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2018 DIGILAW 561 (KER)

Kochammini Thampuran v. State of Kerala

2018-07-12

P.V.ASHA

body2018
JUDGMENT : In the book Due Process of Law released in 1979, Lord Denning said: “A woman feels as keenly, thinks as clearly, as a man. She in her sphere does work as useful as man does in his. She has as much right to her freedom -- to develop her personality to the full – as a man.” 2. Yet, the female members of the erstwhile Royal Family of Cochin have approached this Court aggrieved by the disqualification imposed on them from being nominated as Trustees of the Palace Administration Board, as trusteeship is exclusively set apart to the male members, seeking a declaration that S.4 of the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund Proclamation IX of 1124 M.E (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Royal Proclamation’) to the extent it stipulates nomination of only the male members of the family to be trustees in the Palace Administration Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’) is unconstitutional. 3. The Royal Proclamation was promulgated by the Maharaja of Cochin on 15th Midhunam 1124 ME corresponding to 29.06.1949, in order to make provisions for the administration, management and conservation of the properties of the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund. The Travancore Cochin State was formed on 01.07.1949 just after 2 days of the promulgation of the Proclamation. As per S.3 of the Proclamation, the estate and palace fund shall vest in the palace administration board and the board shall administer the estate and the palace fund subject to the provisions of the Proclamation. ‘Estate’ is defined under S.2(b) to mean the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and all the properties belonging to the said estate. The ‘palace fund’ is defined under S.2(c) to mean the special palace fund then in existence and the payments made from time to time by the Government towards the maintenance of the junior members of the family and it includes properties earned out of such fund and property owned in common by the family. Under S.12, the Board is empowered to frame byelaws for the proper administration of the Estate and Palace Fund with the previous sanction of the Maharaja. Under S.12, the Board is empowered to frame byelaws for the proper administration of the Estate and Palace Fund with the previous sanction of the Maharaja. Under S.20, the Board is empowered to frame byelaws for regulating leave, payment of salary, discipline, control etc to the officers and servants of the Board; to fix the allowances of Trustees, audit of accounts, etc., supervision, control etc., of the properties of minor members, etc. subject to approval of Maharaja. As per S.4, as it originally stood, the Board was to consist of 5 trustees who shall be nominated by the Maharaja of Cochin from among the male members of the family so as to secure representation for each of the 4 main thavazhies of the family. It further provided that one of the trustees shall be appointed as the President of the Board by the Maharaja of Cochin and the president and other trustees shall hold office for a term of 3 years from the date of their appointment. As per clause 22 of the Proclamation, as it originally stood, the palace fund was impartible and the management of the estate and the palace fund were to be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Proclamation. 4. When the Hindu Succession Act came into force in the year 1956, S.5(iii) of that Act exempted the Estate and Palace fund which are governed by the Proclamation IX of 1124, from the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. However, the Valiamma Thampuram Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 was enacted by Act 16 of 1961, enabling partition of the estate and palace fund. It got the assent of the President on 6.5.1961. Under S.4 of the Act each member i.e., member of the family of Maharaja of Cochin, shall be entitled to an equal share of the Estate and Palace Fund and on obtaining one’s share, it will be the separate property of that member. S.6 of the Act provided for execution of the deed of partition on behalf of all the members by the Maharaja of Cochin and members of the Board and that it shall be binding on all the members of the family and that it shall be registered under the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1939. S.6 of the Act provided for execution of the deed of partition on behalf of all the members by the Maharaja of Cochin and members of the Board and that it shall be binding on all the members of the family and that it shall be registered under the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1939. By S.10 of this Act clause (iii) of S.10 of Hindu Succession Act was to stand omitted with effect on and from the date of execution of Partition deed under S.6. As per S.11, the provisions contained in S.4 which provided for nomination of male members to the Board of Trustees so as to secure representation for each of the four thavazhies was amended inserting the words and amending it as “as far as possible” to secure representation for each of the four main thavazhies, the members became entitled to equal share of the estate and palace fund. When the Joint Family Abolition Act, 1975 came into force in 1976, S.8 therein saved the Proclamation. 5. As per Act 15 of 1978, the Act 16 of 1961 was amended in order to make provision for partition. S.3 was substituted, enabling the senior-most male member of the family to direct the Board to effect partition of the estate and Palace Fund among all the members entitled to a share in the estate and Palace Fund, within sixty days from the date of commencement of the Valiamma Thampuram Kovilakam Estate and Palace Fund (Partition) and Joint Family System (Abolition) Amendment Ordinance, 1978, under S.4 of the Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975. It also provided that in the event of failure on the part of the senior member of the family to direct the Board to effect partition, the Board shall proceed to effect partition, after the prescribed period. Thus by the 1978 amendment, senior member of the family stepped into the shoes of Maharaja of Cochin and clause c was inserted in S.2 to define ‘family’ as marumakathayam joint family consisting of the 4 main thavazhies of the Ruler of former State of Cochin. Similarly member who was defined as member of the family of Maharaja of Cochin was substituted as member of the family. 6. Similarly member who was defined as member of the family of Maharaja of Cochin was substituted as member of the family. 6. As at present, S.4 of the Promulgation read as follows: “The Board shall consist of five Ttrustees who shall be nominated by the senior most male member of the family from among the male members of the family so as to secure representation as far as possible for each of the 4 main thavazhies of the family. One of the Trustees shall be appointed as the President of the Board by the senior most member of the family. ” The validity of the Amendment Act 15 of 1978 came up for consideration of the Apex Court in Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran v. State of Kerala AIR 1979 SC 1918 ) and it was upheld. The issue which was under consideration in that judgment was with respect to the provision enabling partition of the estate and palace fund. It is stated that a partition was effected and partition deed as contemplated in 1961 Act was registered. 7. The female members of the royal family submitted representations before all the authorities requesting for inclusion of female members also as members of the trustee board. The matter was taken up before the palace administration as well as the State Government. It is stated that even though 2 bills were presented during the tenure of 12th and 13th Kerala Legislative Assembly, both the bills lapsed. 8. The petitioners alleged that the restriction against female members is in clear violation of Article 15 and the same is liable to be declared unconstitutional. 9. The 1st and 2nd respondents have filed separate counter affidavits. 10. In the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent-Government, it is stated that the Government had considered the request of the female members of the Cochin Royal Family for reconstitution of the administration board by giving representation to the family members also and it was decided to substitute S.11 of the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 so as to bring in amendments in S.4 of the said Proclamation. Amendment bills Nos.54 and 120 were initiated twice for the said purpose during the 12th and 13th Kerala Legislative Assembly; but the bills lapsed. Amendment bills Nos.54 and 120 were initiated twice for the said purpose during the 12th and 13th Kerala Legislative Assembly; but the bills lapsed. It is stated that as at present there is no request pending before the Government to reintroduce the lapsed bill seeking amendment to the 1961 Act. It is further stated that the proposal to bring in an amendment to the Act 1961 requires policy decision of the Government which requires detailed examination and consultation and it is a time consuming process. It is stated that the Govt. will take appropriate decision as and when the lapsed bill is reintroduced in case any representation is submitted to the Government. 11. The 2nd respondent has filed a counter affidavit. It is stated that the then Maharaja of Cochin in his wisdom promulgated Ext.P1 proclamation and made provisions for its administration, management and conservation of properties of the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam and Palace fund. The Board has been administering the Kovilakam Estate and Palace Fund for the past 67 years. According to the 2nd respondent, the Writ Petition is belated and without bona fides. It is stated that consequent to the amendment in 1978, Ext.P4 partition deed was executed. The sale proceeds and compensation received from the properties belonging to the 2nd respondent were distributed among the members. The Board has undertaken several welfare activities for the benefit of family members and is fulfilling its functions properly and transparently. It is their case that as at present a change in the composition of the statutory board is unwarranted. It is stated that vast experience in managing the affairs of the family is required to run the activities of the Board and several of the senior members of the family are reluctant to become members of the Board. It is further stated that the 2nd respondent had passed a resolution on the basis of the request of the family members to request the Government to make necessary amendments in Ext.P1 so as to include female members in the Board and accordingly Ext.R2(e) representation was submitted based on Ext.R2(d) resolution dt. 16.2.2002. The 2nd respondent had thereafter submitted Ext.R2(f) and (g) on 22.2.2011 and 7.2.2015 respectively. It is also their case that no specific purpose would be served by changing the composition of the Board. 12. Heard the learned counsel on either side. 13. 16.2.2002. The 2nd respondent had thereafter submitted Ext.R2(f) and (g) on 22.2.2011 and 7.2.2015 respectively. It is also their case that no specific purpose would be served by changing the composition of the Board. 12. Heard the learned counsel on either side. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners relying on the judgments in Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran v. State of Kerala AIR 1979 SC 1918 ), Kathi Raning v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1952 SC 123 ) , Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India AIR 1999 SC 1149 ), Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant (2003) 6 SCC 277 ), Siniya Mol v. K.S.E.B. ( 2007 (1) KLT 818 ), and Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. Of India (2008) 3 SCC 1 ) argued that the exclusion of female members from the Trustee Board by way of S.4 of the Act is unconstitutional and there is no nexus behind the exclusion of women from the administration of the palace fund, with any object and it is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution apart from the fact that it is void under Article 13 of the Constitution of India. 14. Even though the Apex Court has considered the provisions in the proclamation and the Partition Act 1961, and Amendment Act 1978 in the judgment in Ramavarma Bharathan Thampuran v. State of Kerala & Ors. AIR 1979 SC 1918 ) and the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Amendment Act (15 of 1978) as well as the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) Act were upheld, and even though the Apex Court has considered the entire enactment elaborately, the validity of S.4 or, at any rate, S.4 to the extent it nominates only male members has not come up for consideration in that case. The issue raised was with reference to the portability of the properties. 15. When the gender discrimination is being perpetuated in the above circumstances, it is worthy to have a look at the judgments where this Court deprecated gender discrimination in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution of India. 16. The issue raised was with reference to the portability of the properties. 15. When the gender discrimination is being perpetuated in the above circumstances, it is worthy to have a look at the judgments where this Court deprecated gender discrimination in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution of India. 16. In the judgment in C.B.Muthamma v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 1868 ) the Apex Court was considering the validity of a provision requiring permission from the employer for marriage and denial of right to employment to a married woman for entry into the foreign service. The petitioner therein was denied promotion to Grade I of the Indian Foreign Service. She was compelled to give an undertaking that she would resign from service if she were to get married. Rule 8(2) of the Indian Foreign Service (Conduct and Discipline) Rules, 1961 provided that a woman member of its service shall obtain permission of the Government in writing before her marriage is solemnised and at any time after the marriage a woman member of the service may be required to resign from service if the Government is satisfied that her family and domestic commitments are likely to come in the way of the due and efficient discharge of her duties as a member of the service. The Apex Court observed that a similar situation may very well arise in the case of a male member and that it was ununderstandable in those days of nuclear families, intercontinental marriages and unconventional behaviour; the naked bias against the woman was deprecated. As per clause 4 of Rule 18 of the IFS (Recruitment, Cadre, Seniority and Promotion) Rules, 1961, no married woman shall be entitled as of right to be appointed to the service. The Apex Court observed in paras.6 and 7 as follows: “6. At the first blush this rule is in defiance of Art.16. If a married man has a right, a married woman, other thing being equal, stands on no worse footing. This misogynous posture is a hangover of the masculine culture of manacling the weaker sex forgetting how our struggle for national freedom was also a battle against woman’s thraldom. Freedom is indivisible, so is Justice. That our founding faith enshrined in Arts. This misogynous posture is a hangover of the masculine culture of manacling the weaker sex forgetting how our struggle for national freedom was also a battle against woman’s thraldom. Freedom is indivisible, so is Justice. That our founding faith enshrined in Arts. 14 and 16 should have been tragically ignored vis-a-vis half of India’s humanity, viz., our women, is a sad reflection on the distance between Constitution in the blood and Law in action. And if the Executive as the surrogate of Parliament, makes rules in the teeth of Part III, especially when high political office, even diplomatic assignment has been filled by women, the inference of die-hard allergy to gender parity is inevitable. 7. We do not mean to universalise or dogmatise that men and women are equal in all occupations and all situations and do not exclude the need to pragmatise where the requirements of particular employment, the sensitivities of sex or the peculiarities of societal sectors or the handicaps of either sex may compel selectivity. But save where the differentiation is demonstrable, the rule of equality must govern. This creed of our Constitution has at last told on our governmental mentation, perhaps partly pressured by the pendency of this very Writ Petition. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that Rule 18(4) (referred to earlier) has been deleted on November 12, 1973. And, likewise, the Central Government’s affidavit avers that Rule 8(a) is on its way to oblivion since its deletion is being gazetted. Better late than never. At any rate, we are relieved of the need to scrutinise or strike down these rules.” The Apex Court concluded the judgment with a wish to impress upon the Government the need to overrule all service rules to remove the stain of sex discrimination without waiting for adhoc inspiration from Writ Petitions or gender charity. 17. In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335 ), the Apex Court held that the service regulation which provided for termination of service on first pregnancy and extension beyond 35 years at the discretion of managing director were arbitrary and unconstitutional. Subsequent to the judgment, there had been several attempts to modify the regulations. 18. Muthumma’s case was in the year 1979. Subsequent to the judgment, there had been several attempts to modify the regulations. 18. Muthumma’s case was in the year 1979. Two decades thereafter the claim of a mother to act as a natural guardian, in a case where the father was not serious in protecting the welfare of the minor daughter came up for consideration in the judgment in Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India AIR 1999 SC 1149 ). Though the father was alive and provisions contained in S.6(a), fixed the turn of mother to get guardianship only after the father, the Apex Court after interpreting the provisions in S.6 (a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, allowed the mother to act as guardian, seeing that the father was not performing his duties as a father, observing that it does not necessarily mean after the life time of father. As per S.6(a) the natural guardian of a Hindu minor in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl is the father, and after him the mother with exception that in respect of a minor below the age of 5 years custody shall be with the mother”. It was held that if the father is wholly indifferent to the matters of minor even if he is living with the mother or if by virtue of mutual understanding between the father and mother, latter is put exclusively in charge of the minor or if the father is physically unable to take care of the minor on any reason, the father can be considered to be absent and the mother being a recognised natural guardian can act validly on behalf of the minor as the guardian. Interpreting the provisions contained in S.4(b) which defines the term ‘guardian’ and S.6(a), the Apex Court held that a harmonious construction of both those provisions would not cause any violence to the language of S.6(a). Therefore, normally it is the father who is the natural guardian and in the circumstances of the case it was held that the mother who was actually managing the affairs of the minor daughter who was under her care and protection was liable to be declared as the guardian. In that case the Reserve Bank of India had insisted upon an application signed by the father in order to open a deposit account in the name of the minor. In that case the Reserve Bank of India had insisted upon an application signed by the father in order to open a deposit account in the name of the minor. The Apex Court directed that RBI and similarly based other organisation to formulate appropriate methodology in the light of the observations in that judgment to meet such situations. Para.45 and 47 of the judgment are relevant which read as follows: “45. Be it noted further, that gender equality is one of the basis principles of our Constitution and in the even the word `after’ is to be read to mean a disqualification of a mother to act as a guardian during the lifetime of the father, the same would definitely run counter to the basic requirement of the constitutional mandate and would lead to a differentiation between male and female. Normal rules of interpretation shall have to bow down to the requirement of the Constitution since the Constitution is supreme and the statute shall have to be in accordance therewith and not de hors the same. The father by reason of a dominant personality cannot be ascribed to have a preferential right over the mother in the matter of guardianship since both fall within the same category and in that view of the matter the word `after’ shall have to be interpreted in terms of constitutional safe-guard and guarantee so as to give a proper and effective meaning to the words used. 47. In that view of the matter question of ascribing the literal meaning to the word ‘after’ in the context does not and cannot arise having due regard to the object of the statute, read with the constitutional guarantee of gender equality and to give a full play to the legislative intent, since any other interpretation would render the statute void and which situation in our view ought to be avoided. ” 19. In the judgment in Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant (2003) 6 SCC 277 ), the issue was regarding the age of retirement of Air Hostesses. ” 19. In the judgment in Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant (2003) 6 SCC 277 ), the issue was regarding the age of retirement of Air Hostesses. The High Court of Bombay held that the provision restricting the age of retirement of Air Hostesses from flying duties at 50 years with option to accept post for ground duties after 50 years upto the age of 58 years amounts to discrimination based on sex in violation of Articles 14, 15 & 16 of the Constitution of India. In the Indian Airlines the minimum retirement age of Air Hostesses was fixed as 35 years or on marriage if it takes place within 4 years of service or on first pregnancy whichever occurs earlier as per Government of India notification dt.12.4.1980. Air India also incorporated similar provisions in their regulations. The male cabin crew members could continue till the age of 58 years. The dispute was pending in the National Tribunal. The Apex Court held that there is no constitutional prohibition against the State in giving a special treatment to the women in employment on their demand and directed to resolve the issue before the Tribunal. 20. In the judgment in Siniya Mol v. K.S.E.B. ( 2007 (1) KLT 818 ), a learned Single Judge of this Court had, while considering the exclusion of women from the candidature for the post of Electricity Worker (Mazdoor) (though it was subsequently reversed by the D.B., in view of the circumstances which arose in that case), elaborately discussed the right of women, and the issue of gender discrimination prevailing in our country, despite CEDAW and the constitutional provisions and legislation in her favour. 21. Gender equality was the subject matter of consideration in Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India (2008) 3 SCC 1 ) where the Apex Court upheld the right to self determination with security and protection and the duty of State in employment avenues where women face adverse circumstances and the measures to be taken by holding that prohibiting employment of women in the premises where liquor or intoxicating drugs were consumed by the public as unconstitutional. In paras.37 and 38 it was held that instead of putting curbs on women’s freedom, empowerment would be a more tenable and socially wise approach and empowerment should reflect in the law of enforcement of the State as well as law modelling done in this behalf. 22. The Apex Court in Charu Khurana v. Union of India (2015) 1 SCC 192 ), while considering the question of denial of membership to female Make up artists in Cine Costume and Make-up Artists and Hair Dressers Association of Mumbai, observed as follows: “though there has been formal removal of institutionalised discrimination, yet the mind-set and the attitude ingrained in the subconscious have not been erased, women still face all kinds of discrimination and prejudice. The days of yore when women were treated as fragile, feeble, dependent and subordinate to men, should have been a matter of history, but it has not been so, as it seems.” The Apex Court traced out the history of the battles of women to vindicate their rights from 1792 onwards, referring to various materials, writings of renowned personalities and deprecated the attitude being adopted towards women. The observations in Voluntary Health Assn. of Punjab v. Union of India (2013) 4 SCC 1 ), referring to the following words of Vivekananda : “Just as a bird could not fly with one wing only, a nation would not march forward if the women are left behind” that a society that does not respect its women cannot be treated to be civilised, were reiterated. The following observations on the fundamental duty of citizens to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women and the obligation of State to protect women from such practices and ensure equality, are relevant: “33.In this context, a reference may be made to Article 51-A. Clauses (e) and (j) provide as follows: “51-A. (e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women; * * * (j) to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement;” On a condign understanding of clause (e), it is clear as a cloudless sky that all practices derogatory to the dignity of women are to be renounced. Be it stated, dignity is the quintessential quality of a personality and a human frame always desires to live in the mansion of dignity, for it is a highly cherished value. Clause (j) has to be understood in the backdrop that India is a welfare State and, therefore, it is the duty of the State to promote justice, to provide equal opportunity to all citizens and see that they are not deprived of by reasons of economic disparity. It is also the duty of the State to frame policies so that men and women have the right to adequate means of livelihood. It is also the duty of the citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. xxx xxx xxxx 41. The aforesaid pronouncement clearly spells out that there cannot be any discrimination solely on the ground of gender. It is apt to note here that reservation of seats for women in panchayats and municipalities have been provided under Articles 243(d) and 243(t) of the Constitution of India. The purpose of the constitutional amendment is that the women in India are required to participate more in a democratic set-up especially at the grass root level. This is an affirmative step in the realm of women empowerment. The 73rd and 74th Amendments of the Constitution which deal with the reservation of women has the avowed purpose, that is, the women should become parties in the decision-making process in a democracy that is governed by the rule of law. Their active participation in the decision-making process has been accentuated upon and the secondary role which was historically given to women has been sought to be metamorphosed to the primary one. The sustenance of gender justice is the cultivated achievement of intrinsic human rights. Equality cannot be achieved unless there are equal opportunities and if a woman is debarred at the threshold to enter into the sphere of profession for which she is eligible and qualified, it is well-nigh impossible to conceive of equality. It also clips her capacity to earn her livelihood which affects her individual dignity. Equality cannot be achieved unless there are equal opportunities and if a woman is debarred at the threshold to enter into the sphere of profession for which she is eligible and qualified, it is well-nigh impossible to conceive of equality. It also clips her capacity to earn her livelihood which affects her individual dignity. It is highly unfortunate that the State did not take any positive action to remove the discrimination against women.” The Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 18-12-1979. Defining discrimination against women, it set up an agenda to end such discrimination. Article I of CEDAW defines discrimination as follows: “1. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” 23. The following Articles of CEDAW are relevant for the purpose of this case. Article 2 state parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agreed to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and to this end, undertake: (a) to embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated herein and to ensure through laws and other appropriate means, the practical realisation of this principle; (b) to embody the principle of equality of men and women in national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated herein and prevention through laws and other appropriate means the practical realisation of this principle; (c) to establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with man and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination; (d) to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions act in conformity with this obligation. (e) to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person or organisation or enterprise; (f) to take all appropriate measures including legislation to modify or abolish existing laws and regulations customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women (g) to repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women Article 3 States parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields all appropriate measures including legislation to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on the basis of equality with men. xxx xxx xxx Article 7 States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and in particular, shall ensure to women on equal terms with men, the rights; (a) to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies; (b) to participate in the formulation of governments policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government; (c) to participate in non-governmental organisations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country Article 8 States parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their governments at the international level and to participate in the work of the National organisations xxxxx Article 15 1. States parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law 2. States parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, the legal capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity, in particular, there shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer properly and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals 3. States parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with the legal effect is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void. 4. xxxx Article 16 1. States parties agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with the legal effect is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void. 4. xxxx Article 16 1. States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure on a basis of equality of men and women; (a) xxx xxxx (g) the same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for valuable consideration.” Government of India is a participating country, which ratified the CEDAW as an active participant on 19.6.1993, acceded to it and reiterated that discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity and it is an obstacle to the participation on equal terms with men in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their country; it hampers the growth of the personality from society and family, making more difficult for the full development of potentialities of women in the service of the respective countries and of humanity. By accepting the convention, India has committed itself to undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women in all forms including to incorporate the principle of equality of men and women in their legal system, abolish all discriminatory laws, and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women; to ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination. It is therefore bound to implement the provisions of CEDAW. Thus the State is duty bound to act in tune with the provisions contained in the rules in order to repeal those rules which provide discrimination towards women. 24. Despite all these the female members of the family of erstwhile Maharaja of Cochin, continue to be disqualified from being nominated as member of the Board of Trustees. The power to nominate members is also seen vested only in the senior most male member. Eventhough several amendments were carried out to the proclamation since its promulgation in 1949, before the Constitution of India came into force, there is no alteration with respect to the nomination exclusively set apart to male members or in other words, the female members continue to be kept away from the administration of Estate and Palace Fund even after 69 years. That is : the status of the female members of the family of former Cochin Maharaja continues to be that of 1949, the primitive years, despite the provisions contained in Article 15(1) of the Constitution which prohibits discrimination against any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth or any of them; despite India being a signatory of CEDAW and despite a series of amendments to the proclamation effected between 1961 and 1978. Though the nation was headed by female Prime Minister, President, etc., and women in the country and the State have marked their presence in almost every fields, with proven ability, S.4 to the extent it disqualifies female members continues without any change. It is seen that the palace administration as well as the Government had proposed amendments whereby it stands admitted that there is no basis for keeping the female members away from the Palace Administration and for insisting nomination of a male member from the family. However even after the passing of 2 bills before the Legislative Assembly, both lapsed, in the absence of any effective follow up action, which also can apparently be another act of discrimination. Even then the 1st respondent requires a further representation for further steps for amendment, when they are duty bound to remove all sorts of gender discrimination. 25. It is for the Government to take up the matter even in the absence of any representation and to allow participation of women also in the administration of the palace. The proposed amendment insists at least one female member in the trustee board. However, I am of the view that the provision which provides for nomination of “male members of the family” need be modified as “members of the family”, as requested by the petitioners without qualifying the same as male or female. 26. Therefore, it is declared that S.4 of the Proclamation to the extent it excludes the female members of Erstwhile Royal Family of Cochin from being nominated as Trustees to the Palace Administration Board is unconstitutional. There shall be a direction to the additional 3rd respondent to take expeditious action for reconstitution of the Board, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed to the above extent.