JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anant Kumar, J.—This second appeal under Section 100 Civil Procedure Code 1908 has been filed by the appellant-defendant against judgement and decree dated 11.9.1981 passed by Civil Judge, Sitapur in respect of Civil Appeal No. 128/80 (Jagannath v. Bhagwan Din) whereby he set aside the judgment and decree dated 29.4.1980 passed by Munsif, Biswa, Sitapur to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff i.e. O.S. No. 39 of 77 (Jagannath v. Bhagwan Din). 2. During pendency of the appeal, the appellant Bhagwan Din had transferred the property in dispute through a sale-deed to one Dharmpal, who has, later on, been impleaded as Appellant No. 2. During the pendency of the appeal, the sole respondent Jagannath died and he was substituted by one Murli and on death of Murli, he was substituted by Ram Lakhan-Respondent No. 1/1, Kalika Prasad-Respondent No. 1/2 and Awadhesh Kumar-Respondent No. 1/3, all sons of Late Murli. 3. Brief facts relevant for disposal of the second appeal is that the original plaintiff /respondent had filed a suit being Civil Suit No. 39/77 for cancellation of sale-deed executed by one Govindey on 2.4.74 in favour of the defendant-appellant Bhagwan Deen on the allegation that the plaintiff was the sole heir of Govindey (deceased), who was owner of the plot in dispute as detailed at the foot of the plaint, was the real maternal uncle of the plaintiff and he was a bachelor all his life and had died on 3rd January, 1975 leaving behind the plaintiff alone as his nearest heir. Prior to his death for about ten years, he was suffering from Tuberculosis and used to have fever and on that account he had become very weak. About two years prior to his death, he had lost his sense and he was completely unable to move. He had also become hard of hearing and in the beginning of 1974, he was almost on death-bed. It was further alleged in the plaint that defendant-appellant Bhagwan Deen R/o Village - Basira, District - Lakhimpur Kheri, a distant relative of Govindey deceased came to village Jafarabad and stayed with Govindey and in connection with his treatment, defendant used to take him sometimes to Biswan and on account of this Govendey-Respondent developed confidence on him and taking undue advantage of his confidence and by exercising undue influence on Govindey-defendant-appellant got executed a sale-deed in respect of plot in dispute. The contents of the sale-deed were never read over to executant. No sale consideration was paid to him and Govindey did not deposit 20 times of the rent, so he had no right to execute sale-deed, therefore, the suit for cancellation of sale-deed was filed on the following grounds : A) that Govendey was having full confidence on defendant/appellant and the defendant betrayed the confidence in executing the sale-deed. B) that Govendey was not paid any consideration for execution of the said sale-deed. C) that Govindey had lost his sense and he had not executed the sale-deed in his full sense and by playing fraud the thumb impression of Govindey was obtained on the said sale-deed and since Govindey was deaf, the sale-deed was never read over to him and was not given chance to understand the same. D) that Govindey had not deposit 20 times of land revenue to procure the Bhumidhari rights and he had no right to sell the said land, even the defendant-appellant was not having good financial condition to pay a sum of Rs. 9000/- as consideration and the possession of the land was never transferred to the defendant. 4. Accordingly, the relief was sought in the suit for cancellation of the registered sale-deed dated 2.4.74, which was registered on 5.4.74 in Bahi No. 1, Jild No. 277, at Page 211-214 and at Serial No. 254. Relief of possession was further added later on in the main relief through an amendment. The defendant/appellant appeared and contested the suit of the plaintiff on the ground that Govindey was not the real maternal uncle of the plaintiff nor he was related to him in any manner and the plaintiff has got no right to file the suit challenging the sale-deed. 5. It was further stated that the said sale-deed executed by Govindey was out of his free will, in sound state of mind and for consideration and entire amount was paid to him and thumb impression was appended by him upon the said sale-deed. It was further stated that the defendant has not played any fraud with him. It was further stated that during consolidation, the plaintiff had not moved any application for mutation and the land in dispute had been mutated in favour of the defendant during the consolidation operation, as such, the suit is barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It was further stated that during consolidation, the plaintiff had not moved any application for mutation and the land in dispute had been mutated in favour of the defendant during the consolidation operation, as such, the suit is barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It was further stated that one Mullu, Chetram and Murli all R/o Jafrabad, Benipur, Tehsil - Biswan, District Sitapur had filed an objection in the Consolidation Court in mutation proceedings filed by the defendant, however, their objections were dismissed by the Consolidation Court and the land was mutated in the name of defendant and appeal filed by the Mulla and others before the Consolidation Officer was also dismissed. It was further stated that Mulla and others had initiated a proceeding under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code and the said proceedings were also terminated in favour of the defendant. Mulla and others had also filed a suit for cancellation of said sale-deed i.e. O.A. No. 274 of 1975 against the defendant-appellant, wherein the plaintiff Jagannath had appeared as one of the witnesses and the said suit was also dismissed on 8.12.76, against which, Civil Appeal No. 60/77 was filed and the same was also dismissed by the District Judge on 14.5.77. When the said Mullu and others could not succeed against the defendant-appellant, then with the connivance of Mullu and others, present plaintiff has filed the present suit just to harass him. 6. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed issues and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove that Govindey was maternal uncle of the plaintiff. The Trial Court further held that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the said sale-deed was executed without any consideration and at the time of execution of the sale-deed, Govindey (deceased) was not in a fit state of mind. It was further held that Govindey had already deposited 20 times land revenue and had obtained Bhumidhari right. Accordingly, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgement and decree, the plaintiff filed a civil appeal being Civil Appeal No. 128/80. It was further held that Govindey had already deposited 20 times land revenue and had obtained Bhumidhari right. Accordingly, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgement and decree, the plaintiff filed a civil appeal being Civil Appeal No. 128/80. The appellate Court after hearing the parties had not agreed with the findings of the Trial Court and had come to the conclusion that plaintiff was the real BHANJA of the deceased Govindey and he was having preferential heir within the meaning of Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short ‘’U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act), and he had got right to file the suit. The appellate Court, further, held that the Govindey was a T.B. patient. When the sale-deed was produced before the Sub-Registrar for registration, the Sub-Registrar was not satisfied with the physical and mental condition of the executant (Govindey) and he was directed to produce a medical certificate and in compliance of the direction, a medical certificate of one Dr. Irfan Ali was obtained and was filed, on the basis of the said certificate, the sale-deed was accepted and registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, which clearly shows that the Sub-Registrar was not satisfied with the mental condition of the executant and on account of that, he directed the executant to obtain the medical certificate. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that execution of the sale-deed was not properly proved, rather there was very highly suspicious circumstances to suggest that some sort of bungling had been done in order to get the said sale-deed executed. The First Appellate Court also concluded that on the evidence on record the passing of the consideration to the executant was not properly proved, as such, in absence of consideration, there could be no proper sale in the eye of law, so the First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the sale-deed was liable to be cancelled. Accordingly, the Appeal was allowed. Judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 29.4.1980 was set aside and the suit was decreed, hence, this second appeal has been filed. 8. I have heard Shri Pradeep Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 9. This Court after hearing the parties has framed the following substantial question of law. 8. I have heard Shri Pradeep Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 9. This Court after hearing the parties has framed the following substantial question of law. (1) Whether the first appellate Court has wrongly relied upon the law laid down by this Court reported in 1966 RD page 392 ? (2) Whether the re-appraisal of evidence by the learned first appellate Court is against the judicial norms an scheduled by various Courts ? Later on vide this Court’s order dated 24.9.2014, 3rd substantial question of law was framed as under : (3) Whether suit for cancellation of sale-deed filed by the plaintiff/respondent was barred by Section 49 of C.H. Act and both the Courts below has given perverse finding to this effect.” 10. So far as first substantial question of law ‘’whether the First Appellate Court has wrongly relied upon the law laid down by this Court reported in 1966 RD 392' is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned First Appellate Court has wrongly relied upon the judgment of this Court in Mewa and other v. Baldeo, 1966 RD 392. It is also stated that in the present case, the relief regarding possession has been added by way of amendment. The property under dispute was in possession of appellant and said relief of possession cannot be granted by the Civil Court under the provisions of Section 331 of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act and the suit before the Civil Court was barred. 11. I have carefully gone through the judgment rendered by Division Bench of this Court in Mewa and others v. Baldeo, 1966 RD 392. So far as the facts of the said case are concerned, the plaintiff had filed a suit in the Civil Court for cancellation of a sale-deed on the ground of fraud. He claimed that he was in possession of the property but in the alternative also prayed that if the opposite party was found in possession a decree for delivery of possession may also be passed. The defendant raised an objection to the maintainability of the suit in the Civil Court. The matter came up before the Division Bench for consideration of the said principle of law. The defendant raised an objection to the maintainability of the suit in the Civil Court. The matter came up before the Division Bench for consideration of the said principle of law. The Division Bench of this Court after considering the relevant provisions of Section 331 of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act has also held as under: “5. It is well-settled that every suit of a civil nature lies in a Civil Court unless it is expressly barred by statute. What has therefore to be seen is what is the bar created by the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act in respect of such suits which would normally be filed in Civil Courts. The only bar that exists in the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act is Section 331. The relevant part of the section which creates the bar is in the following words: “No Court other than the Court mentioned in column 4 of Sch. II shall........ take cognizance....... Of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any sucvh suit or application.” 6. In substance, therefore the bar exists where a suit is filed in a Civil Court which is based upon a ‘’cause of action’ in respect of which cause of action the plaintiff could get any relief by a proceeding in the revenue Court. Therefore, the primary important thing to be observed in each case filed in Civil Court is, where an objection is raised as to its maintainability in a Civil Court, as to what is the cause of action for it, and whether on the basis of that cause of action any relief can be granted by the revenue Court. If the cause of action is one in which the revenue Court can give no relief then the suit is one which would lie in the Civil Court. If the cause of action is one in respect of which no relief can be claimed in the revenue Court then the suit is maintainable in the Civil Court and once the suit is maintainable in the Civil Court then there is no bar in Civil Court granting all possible reliefs flowing from that cause of action. Consideration of individual reliefs divorced from cause of action is, therefore, wholly irrelevant. 7. Consideration of individual reliefs divorced from cause of action is, therefore, wholly irrelevant. 7. Applying this principle to the present case we find that the cause of action in the present case is that the plaintiff was, under fraudulent circumstances, induced to execute a sale-deed of his property in favour of the defendants and the plaintiff wants that that sale-deed be cancelled and his property be restored to him. In these circumstances the real cause of action of the plaintiff is the fraudulent act in obtaining the sale-deed. The sale-deed having been executed by the plaintiff himself, on account of fraud, as alleged by him, is only a voidable document and is, therefore, valid and binding upon the plaintiff as long as it is not set aside. The title which has passed from the plaintiff to the defendants would continue to vest in the defendants as long as the sale-deed is not cancelled and obviously as long as the sale-deed is not cancelled no relief can be granted to the plaintiff either by way of declring his title, because he has no title, or of delivering of property as long as he does not get back his title which he has sold by sale-deed, Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh (3). In these circumstances the revenue Court can give no relief as long as the sale-deed is not cancelled. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that the revenue Court can give a declaration that the plaintiff is the owner because the sale-deed was executed by fraud and the revenue Court could also give possession. As stated above neither declaration nor possession can be given to the plaintiff as long as the sale-deed is not cancelled. This Court in case of Mewa (Supra) has concluded as under: 19. In the result, therefore, the present case being one for cancellation of the sale-deed, the suit has been rightly held to be maintainable in the Court. Therefore is no force in this revision. It is accordingly dismissed with cost. Revision dismissed. 12. The First Appellate Court on the basis of said judgment had concluded that since in the present case as per allegation of the plaint, the sale-deed in question was sought to be cancelled on the ground of fraud played upon the executant of the sale-deed Govindey, the suit was triable by the Civil Court. 13. Revision dismissed. 12. The First Appellate Court on the basis of said judgment had concluded that since in the present case as per allegation of the plaint, the sale-deed in question was sought to be cancelled on the ground of fraud played upon the executant of the sale-deed Govindey, the suit was triable by the Civil Court. 13. To my view, the learned Trial Court has not committed any error in relying upon the said case law reported in Mewa and others v. Baldeo, 1966 RD 392. In the clear terms, the Division Bench has held in the facts and circumstances of the said case that the suit was triable by Civil Court where the main relief was for cancellation of sale-deed and the relief of possession was ancillary. As per dictum of the said case law, the present suit was triable by Civil Court. To my view, the First Appellate Court has not committed any manifest error in relying upon the principles of law laid down in the said case law. Accordingly the first substantial question of law is decided in the terms that “the First Appellate Court has not committed any mistake in relying upon the case law in Mewa and others v. Baldeo, 1966 RD 392”. 14. So far as second substantial question of law ‘’ whether the re-appraisal of evidence by the learned first appellate Court is against the judicial norms as scheduled by various Courts’ is concerned, it is to be seen from perusal of the record as to whether the First appellate Court has recorded its findings against judicial norms as settled by various Courts. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellants has stated that on the basis of evidence on record, the learned Trial Court after appreciation of evidence on record had held that the plaintiff in his evidence had clearly stated on the basis of presumption in his statement that the sale-deed was obtained by the defendant from Govindey by playing fraud. Regarding passing of consideration also he had no personal knowledge and only by assumption he concludes that no consideration had passed. Regarding passing of consideration also he had no personal knowledge and only by assumption he concludes that no consideration had passed. This evidence of plaintiff was disbelieved by the Trial Court, rather, the Trial Court relied upon the statement of Bhagwan Deen (DW.1) and Chandra Bhan (DW.3), who had stated that before the Registrar, Govindey had admitted that he had received the full consideration and even the Sub-Registrar had also affirm this while making endorsement on the sale-deed. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that learned First Appellate Court had wrongly discarded the findings of the Trial Court and on the basis of surmises and conjunctures held that since Govindey (executant of the document) was a T.B. patient and had been ill for several years, prior to his death, so on the basis of presumption, the First Appellate Court concluded that passing of consideration of the executant Govindey was not proved. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a case law reported in J.B. Sharma v. State of M.P., 1988 SCC 451 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held “It will thus be seen that the first appellate Court while recording the finding acted on an assumption not supported by any evidence and further failed to consider the entire document on the basis of which the finding was recorded. The High Court was, therefore, justified under Section - 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the finding.” He further referred a case law in Maria Colaco and another v. Alba Flora Herminda d’couzand and others, 2008 CCD 83; wherein, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that it is true that in the second appeal, the High Court should not interfere in the question of fact but in the scrutiny of evidence, it finds that the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court is total perverse, as such, High Court can interfere in the matter and constitute the question of law. 16. In the present case, after considering the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.3 (Bhagwan Deen and Chandra Bhanu), learned trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the endorsement had been made by Sub-Registrar before whom the said document was executed. 16. In the present case, after considering the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.3 (Bhagwan Deen and Chandra Bhanu), learned trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the endorsement had been made by Sub-Registrar before whom the said document was executed. Though the trial Court has recorded a finding that Govindey was old and weak at the time of execution of the documents but the Sub-Registrar before whom the document was registered had recorded a categorical noting that the executant was in full sense. This apart, since the plaintiff had filed the suit amongst other grounds on this ground that no consideration had passed to the executent of the said document, the burden of proof was on plaintiff to prove the same. The learned first appellant Court has wrongly sifted the burden on the defendant. So, to my view, the Trial Court has rightly believed the statement of D.W.1 and D.W.3 and the endorsement made by Sub-Registrar and in this regard the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court are perverse and without justification and reasoning. The First Appellate Court has wrongly disbelieved these evidence. So, to my view, the finding of the First Appellate Court in this regard are not sustainable in eye of law and while concluded on substantial question of law held that the First Appellate Court has wrongly re-apprised the evidence recorded by the Trial Court against the judicial norms as scheduled by various Courts and has based its findings on surmises and conjunctures. 17. So far as substantial question No. 3 ‘’whether suit for cancellation of sale-deed filed by the plaintiff/respondent was barred by Section 49 of C.H. Act and both the Courts below has given perverse finding to this effect’ is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has stated that it had come before the Trial Court that after execution of sale-deed by Govindey in favour of the defendant, there was consolidation operation in the village and during the consolidation operations, the plaintiff had not raised any objection to the sale-deed before the Consolidation Authorities and accordingly on the basis of said sale-deed, the name of defendant was recorded in the Revenue Records. Since the plaintiff had not raised any objection before the consolidation authorities at the relevant time, his suit for cancellation of sale-deed was barred by Section 49 of Consolidation of holdings Act and in this Regard the findings of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court are perverse and against the provisions of law. 18. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondent has stated that once the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court had come to the conclusion that the suit filed by the plaintiff was maintainable before the Civil Court, as such, issue involved in this matter could not have been decided by the Revenue Court, so there is no question of the suit being barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and in this regard the findings recorded by the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court does not suffer from any illegality. In this regard a reference to Section 49 of Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 is relevant. 19. Section 49 of Consolidation of Holdings Ac, 1953 reads as under: “49. Bar to Civil Courts Jurisdiction.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of right of tenure-holder in respect of land lying in an area, for which a notification has been issued under sub-section(2) of Section 4 or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act: Provided that nothing in this section shall preclude the Assistant Collector from initiating proceedings under Section 122-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in respect of any land, possession over which has been delivered or deemed to be delivered to a Gaon Sabha under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act 20. This provision indicates that if the relief claimed in the Civil Court could have been granted by the Consolidation Authorities only then it cannot be held that the suit was barred by Section 49 of Consolidation of holdings Act. In the present case, before the trial Court this issue was raised by the defendant that the suit was barred by Section 49 of Consolidation of Holdings Act and in this regard the Trial Court has framed Issue No. 3. This issue was treated as preliminary issue and was decided by the trial Court on 19.9.78 and it was concluded that the suit was not barred by Section 49 of consolidation of Holdings Act. 21. Aggrieved by the said findings, the defendant has preferred a civil revision being Civil Revision No. 8 of 1978 which was decided by the District Judge, Sitapur vide his judgement and order dated 22.8.78. The Revisional Court agreed with the findings of the Trial Court held that in a suit in which cancellation of document has been raised, relief of the possession lies before the Civil Court and not by virtue of Section 33 of Zamindari Abolution Act before the Revisional Court. Against the judgment of the Revisional Court, the defendant had not taken any further proceedings, so between the parties this issue was concluded there itself. Accordingly, the first appellate Court had also recorded findings to the effect that suit was not barred by Section 49 of Consolidation of Holdings Act, So to my view, the Trial Court, the Revisional Court and the First Appellate Court as stated above, had taken correct view of the matter in view of case law Mewa and others v. Baldeo, 1966 RD 392. So, to my view, the suit for cancellation of sale-deed filed by the plaintiff-respondents was not barred by Section 49 of Consolidation of Holdings Act and the findings recorded by both the Courts below does not suffers from any illegality. The substantial question of law is decided accordingly. 22. From the above discussion, it is evident that the learned First Appellate Court has committed manifest error in re-apprising the evidence relied upon by the Trial Court. As such, to my view, the finding recorded by the Trial Court that passing of consideration is fully proved and it was admitted fact between the parties that sale-deed was executed by Govindey. From the above discussion, it is evident that the learned First Appellate Court has committed manifest error in re-apprising the evidence relied upon by the Trial Court. As such, to my view, the finding recorded by the Trial Court that passing of consideration is fully proved and it was admitted fact between the parties that sale-deed was executed by Govindey. It was also not proved that any fraud was played with Govindey at the time of execution of sale-deed. So to my view, the Trial Court has recorded a well founded and well considered findings and had rightly concluded that the suit of the plaintiff for cancellation of the sale-deed and for possession was liable to be dismissed and the adverse finding in this regard recorded by the first appellate Court is not sustainable. Accordingly to my view this appeal is liable to be allowed. 23. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgement and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 128 of 80 (Jagarnnath v. Bhagwan Din) dated 11.9.1981 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in respect of O.S. No. 39 of 77 (Jagannath v. Bhagwan Deen) dated) dated 29.4.80 is restored with cost. 24. Let the lower Court record be transmitted immediately to the Court concerned.