police, Mainpuri and the Fire Authorities possessing jurisdiction, having found the subject retail outlet to be compliant with the requirements of law, issued the NOC to the petitioner. 2. However, the Executive Engineer, PWD (respondent No. 3) by order dated 7.9.2017 refused to issue NOC. Without the requisite NOC the petitioner cannot establish the retail outlet. The petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid rejection of his application for grant of NOC has instituted the instant writ petition assailing the aforesaid order. 3. The order impugned in the instant writ petition dated 7.9.2017 passed by the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Construction Division-3, Mainpuri has declined the NOC to the petitioner on the ground that the proposed retail outlet dealership was situated within 90 metres of Ratibhanpur Sahan Marg intersection. The aforesaid location of the proposed retail outlet fell within the proscribed distance of 300 metres from an intersection. The aforesaid location of the proposed retail outlet fell within the proscribed distance of 300 metres from an intersection. The said prohibition was created by the Indian Road Congress Guidelines, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IRCG’). In short the location of the retail outlet dealership violated the IRCG norms for situating retail outlet dealership. 4. Heard Sri Ajay Vikram Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 to 3 and Sri Vikas Budhwar, counsel for respondent No. 4. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order on various grounds. The first submission made by Sri Ajay Vikram Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the refusal to grant NOC by the impugned order to set up retail outlet dealership on the proposed site is based solely on the ground of violation of IRCG. The proposed location is within 90 metres of Ratibhanpur Sahan Marg intersection, while the IRCG provide that no retail outlet can be situated within 300 metres of any intersection. Elaborating his submission, Sri Ajay Vikram Yadav contends that aforesaid norms laid down by the IRCG relating to the situation of retail outlet dealership are not applicable to the case of the petitioner. The application of IRCG norms to the case of the petitioner and the rejection of the NOC for alleged violation of the same is in the teeth of law laid down by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., 2014(6) ADJ 270 . He also relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and 7 others (Writ-C No. 58534 of 2017), rendered on 8.12.2017. Learned counsel for the petitioner thereafter contends that the guidelines and norms for location of retail outlet dealership established by various petroleum companies have been provided by the order dated 24.7.2013 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. The aforesaid norms and guidelines are applicable to fuel stations which are situated along National Highways. 6. Sri Ajay Vikram Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner in his final submission asserts that the impugned order admittedly visits the petitioner with penal consequences but the same has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. The adverse material relied upon in the impugned order was not provided to the petitioner. 6. Sri Ajay Vikram Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner in his final submission asserts that the impugned order admittedly visits the petitioner with penal consequences but the same has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. The adverse material relied upon in the impugned order was not provided to the petitioner. The petitioner was never given any opportunity of hearing to tender his defence prior to passing of the impugned order. 7. Learned Standing Counsel upon perusing the impugned order and being faced with the law laid down by this Court fairly concedes to the legal position that the reasons in the order impugned cannot be supplemented or improved upon in a counter-affidavit. Further the defects which go to the root of the matter upon a perusal of the impugned order cannot be supplied by filing affidavits on behalf of the State respondents. 8. Sri Vikas Budhwar adopts the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner and does not dispute the applicability of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra) and Ashwani Kumar Singh (supra), to the facts of this case. 9. In this view of the matter it will not be in the interest of justice to keep the matter pending and with the consent of the parties writ petition is being finally disposed of at the admission stage. 10. Admittedly the impugned order cites only one reason for declining to issue NOC for establishing the retail outlet at the appointed site. The reason provided in the impugned order states that IRCG proscribed the establishment of a retail petrol outlet at any site which is situated within 300 metres of an intersection. A finding of fact is further recorded on the basis of a report of Assistant Engineer that the proposed site of the retail outlet dealership is within 90 metres of Ratibhanpur Sahan Marg intersection. The proposed site being within the prohibitory regime laid down by the IRCG, does not qualify for grant of NOC. Hence the same stands rejected. 11. The issue of applicability of IRCG and the enforcement of the prohibitory regime created by such guidelines came up for consideration before this Hon’ble Court. 12. The issue of nature, scope and enforceability of IRCG to establishment of retail petrol outlet was considered by successive Division Benches of this Court. Hence the same stands rejected. 11. The issue of applicability of IRCG and the enforcement of the prohibitory regime created by such guidelines came up for consideration before this Hon’ble Court. 12. The issue of nature, scope and enforceability of IRCG to establishment of retail petrol outlet was considered by successive Division Benches of this Court. Some of the judgments handed down in this regard were rendered in the cases of M/s Vikas Traders v. Union of India and others (Writ Petition No. 36700 of 2005), Lila Dhar Gera v. The Union of India and others (Writ Petition No. 12283 of 2010), Mahtab Ahmad v. Union of India Through Principal Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and others (Writ Petition No. 43483 of 2010). Though the line of judicial authority was consistent, considering the importance of the issue, the law on the point was finally consolidated by a Division Bench judgment of this Court (of which one of us Hon’ble Krishna Murari J. was a member) entered in the case of Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., 2014(6) ADJ 270 . This Court after considering the law on the point as well as the judgments on the issue handed down by this Court laid down the law in the following manner : “The issue stands settled by pronouncements of different Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Vikash Traders (supra), Lila Dhar Gera (supra) and Metab Ahmad (supra). The same view has again been reiterated by another Division Bench in the case of Ajay Kumar Goyal v. State of U.P. Thru Secy. and others, Writ Petition No. 13768 of 2012, decided on 2.5.2012. It may be relevant to quote the following observation. “Sri Rajeev Misra, learned counsel submitted that the Plot Nos. 415-16 situate at Village Dagrauli, Tehsil Hasanpur, District J.P. Nagar abuts the Main District Road and, therefore, in accordance with the guidelines prescribed by the Indian Road Congress, the retail outlet should be at a distance of 300 metres. He further submitted that the Oil Companies had formulated norms for fuel outlets under which distance from intersections for considering the location of the retail outlet has been prescribed. He further submitted that the Oil Companies had formulated norms for fuel outlets under which distance from intersections for considering the location of the retail outlet has been prescribed. In respect of Rural Stretch, if the location is on the intersection with any National Highways/State Highways/Main District Road then it should be situated at a distance of 1000 metres whereas if the location is on the intersection with Rural Roads with carriageway width of 3.5 metres or more then it should be situated at a distance of 300 metres. According to him, the present plots are situated barely at a distance of 150 metres and, therefore, ‘No Objection Certificate’ could not have been granted. The submission is wholly misconceived. This Court has held in a catena of decisions that the guidelines prescribed by the Indian Road Congress are not statutory guidelines. Some of the decisions are as follows: 1. M/s. Vikash Traders v. Union of India and others, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36700 of 2005, decided on 6.5.2005. 2. Lila Dhar Gera v. The Union of India and others, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12283 of 2010, decided on 20.7.2010. 3. Mahtab Ahmad v. Union of India Thru Prin.Sec.Mini Of Pet. and others, Writ C No. 43483 of 2010, decided on 29.7.2010.” In view of the settled law on the point, the order of the District Magistrate refusing to grant No Objection Certificate on the ground of violation of the guidelines of the IRC cannot be said to be legally justified.” 13. The judgment of this Court in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra) was subsequently followed and approved in the case of Ashwani Kumar Singh (supra). This Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar Singh (supra) upon considering the law laid down by this Court in the case of Lila Dhar (supra) and Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. (Writ-C No. 53352 of 2017 decided on 13.11.2017) and Deepak Agarwal (supra) essentially reiterated the position of law in the following terms : “Similarly this Court in Anil Kumar held as under: “The sole ground which had weighed with the authority is a perceived disqualification of the site in light of certain Guidelines laid down by the Indian Road Congress. This decision has come to be made evidently without bearing in mind the judgment rendered by this Court on Civil Misc. This decision has come to be made evidently without bearing in mind the judgment rendered by this Court on Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12283 of 2010 decided on 20 July 2010 followed by various Division Benches thereafter and which were noticed in a subsequent decision rendered by a Division Bench of the Court in Deepak Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, 2014(6) ADJ 270 (DB). This Court had in clear and unequivocal terms held that the Guidelines framed by the Indian Road Congress were not statutory and that in view thereof a refusal to accord no-objection on an infraction of the same could not be sustained. Dealing further with the issue of certain Guidelines issued by the Union Government through its Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways, it was held that those Guidelines would only apply to outlets which are situate on National Highways. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the decision taken by the third respondent would merit reconsideration.” From the above, it is evident that this Court has consistently ruled that neither the Indian Road Congress Guidelines nor the Circular of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways dated 25 September 2003 would have any application to the establishment of petroleum outlets on sites other than those situate on a National Highway.” 14. It is also pertinent to point out that the impugned order dated 7.9.2017 also confirms the location of the retail petrol outlet at the Etawah-Mainpuri (State Highway-83 road) at the 40 km point in village Ratibhanpur, Tehsil and District Mainpuri. The impugned order does not contain any recital or reference to the location of the proposed retail outlet with respect to proximity to any National Highway. 15. The judicial opinion of this Court has converged to hold that the IRCG are non statutory in nature. The IRCG do not govern and cannot regulate the establishment of various petrol retail outlets in the State. Any attempt by the State authority to apply and enforce the guidelines of IRCG to setting up of petrol retail outlets is illegal and beyond jurisdiction. The refusal to grant NOC for violation of IRCG is an arbitrary and illegal exercise of power. Any attempt by the State authority to apply and enforce the guidelines of IRCG to setting up of petrol retail outlets is illegal and beyond jurisdiction. The refusal to grant NOC for violation of IRCG is an arbitrary and illegal exercise of power. The impugned order rejects the application for issuance of NOC only on the ground that the establishment of petrol outlet dealership at the proposed site violates the IRCG is thus held to be arbitrary and illegal. The order is unsustainable in law on this ground alone. 16. However, considering the importance of the matter and the implications of the regulatory regime in regard to which the issues are being raised, it would be appropriate to consider the other relevant aspects of the matter and arguments raised at the bar. 17. A large number of regulatory measures are directed at setting up of retail outlet dealerships and a number of statutory authorities oversee such regulatory compliances. A dealer wishing to set up a retail petrol outlet is under an obligation of law to execute various regulatory measures, comply with various statutory provisions and take out several clearances from statutory or appropriate authorities as the case may be. The regulatory compliance which is relevant to the instant controversy is the NOC which is issued by the competent authority under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002. For facility of reference Rule 144 is reproduced here under : “144. No-objection certificate—(1) Where the licensing authority is the Chief Controller or the Controller, as the case may be, an applicant for a new licence other than a licence in Forms III, XI, XVII, XVIII or XIX shall apply to the District Authority with two copies of the site-plan showing the location of the premises proposed to be licensed for a certificate to the effect that there is no objection, to the applicant receiving a licence for the site proposed and the District Authority shall, if he sees no objection, grant such certificate to the applicant who shall forward it to the licensing authority with his application Form IX. (2) Every certificate issued by the District Authority under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of the plan of the proposed site duly endorsed by him under his official seal. (2) Every certificate issued by the District Authority under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of the plan of the proposed site duly endorsed by him under his official seal. (3) The Chief Controller or the Controller, as the case may be, may refer an application not accompanied by certificate granted under sub-rule (1) to the District Authority for his observations. (4) If the District Authority, either on a reference being made to him or otherwise, intimates, to the Chief Controller or the Controller, as the case may be, that any licence which has been applied for should not, in his opinion, be granted, such licence shall not be issued without the sanction of the Central Government. (5) The District Authority shall complete his inquiry for issuing NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATE (NOC) under sub-rule (1) and shall complete the action for issue or refusal of the NOC, as the case may be, as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of receipt of application by him. [(6) Where the location of storage of petroleum is within the notified area of a Port or Airport under the control of the state, or establishment of Indian Space Research Organisation or Department of Atomic Energy, NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATE from the District Authority referred to in sub-rules (1) to (5) shall not be required: Provided that consent for establishment of petroleum storage from the competent authority of concerned notified area or head of the establishment, as the case may be, is obtained.] 18. Considering the inflammable nature and the explosive character of the products which are stored and vended in petrol retail outlets, a strict vigil by the statutory and other appropriate authorities coupled with scrupulous compliances of all regulatory measures is most essential and mandatory in nature. Any laxity in observance of the regulatory measures could pose a danger to public life and health. However the imperatives of regulatory compliances have to go hand in hand with the mandate of procedural propriety. The strict insistence on ensuring regulatory compliances and maintaining regulatory standards does not obviate the need for adherence to the requirements of procedural fairness as evolved by the Courts. 19. Grant or denial of any licenses or regulatory certificates ‘NOC’ in the instant case, has a direct bearing on the fundamental rights of the petrol outlet dealer guaranteed under the Constitution. 20. 19. Grant or denial of any licenses or regulatory certificates ‘NOC’ in the instant case, has a direct bearing on the fundamental rights of the petrol outlet dealer guaranteed under the Constitution. 20. Upon grant of dealership of the retail outlet the petitioner is bound by the terms of the contract. The petitioner is restrained from pursuing any vocation other than management of the retail outlet dealership by the covenants of the contract. Hence the management and running of the retail outlet is the sole vocation or trade or profession which the petitioner can lawfully pursue. In such a situation, after lawful appointment as retail outlet dealer, the right to establish and run the retail outlet dealer becomes a fundamental right of the petitioner. Of course this right is subject to terms of the allotment letter, the covenants of the contract and other requirements of law. The right to pursue one’s choice of profession, occupation, trade or business flows from Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The right can be restricted and curtailed in accordance with law and not by any arbitrary action of authorities. For ease of reference the provisions of Article 19 (1) (g) and Article 19 (6) which disclose the scope of right to practise a vocation of one’s choice and the limitations and restrictions which can be imposed in the enjoyment of such right are extracted here under : 19(1)(g)- Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.- (1) All citizens shall have the right- (a)........ (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. (19)(6)- Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,— (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or 10 The Constitution of India. (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service,whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. 21. The right cannot be curtailed or restricted by an arbitrary order or in a manner not in accord with Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. Rejection of the NOC by an arbitrary order would infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner assured by Article 19(1)(g) and such arbitrary rejection is not saved by Article 19 (6) of the Constitution of India. 22. The competent authority while exercising powers under Rule 144, can accept or refuse the application of a dealer for grant of NOC. The letter of Rule 144 (quoted earlier) does not provide for a procedure to be adopted by the competent authority before rejecting an application for grant of NOC. In the Rule 144 there is no requirement for the authority to observed the principles of natural justice before declaring NOC. The question is how to traverse the vacant statutory space. 23. Statutory silences are not a novelty to the field of law. Statutory vacant spaces as in the instant case can only be traversed by the road map provided by our procedural jurisprudence. 24. Courts in India have frequently faced situations, where the statutes provide no guide to the procedure to be adopted by the authorities before passing orders adverse to the parties. This lack of statutory guidance left the citizens to the unguided discretion of the authorities. The authorities often adopted arbitrary procedures which lead to miscarriage of justice. The legal challenge thus posed was faced frontally and dealt with on a conceptual basis. The Courts resolved the issue by evolving and entrenching the principles of natural justice in our processual jurisprudence. The principles of natural justice were set out with clarity and implemented with consistency. Today natural justice lies at the heart of procedural jurisprudence and is an indispensible element of procedural propriety. 25. At this stage it would be apposite to understand and extract the elements of natural justice which would be relevant for a judgment on the issue at hand. 26. The case law on various aspects of natural justice is very large and largely consistent. It would not be prudent to overburden this judgment with repetitive citations. 25. At this stage it would be apposite to understand and extract the elements of natural justice which would be relevant for a judgment on the issue at hand. 26. The case law on various aspects of natural justice is very large and largely consistent. It would not be prudent to overburden this judgment with repetitive citations. However a few relevant case laws would suffice to give a comprehensive understanding of the law and provide a clear vision for action. 27. In the case of Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and others, (2015) 8 SCC 519 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the jurisprudential foundation of natural justice and the necessity of incorporating it in administrative procedures to ensure fairness and good governance and prevent miscarriage of justice. The judgment also cites with approval past authority of the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein principles of natural justice were held to be an integral part of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was also held that the principles of natural justice were applicable even when there was no statutory requirement. The relevant extracts of the judgment are quoted here under : “24. The principles have sound jurisprudential basis. Since the function of the judicial and quasi-judicial authorities is to secure justice with fairness, these principles provide great humanising factor intended to invest law with fairness to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. The principles are extended even to those who have to take administrative decision and who are not necessarily discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They are a kind of code of fair administrative procedure. In this context, procedure is not a matter of secondary importance as it is only by procedural fairness shown in the decision making that decision becomes acceptable. In its proper sense, thus, natural justice would mean the natural sense of what is right and wrong. 26. Allan, on the other hand, justifies the procedural fairness by following the aforesaid principles of natural justice as rooted in rule of law leading to good governance. In its proper sense, thus, natural justice would mean the natural sense of what is right and wrong. 26. Allan, on the other hand, justifies the procedural fairness by following the aforesaid principles of natural justice as rooted in rule of law leading to good governance. He supports Galligan in this respect and goes to the extent by saying that it is same as ensuring dignity of individuals, in respect of whom or against whom the decision is taken, in the following words: “The instrumental value of procedures should not be underestimated; the accurate application of authoritative standards is, as Galligan clearly explains, an important aspect of treating someone with respect. But procedures also have intrinsic value in acknowledging a person’s right to understand his treatment, and thereby to determine his response as a conscientious citizen, willing to make reasonable sacrifices for the public good. If obedience to law ideally entails a recognition of its morally obligatory character, there must be suitable opportunities to test its moral credentials. Procedures may also be though to have intrinsic value in so far as they constitute a fair balance between the demands of accuracy and other social needs: where the moral harm entailed by erroneous decisions is reasonably assessed and fairly distributed, procedures express society’s commitment to equal concern and respect for all.” 27. It, thus, cannot be denied that principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct decision and procedural fairness is fundamentally an instrumental good, in the sense that procedure should be designed to ensure accurate or appropriate outcomes. In fact, procedural fairness is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms. 28. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. It is for this reason that the Courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision is made, but there may be instances where though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders, which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision for prior hearing. But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of natural justice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not. 29. De Smith captures the essence thus- “Where a statute authorises interference with properties or other rights and is silent on the question of hearing, the Courts would apply rule of universal application and founded on plainest principles of natural justice”. 30. Wade also emphasizes that principles of natural justice operate as implied mandatory requirements, non-observance of which invalidates the exercise of power. 31. In Cooper v. Sandworth Board of Works (1863) 14 GB (NS) the Court laid down that: ‘...although there is no positive word in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet justice of common law would supply the omission of Legislature”. 33. In his separate opinion, concurring on this fundamental issue, Justice K. Ramaswamy echoed the aforesaid sentiments in the following words: “61. It is now settled law that the proceedings must be just, fair and reasonable and negation thereof offends Articles 14 and 21. It is well-settled law that principles of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No decision prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an opportunity or supplying the material which is the basis for the decision. The enquiry report constitutes fresh material which has great persuasive force or effect on the mind of the disciplinary authority. The supply of the report alongwith the final order is like a post mortem certificate with putrefying odour. The failure to supply copy thereof to the delinquent would be unfair procedure offending not only Articles 14, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution, but also, the principles of natural justice.” 34. Likewise, in C.B. Gautam v. Union of India and others (1993) 1 SCC 78 , this Court once again held that principle of natural justice was applicable even though it was not statutorily required. The Court took the view that even in the absence of statutory provision to this effect, the authority was liable to give notice to the affected parties while purchasing their properties Under Section 269-UD of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court took the view that even in the absence of statutory provision to this effect, the authority was liable to give notice to the affected parties while purchasing their properties Under Section 269-UD of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It was further observed that: “30.........the very fact that an imputation of tax evasion arises where an order for compulsory purchase is made and such an imputation casts a slur on the parties to the agreement to sell leads to the conclusion that before such an imputation can be made against the parties concerned they must be given an opportunity to show-cause that the under valuation in the agreement for sale was not with a view to evade tax. It is, therefore, all the more necessary that an opportunity of hearing is provided.” 35. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the Court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak’s case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another (1978) 1 SCC 248 also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Suvarna Board Mills and another (1994) 5 SCC 566 , this aspect was explained in the following manner: “3. It has been contended before us by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action Under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It has been contended before us by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action Under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well-settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law: All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case.” 28. In the case of Gorkha Security Services v. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2014) 9 SCC 105 , Hon’ble Supreme Court provided for implied applicability of principles of natural justice to statutory provisions unless the stature specifically or by necessary implication excluded such applicability. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “29. However, their aim is to secure justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. It is now well established proposition of law that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, in exercise of power pre-judicially affecting another must be in conformity with the rules of natural justice. 30. We are conscious of the following words of wisdom expressed by this Court through the pen of Justice Krishna Iyer in the case of Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and another v. Ramjee, 1977 (2) SCC 256 : “1..If the jurisprudence of remedies were understood and applied from the perspective of social efficaciousness, the problem raised in this appeal would not have ended the erroneous way it did in the High Court. Judges must never forget that every law has a social purpose and engineering process without appreciating which justice to the law cannot be done. Here, the socio-legal situation we are faced with is a colliery, an explosive, an accident, luckily not lethal, caused by violation of a Regulation and consequential cancellation of the certificate of the delinquent shot-firer, eventually quashed by the High Court, for processual solecisms, by a writ of certiorari. Here, the socio-legal situation we are faced with is a colliery, an explosive, an accident, luckily not lethal, caused by violation of a Regulation and consequential cancellation of the certificate of the delinquent shot-firer, eventually quashed by the High Court, for processual solecisms, by a writ of certiorari. 13....Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt—that is the conscience of the matter.... 14...We cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artefact. Nor can we fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity. “ 29. In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and others, (2015) 8 SCC 519 , Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised and provided for the need to adapt the principles of natural justice with flexibility to the facts of the case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to cast the principles of natural justice in any straight-jacket formula. In para 38 Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the law as under : “38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the Courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straight-jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. They cannot be applied in any straight-jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the Courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on.” 30. Yet again in the case of Poonam v. State of U.P. and others, (2016) 2 SCC 779 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized the need to embed principles of natural justice even when not embodied in a statute or in the rules framed there under. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also required that the administrative authorities which passed orders affecting the rights of individuals need to inform their decisions by principles of natural justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down law and in paragraph 20 of the judgment held as under : “20. In this context the authority in Sadananda Halo and others v. Momtaz Ali Sheikh and others (2008) 4 SCC 619 is quite pertinent. The Division Bench referred to the decision in All India SC and ST Employees’ Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen (2001) 6 SCC 380 wherein this Court had addressed the necessity in joining the necessary candidates as parties. The Court referred to the principle of natural justice as enunciated in Canara Bank v. Debasis Das (2003) 4 SCC 557 . We may profitably reproduce the same: “63...Natural justice has been variously defined. v. A. Arthur Jeen (2001) 6 SCC 380 wherein this Court had addressed the necessity in joining the necessary candidates as parties. The Court referred to the principle of natural justice as enunciated in Canara Bank v. Debasis Das (2003) 4 SCC 557 . We may profitably reproduce the same: “63...Natural justice has been variously defined. It is another name for common sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.” And again: “63...Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance.... “ 31. In the case of Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj and others v. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly and others, (2016) 6 SCC 82 , Hon’ble Supreme drew additional contours of principles of natural justice, namely providing adverse material and an opportunity to meet the same to parties who would be adversely affected by the decision. “ 31. In the case of Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj and others v. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly and others, (2016) 6 SCC 82 , Hon’ble Supreme drew additional contours of principles of natural justice, namely providing adverse material and an opportunity to meet the same to parties who would be adversely affected by the decision. The Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the law on the aforesaid proposition in the following terms : “44. The principles of natural justice require that the Petitioners ought to have been granted an opportunity to see the video recording. Perhaps they might have had an opportunity to explain why the video recording does not contain any evidence/material for recommending action against all or some of them or to explain that the video recording should have been interpreted differently. 45. The Privileges Committee should have necessarily offered this opportunity, in order to make the process adopted by it compliant with the requirements of Article 14. Petitioner No. 1 in his reply letter to the notice issued by the Privileges Committee seeks permission to give further explanation when the video recording is provided to him. The Petitioner No. 3 in his reply letter states that he believes his version of his conduct will be proven by the video recording. The other Petitioners do not mention the video recording in their reply letters. However, it is not the Petitioners’ burden to request for a copy of the video recording. It is the legal obligation of the Privileges Committee to ensure that a copy of the video recording is supplied to the Petitioners in order to satisfy the requirements of the principles of natural justice The failure to supply a copy of the video recording or affording an opportunity to the Petitioners to view the video recording relied upon by the committee in our view clearly resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice i.e. a denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the case. We, therefore, have no option but to set aside the impugned resolution dated 31.3.2015 passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. The same is accordingly set aside.” 32. Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kemtech International Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (I & G), (2014) 14 SCC 552, wherein in para 4 Court held as under : 4. The same is accordingly set aside.” 32. Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kemtech International Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (I & G), (2014) 14 SCC 552, wherein in para 4 Court held as under : 4. Bearing in mind the principles of natural justice, we feel, the prayer made is reasonable. Accordingly, we direct that, while examining the case for the purpose of quantification of short-levy, the Adjudicating Authority shall supply all the documents, on which it proposes to place reliance, to the Appellants. It will be open to the Appellants to furnish their explanation thereon. They would also be permitted to lead additional evidence, in support of their claim.” 33. Lastly in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad and others, (2012) 4 SCC 407 and Manohar v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2012) 13 SCC 14 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering with approval previous authority on the point holding that the requirement to record reasons in support of the decision was one fundamental aspect of principles of natural justice. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgments are reproduced here under : “42. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , it has been held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action. The expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice provides for requirement to record reasons as it is now regarded as one of the principles of natural justice, and it was held in the above case that except in cases where the requirement to record reasons is expressly or by necessary implication dispensed with, the authority must record reasons for its decision. 43. In Krishna Swami v. Union of India and others, AIR 1993 SC 1407 , this Court observed that the rule of law requires that any action or decision of a statutory or public authority must be founded on the reason stated in the order or borne-out from the record. The Court further observed: “47...Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for their erection and the actual conclusions. They would also demonstrate how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusions reached. The Court further observed: “47...Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for their erection and the actual conclusions. They would also demonstrate how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violating Article 14 or unfair procedure offending Article 21.” 44. This Court while deciding the issue in Sant Lal Gupta and others v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. and others, (2010) 13 SCC 336 , placing reliance on its various earlier judgments held as under: “27... It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice - delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. “3...The giving of reasons for a decision is an essential attribute of judicial and judicious disposal of a matter before Courts, and which is the only indication to know about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken, as also the fact that the Court concerned had really applied its mind.” The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected.” 45. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected.” 45. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and others, AIR 1987 SC 71 , this Court held that on charge of misconduct the authority holding the inquiry must record reasons for reaching its conclusion and record clear findings. The Court further held: “30...In fairness and justice, the member is entitled to know why he has been found guilty. The case can be so serious that it can attract the harsh penalties provided by the Act. Moreover, the member has been given a right of appeal to the High Court under Section 22A of the Act. The exercise his right of appeal effectively he must know the basis on which the Council has found him guilty. We have already pointed out that a finding by the Council is the first determinative finding on the guilt of the member. It is a finding by a Tribunal of first instance. The conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee does not enjoy the status of a “finding”. Moreover, the reasons contained in the report by the Disciplinary Committee for its conclusion may or may not constitute the basis of the finding rendered by the Council. The Council must, therefore, state the reasons for its finding.” 46. The emphasis on recording reason is that if the decision reveals the ‘inscrutable face of the sphinx’, it can be its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind of the authority before the Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made. In other words, a speaking out, the inscrutable face of the sphinx is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. 56. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made. In other words, a speaking out, the inscrutable face of the sphinx is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. 56. The explanation furnished by the Appellant for not holding the meeting and acceptance of tender by the council itself and not by the Appellant, has not been considered at all. No reasoning has been given by the Statutory Authority for reaching the conclusions. We fail to understand as on what basis such a cryptic order imposing such a severe punishment can be sustained in the eyes of law. 18. In the case of A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others, the Court held as under: “17.... It is not necessary to examine those decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding... 20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the Courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. Till very recently it was the opinion of the Courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.” 19. In the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. and others v. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Court dealt with the question of demarcation between the administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders and the requirement of adherence to natural justice. The Court held as under: “47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants’ faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of ‘due process’.” 34. The provisions of Rule 144 are now required to be viewed in the perspective of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court extracted in the preceding paragraphs. Considering the nature of power under Rule 144 and the consequences flowing from exercising of such power, we hold the principles of natural justice to be implicit in the scheme of Rule 144. Principles of natural justice are held to be an integral part of Rule 144 and embodied in the scheme of Rule 144. In such view, the procedure adopted while exercising powers under Article 144 has to be compliant with principles of natural justice. However the concept of natural justice has to be adapted to the peculiar features of Rule 144 and facts and circumstances of the case at hand with a view to ensure procedural fairness. 35. In the case of Rule 144 the requirements of natural justice are to provide the adverse material and the grounds on which the application for NOC of the party is proposed to be rejected. The authority when minded to decline the NOC should issue a show-cause notice, containing all the grounds for the proposed rejection and provide the adverse material to the dealer. The retail outlet dealer should be given full opportunity to refute the adverse material against him and tender his defence in regard to the same. After consideration of the adverse material in the record and the defence of the retail outlet dealer, the competent authority is required to apply his mind to the issues at hand and return findings by a reasoned and speaking order. 36. After consideration of the adverse material in the record and the defence of the retail outlet dealer, the competent authority is required to apply his mind to the issues at hand and return findings by a reasoned and speaking order. 36. Admittedly in the instant case the adverse material like the reports of the Assistant Engineer on which reliance was placed while passing the impugned order were not furnished to the petitioner. Nor was the petitioner alerted to the fact that his application was liable to be rejected for non compliance of the IRCG. The petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing to tender his defence at any time prior to the impugned order. The procedure thus adopted by the competent authority to reject the application for grant of NOC was arbitrary and violated the principles of natural justice. The impugned order is illegal and unsustainable in law for the aforesaid reason as well. 37. Another point which has been raised for consideration is the applicability of order dated 24.7.2013 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highway and the enclosures as appendix 1 and 2 to the aforesaid order. 38. The learned Standing Counsel contends that the impugned order infact implements the order dated 24.7.2013 issued by the Government of India. In his submission, the rejection of the NOC by the impugned order fulfills the salutary purpose of the order dated 24.7.2013 is in conformity with the same. The impugned order may be illegal but the same may not be quashed in view of such equitable considerations. 39. The Government of India order dated 24.7.2013 lays down in considerable detail and with meticulous care, the guidelines for access permission to fuel stations etc. along National Highways. The relevant provisions are extracted here under for ease of reference : “No. RW/NH-33023/19/99-DO-III Dated: 24th July, 2013 To 1. The Chief Secretaries of all State Governments/U.Ts. 2. The Principal Secretaries /Secretaries of all States/U.Ts. Public Works Department dealing with National Highways, other Centrally Sponsored Schemes and State Schemes. 3. The Engineers-in-Chief and Chief Engineers of Public Works Departments of States/U.Ts dealing with National Highways, other Centrally Sponsored Schemes and State Schemes. 4. The Chairman, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), G-5and6, Sector-10, Dwarka, New Delhi-110 075. 5. Director General (Border Roads), Seema Sadak Bhawan, Ring Road, New Delhi 110 010. 3. The Engineers-in-Chief and Chief Engineers of Public Works Departments of States/U.Ts dealing with National Highways, other Centrally Sponsored Schemes and State Schemes. 4. The Chairman, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), G-5and6, Sector-10, Dwarka, New Delhi-110 075. 5. Director General (Border Roads), Seema Sadak Bhawan, Ring Road, New Delhi 110 010. Sub: Guidelines/Norms for access permission to Fuel Stations, Private Properties, Rest Area Complexes and such other facilities along National Highways. Sir, Ministry had issued separate guidelines on access permission to Fuel Stations, Service Stations; Rest Areas etc. vide Circular No. RW/NH-33023/19/99-DO-III dated 25.9.2003/17.10.2003, and access permission to Private Properties etc. along National Highways vide Circular No. RW/NH-33023/19/99-DO-III dated 31.8.2000. With the improvement in the National Highway network, a greater need for road safety of the users has been felt alongwith stricter enforcement of the guidelines. It has also been decided that unified norms for access to Fuel Stations, Service Stations, Private Properties, Rest areas and other such facilities along the National Highways may be evolved. 2. Accordingly, the existing Norms and guidelines have now been modified and the unified Guidelines/Norms are enclosed at Appendix-I and Appendix-II. The Norms at Appendix-I will be applicable for access permission to all Fuel stations, Service stations, Rest areas, etc. and Norms at Appendix-II will be applicable for access permission to Private Properties, from the date of the issue of this Circular. These norms shall be followed for seeking and granting permissions for the access to National Highways. 3. The power to give permission for access to National Highways lies with the Highway Administration as per the Highway Administration Rules, 2004 under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002. All such access permissions to the National Highways are to be given under Section 28 and 29 of Chapter IV and Section 38 of Chapter VI of the Control of National Highways (Land & Traffic) Act, 2002. These permissions are to be given by the concerned Highway Administration notified by the Central Government under sub-section (1) of Section 28 as per the Guidelines and instructions issued by the Central Government under sub-section (2) of Section 28 of the Control of National Highways (Land & Traffic) Act, 2002. 9. These permissions are to be given by the concerned Highway Administration notified by the Central Government under sub-section (1) of Section 28 as per the Guidelines and instructions issued by the Central Government under sub-section (2) of Section 28 of the Control of National Highways (Land & Traffic) Act, 2002. 9. In order to make the system of granting access permissions from National Highways easier and transparent, there shall be a website, developed by NIC, in which each Highway Administration will be provided an account for signing in. The Highway Administration will periodically update the status of an application for access permission from National Highways on the web site. For this purpose, a computer and internet facility shall be made available to each Highway Administration. With the development of web based monitoring system, it is envisaged that delays, if any, will be regularly monitored in the meetings of the Relaxation Committee of the Ministry. APPENDIX - I (Enclosure to Ministry of Road Transport & Highways letter No. RW/NH-33023/19/99-DOIII dated the 24th July, 2013) I- NORMS FOR LOCATION, LAYOUT AND ACCESS TO FUEL STATIONS ALONG NATIONAL HIGHWAYS. 1. These norms have been finalized in conformity to IRC: 12, ‘Guidelines for Access, Location and Layout of Roadside Fuel Stations and Service Stations’ and in substantial modification to the Ministry’s Circular No. RW/NH-33023/19/99-DOIII dated 25.9.2003/17.10.2003 on “Norms for the Access for Fuel Stations, Service Stations and Rest Areas along National Highways”. These norms shall be applicable to all new fuel stations with effect from the date of issue of this Circular. 2. Petrol/Diesel retail outlets and service stations with or without Rest Area Amenities etc. are hereinafter referred to as Fuel Stations. 3. These norms are applicable to all Fuel Stations with or without other user facilities of rest areas, along un-divided carriageway and divided carriageway sections of National Highways in plain, rolling and hilly terrain and passing through urban stretches. For this purpose hilly or mountainous terrain would be, when the cross slope of the country is more than 25%. The urban stretches would be, where National Highway passes through a town of population of 20,000 and more (Census 2011 will apply) 4.0 General Conditions of Siting 4.1 The fuel stations shall generally be a part of the rest area complex along the highways. The urban stretches would be, where National Highway passes through a town of population of 20,000 and more (Census 2011 will apply) 4.0 General Conditions of Siting 4.1 The fuel stations shall generally be a part of the rest area complex along the highways. Rest areas should have various amenities for users e.g. places for parking, toilets, restaurants, rest rooms, kiosks for selling sundry items, bathing facilities, repair facilities, crèche etc. These aspects should be incorporated while planning for improvement and upgradation of highways and/or planning for new fuel stations along the highways. The rest area complex can be planned subject to their commercial viability. 4.2 It should be ensured that the location of the proposed fuel station does not interfere with future improvements of the highway and the nearby intersections/junctions. 4.3 The fuel stations would be located where the highway alignment and profile are favourable i.e. where the grounds are practically level, there are no sharp curves not less than those specified for minimum design speed or steep grades (more than 5%) and where sight distances would be adequate for safe traffic operations. The location would not interfere with placement and proper functioning of highways signs, signals, lighting or other devices that affect traffic operation. 4.4 While considering the proposal for new fuel stations it would be ensured that the fuel stations on a corridor are well distributed on both sides of the highways so that vehicles normally do not have to cut across the traffic to reach them. The fuel stations would be serving only the traffic moving on the adjacent lane. For the vehicles travelling in the lanes in opposite direction, separate fuel stations need to be planned for which permission would be considered keeping also in view of its location and distance norms. In urban areas with population more than 2 million, fuel stations will not be allowed to be set up within the municipal limits along the National Highways even though with service roads, as these can be located on side roads for local traffic. 4.5 In order to provide safe length for weaving of traffic, fuel stations along National Highways shall be located at the minimum distance from an intersection (gap in the central median be treated as intersection) as given below. For single carriageway section, these minimum distances would be applicable for both sides. 4.5 In order to provide safe length for weaving of traffic, fuel stations along National Highways shall be located at the minimum distance from an intersection (gap in the central median be treated as intersection) as given below. For single carriageway section, these minimum distances would be applicable for both sides. All the distances shall be measured between the tangent points of the curves of the side roads at intersections / the median openings and the access / egress roads of the fuel stations, as is applicable, in a direction parallel to the centre line of the nearest carriageway of the National Highway. 1. Plain and Rolling Terrain Distance (i) Intersection with NHs/SHs/MDRs 1000m (ii) Intersection with Rural Roads/approach roads to private and public properties 300m 2. Hilly/Mountainous Terrain (i) Intersection with NHs/SHs/MDRs 300m (ii) Intersection with all other roads and tracks 100m 4.5.2 Urban Stretches (I) Plain and Rolling Terrain Distance A Urban Area with population of more than 20,000 and less than one lakh. 1. Intersection with any category of roads of carriageway width of 3.5m and above 300m (i) Intersection with roads of carriageway width of less than 3.5m 100m (B) B Urban Area with population of one lakh and above (i) Intersection with any category of road (irrespective of carriageway width) 100m (II) Hilly and Mountainous Terrain (i) Intersection with any category of road (irrespective of carriageway width) 100m 4.5.3 There shall not be any median gap on a divided carriageway within a distance of 300 m on each side of the fuel station. This minimum distance i.e. 300 m shall be measured between the start of the median gap and the nearest tangent point of access/egress road of the fuel station, as is applicable, in a direction parallel to the centre line of the nearest carriageway of the National Highway. This stipulation shall be applicable for such median gaps, which are located neither in front of nor in proximity of any intersection or intersecting roads. For intersecting road median gaps or median gaps in proximity of intersections, the provisions stipulated under para 4.5.1 and para 4.5.2 shall apply.” 40. The requirement for such comprehensive guidelines is not far to seek. These guidelines have been created in public interest to ensure public safety and to maintain smooth flow of traffic on National Highways. For intersecting road median gaps or median gaps in proximity of intersections, the provisions stipulated under para 4.5.1 and para 4.5.2 shall apply.” 40. The requirement for such comprehensive guidelines is not far to seek. These guidelines have been created in public interest to ensure public safety and to maintain smooth flow of traffic on National Highways. Government order dated 24.7.2013 consolidates and creates a coherent scheme for setting up fuel stations and other facilities alongwith National Highways with a view to achieve the aforesaid objectives. Prior to the Government Order dated 24.7.2013 the norms and guidelines issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highway by order dated 25.9.2003 were holding the field. The aforesaid guidelines have now been superseded by the Government Order dated 24.7.2013. However, some features of the features of order dated 25.9.2003 have been adopted in order dated 24.7.2013. 41. A perusal of the aforesaid guidelines in Government Order dated 24.7.2013 shows that the same are applicable to National Highways and not to the State Highways. In particular, norms/guidelines providing for the proposed fuel stations interfering with future improvement of Highways and nearby intersections/junctions, have a restricted and an exclusive application to the National Highways alone. The scheme of the Government Order and the appendix attached therewith shows that measurement of distance has to be made with the National Highway as the fixed reference point. The reference in the aforesaid Government Order dated 24.7.2013 alongwith appendix to the State Highway, intersection with roads, tracks, MDRs, rural roads, approach roads to private and public property etc. refer to situations where the said State Highways, MDRs, rural roads, approach roads to private and public property etc. either intersect the National Highways or are established in proximity to the National Highway as provided in the aforesaid order issued by the Government of India. The State Highways cannot be taken as stand alone or sole reference points in terms of the Government Order dated 24.7.2013. Of course it is open to the State Government to provide for such guidelines and norms taking either the State Highways or other State roads as the reference points. The Government Order dated 24.7.2013 is not applicable to the facts of this case. The impugned order becomes indefensible. 42. We hold the impugned order dated 7.9.2017 held to be arbitrary and illegal. 43. The Government Order dated 24.7.2013 is not applicable to the facts of this case. The impugned order becomes indefensible. 42. We hold the impugned order dated 7.9.2017 held to be arbitrary and illegal. 43. In view of the aforesaid facts, we issue a writ of certiorari and quash the impugned order dated 7.9.2017 passed by the Executive Engineer, PWD (respondent No. 3) annexure 7 to the writ petition and remand the matter back to respondent No. 3 for fresh consideration. We issue a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 3 to pass a fresh order on the application for NOC, consistent with the observations made in the judgment within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 44. The writ petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.