JUDGMENT : SAMBUDDHA CHAKRABARTI, J. 1. Child In Need Institute (CINI) (the Institute, for short), a registered society has challenged an Award, dated September 29, 2016, passed by the respondent Tribunal. By the said Award, the learned Judge had held that the service rules of the Institute were not transparent and the workmen concerned were terminated without complying with the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, (the Act, for short). The Tribunal further observed that since the Service Rules of the Institute before 1989 did not have any provision for retirement, the workmen were not bound by the Service Rules of 1989 by which a provision relating to retirement was incorporated or even by the subsequent modifications made in 1996 and 2006. It has further been held that "the workmen were entitled to be reinstated with full back wages. However, this Tribunal is not inclined to accept the age of retirement of the concerned workmen at the age of 60 years. This, however, shall not debar the contending parties from fixing for the age of retirement by way of settlement." 2. The petitioner has assailed the Award on grounds of perversity as well as on the ground that reliance by the Tribunal on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Kettle Well Butten & Co. Ltd. Vs. Kettle Well Butten & Co. Ltd, 1964 2 LLJ 146 was thoroughly misconceived. 3. In order to appreciate the grievances of the petitioner the factual background of the case is necessary to be taken into consideration. The aims and objects of the Institute are provided in the Rules and Regulations as well as in the Memorandum of Association. Clause 3 of its Memorandum of Association mentions development of human resources, particularly in respect of children, adolescents and women belonging to the vulnerable segments of the populations, as one of its aims and objects. In Clause 3(u) it has been specifically provided that the society shall not pay any dividend, gift or divide bonus in money to any of its members by way of profit and its income or property shall be applied solely for the purpose of its aims and objects provided nothing therein shall prevent in good faith payment of remuneration of the office bearers, other persons, institutions or societies in return of services rendered to the society. For the purpose of carrying out its objectives the Institute obviously requires manpower. Workmen were appointed on contractual basis by the Institute. 4. The Institute had its own Service Rules from its very inception which, however, did not contain any provision for retirement. At the 56th meeting the governing body of the Institute, held on February 21, 1989, these rules were modified by incorporating in Rule 12 of the new Service Rules the age of retirement at 60 years or after 30 years of service whichever would come earlier. 5. These rules were subsequently modified in the year 1996. In the modified rule, the provision for retirement was contained in Rule 9 which was the same as in Rule 12 inserted by the Service Rules of 1989. Ten years later a further amendment in the Service Rules was effected but Rule 9 was retained without any alteration. The case of the petitioner is that after the introduction of the provision relating to retirement in the year 1989 all the workmen of the Institute were informed of their respective dates of retirement upon attaining the age of 60 years or after completion of 30 years of service whichever was earlier. 6. The Institute had two classes of workmen viz., those who joined the service in 1978 and those who joined three years later i.e., in 1981. Those who joined in the year 1978 were intimated by a letter, dated July 20, 1989 that they would retire in the year 2008 after completion of 30 years of service. Seven out of such workmen requested the management of the petitioner that the period of 30 years of service should be computed from 1981 by bringing them at par with those who had joined in that year and their retirement would also be on such basis. The management had acceded to the request and agreed that these workmen would retire in the year 2011 in parity with those who joined as regular workmen in the year 1981. In the year 2011, they ceased to be workmen of the Institute and had accepted the retiral benefits without any objection. 7. About two years thereafter the respondent union started espousing the cause of 16 workmen who had retired in the year 2011 challenging their retirement in terms of Rule 9 of the Service Rules primarily contending that it was a case of termination of service. 7. About two years thereafter the respondent union started espousing the cause of 16 workmen who had retired in the year 2011 challenging their retirement in terms of Rule 9 of the Service Rules primarily contending that it was a case of termination of service. The dispute was ultimately referred to the Tribunal mainly for adjudication of whether the termination of service by way of superannuation by the Institute of 16 workmen as per the list enclosed with the order of reference with effect from the dates mentioned against their names was justified. Before the Tribunal evidence was adduced by the respective parties and documents were proved. The Tribunal disposed of the dispute by an Award in the manner as mentioned earlier. 8. Mr. Pal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, placed certain admitted facts. Out of these 16 workmen, seven were attached to the Institute from April 1978. By letters, dated January 1, 1982, they were intimated that their services were regularized with effect from January 1, 1981. After the introduction of the Service Rules in 1989 incorporating the provision for retirement the concerned workmen were informed of their respective dates of retirement after completion of 30 years of service at the Institute. This period was to be computed with reference to the dates of engagement as mentioned in the respective appointment letters. 9. Since there were some differences in years between the dates of their first association with the Institute the workmen requested the management to consider the year 1981 i.e., the date of their regularization as the date of their appointment and the Institute calculated 30 years from the said dates as per Rule 12 of the Service Rules, for fixing the date of retirement. The benefit of the workmen was taken into consideration and the dates of their retirement were altered after negotiation. The workmen put their signatures signifying their acceptance of the respective dates of retirement. All the workmen received their respective retirement notices and they, in fact, superannuated from service of the company with effect from the dates as mentioned in the list annexed to the order of reference and all these workmen had received retiral benefits without any reservation. 10. Mr. Pal further submitted that the dates of respective superannuation were very much known to the concerned workmen for more than two decades before their actual retirement. 11. 10. Mr. Pal further submitted that the dates of respective superannuation were very much known to the concerned workmen for more than two decades before their actual retirement. 11. There were, in fact, three Service Rules prevalent during the relevant period of time after being amended by the governing body of the Institute. The reason for first amendment in 1989 was that the rules were at an elementary stage. It was twice modified thereafter, i.e., in 1996 as well as in 2006. The petitioner referred to various documents and submitted that the workmen had full knowledge about existence of the Service Rules and the relevant provision of retirement. 12. The respondent no. 3 union has seriously assailed the action of the Institute and defended the Award passed by the Tribunal. According to them what the petitioner did in respect of the concerned workmen amounted to termination of service in the name of attaining the age of retirement. But the admitted Service Rules did never provide any date of retirement nor was there any provision or any clause whereby the workmen were or could be asked to retire after completion of 30 years of service or upon reaching the age of 60 years. The letters of appointment will make it very clear that no age of retirement was mentioned therein. According to the respondents the age of superannuation has nothing to with reaching a certain length of service i.e., the tenure of service is entirely different from the date of retirement. Since the appointment letters or the Service Rules, viz., Exts. 41 and 42, did not fix any age of superannuation, there was no question of reaching the age of superannuation or retirement from service by the workmen after working for 30 years in the Institute. 13. It has been further contended by the union that there is no evidence that the subsequent Service Rules being Exts. 43 and 45 came into being after superseding the earlier Service Rules. In fact, the two subsequent Service Rules have no specific role in the instant case and have no existence in the eye of law. After putting in 33 years of service a batch of the workmen were terminated in the name of retirement after completion of 30 years of service. The service period of the workmen was extended according to the convenience of the management in the pretext of negotiation. After putting in 33 years of service a batch of the workmen were terminated in the name of retirement after completion of 30 years of service. The service period of the workmen was extended according to the convenience of the management in the pretext of negotiation. But nowhere in the purported Service Rules being Exts. 43 and 45 there was any reference to any provision for extension of the service period. This in turn goes to show that everything depended upon the decision of the management. The respondent no. 3 has asserted that this termination was unconnected with the service condition of the workmen and the existence of the subsequently introduced Service Rules was also not within their knowledge. 14. A further point taken by the union is that the Director or the Deputy Director of the Institute or any person holding the post of the Director's level was not authorized and empowered to issue any notice declaring the workmen as retired. Only the person holding the post of the Secretary could act and execute any document on behalf of the organization. Ext. 8 was the letter of the workmen, dated August 27, 2010, to the management for withdrawing the letters of the alleged termination which were served upon them in the name of retirement. A sizeable number of workmen holding higher positions were allowed to complete their service period after reaching the age of 60 years which, they alleged, was an act of discrimination. 15. The union has assailed the act of the respondents alleging that none of the workmen reached the minimum age of 60 years. Therefore, such retirements are not only detrimental to the interest of the workmen, the act itself was unfair, mala fide, unreasonable and without any jurisdiction. The policy of the management was against the prevalent practice followed by other similar institutes for determining the age of retirement of their workmen. This was done to reduce the number of workmen according to the convenience of the management. 16. The respondent no. 3 herein further alleged that the Service Rules of 1996 were never visible and accessible to the workmen during their entire period of employment. It was only in the month of August 2010 that the concerned workmen could come to know of the Service Rules of 1996. So also was the respondent's response to the modified Service Rules of 1989. 3 herein further alleged that the Service Rules of 1996 were never visible and accessible to the workmen during their entire period of employment. It was only in the month of August 2010 that the concerned workmen could come to know of the Service Rules of 1996. So also was the respondent's response to the modified Service Rules of 1989. It was belatedly filed in the Tribunal by filing a special petition to that effect. On the contrary, the resolution to support the modification of 1989 in the original Service Rules was never placed before the Tribunal. Even the direction of the Tribunal upon the management of the Institute for submitting copies of the extract of the minutes and resolution for the year 1981 to the year 2011 were not submitted by the management of the Institute. 17. The respondent no. 3 also alleged that the Service Rules of 1996 was a manufactured document. This was created to perpetuate the illegal and unfair activities as well as nepotism of the Institute by reducing the number of workmen by terminating them from service against the statutory provisions of law. This was the result of the introduction of the mala fide scheme of the employer to reduce a sizeable number of permanent workmen in the name of the so-called retirement and, thereby, to engage contractual workers in their place. The union has submitted in line with their pleadings in the written statement before the Tribunal that apprehending their termination the workmen made a collective representation on August 27, 2010. Subsequently, they made another collective representation on February 14, 2011. After the union was formed it intervened into the matter and represented the workmen before the management of the Institute by two written representations, dated May 25, 2011 and August 22, 2011 respectively. 18. The union has referred to the affidavit-in-chief of Smt. Nirupama Ray, one of the workmen, wherein she stated that there was no Service Rules of 1996 and the workmen concerned were also not communicated about the existence of any such Service Rules, though they were illegally terminated on the basis of the same. It was also asserted in the affidavit that quite a number of higher officials were allowed to continue in their respective posts upto 60 years of age and some of them continued even after they reached 60 years. It was also asserted in the affidavit that quite a number of higher officials were allowed to continue in their respective posts upto 60 years of age and some of them continued even after they reached 60 years. The Service Rules of the Institute did not contain any provision for retirement of the workmen concerned after completing 30 years of service or on reaching the age of 60 years whichever was earlier. 19. The existence of this Service Rules has been admitted by the management of the Institute in its application, dated June 26, 2012. When there were Service Rules already in existence there was no scope for introduction of new Service Rules in the year 1996, particularly when in the new Service Rules of 1996 there was no indication that the same superseded the earlier Rules. The management also did not produce any document to show that the earlier Service Rules were withdrawn or cancelled. 20. The union has also assailed the subsequent Service Rules as these did not furnish any detailed information about when those are framed, approved or passed. The subsequent Service Rules which have been exhibited as Exts. 43 and 45 do not contain any official seal or signature. No properly authenticated copy was placed or shown by the governing body to that effect. From this the union argued that the earlier Service Rules cannot be ignored in any way and on the contrary the subsequent Service Rules have no role to play in this matter. 21. Since the Memorandum of Association does not provide for any post of Director or Deputy Director as office bearers, the Director or Deputy Director or any person holding the post of a Director's level was not legally authorized and empowered to issue any notice declaring the workmen as retired. Only the Secretary could act and execute documents on behalf of the organization. So all acts done by any person designated as Director or Deputy Director is a nullity in the eye of law. In terms of the relevant Rules the President, the Secretary and Treasurer are the prime office bearers to function for the organization. 22. Moreover, the union argued, the formation of the governing body was also not in terms of the Memorandum of the Association and the rules and regulations of the Institution. In terms of the relevant Rules the President, the Secretary and Treasurer are the prime office bearers to function for the organization. 22. Moreover, the union argued, the formation of the governing body was also not in terms of the Memorandum of the Association and the rules and regulations of the Institution. They placed reliance on the crossexamination of OPW 1 to submit that his statements clearly proved the hollowness and lack of substance of the contention of the management of the Institute in terminating the service of the workmen in the name of purported retirement. 23. The respondent no. 3 referred to Section 2(r) of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 for a definition of the word 'superannuation' and argued that in terms of the said definition the word means the attainment by the workman of such age as is fixed in the contract or condition of the service as the age on the attainment of which the workman shall vacate the employment. In the present case, neither the letters of appointment issued to the respective workmen nor the Service Rules provided for any fixed age of superannuation. As such, there was no question of attaining the age of superannuation or retirement from service by the concerned workmen. The union heavily relied on the case of Workmen of Kettle Well Bullen & Co. Ltd. for a proposition that the age of superannuation is not applicable to the workmen who had joined the service at a time when there was no age of superannuation. It was also argued, with reference to the facts of that case, that the fact that such age was fixed in the year 1947 and was not challenged by the workmen till about 1961 could not lead to the inference that they had accepted the age of superannuation. 24. After discussing the respective cases and the evidences adduced on behalf of the parties the Tribunal below observed that there were four sets of Service Rules placed before it, viz., Exts. 41, 42, 43 and 45. The first two were in the organization prior to the Service Rules of 1989 came into existence and contained no provisions for retirement. The Service Rules of 1989 i.e., Ext. 41, 42, 43 and 45. The first two were in the organization prior to the Service Rules of 1989 came into existence and contained no provisions for retirement. The Service Rules of 1989 i.e., Ext. 45 incorporated the provision for retirement in clause 12 of the Rules to the effect that the age of retirement would be 60 years of a particular workman or after 30 years of service at the Institute whichever was earlier. The 1996 Service Rules (Ext. 43) also contains the same criteria for retirement of a workman with the alteration in the serial number of the clause containing this provision. Clause 12 of the 1989 Rules was incorporated as clause 9 of the 1996 Rules. 25. The Tribunal noted an apparent discrepancy about the different dates of retirement in respect of different workmen. It has taken note of the submissions made on behalf of the Institute about the two classes of workmen i.e., those who were attached with the Institute since 1978 and those who were attached from 1981. In respect of the second group of workmen there was reconsideration for fixing date of retirement after completion of service for 30 years with effect from the respective dates of appointment from the year 1981. The Tribunal had also taken note of the fact that the management had negotiated with a group of workmen who joined the organization in the year 1978 and their services were regularized on January 1, 1981. 26. The Tribunal, however, held that this classification of the two categories of workmen has no evidentiary value as it had not been pleaded in the written statement and this negotiation has also not been provided in the service rules. The Institute had nowhere stated in the written statement that there were two types of workmen. Therefore, a fact which is not pleaded cannot be attached with any evidentiary value. On the other hand, various documents marked as Exts. A to P showed that there was no scope for negotiation between the concerned workmen and the management of the Institute. From this the Tribunal held that the whole issue concerning service rules of the Institute has no transparency and its finding supported the case of the union. 27. Nowhere from Exts. 43 and 45, the Tribunal held, it is found that the earlier Service Rules were either cancelled or superseded or amended. From this the Tribunal held that the whole issue concerning service rules of the Institute has no transparency and its finding supported the case of the union. 27. Nowhere from Exts. 43 and 45, the Tribunal held, it is found that the earlier Service Rules were either cancelled or superseded or amended. It has further been observed that the silence regarding the year when the service rules were brought into being was also suspicious. Ext. 45 is nothing but a rubber stamp insertion regarding the year. From the rubber stump insertion in Ext. 45 it cannot be inferred that these Service Rules came into being on February 21, 1989. There was no system regarding introduction of the Service Rules. 28. From the fact that there was no mention in Exts. 41 and 42 in Ext. 43 that the earlier service rules had been superseded the Tribunal inferred that the Service Rules of 1996 was a manufactured document for the purpose of terminating the workmen on the pretext of superannuation. This arbitrary procedure of extending the age of retirement indicates that there was no date of retirement in the earlier service rules and the subsequent service rules did not come into operation when these workmen joined the service. Exts. 41 to 43 governed the field regarding the matter of retirement. The Tribunal further observed that since there was no age of retirement in the Service Rules of the Institute when these workmen joined their retirement on superannuation was not justified. 29. The Tribunal laid no bones about it and reiterated that it was not attaching any value to the stand of the Institute that there were two classes of workmen on their dates of retirement and those workmen retired after 33 years as there was negotiation between the concerned workmen mentioned in those exhibits. It was in the opinion of the Tribunal that there was no scope for issuing notices, dated July 20, 1989, as at that point of time Ext. 43 had not come into being. 30. Even if it was a finding of the Tribunal that the workmen had accepted the retiral benefits without raising any objection regarding the rule of the retirement either at the age of 60 years or on the expiry of 30 years of service whichever was earlier it was of the view that Exts. 43 had not come into being. 30. Even if it was a finding of the Tribunal that the workmen had accepted the retiral benefits without raising any objection regarding the rule of the retirement either at the age of 60 years or on the expiry of 30 years of service whichever was earlier it was of the view that Exts. 43 and 45 were not applicable to these workmen as they were in service much before 1989. The Tribunal relied on the judgment in the case of Kettle Well Bullen & Co. Ltd. and held that acceptance of retiral benefits by the concerned workmen would not amount to waiver or acquiescence of the benefits of the previous service rules. Even if the workmen had knowledge about the change in the age of retirement it cannot help the Institute as the workmen shall be guided by Exts. 41 and 42. After considering the different judgments relied on by the respective parties the Tribunal calculated that the service rules of the Institute were not transparent and, therefore, retirement of the workmen was nothing but termination of service and they were entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. 31. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned Advocate for the union very specifically submitted that the relationship between the concerned workmen and the management was that of a mutual trust. Considering the social status of the workmen and the fact that they were either illiterate or half literate and in view of their economic conditions, they had to repose complete trust in Dr. Chowdhury, the founder of the organization. Consequently, they signed the documents like the letters, dated July 20, 1989, without any question but the management could not keep its trust and made them retire after 30 years of service taking advantage of their illiteracy. 32. Mr. Bhattacharya further submitted that tenure of service cannot be a measuring rod for retirement of a workman and a service for a particular period cannot co-exist simultaneously as the age of retirement. He argued that the concept of retirement is always an age specific one which was in the present case was 60 years. 33. The union further wanted to make out a case that the modifications in the service rules were never intimated to the concerned workmen or they nor were they served with any copy of the rules while they were in service. Mr. 33. The union further wanted to make out a case that the modifications in the service rules were never intimated to the concerned workmen or they nor were they served with any copy of the rules while they were in service. Mr. Bhattacharya, however, did not try to justify the repeated use of the word 'non-transparency' by the Tribunal in respect of the service rules of the subsequent period which was an unhappy and inappropriate coinage of word. But he stuck to the point that these subsequent service rules were, in fact, manufactured for the purpose of retiring the workmen. 34. The union further criticized the letters, dated July 20, 1989, as a manufactured as all the letters disclosed that the same date of retirement. The basis of such criticism was that all the workmen did not join the organization on the same date and, therefore, their dates of retirement could not be the same. Mr. Bhattacharya further submitted that the management had no authority to negotiate about the date of retirement as the service rules did not make any provision for the same. It has also to be taken note of, as submitted by the union, that the management also did not stick to its provision for retirement after rendering 30 years of service as the service tenure of those ex-workmen crossed 33 years. Mr. Bhattacharya further argued that in a case such as this the Court has to take into consideration the social status, level of education, poverty of the workmen concerned and, therefore, the case cannot be decided by applying principle of estoppel. 35. Facts in the present case are not much in dispute. The issues involved in the present dispute are more legal than factual. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the Tribunal while passing the impugned Award made any major factual mistake or the Award was not sustainable for not considering the factual aspects of the case. The facts had well been laid before the Tribunal - both in the form of pleadings, documents and oral evidence. The question is whether the interpretation given by the Tribunal to them or even to the admitted position can be said to be ultimately sustainable. 36. The facts had well been laid before the Tribunal - both in the form of pleadings, documents and oral evidence. The question is whether the interpretation given by the Tribunal to them or even to the admitted position can be said to be ultimately sustainable. 36. A very major issue seems to have eluded the Tribunal with regard to the differences in the dates of joining the Institute of different workmen and the date of regularization. It is not disputed that the workmen themselves requested the management to consider 1981 which was the date of regularization, as the date of appointment and to calculate 30 years from the said date for determining the date of retirement. The management responded to the request positively and favourably. Consequently the dates of retirement for a set of workmen had been changed. Exts. R/1 to R/7 bear testimony to the stand of the management that the dates of retirement were fixed as per the date of regular engagement. Mention may be made of two workmen in this connection. For example, Smt. Nirupama Ray was initially appointed in April 1978. The initial date of retirement as per Rule 12 of the new Service Rules should have been April 1, 2008. The date of her regular engagement was January 1, 1981 and in terms of Rule 12 of Ext. 45, she retired with effect from January 1, 2011. Again, Smt. Urmila Naskar joined the Institute in April, 1978. She was also to retire in terms of the said provision of new Rules as mentioned before on April 1, 2008. The date of her regular engagement also was January 1, 1981 and Ext. D shows that the date of her retirement was January 1, 2011 accepting the date of regular engagement as the date of appointment. 37. Thus, both the classes of workmen i.e., those who had different dates for attachment with the Institute with different dates of regular employment and the group of workmen who had only one date of appointment were clearly aware of their respective dates of retirement. It is also not in dispute that all the workmen had received their respective notices of retirement and they retired with effect from those dates and all of them received their retiral benefits without any reservation or objection. This is obvious from the Ext. S series of documents. It is also not in dispute that all the workmen had received their respective notices of retirement and they retired with effect from those dates and all of them received their retiral benefits without any reservation or objection. This is obvious from the Ext. S series of documents. Retirement notices were received by the workmen through Exts. A to P, sent by the Institute by which they were asked to retire with effect from the dates mentioned therein and, therefore, the workmen concerned were aware of their dates of retirement well in advance. What PW 1 had stated in cross-examination is also corroborated from evidence of OPW 1 that all these workmen were served with letters, dated July 20, 1989 informing each of them of her date of retirement. Those letters were issued under his signature and all these exhibits were received by the workmen by putting their signatures on them. He also stated in his affidavit-in-chief that during the service tenure none of the workmen raised any objection regarding the date of her retirement nor even at the stage of receiving the amount representing their retiral dues. Over and above that they had granted receipts as token of acceptance of the amount. 38. In its objection to the union's application, dated June 5, 2012, the Institute very specifically pleaded that the Service Rules which were at a very preliminary stage were superseded and replaced by subsequent service rules which were approved in the 56th meeting of the governing body held on February 21, 1989. These Rules were again twice superseded by virtue of the decisions taken at the 86th meeting of the governing body, held on March 19, 1996 and by its 126th meeting, held on October 27, 2002 respectively. They also clearly stipulated that the retirement of a workman would be either upon attaining the age of 60 years or after completion of 30 years of service whichever was earlier. 39. It has been the persistent case of the union that the workmen concerned had no knowledge of the existence of the Service Rules and no copy of the same was ever served upon them. Mr. Pal has referred to Exts. 8, 9, 10, 20 and 43 to prove that the workmen had full knowledge of the existence of the Service Rules including the provision relating to retirement. Mr. Pal has referred to Exts. 8, 9, 10, 20 and 43 to prove that the workmen had full knowledge of the existence of the Service Rules including the provision relating to retirement. Moreover, the admission of PW 1 in cross-examination leaves no manner of doubt that the workmen were aware of the same. She even stated that after receiving the letter dated September 15, 2010 from the Director of the Institute the workmen never contended that there was no existence of service rules. 40. Of the two classes of workmen involved in the present case the first was attached with the Institute from April 1978 and they were issued appointment letters which have been marked as Exts. R/1 to R/7. They became regular workmen in the year 1981. The other group of workmen were appointed in the year 1981 (Exts. R/8 to R/14) and about them there was no dispute about calculating 30 years of service from the respective dates of their appointments. But in respect of the first group of workmen the year of retirement ought to have been 2008 calculating 30 years from the initial dates of entry. Since there was a provision in Exts. A to P for expressing the views of the workmen, after a discussion and on a negotiation it was agreed that 1981 representing the year in which they became regular was to be considered as the date of appointment and the date of retirement were also fixed in the year 2011. 41. Thus, if at all, the extension of service of a class of workmen by three years definitely enured to the benefit of the workmen themselves and concomitantly to the disadvantage of the Institute. Regard being had to the common course of human conduct there cannot be a doubt for a moment that this must have been the result of a discussion or negotiation between the Institute and the first category of the workmen. Otherwise, the Institute is not expected to take a decision of its own which would be entirely to the detriment of the interest of the Institute itself. If the Institute had not been specifically requested by the workmen to treat 1981 as the year of their respective appointments the management of the Institute had no reason to take a decision against their own interest. If the Institute had not been specifically requested by the workmen to treat 1981 as the year of their respective appointments the management of the Institute had no reason to take a decision against their own interest. Such a decision also could not be taken but for a discussion between the management and the workmen. This is what OPW 1 had described as negotiation in his evidence. 42. Mr. Pal made a grievance that in passing the Award the Tribunal went beyond the order of reference inasmuch as what the Tribunal was to decide was whether the purported termination of service by way of superannuation of the workmen was justified. This did not give the Tribunal any liberty or even an occasion to adjudge the validity of the service rules, particularly about their legality, illegality or transparency. Such an adjudication should not have found its place in the Award even by way of an incidental observation to the main issue. The main question involved, the petitioner asserted, was whether the workmen had knowledge of their respective dates of retirement. There is hardly any question of termination of service if the severance of employer-employee relationship would be attributed to the superannuation of the workmen in terms of the provision relating to 'retirement' in the service rules. 43. It has already been found that the workmen were already aware of the provision relating to their dates of retirement and they never raised any dispute at any point of time before. When the workmen had written a letter which appears at page 290 of the writ petition to change the rule relating of the retirement from after 30 years of service or upon attainment of 60 years of age whichever was earlier, there cannot be any scope for entertaining any doubt that they were aware and conscious of the contents of the letters, dated July 20, 1989. These workmen were informed of their respective dates of retirement more than two decades before the final date of severance of relationship of employer-employee. Thus, the case sought to be made out by the respondent union that they were not aware of the dates of retirement or because of the relationship of mutual trust they had accepted the notices in good faith has hardly any podium to stand on. Thus, the case sought to be made out by the respondent union that they were not aware of the dates of retirement or because of the relationship of mutual trust they had accepted the notices in good faith has hardly any podium to stand on. Over and above everything there is nothing denying that these workmen had accepted their retiral benefits without any objection or protest, either before or at the relevant point of time. 44. It has been observed by this Court in Tushar Kanti Roy Vs. Eighth Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata, 2013 1 CHN(Cal) 504, that if a litigant by his conduct induces other men to believe that he was pursuing a certain course leaving aside the other and as a result of it, that had induced other men to alter his course of action he is not permitted to subsequently change his stand by resorting to the other course which he had intentionally decided not to follow. 45. This principle also applies to the present case as by accepting the retiral dues without any objction the workmen had induced the management of the Institute to believe that they would not raise any issue about the retirement subsequently and to part with a substantial amount of money at the time of their retirement. After having reaped the benefit in the form of acceptance of retiral dues the workmen cannot plainly be allowed to turn around and agitate over the same issue. 46. It is a settled principle of law that a party must not be allowed to affirm and disaffirm the same transaction. It cannot be that when it is for his benefit he should affirm it and disaffirm when it goes to his prejudice and this is not an equitable principle of law. More than one hundred and fifty years ago the law on the point was stated with clarity by the Privy Council in an appeal from two judgments of the Sudder Diwani Adalat, Kolkata in Shah Mukhun Lall and Others Vs. Baboo Sree Kishen Singh and Others, reported in 12 MIA 157 when Lord Chelmsford held that a man cannot both affirm and disaffirm the same transaction, so it is true nature for his own relief and insist on its apparent character to prejudice his adversary. Baboo Sree Kishen Singh and Others, reported in 12 MIA 157 when Lord Chelmsford held that a man cannot both affirm and disaffirm the same transaction, so it is true nature for his own relief and insist on its apparent character to prejudice his adversary. His Lordship observed that this maxim was founded not so much on any positive law, as on the broad and universally applicable principles of justice. 47. This is preciously why the claim of the workmen in the present case should be turned down. They had knowledge of the date of retirement from before, accepted the retiral dues and then disowned their knowledge only with a view to continue to be in employment. Since these workmen never raised any objection to the new Service Rules and signified their consent to the date of retirement by putting their signatures they are estopped from raising any dispute or even to question the action taken by the petitioner. 48. By their conduct they had induced the management of the petitioner Institute to take a certain course of action and, therefore, they must be estopped from questioning the legality of the same. 49. If the workmen had thought that they would not accept the dates of their retirement they should have raised issue long before and ought not to have accepted the same by putting their signatures. If from the very outset they intended not to be bound by the dates of retirement reached after mutual negotiation it was their duty to let the Institute know of it and not accept the retiral dues. This is a case where the workmen had duty to speak, if they intended not to act not inconsonance with what their silence otherwise suggests. By their conduct the workmen held out and implied a promise to the management of the acceptance of the new Service Rules and made the Institute to make the payment of retiral dues. They are now estopped from taking a point contrary to their conduct and are bound by promissory estoppel as well. 50. The submission of Mr. Bhattacharya that since the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act is to ensure social justice the principle of estoppel has no application to it, cannot be accepted. They are now estopped from taking a point contrary to their conduct and are bound by promissory estoppel as well. 50. The submission of Mr. Bhattacharya that since the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act is to ensure social justice the principle of estoppel has no application to it, cannot be accepted. It is true that there was a point of time when there were certain misgivings about the application of some technical doctrines like estoppel, res judicata, etc., to industrial adjudications. The controversy is no longer relevant. After exhaustively discussing various judgments the Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, (2006) AIR SC 3229 applied the said principles to industrial adjudication having regard to the reference made by the appropriate government. Thus, there is no bar in applying these principles to the facts of the present case. One thing stands out very clearly that the detailed discussion made by the Tribunal about the existence, variation or modification of the service rules and the conclusion that there was lack of transparency in the service rules are all beyond the scope of order of reference and there was no earthly reasons for the Tribunal to travel beyond the parameters of the reference to decide the validity of the service rules in the present case and also to make an inference that the Service Rules of 1996 was a manufactured document for the purpose of terminating the workmen on the pretext of superannuation. 51. It is also not clear how the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion of termination of the concerned workmen of the Institute from the given facts. This finding is not based on any evidence. On the contrary, PW 1 has specifically admitted that the management of the Institute had served notice of retirement upon the workmen after completing 30 years' of service. This was not a case of retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. The proviso to of Section 2(oo) of the Act makes it clear that retirement is never included within the ambit of retrenchment. If the act of the management does not come within the definition of retrenchment there is no question of payment of retrenchment compensation under Section 25F of the said Act. The proviso to of Section 2(oo) of the Act makes it clear that retirement is never included within the ambit of retrenchment. If the act of the management does not come within the definition of retrenchment there is no question of payment of retrenchment compensation under Section 25F of the said Act. The Tribunal, it seems, failed to attach due importance to this provision of law as well as the notices sent to the workmen long before their dates of retirement. 52. The learned Judge of the Tribunal on the other hand placed strong reliance on the case of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. and applying the ratio decided therein concluded that although the workmen had knowledge of their respective dates of retirement they were not bound by the Service Rules of 1989 as when they joined the Institute the same were not in existence. 53. The Supreme Court in that case had held that where the rules of retirement were framed by the company it would have no application to its prior workmen unless it is shown that such workmen had accepted the new rules as part of their conditions of service. With reference to the facts of that case the Supreme Court further observed that there was nothing to show that after the new rules for retirement came into force they were actually applied by the company to its older workmen. Thus, if in a case it can be shown that the new rules for retirement were actually applied by the company to its older workmen the ratio in Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. would not apply. 54. Another important finding of the Supreme Court in that case was that the company made no specific averment that at any time after the new rules were framed the prior workmen invariably or even generally retired when they were 55 years of age. In the absence of any satisfactory evidence that the new rule of retirement was actually enforced as against the prior workmen, the same cannot be made applicable to the given case in respect of the new workmen. 55. If the bases of the conclusion are sought to be applied to the facts of the present case it becomes very difficult to decide the case on the ratio of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. 55. If the bases of the conclusion are sought to be applied to the facts of the present case it becomes very difficult to decide the case on the ratio of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. The materials on record without doubt go to show that the workmen connected with the case had definite knowledge about the respective dates of their retirement. The second parameter laid down by the Supreme Court cannot also be made applicable to the present case as the new Service Rules relating to retirement were certainly applied to its older workmen as well. Moreover, the union has not been able to prove that any workman of the Institute belonging to the concerned rank had not retired after putting in 30 years of service in terms of the provisions of the new Service Rules. It appears that the Tribunal merely applied the final conclusion of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. without satisfying itself whether the substratum of the judgment on which its conclusion was based did actually exist in the present case so as to make the ultimate ratio of the judgment applicable. The contingent preconditions for applying the conclusion of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. was never attempted to be tested in the present case. The Tribunal erred in blindly applying the ratio of that judgment without first considering the applicability of the logical parameters. 56. It is also not understood why the Tribunal totally brushed aside the admission of the workmen that they had knowledge about the alteration in the provision relating to retirement. The reason for rejection of such admission is neither valid nor acceptable. The Tribunal has held, and quite repeatedly, that an admission against law cannot be accepted. The Tribunal had left the matter at that without trying to explain or elucidate what it had sought to mean by an admission against law. 57. Mr. Pal has submitted that this is a case where the concerned workmen should be absolutely bound by their conduct for the simple reason that as early as in the year 1989 they had all consented to the altered criteria for retirement. They did not raise any dispute about it till before August 27, 2010 when the management received a letter from them. Even that letter left no room for any confusion that the workmen had knowledge of the year of retirement. They did not raise any dispute about it till before August 27, 2010 when the management received a letter from them. Even that letter left no room for any confusion that the workmen had knowledge of the year of retirement. If they had not disputed about the date of retirement for more than two decades they must be deemed not only to have waived their rights but consented to the respective dates of their retirement. If that be so, they must subsequently be estopped from raising a dispute after such a long period of time. The petitioner relied on the judgment in the case of Tushar Kanti Roy on the point when the action or omission on the part of workmen may operate as an estoppel against them. Since the principle decided in that case has already been discussed earlier the same may not be repeated. 58. Applying, however, the principle of law decided in that case I quite agree with the submission of the petitioner that the union ought to have been estopped from challenging the provision relating to retirement in the service rules. The learned Judge ought to have taken the effect of knowledge of the date of retirement of the workmen borne by their admission, into consideration and in not doing so he definitely failed to take into account the legal consequences of such admission. This admission is obviously in respect of the knowledge of the workmen. In other words, it was an admission of fact and, therefore, there was no scope for treating the same as an "admission against law". If the learned Judge was of the view that this admission was against any law he should have specifically mentioned which provision of law was being violated if the admission was accepted. After all, the service rules of the Institute was not a statutory one. 59. Mr. Pal further submitted that since a very major portion of the facts involved in the case have either not been considered or the Tribunal failed to attach due importance to the same, the Award must be held to be a totally perverse one. According to the petitioner if the materials had been examined in their proper perspective the Tribunal would never have arrived at the conclusion which it did. According to the petitioner if the materials had been examined in their proper perspective the Tribunal would never have arrived at the conclusion which it did. Thus, there has been a major lacuna in the decision making process of the Tribunal in passing the impugned Award and a Court examining the validity of the Award, even in a writ petition has every authority to go into the factual aspect of the case to test the validity of the decision making process. In State of U.P. and Another Vs. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 , the Supreme Court had specifically observed that while examining and scrutinizing the decision making process it becomes inevitable to also appreciate the facts of the given case as otherwise the decision cannot be tested on the grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. Therefore, to a limited extent of scrutinizing the decision making process it is always open to the Court to review the evaluation of facts by the decision maker. 60. That apart, if the petitioner alleges before a higher forum that the finding of the Tribunal is perverse being not based upon the materials on record or for not considering the materials placed before a Tribunal, validity of such submission must have to be tested upon assessment and the evaluation of the facts by the Tribunal below. This applies even to an adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act and also in respect of a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 61. The Supreme Court in the case of Management of Madurantakam Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 2 Scale 274 , observed that normally a labour court or an industrial tribunal is the final court of facts, but if a finding of a facts is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India can go into the factual question decided by the labour court or the Tribunal. Again, in Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Others, (2011) 5 Scale 423 the Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether a disputed question of fact can be gone into by a writ court. Again, in Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Others, (2011) 5 Scale 423 the Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether a disputed question of fact can be gone into by a writ court. The Supreme Court after considering a large number of cases observed that a High Court can also interfere with such a decision of an authority whose order is under challenge in a writ proceeding where there was no legal evidence before the authority concerned or where the decision of the authority concerned is held to be perverse i.e., a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at on the basis of the materials available on record. Question is always one of discretion and not of jurisdiction of the court which may in a proper case enter upon a decision on questions of fact raised by the petitioner. 62. That a writ court in an appropriate case may enter into the factual aspect of the matter has long been decided as a settled proposition of law. More than half a century ago the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Binapani Dei and Others, (1967) 2 SCR 625 , observed that in a writ petition the High Court is not precluded from entering upon a decision on questions of facts raised by the petition. Where an enquiry into complicated questions of fact arises in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the right of an aggrieved party to obtain relief claimed may be determined, the High Court may in appropriate cases decline to enter upon that enquiry but the question is one of discretion and not of jurisdiction of the Court. In ABL International Ltd. and Another Vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others, (2004) 3 SCC 553 , the Supreme Court observed that in an appropriate case the writ court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar for a court to entertain a writ petition even if it involves some disputed questions of fact. This is all the more so in a case where an aggrieved party assails an Award passed by the Tribunal on the ground of perversity. This is all the more so in a case where an aggrieved party assails an Award passed by the Tribunal on the ground of perversity. Even if the Tribunal or a labour court is otherwise considered to be the final court of fact the writ court, in order to decide the validity of the claim of the petitioner, has to scrutinize the conclusion reached by the Tribunal or a labour court on the basis of the facts involved in this case and the evidence produced therein to ascertain whether the conclusion is valid or vitiated by any perversity calling for an interference. 63. Considering the weight of the materials on record including the evidence, both oral and documentary, there is no escape from the conclusion that the order of reference should have been answered in the affirmative and the Tribunal committed a serious error in assessing the weight of the evidence, in failing to attach due importance to very material pieces of evidence and to appreciate the effect of the positive evidence in favour of the Institute in their proper perspective. 64. The Award, principally based on the judgment in Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. , has failed to consider the primary difference in the fact situations between the two cases and also the parameters for applying the ratio in that case to the present order of reference. In Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. itself the Supreme Court had clearly indicated the factors for coming to the conclusion in that case. The Tribunal before applying the judgment as of necessity was required to consider whether those factors were present in the facts of the present case as well and, if not, should have held that the ratio in the case of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. had no manner of application. The Award and the process of ratiocination present no evidence of the Tribunal's undertaking this exercise before applying Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. to the present case and concluding that the retirement of the concerned workmen was nothing but a termination of service rendering them entitled to be reinstated with full back wages. 65. It has already been examined and found how the Tribunal misread the undisputed facts and how it failed to attach due importance to them. Ltd. to the present case and concluding that the retirement of the concerned workmen was nothing but a termination of service rendering them entitled to be reinstated with full back wages. 65. It has already been examined and found how the Tribunal misread the undisputed facts and how it failed to attach due importance to them. Equally the Tribunal failed to appreciate the effect and legal implication of the workmen receiving the payments after retirement without protest in any manner whatsoever. Knowledge of the date of retirement and acceptance of the retiral dues without prejudice were the two factors which should have weighed with the Tribunal in holding that in view of the admitted factual background the union should be estopped from agitating and espousing the claim of the workmen as the same had no legal validity. The Tribunal most certainly was required to hold that a protest after more than two decades of the knowledge of the year of the retirement and acceptance of the same by making endorsements on the notices were simply not maintainable. 66. What impelled the Tribunal to hold the Service Rules of 1989 to be a manufactured one is not clear from the Award nor does the logical process of reasoning lead to the conclusion of the Tribunal which again was also beyond the scope of the order of reference. It is equally perplexing to try to understand why the Tribunal held that there was no transparency in the formation of the Service Rules of 1989. Mr. Bhattacharya was obviously on the defensive about this conclusion. But nobody can dispute that the letter received by the management on August 27, 2010 from the workmen proved that they had full knowledge about the dates of their retirement. This, along with what have been discussed above, renders the finding of the Tribunal completely unsustainable. 67. Mr. Pal has made a grievance that the learned Judge could not appreciate that the Service Rules of 1989 was equally applicable to holders of managerial rank as well as the workmen of the Institute. I find sufficient room for such a complaint. The Tribunal ought to have held that the provision for retirement as mentioned in the Service Rules of 1989 and subsequently modified were applicable to all the employees and workmen alike who were attached with the Institute before 1989 across the organization. 68. The submission of Mr. I find sufficient room for such a complaint. The Tribunal ought to have held that the provision for retirement as mentioned in the Service Rules of 1989 and subsequently modified were applicable to all the employees and workmen alike who were attached with the Institute before 1989 across the organization. 68. The submission of Mr. Bhattacharya that the workmen concerned were either illiterate or half literate and there was a relationship of trust between the parties which the Institute had abused, does not appear to be borne by the facts of the case. The relationship with the workmen was contractual in nature which is always governed by the rules and regulations of service framed by the employer. When the workmen raised a dispute long after their knowledge of the respective dates of retirement and even after accepting their retiral dues without any protest and decided to take the former employer to a court of law they by their conduct did not exhibit the relationship of any trust between them. The educational background of the workmen also betrays the claim of Mr. Bhattacharya that they were either illiterate or half literate. It is never their case of the workmen that when they were served with notices informing them of their respective dates of retirement more than two decades ago they had accepted and signed on them without going through the documents or they could not understand their contents. The materials on record do not reflect that the Institute had ever breached any trust reposed in them or had acted in a manner of mistrust. That apart, such a submission must be held to be entirely unsustainable for want of any evidence to that effect before the Tribunal. Such was never their case at all at any stage of the proceeding, but submitted at the hearing of this petition. 69. I also do not find any force in the submission of Mr. Bhattacharya that the tenure of service cannot be the yardstick of retirement for a workman or that it cannot co-exist with a particular age for retirement of a workman. 70. If any service rules provide that an employee or a workman, as the case may be, shall retire upon attaining a certain age or after putting in service for a certain number of years at the organization the provision for retirement cannot be flawed on that ground alone. 70. If any service rules provide that an employee or a workman, as the case may be, shall retire upon attaining a certain age or after putting in service for a certain number of years at the organization the provision for retirement cannot be flawed on that ground alone. Such provisions are frequently found in various service rules without creating any inherent conceptual anomaly. A tenure post primarily is a condition for holding an office for a certain period. If a person is appointed to a tenure post his appointment to the said post ends on the completion of his tenure, unless of course, it is further curtailed on justifiable grounds. But when both the tenure as well as attaining a certain age are mentioned for retiring a workman it cannot be said that merely because two criteria have been mentioned in the service rules, the appointment ceases to be to a tenure post, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. L.P. Agarwal vs. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 526 . 71. Two conditions for retirement are quite frequently found and a well accepted norm. The Supreme Court has upheld the provisions of retirement based on rendering a particular number of years of service or retirement on attaining a particular age, whichever was earlier in the case of Yeshwant Singh Kothari vs. State Bank of Indore and others, (1993) Supp2 SCC 592. It observed "11. It was also noticed that not to provide for an age of retirement at all would be contrary to public interest because the State cannot afford the luxury of allowing its workmen to continue in service after they have passed the point of peak and that rules of retirement do not take away the right of a member to his livelihood, the only limit is to the right to hold office till the stated number of years. The provision in the Regulation in hand for maintaining the age of retirement at 58 years as before but in the same breath permitting retirement on the completion of 30 years of service, whichever occurs earlier, is in keeping with the policy of reckoning a stated number of years of office attaining the crest, where after inevitably is the descent, justifying retirement. In this context 30 years' period of active service is not a small period for gainful employment, or an arbitrary exercise to withhold the right to hold an office beyond thirty years, having not attained 58 years of age." 72. Again in the case of Nagaland Senior Government Workmen Welfare Association and others vs. State of Nagaland and others, (2010) 7 SCC 643 , the Supreme Court observed that merely because some workmen had to retire from public employment on completion of 35 years of service although they had not completed 55 years of age does not lead to any conclusion that the impugned enactment is arbitrary, irrational, unfair and unconstitutional. There is nothing wrong if the legislature provides for retirement of the Government workmen based on maximum length of service or on attaining a particular age, whichever is earlier, if the prescribed length of service or age is not irrational. 73. More recently in the case of Union of India and others vs. A. K. Behl, AVSM, PHS, (2015) 8 Scale 246, the Supreme Court had occasion to observe that the number of years a workman actually puts in before he retires from service or the age of the workman may not be the sole basis for retirement. There can be a dual basis viz. number of years which he puts in and the age at which he would retire. 74. Therefore, the contention of the union about the impermissibility of retiring a workman on the basis of the tenure of her attachment with the Institute or with reference to a certain age, whichever is earlier, is not an acceptable one and must be held to be without any legal sanction. Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that the workmen were not aware of the provisions of the Service Rules and the modification in those Service Rules were not within their knowledge also is not at all a convincing one. It has already been found before that the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal about the Service Rule was beyond the scope of the reference and the Tribunal could not make out a third case. So far as the allegation about the lack of knowledge in respect of the Service Rules is concerned, the same is not borne by the materials on record. On the contrary the reverse fact situation clearly emerges from the records. So far as the allegation about the lack of knowledge in respect of the Service Rules is concerned, the same is not borne by the materials on record. On the contrary the reverse fact situation clearly emerges from the records. The workmen were informed of the introduction of the new provision relating to retirement by the Rules of 1989. The letter received by the management on July 20, 1989 from them also leaves no manner of doubt that they had definite knowledge of it. 75. The next contention of the union questioning the authenticity of that the letters, dated July 20, 1989 is based on a misconceived appreciation of the factual position. The only reason for their suspicion is that all such letters contained identical dates of retirement which is not possible in any organization. In the process they chose to gloss over that the management of the Institute had fixed a notional date of joining the organization for the workmen for those who had joined in the year 1978. This notional date was fixed at January 1, 1981. Therefore, for that group of workmen the date of the retirement must be the same. But in respect of the other class of workmen who joined in the year 1981 their dates of retirement had been fixed with reference to their respective dates of joining. While making this submission the union appears to have totally missed out that this fixation of notional dates of appointment had been made by the management at the behest of the workmen themselves. Otherwise, there was no earthly reason for the management to extend the tenure of their employment by three years. 76. The last submission of Mr. Bhattacharya that there could not be any negotiation as the Service Rules did not provide for the same must also equally fail. It has to be noted that when the Service Rules of any establishment lay down a provision relating to the retirement it never contains simultaneous provision rendering it to be a negotiable one. Those who had joined in the year 1978 would have completed 30 years of service in the year 2008 and their dates of retirement were also fixed in the year 2008. Those who had joined in the year 1978 would have completed 30 years of service in the year 2008 and their dates of retirement were also fixed in the year 2008. When they received the benefit of three years' additional service fixing January 1, 1981 as the notional date of regularization it must have been the result of and preceded by some negotiation between the parties. The letters, dated July 20, 1989 themselves bring it out quite distinctly and conclusively. The concerned workmen after enjoying three years of additional service cannot really turn around and question the competence of the authority to negotiate with them. They themselves were the beneficiaries of the negotiation and discussion that had taken place between them. After reaping the advantage of the same and remaining silent for more than two decades they cannot be heard on the lack of authority on the part of the management to negotiate with them. Thus, all the points taken by the union in assailing the action taken by the Institute and in defence of the Award fail. 77. I equally find sufficient merit in the submissions of the petitioner that the Award impugned in the writ petition is bad in law and not a sustainable one. The Award does not take into consideration a major portion of the materials on record, is against the weight of the totality of the evidence adduced, has failed to apply the correct proposition of law and has applied the wrong tests based on an inapplicable judgment with very different factual background, rendering it liable to be set aside. I find no impropriety with the acts of the Institute. They are just, valid and legally impervious. Both law and equity stand in their favour. The Award impugned is set aside and quashed. The writ petition succeeds. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.