ORDER : 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The writ petition lies in a narrow compass and that with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is taken up for final disposal at the stage of preliminary hearing itself. 3. The petitioner is the defendant in the suit and is before this Court assailing the order dated 22.02.2018 passed by the trial Court on the admissibility of documents produced in the course of evidence by the defendant. The trial Court has been pleased to reject the said documents. 4. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the petition are as under: That One Smt.Goda Bai w/o. Sri.B.K.Garudachar was the owner of the premises bearing No.6 (present No.7) situated on Kengal Hanumanthaiah Road, Division No.62, Bengaluru City. There is no dispute with regard to the ownership of the suit schedule premises and the status of the defendant as a tenant. 5. On 26.09.1977, a registered lease deed came to be executed in favour of the petitioner for a period of 37 years and 06 months and that the lease period expires on 25.03.2015 and even after expiration of the lease period, the defendant continued in occupation of the premises. That in view of the terms of the lease deed dated 26.09.1977, the defendant-petitioner herein was enabled to put up a super structure and which structure after completion of the lease period would absolutely vest with the lessor. 6. That the defendant pursuant to the lease deed, commenced construction activities where upon the same was objected to by the State Authorities on the premise that suit premises had become the subject matter of a acquisition notification and on account of the acquisition of the suit premises, further progress of the construction got stunted and the suit premises got embroiled in litigation and on account of this, the defendant lost substantial time amounting to almost more than 2½ years and later, due to the efforts of the parties, the State did not proceed with the completion of the acquisition process. 7. That on account of the ensuing delay, the lessor Smt.Goda Bai executed the document which is described by the defendant as an extension of lease period thereby enlarging the lease period upto 31.12.2022. 8. 7. That on account of the ensuing delay, the lessor Smt.Goda Bai executed the document which is described by the defendant as an extension of lease period thereby enlarging the lease period upto 31.12.2022. 8. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the issues and the plaintiffs let in their evidence. Thereafter, in the course of examination of DW.1, a memo was filed into the Court enclosing a copy of the lease agreement dated 31.12.1979 and the letter addressed to the defendant. The marking of the said document was vehemently opposed by the plaintiffs and on objections raised, the trial Court was pleased to pass a detailed order and thereby rejected the Photostat copy which was sought to be produced along with memo. The rejection was on the premise that the lease agreement dated 31.12.1979 is neither registered nor sufficiently stamped. 9. The trial Court while so rejecting the said document was pleased to traverse the provision of Section 107 of the TP Act, Sections 17(1)(b), 17(d) and Section 49 of the Registration Act and was also pleased to rely on the ruling rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta reported in AIR 2004 Calcutta 316 and on the rulings of the Apex Court reported in 2004 (1) SCC page 1, 2015 (16) SCC 787 and 2008 (8) SCC 564 to arrive at the conclusion that the documents cannot be permitted to be marked, 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner would strenuously contend that the agreement dated 31.12.1979 which was sought to be produced is admittedly a Photosat copy as the original was with the lessor and the said fact is evidenced by the letter addressed by the husband of the lessor who infact was interacting with the defendant. He would contend that a bare perusal of the agreement would demonstrate that the same is only an extension of lease and not a renewal of the lease so as to render it as a compulsorily registrable document. He would further contend that the trial Court has failed to comprehend the scope of Section 107 of the TP Act and that the trial Court has erred in holding that the said document cannot be permitted to be marked and adduced as evidence in the absence of registration. He would further contend that the trial Court has failed to comprehend the scope of Section 107 of the TP Act and that the trial Court has erred in holding that the said document cannot be permitted to be marked and adduced as evidence in the absence of registration. He would further contend that the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in the various rulings relied upon by the plaintiffs-respondents herein are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs would strive to reiterate the findings rendered by the trial Court and would support the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. He would submit that the order of the trial Court does not call for any interference as what is sought to be produced is the purported agreement dated 31.12.1979 which amounts to an alteration/modification of the terms of a registered contract and that the terms and conditions of a registered document can be modified or altered only by a document written and registered and that the oral evidence cannot be relied upon or let in, in view of the bar under Section 92 of the Evidence Act. He would further place reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court reported in 2000 (7) SCC 104 to buttressing the said argument. 12. In the light of the above contentions, the points that falls for consideration by this Court is: 1. Whether the trial Court was justified in rendering a finding on the admissibility of the Documents at the intermediate stage of trial? and 2. Whether the order impugned in the writ petition is sustainable in law? 13. This Court has adverted itself to the pleadings in the plaint, in the written statement and in the petition and the various documents relied upon by the parties and the reasoning set out in the impugned order. 14. Even on a cursory perusal of the order impugned, it is apparent that the trial Court has not traversed the pleadings in the written statement and the consideration of the issue of admissibility of document has been in isolation of the facts pleaded by the defendant. 15. 14. Even on a cursory perusal of the order impugned, it is apparent that the trial Court has not traversed the pleadings in the written statement and the consideration of the issue of admissibility of document has been in isolation of the facts pleaded by the defendant. 15. From the material on record, it is seen that the defendant-tenant has asserted such a right and the execution of such a document at the earliest point of time i.e., in reply to the legal notice effected by the plaintiffs-respondents herein. In response to the legal notice issued by the plaintiffs, by reply, it was asserted that the lease period expires only on 31.02.2022 and not on 26.03.2015. The said fact also came to be reiterated under the reply notice dated 17.06.2015 addressed by the defendant’s counsel. In the reply notice, there is a detail reference to the various clauses of the agreement dated 31.12.1979 and it is virtually contended that after the execution of the lease agreement dated 31.12.1979, the parties have adhered to the terms and conditions therein more particularly with reference to the payment and receipt of the rentals. Despite the same, disregarding the assertion, the plaintiffs instituted the suit and the said suit came to be resisted by the defendant-petitioner herein by filing a detailed statement of objections. 16. In the written statement, it is asserted that the plaintiffs have suppressed the agreement dated 31.12.1979 whereby the date of commencement of the lease and date of conclusion of the lease period came to be altered and benefit was extended on account of a fact which was beyond the control of both the parties that the extension was on account of precious time lost in saving the assets from the long arm of the State. 17. It is also asserted that the parties have been acting in consonance with the terms of the agreement dated 31.12.1979 and that there was an alteration of date of commencement and more so in the matter of quantum and payment of rents. Thus, it is asserted that the subsequent document has been consciously acted upon by the parties in the matter of receiving the rents and the rents were paid in terms of the agreement dated 31.12.1979. Thus, it is asserted that the subsequent document has been consciously acted upon by the parties in the matter of receiving the rents and the rents were paid in terms of the agreement dated 31.12.1979. The reference with regard to same is also made in the letter dated 11.01.1980 addressed by one B.K.Garudachar husband of the lessor and it is claimed that the letter is also counter signed by the lessor. 18. On a summation of the facts averred by the defendant, primafacie it appears that the defendant has canvassed a case of novation. It is virtually pleaded that the parties have been acting contrary to the terms of the registered lease deed dated 26.09.1977 and in compliance of the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 31.12.1979. Be that as it may, it is a case i.e., neither canvassed before the trial Court nor is this Court adjudicating the said issue. 19. On a bare reading of the impugned order, it is apparent that the trial Court has not at all traversed the pleadings set out either in the reply letters or in the reply legal notice or the written statement. Further on a closer scrutiny of the pleadings, it is apparent that the defendant has pleaded certain factual aspects which factual aspects have neither been adverted to nor have they been considered by the trial Court while deciding the objections with regard to the admissibility of the documents. It is also apparent that the petitioner-defendant may also be entitled in law to bring on record the same by way of secondary evidence. 20. In the considered opinion of this Court, the trial Court erred in determining the objections in isolation of the facts and rendering a finding on the issue without recourse to trial. The trial Court ought to have rendered a more detailed exercise after having regard to the contents of the documents and with reference to the conduct of the parties as alleged by the defendant and this would have been possible only if the parties were permitted to tender evidence in a manner known to law. Apparently, the trial Court has taken up the task of adjudicating the issue based on the first principles which approach cannot be accepted. The issue involves adjudication of facts which the trial Court has not at all appreciated. 21. Apparently, the trial Court has taken up the task of adjudicating the issue based on the first principles which approach cannot be accepted. The issue involves adjudication of facts which the trial Court has not at all appreciated. 21. It is necessary to state that there could be no quarrel with the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the rulings relied upon by the trial Court and before this Court. The crucial aspect which the trial Court has failed to address itself to is, as to whether the said rulings are applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The trial Court has examined the issue in a perfunctory manner without elucidating upon the contents of the documents read in conjunction with the pleadings. The contents of the documents ought to have been examined in the light of the pleadings set out by the parties and their conduct and the law in this regard. From the earliest point of time, the defendant has consistently pleaded with regard to the agreement dated 31.12.1979. 22. Though it is specifically pleaded by the lessee that the rents are being paid pursuant to the terms of the agreement dated 31.12.1979, there is not even whisper much less consideration about his aspect. Objections have been considered and addressed in a very perfunctory manner. In the opinion of the Court, the same is not a judicious approach nor is it a justice oriented approach. 23. The trial Court ought to have addressed the objections keeping in view the totality of the circumstances including the plea set out by the defendant. The trial Court has miserably failed in this regard. Thereby, the trial Court ought to have addressed the issue after a full fledged trial. The consideration of the objections in a perfunctory fashion and in isolation of the surrounding facts and circumstances would result in a miscarriage of justice. The trial Court ought to have elucidated on the issue after permitting the parties to adduce evidence and after permitting the parties to place all the material before the Court. As such, opportunity would have enabled the Court to address the issue with reference to the broad spectrum of facts involved in the case. Such adjudication with reference to facts in the light of the statute would have resulted in a complete adjudication of the contentious issue. 24. As such, opportunity would have enabled the Court to address the issue with reference to the broad spectrum of facts involved in the case. Such adjudication with reference to facts in the light of the statute would have resulted in a complete adjudication of the contentious issue. 24. Further, the approach of the trial Court is also contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of the Bipin Shantilal Panchal vs. State of Gujarat and another reported in (2001) 3 SCC 1 wherein, a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in similar circumstances have laid down the law that the trial Court when addressing objections to admissibility of the documents ought not to resort to pass a detailed order either upholding or overruling such objections. In fact, it has categorized such approach as an archaic practice resulting in multiplicity of proceedings and protraction of the proceedings, as consideration of contentious, issues, pending disposal of the suits definitely result in the aggrieved party approaching the higher Court to assail his grievance and seek redressal at a interlocutory stage thereby resulting in inordinate delay in adjudication of the proceedings before the trial Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court in this regard has held in paragraphs Nos.13 to 16 as follows: “13. It is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. But the fall out of the above practice is this: Suppose the trial court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the material from being admitted in evidence and then proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case finally. If the appellate or the revisional court, when the same question is recanvassed, could take a different view on the admissibility of that material in such cases the appellate court would be deprived of the benefit of that evidence, because that was not put on record by the trial court. In such a situation the higher court may have to send the case back to the trial court for recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. In such a situation the higher court may have to send the case back to the trial court for recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or remoulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings. 14. When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment. If the court finds at the final stage that the objection so raised is sustainable the judge or magistrate can keep such evidence excluded from consideration. In our view there is no illegality in adopting such a course. (However, we make it clear that if the objection relates to deficiency of stamp duty of a document the court has to decide the objection before proceeding further. For all other objections the procedure suggested above can be followed.) 15. The above procedure, if followed, will have two advantages. First is that the time in the trial court, during evidence taking stage, would not be wasted on account of raising such objections and the court can continue to examine the witnesses. The witnesses need not wait for long hours, if not days. Second is that the superior court, when the same objection is recanvassed and reconsidered in appeal or revision against the final judgment of the trial court, can determine the correctness of the view taken by the trial court regarding that objection, without bothering to remit the case to the trial court again for fresh disposal. We may also point out that this measure would not cause any prejudice to the parties to the litigation and would not add to their misery or expenses. 16. We may also point out that this measure would not cause any prejudice to the parties to the litigation and would not add to their misery or expenses. 16. We, therefore, make the above as a procedure to be followed by the trial courts whenever an objection is raised regarding the admissibility of any material or any item of oral evidence.” In the light of the discussion above and the law laid down by the Apex Court, the writ petition is partly allowed. The order impugned is set aside. The trial Court shall adopt the procedure as set out by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Bipin Shantilal Panchal case stated supra. The trial Court shall mark the documents subject to the objections raised and continue with the trial and thereafter, shall consider the objections at the final stage of rendering the final judgment. The writ petition stands ordered accordingly.