ORDER : The present writ petition has been filed for directing the respondents to immediately and forthwith provide road permit to the petitioner in terms of the provisions of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax, 2005 (in short Act, 2005) for delivery of transporter and dealer’s challan of remaining 32,00,000 (Thirty two lacs) having value of Rs.44,48,000/- pursuant to the Purchase Order dated 24.04.2012. It has further been prayed for issuance of direction upon the respondents to pay to the petitioner a sum of Rs.44,48,000/- being the value of remaining 32 lacs transporter and dealers’ challan manufactured by the petitioner pursuant to the Purchase Order dated 24.04.2012. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the State of Jharkhand issued Purchase order to the petitioner as contained in letter No. 768 dated 24.04.2012 for printing and supply 80 lacs Statutory Form-D transport challan and 20 lacs dealers challan. The petitioner was to supply part of the consignment in the month of May 2012 and the remaining in the month of July 2012. The petitioner by its letter dated 16.11.2012 reminded the respondents that the entire consignment is ready for dispatch since May 2012 and further requested for providing the road permit so that the consignment can be delivered to them as in terms with the provisions of the Act, 2005 particularly Section 72, no movement of goods can take place in the State of Jharkhand except without valid road permit and it is the duty of the purchaser of goods to furnish the road permit to the seller of goods to enable the seller to transport the goods and get the same delivered in the State of Jharkhand. According to the petitioner, in spite of its repeated requests, the respondents did not provide the road permit citing the reason that they did not have appropriate storage for the consignment and as such, the delivery date was extended. The respondents issued first road permit on 23.02.2013 and as such, the petitioner effected delivery of 68 lacs transport challan having value of Rs. 94,52,000/-. However, no road permit was issued for the remaining part of consignment of 32 lacs having value of Rs.44,48,000/-. The respondent made payment towards the invoice nos. 186 and 187 amounting to Rs.47,26,000/- on 09.05.2013 however payment for the invoice no. 201 and 202 was not released. 94,52,000/-. However, no road permit was issued for the remaining part of consignment of 32 lacs having value of Rs.44,48,000/-. The respondent made payment towards the invoice nos. 186 and 187 amounting to Rs.47,26,000/- on 09.05.2013 however payment for the invoice no. 201 and 202 was not released. The respondents issued letter dated 25.04.2013 to the petitioner annexing a letter dated 01.04.2013 issued by the Treasury Officer, Doranda alleging that the invoices bearing nos. 201 and 202 are forged one as the original and duplicate invoices have been signed by two different persons. The petitioner replied the letter dated 25.04.2013 stating that both the original and duplicate invoices have been signed by the authorized officers of the petitioner. Again by letter dated 29.11.2013, the respondents informed the petitioner that the reply submitted by it did not contain any justification of the allegation and subsequently petitioner submitted an affidavit on 02.02.2013 stating that the invoice no. 202 is authentic. Thereafter, the petitioner repeatedly requested for issuance of road permit for remaining consignment but the same was not issued which gives rise to filing of the present writ petition. 3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that in spite of repeated requests of the petitioner, the respondents did not provide the road permit for the remaining consignment and as such the respondents failed for fulfil their obligations under the third purchase order. However, the petitioner has successfully completed two earlier orders dated 01.02.2011 and 30.12.2011 and payment has already been made to it. It is further submitted that the printed challans contain barcoding, holograms, and symbols with invisible ink for the security reasons and, therefore, the same cannot be sold to any third party and as such the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss in case the consignment is not accepted. It is further submitted that in accordance with the terms of the third purchase order, the petitioner has taken utmost care in preserving and maintaining these consignments and has merely acted in terms of the contract and now the petitioner is not in a financial position to maintain these goods at its storage facility to ensure that these goods are not misused. It is also submitted that in terms of the purchase order dated 24.04.2012, the petitioner printed one crore challans, hence the respondents are bound by the contractual terms between the parties and are under obligation to take the delivery of remaining 32 lakh challans and discharge the consideration towards the same. It is further submitted that the entire consignment was manufactured in May, 2012 itself and the remaining challans are being maintained in the godown of the petitioner even today. It is further submitted that Section 70 of the Contract Act, 1872 provides that when a person has acted under a valid contract for another, the latter is liable to compensate the former. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in support of his argument, has put reliance on the following judgments:- i. Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd. reported in (1983) 3 SCC 379 ii. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. &Anr. Vs. The Ulhasannagar Municipal Council and Another reported in (1970) 1 SCC 582 iii. Kumari Shrilekha Vidhyarthi Vs. State of U.P reported in (1991) 1 SCC 212 iv. ABL International & Anr. Vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 553 v. Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Devi Ispat Limited & Ors. reported in (2010) 11 SCC 186 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that road permit for seventeen lakhs transporting challans was sent by the department vide letter no. 429 dated 23.02.2013. The petitioner supplied 34,00,000 transporting challans on 08.03.2013 and again supplied 34,00,000 challans on 16.03.2013 and as such total 68,00,000 numbers of transporting challans have been received. It is further submitted that the payment of Rs.47,26,000/- against the supply of 34,00,000 transporting challans have been made and for payment of another 34,00,000 transporting challans, bill of Rs. 43,74,000/- was issued vide letter no. 743 dated 25.03.2013 and was sent to the Doranda Treasury for payment of the said amount but due to certain objections raised by the Treasury Officer, Doranda the payment could not be made. Pursuant to the objection of the Treasury, certain clarification was sought from the petitioner vide letter dated 25.04.2013. 43,74,000/- was issued vide letter no. 743 dated 25.03.2013 and was sent to the Doranda Treasury for payment of the said amount but due to certain objections raised by the Treasury Officer, Doranda the payment could not be made. Pursuant to the objection of the Treasury, certain clarification was sought from the petitioner vide letter dated 25.04.2013. In the meantime, the office of the Accountant General, Jharkhand also raised objections regarding the bill presented on behalf of the petitioner to which the respondent replied, but till date the objection has not been cleared from the office of the Accountant General and as such the payment could not be made. It is also submitted that the petitioner has failed to supply transporting challans within the scheduled time and as such the respondents are not bound by the terms of the agreement. Since the payment against 34,00,000/- numbers of transporting challans was pending, it is doubtful that the petitioner had printed the rest of the transporting challans within schedule time. It is further submitted that since the payment was objected by the office of the Accountant General, the road permit for procuring remaining 32,00,000 challans could not be issued. The petitioner supplied 68,00,000 transporting challans in the month of March 2013 against the road permit issued in the month of February 2013 for only 17,00,000 transporting challan and, therefore, had the remaining 32,00,000 transporting challans been ready at that point of time i.e., in the month of March 2013, the petitioner would have dispatched the same. Thus, it is presumed that the total challans were not ready for supply till the stipulated time. In fact, the petitioner neither prayed for issuance of road permit nor supplied the challans within the stipulated time as per the condition of the work order. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents places reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ”State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd.” reported in (2002) 1 SCC 216 and submits that the writ proceeding is not the remedy for enforcing the contractual obligation. If the petitioner feels aggrieved, it may seek recourses in terms with the agreement. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the materials available on record. Vs. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd.” reported in (2002) 1 SCC 216 and submits that the writ proceeding is not the remedy for enforcing the contractual obligation. If the petitioner feels aggrieved, it may seek recourses in terms with the agreement. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner was issued purchased order for printing and supplying of 80 lacs Statutory Form-D transport challan and 20 lacs dealers challan. Admittedly, 68 lacs transport challans having value of Rs.94,52,000/- was supplied to the respondents and the payment for 34 lacs challans amounting to Rs. 47,26,000/- was made to the petitioner, however, the payment of the remaining consignment of 34 lacs have been kept in abeyance in view of the objection made by the Doranda Treasury and the office of Accountant General. The contention of the petitioner is that the road permit for the remaining 32 lacs challans has not been issued by the respondents in spite of the repeated requests and the same are kept lying in the godown of the petitioner. On the contrary, the stand of the respondents is that the petitioner could not fulfill the condition as mentioned in serial no. 9 of the order no. 768 dated 24.04.2012. Moreover, in view of certain objections raised by the office of Accountant General, Jharkhand, the road permit has not been issued. 8. I have perused the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner so far the maintainability of the present writ petition. 9. In the case of “Gujarat State Financial Corpn.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “13. Now if appellant entered into a solemn contract in discharge and performance of its statutory duty and the respondent acted upon it, the statutory corporation cannot be allowed to act arbitrarily so as to cause harm and injury, flowing from its unreasonable conduct, to the respondent. In such a situation, the court is not powerless from holding the appellant to its promise and it can be enforced by a writ of mandamus directing it to perform its statutory duty. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would certainly lie to direct performance of a statutory duty by “other authority” as envisaged by Article 12.” 10. In such a situation, the court is not powerless from holding the appellant to its promise and it can be enforced by a writ of mandamus directing it to perform its statutory duty. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would certainly lie to direct performance of a statutory duty by “other authority” as envisaged by Article 12.” 10. In the case of “Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: 11. In the case of Gujarat State Financial Corpn. Vs. Lotus Hotels (P) Ltd. this Court following an earlier judgment in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India held: (SCC pp. 385-86, paras 9 & 11) “The instrumentality of the State which would be ‘other authority’ under Article 12 cannot commit breach of a solemn undertaking to the prejudice of the other party which acted on that undertaking or promise and put itself in a disadvantageous position. The appellant Corporation, created under the State Financial Corporations Act, falls within the expression of ‘other authority’ in Article 12 and if it backs out from such a promise, it cannot be said that the only remedy for the aggrieved party would be suing for damages for breach and that it could not compel the Corporation for specific performance of the contract under Article 226. (emphasis supplied) ……………………………………………………………………………. 11. In the case of “Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 13. Mr Gokhale appearing on behalf of the Municipality urged that the petition filed by the Company apparently raised questions of fact which in the view of the High Court could not appropriately be tried in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. But the High Court has not said so, and on a review of the averments made in the petition this argument cannot be sustained. Merely because a question of fact is raised, the High Court will not be justified in requiring the party to seek relief by the somewhat lengthy, dilatory and expensive process by a civil suit against a public body. The questions of fact raised by the petition in this case are elementary. 12. In the case of “Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- 48. The questions of fact raised by the petition in this case are elementary. 12. In the case of “Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- 48. In our view, bringing the State activity in contractual matters also within the purview of judicial review is inevitable and is a logical corollary to the stage already reached in the decisions of this Court so far. Having fortunately reached this point, we should not now turn back or take a turn in a different direction or merely stop there. In our opinion, two recent decisions in Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons and Mahabir Auto Stores also lead in the same direction without saying so in clear terms. This appears to be also the trend of the recent English decisions. It is in consonance with our commitment to openness which implies scrutiny of every State action to provide an effective check against arbitrariness and abuse of power. We would much rather be wrong in saying so rather than be wrong in not saying so. Non-arbitrariness, being a necessary concomitant of the rule of law, it is imperative that all actions of every public functionary, in whatever sphere, must be guided by reason and not humour, whim, caprice or personal predilections of the persons entrusted with the task on behalf of the State and exercise of all power must be for public good instead of being an abuse of the power. 13. In the case of “ABL International Ltd.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- 27. From the above discussion of ours, the following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition: (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable. 28. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable. 28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks.) And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction. 14. Further, in the case of “Joshi Technologies International Inc. Vs. Union of India”, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the principles to be followed by the writ courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while dealing with a contractual matter, which reads as under:- 69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances. 70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under: 70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness. 70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practise some discriminations. 70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice. 70.8. If the contract between private party and the State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. 70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the decision is not arbitrary. 70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness. 70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. 71. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles and after considering the arguments of the respective parties, we are of the view that on the facts of the present case, it is not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. First, the matter is in the realm of pure contract. It is not a case where any statutory contract is awarded. 15. Having carefully gone through the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it may be construed that there is no absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition in a contractual matter even if some disputed question of facts are involved. If the materials on record are clearly evincible, the writ court may exercise its power of judicial review. 15. Having carefully gone through the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it may be construed that there is no absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition in a contractual matter even if some disputed question of facts are involved. If the materials on record are clearly evincible, the writ court may exercise its power of judicial review. However, if the dispute is of complex nature which can only be determined after thorough/elaborate adjudicatory process by leading evidences, the writ petition should not be entertained. Each and every case is to be dealt with on its own facts. 16. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is plenary in nature and is not subjected to any of the other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court has discretion to exercise or not to exercise such power having regard to the facts of each case. The High Courts have, however, imposed self-restraints in exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction to issue a prerogative writ which is not to be exercised in a routine manner to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction. 17. The respondents have contended that since the petitioner did not supply the materials in time, they are not bound by the terms of contract. The respondents have also doubted the stand of the petitioner that the materials were ready for delivery and due to non-furnishing of the road permit, the same could not be supplied. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assiduously contended that since the road permit was not provided to the petitioner, it could not supply the challans in time. The petitioner had already supplied 68,00,000 transporting challans in the month of March, 2013 against the road permit issued in the month of February 2013 for only 17,00,000 transporting challans. The final consignment was required to be delivered till 01.07.2012, however, the petitioner has not been able to show as to why the remaining consignment was not dispatched at the time of dispatch of 68 lacs transporting challans. The final consignment was required to be delivered till 01.07.2012, however, the petitioner has not been able to show as to why the remaining consignment was not dispatched at the time of dispatch of 68 lacs transporting challans. The first letter that has been brought on record by the petitioner is of 03.09.2012 whereby the Director, Mines was informed that the remaining consignment is ready for delivery which was after three months of the scheduled time of part delivery fixed as May 2012. 18. In the case of “Jain Plastics and Chemicals LTD.” (supra), the claim of the writ petitioner was that the supply the PVC fittings was not made on account of failure or the refusal on the part of the appellants (the State of Bihar) to supply the road permits and as such, it cannot be faulted for non-supply of PVC fittings. After going through the facts of the said case, Their Lordships in para 7 held as under:- 7. In our view, it is apparent that the order passed by the High Court is on the face of it illegal and erroneous. It is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be ground for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in an properly instituted civil suit rather than by a Court exercising prerogative of issuing writs. 19. In the present case also, the contention of the petitioner is that the road permit was not supplied to it and due to that reason the remaining consignment of the printed challans was not delivered to the respondents in time, which has been seriously disputed by the respondents. 19. In the present case also, the contention of the petitioner is that the road permit was not supplied to it and due to that reason the remaining consignment of the printed challans was not delivered to the respondents in time, which has been seriously disputed by the respondents. Since the present case involves disputed question of fact in contractual matter wherein money claim has also been made, in view of the judgment of “Joshi Technologies International” (supra) and “Jain Plastics And Chemicals LTD.” (supra), this Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ petition. 20. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, the present writ petition is dismissed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to take appropriate recourse as provided under law. It is clarified that the observation made in this order shall not prejudice any other forum to adjudicate the dispute in accordance with law.