ORDER: RAKESH KUMAR, J. Heard Sri Ravindra Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, Ms. Shashi Bala Verma, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor as well as Sri Rakesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel, who has been assisted by Sri Anil Kumar Tiwary, learned counsel for the informant/respondent no. 2. 2. The present appeal has been listed under the heading “For Orders (On Petitions)” for considering the prayer for suspension of sentence and granting bail during pendency of the appeal, in view of an interlocutory application i.e. I.A. No. 792 of 2018 filed under Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C. and in terms of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 18th January, 2018 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 2018 {Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 9585 of 2016}. Before proceeding, it would be necessary to incorporate certain facts. 3. The appellant was convicted in Sessions Trial No. 425 of 2008 (arising out of Siswan P.S. Case No. 89 of 2007) by learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Judge’) for commission of offence under Sections 302/120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “I.P.C.”) and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 (for short “Arms Act”) and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life under Sections 302/120(B) of the I.P.C. and he was also imposed a fine of Rs. 40,000/- (forty thousand) for the same offence. Under Section 27 of the Arms Act, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. In case of nonpayment of fine, he was directed to undergo further imprisonment for six months. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 4. After conviction and sentence, the appellant preferred the present appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”). The appeal was admitted on 22-07-2013. Since there was no prayer for bail, same was not considered, which fact is reflected in Order No. 2 dated 22-07-2013. Thereafter, an interlocutory application, vide I.A. No. 1656 of 2013, was filed for suspending sentence and granting bail. By order dated 26-11-2013, a Division Bench of this Court comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice I.A. Ansari (as he then was) and Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.N.Sinha (as he then was) rejected the prayer for suspension of sentence and granting bail. The order dated 26-11-2013 is incorporated herein below:- “We have heard Mr. By order dated 26-11-2013, a Division Bench of this Court comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice I.A. Ansari (as he then was) and Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.N.Sinha (as he then was) rejected the prayer for suspension of sentence and granting bail. The order dated 26-11-2013 is incorporated herein below:- “We have heard Mr. Prabhakar Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant, and Ms. S. B. Verma, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for the State. We have also heard Mr. Anil Kumar Tiwary, learned Counsel for the informant. Perused the materials on record including the impugned judgment and order. Considering the nature of incriminating materials available on record, we are of the view that in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, the sentences, passed against the appellant, cannot be suspended at this state and he cannot be allowed to go on bail. In view of the above and in the interest of justice, the prayer for suspension of sentences and also the prayer for bail are hereby rejected at this stage.” 5. Though only in November, 2013, the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail was earlier rejected, on 18-02-2014, one another application, vide I.A. No. 393 of 2014, was filed by the appellant for grant of provisional bail. This time, a Division Bench of this Court comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice I.A. Ansari (as he then was) and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Samarendra Pratap Singh (as he then was), allowed the interlocutory application and appellant was granted provisional bail with effect from 01-03-2014 to 14-03-2014. The appellant in the year 2015 filed another interlocutory application, vide I.A. No. 1630 of 2015, for suspension of sentence and granting bail, which was disposed of on 12-07-2016 and sentence of the appellant was directed to be suspended and he was directed to be released on bail. 6. On examining order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is evident that informant filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order of this Court i.e. Order No. 19 dated 12-07-2016 and remitted back the matter to this Court for passing a fresh order. It is necessary to incorporate the order dated 18th January, 2018 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 2018 {Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 9585 of 2016} by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which is as follows:- “1. Leave granted. 2. It is necessary to incorporate the order dated 18th January, 2018 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 2018 {Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 9585 of 2016} by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which is as follows:- “1. Leave granted. 2. The defacto complainant is before us, aggrieved by an order dated 12.07.2016 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in I.A. No. 1630 of 2015 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 672 of 2013, suspending the sentence awarded to Respondent No. 2, in a case where he had been convicted by the trial court under Section 302 IPC. 3. Mr. M. Shoeb Alam, learned counsel appearing for the State, has invited our attention to the mandatory requirement of Section 389 Cr.P.C. He has also invited our attention to the Judgment of this Court in Atul Tripathi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2014) 9 SCC 177 , where the legal position has been summed up at paragraph 15, which reads as follows:- “15. To sum up the legal position: 15.1. The appellate court, if inclined to consider the release of a convict sentenced to punishment for death or imprisonment for life or for a period of ten years or more, shall first give an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to show cause in writing against such release. 15.2. On such opportunity being given, the State is required to file its objections, if any, in writing. 15.3. In case the Public Prosecutor does not file the objections in writing, the appellate court shall, in its order, specify that no objection had been filed despite the opportunity granted by the court. 15.4. The court shall judiciously consider all the relevant factors whether specified in the objections or not, like gravity of offence, nature of the crime, age, criminal antecedents of the convict, impact on public confidence in court, etc. before passing an order for release.” 4. Admittedly, such procedure has not been followed in this case. Therefore, the order is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court for passing orders afresh in accordance with law. We also make it clear that since we have not referred to the other contentions raised by the appellant herein, it will be open to the parties to raise all available contentions and the High Court shall advert to the same and pass a reasoned order. 5. We also make it clear that since we have not referred to the other contentions raised by the appellant herein, it will be open to the parties to raise all available contentions and the High Court shall advert to the same and pass a reasoned order. 5. We find that the second respondent herein has been released on bail pursuant to an order dated 12.07.2016, which order we have set aside. Having regard to the submissions made before us, we are of the view that the second respondent be treated on an interim bail for a further period of three months, within which time, we request the High Court, in any case, to dispose of the application filed by the second respondent for suspension of sentence afresh as per this Judgment. 6. In view of the above, the appeal is disposed of.” 7. On perusal of the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is evident that Hon’ble Supreme Court directed to consider the matter in the light of guidelines of the Supreme Court given in Atul Tripathi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., particularly paragraph – 15 of the said judgment. Thereafter, the matter has been listed under the heading “For Orders (On Petitions)” for considering the prayer for suspension of sentence and granting bail. 8. Sri Ravindra Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that it was case of ‘No Evidence’, even then, the learned Trial Judge has passed the judgment of conviction and sentence. He submits that virtually, the appellant was the informant for the occurrence, in which, he has been held guilty in the present case. As per learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant was informant in Siswan P.S. Case No. 24 of 2006, which was registered on 27-03-2006, in which, it was alleged that some of the criminals had killed the husband of the informant of the present case. He submits that without completion of investigation in the said case, after more than one and half years, the informant of the present case, who is wife of the deceased, has come forward to be informant and on the basis of written complaint of the informant namely Sunita Devi regarding same occurrence, another F.I.R., vide Siswan P.S. Case No. 89 of 2007, was registered on 07-10-2007, in which, the appellant was arrayed as F.I.R. named accused person with other 2-3 unknown persons. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Trial Judge mainly relying on the evidence of P.W.7 Bhagwat Mallah has passed the judgment of conviction and sentence. He submits that P.W.7 was not examined during investigation of the present case and after about six years from the date of occurrence, he appeared before the trial court claiming to be eye-witness, and he claimed that he had seen the appellant while committing murder of the husband of the informant. According to learned counsel for the appellant, other evidences were not cogent warranting judgment of conviction and sentence and as such, earlier, a Division Bench of this Court, considering entire fact, has rightly passed order of suspension of sentence and granting bail. He further submits that in view of entire evidence, incarceration of the appellant appears to be unwarranted and as such, he submits that the sentence of the appellant may be suspended and he be directed to be released on bail. 9. Sri Rakesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the informant/respondent no. 2 and Ms. Shashi Bala Verma, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor have opposed the prayer. It was argued by Sri Rakesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the informant that once the prayer for bail of the appellant was earlier rejected by this Court, there was no reason to entertain successive bail petition. He further submits that it is true that in relation to murder of the husband of the informant, the appellant had earlier come forward to be informant, but subsequently, the informant of the present case noticed that in the murder of her husband, the appellant was the main culprit. He further submits that during investigation of the first case i.e. Siswan P.S. Case No. 24 of 2006, certain facts had come forward, which suggested involvement of the appellant and thereafter, on the basis of written complaint filed by the informant, Siswan P.S. Case No. 89 of 2007 was initiated against the appellant and other unknown accused persons. He further submits that on merit also, the appellant does not deserve any favourable order. He further submits that on merit also, the appellant does not deserve any favourable order. According to learned counsel for the respondent, during evidence, this fact has come that the appellant of the present appeal had virtually in the night at about 9:00 PM had come to the residence of the informant of the present case and requested her husband to carry him for purchasing medicine in respect to his ailing wife on motorcycle of her husband. Thereafter her husband with the appellant went on motorcycle. After half an hour, this appellant returned back and gave informant to the informant that her husband was done to death by some unknown persons, while both were on way. He submits that the informant in the fardbeyan has stated that after receiving the information of murder of her husband, she became unconscious and taking advantage of this situation, the appellant of the present case turned as informant of the said occurrence and on the basis of his information, earlier Siswan P.S. Case No. 24 of 2006 was registered against unknown persons. He further submits that during evidence, certain facts have come, which suggest that appellant was having some grudge with the husband of the informant. He submits that during evidence, this fact has come that the appellant had taken about Rs. 20,000/- (twenty thousand) from the husband of the informant and this was also one of the suspected reason for the crime. Another reason was explained that the appellant was suspecting some illicit relation of husband (deceased) of the informant with niece of the appellant, who was earlier residing in Assam. Subsequently, due to torture, she committed suicide. Of course, regarding her death, no any evidence has been brought on record, but it has been argued by learned counsel for the informant that those facts were noticed by the trial court. He further submits that the investigating officer was examined as P.W.9 and he has categorically stated that while he reached to the place of occurrence, as disclosed by the appellant in earlier case, he did not find any blood mark on the road side. According to learned counsel for the informant, during trial, this fact has also come that the husband of the informant was done to death at somewhere else and thereafter, his dead body was kept on road, where motorcycle of the husband of the informant was also lying. According to learned counsel for the informant, during trial, this fact has also come that the husband of the informant was done to death at somewhere else and thereafter, his dead body was kept on road, where motorcycle of the husband of the informant was also lying. He submits that this circumstance categorically suggests that the appellant, in a well designed manner, had killed her husband. He further submits that it is true that P.W.7 Bhagwat Mallah had not appeared during investigation, but during his evidence, he has given cogent explanation for not giving statement earlier before the police. According to Sri Rakesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the informant, while passing judgment of conviction and sentence, the learned Trial Judge had not only relied on the evidence of P.W.7, but there were other evidences and circumstances suggesting involvement of the appellant and as such, the learned Trial Judge has rightly passed the judgment of conviction and sentence. It has also been argued that test for entertaining the prayer for bail during investigation or trial and after conviction and sentence stands purely on different footing. He submits that during investigation or during trial, grant of bail is treated as “Rule” and rejection is treated as “Exception”, whereas, after conviction, the principle is reverse and rejection of bail is “Rule” and granting bail is “Exception”. To bolster this submission, he has highlighted the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported in (2015) 15 SCC 666 (State of Rajasthan vs. Salman Salim Khan) and he has specifically referred to paragraph 19 of the judgment, which is quoted hereinbelow:- “19. Referring to other decisions of this Court, in Ravikant S. Patil this Court further observed: (SCC p. 681, para 16) “16.5. All these decisions, while recognising the power to stay conviction, have cautioned and clarified that such power should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction, would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences.” 10. Besides this, he has argued that once on merit, the prayer for suspension of sentence has already been rejected as well as there was no change in circumstances, his prayer for bail may not be entertained. 11. Besides this, he has argued that once on merit, the prayer for suspension of sentence has already been rejected as well as there was no change in circumstances, his prayer for bail may not be entertained. 11. On the contrary, Sri Ravindra Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2001) 10 SCC 463 (Takht Singh and others vs. State of M.P.) submits that if appellant is in custody for more than three years and there is no reason for early hearing of the appeal, he is entitled to be enlarged on bail. He has further argued that judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Salman Salim Khan’s case (supra) deals with staying conviction, not for suspending sentence and granting bail. 12. Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, we have cursorily examined the evidence available on record. At the very outset, we are of the opinion that in appeal after admission, once the prayer for bail is rejected, at subsequent stage, there is no question for entertaining the prayer for bail since it may amount to review or recall of earlier order which is prohibited in view of Section 362 of Cr.P.C. Even in a bail petition filed under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., though successive bail petition is permissible, such bail petition is permissible only in changed circumstances. At this juncture, it would be necessary to quote paragraph – 8 of judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (2001) 7 SCC 673 (State of M.P. vs. Kajad), which is quoted hereinbelow:- “8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances the second application would be deemed to be seeking review of the earlier judgment which is not permissible under criminal law as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and various other judgments.” 13. In view of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is evident that even successive bail petition under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. can be considered only in changed circumstances. In view of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is evident that even successive bail petition under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. can be considered only in changed circumstances. It would be appropriate at this stage to quote Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. vis-a-vis Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C., which are as follows:- “439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail – (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct - (a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section; (b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified: Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable, is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. (2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.” “389(1) – Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond: Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release: Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail.” 14. Under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., there is provision for enlarging bail to an accused during investigation or trial, whereas, Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C. prescribes an exception for suspending sentence during pendency of the appeal since it categorically states that for suspending sentence or granting bail reasons are required to be recorded. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has already observed that such power should be exercised in exceptional cases. Meaning thereby that in appeal, grant of suspension of sentence is “Exception”, whereas, rejection of prayer for suspension of sentence is “Rule”. Accordingly, in normal course, in appeal, there is no reason to entertain the prayer for suspension of sentence or granting bail, unless the case is of exceptional nature and also there is perversity in the judgment of conviction and sentence. 15. In view of facts and circumstances of the present case, which we have discussed above, we are of the opinion that the present appeal may not be categorised as exceptional case nor there is any perversity in the judgment of Trial Court and as such, there is no reason to pass any favourable order. Since we are not inclined to pass favourable order, we are not proposing to ask the Public Prosecutor to file show cause. 16. Accordingly, the prayer for suspension of sentence and granting bail stands dismissed. The I.A. No. 792 of 2018 too is dismissed. The appellant is directed to surrender immediately after completion of period of interim bail in compliance with the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 18-01-2018 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 2018.