JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioner Corporation and Ms. Panchal, learned advocate for the respondent workmen. 2. In this petition the petitioner – Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (“Corporation” for short) has challenged order dated 31.3.2006 passed by Industrial Tribunal at Nadiad in Reference (IT) No. 19 of 2014. 2.1 By impugned award learned Tribunal interfered with and set aside the order of penalty dated 27.2.1998 passed by the disciplinary authority, in respect of proved misconduct of stoppage of two increments with permanent effect. 2.2 Learned Tribunal interfered with the said order of penalty and substituted said penalty with penalty of stoppage of one increment without future effect. Learned Tribunal also clarified that the period from 27.2.1998 until 31.12.2008 will be considered notional and claimant would not be entitled for actual payment of increments of the said period however from 1.1.2009 the workmen shall be entitled for increments and arrears. 2.3 Feeling aggrieved by the said order and direction the corporation has taken out this petition. 3. So far as factual background is concerned it has emerged from the record that on the allegation that the workman caused assault on the officer of the corporation the competent authority of the corporation issued chargesheet dated 7.1.1997. 3.1 In pursuance of the said chargesheet domestic inquiry was conducted. Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the inquiry officer recorded his finding and submitted report to the disciplinary authority. The inquiry officer held that the charge and allegations against the claimant are proved. 3.2 The disciplinary authority concurred with the finding of inquiry officer. After accepting findings and report by the inquiry officer the disciplinary authority passed order dated 27.2.1998 and imposed penalty of stoppage of two increments with permanent effect. 3.3 For almost 16 years after disciplinary authority passed the order of penalty dated 27.2.1998 the workman did not raise dispute against order of penalty. 3.4 Then as late as in 2014, after gross delay of almost 16 years, the workman raised industrial dispute. 3.5 Appropriate government referred the dispute to learned Labour Court at Nadiad. Learned Labour Court registered the reference / dispute as Reference (IT) No. 19 of 2014. 3.6 At this stage it is pertinent to mention that during the proceeding before learned tribunal the workman filed pursis (exh. 12) and he admitted the legality and propriety of the inquiry. 3.5 Appropriate government referred the dispute to learned Labour Court at Nadiad. Learned Labour Court registered the reference / dispute as Reference (IT) No. 19 of 2014. 3.6 At this stage it is pertinent to mention that during the proceeding before learned tribunal the workman filed pursis (exh. 12) and he admitted the legality and propriety of the inquiry. The workman declared that he does not challenge legality and propriety of the inquiry. However, he kept open the challenge against finding of the inquiry officer. Thus, there was no issue or dispute regarding legality and propriety of the inquiry and / or that there was no dispute with regard to fact that the corporation had conducted legal and fair inquiry. 3.7 In this background, learned Labour Court, while dealing with claimant’s challenge against the findings and conclusion recorded by the inquiry officer decided the issues and the matter on the premise that the corporation did not place on the file of the reference case, the record of domestic inquiry. 3.8 On the said basis learned Labour Court drew inference that the inquiry officer's finding cannot be considered valid and misconduct cannot be construed as proved because the record of the inquiry and findings are not placed before the Labour Court. 3.9 On the said ground industrial tribunal interfered with the order of penalty and passed impugned award with above mentioned directions. 4. In this background Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the corporation assailed the award and submitted that without any justification and in absence of any explanation by the workman, learned Tribunal ignored inordinate and gross delay of 16 years in raising dispute. He submitted that learned Tribunal should not have entertained such grossly delayed reference case. He further submitted that the workman himself had admitted legality and propriety of the inquiry and any dispute with regard to the inquiry was not raised before learned tribunal and that therefore only on the ground that the corporation could not place record of domestic inquiry, the learned Tribunal could not have interfered with the order of penalty. He further submitted that even otherwise, the order of penalty was short of discharge or dismissal. He submitted that learned tribunal exercised jurisdiction irregularly and arbitrarily. According to the corporation the award is bad in law. 5. Learned advocate for the respondent workman opposed the petition and submission by learned advocate for the petitioner. He further submitted that even otherwise, the order of penalty was short of discharge or dismissal. He submitted that learned tribunal exercised jurisdiction irregularly and arbitrarily. According to the corporation the award is bad in law. 5. Learned advocate for the respondent workman opposed the petition and submission by learned advocate for the petitioner. She submitted that the corporation did not place before learned tribunal record of inquiry. Therefore, learned Tribunal is justified in holding that the employer failed to establish that allegations against claimant are proved. According to learned advocate for the respondent there is no error in the award. She submitted that the learned tribunal has merely reduced penalty from stoppage of two increments with permanent effect to stoppage of one increment without future effect and respondent has accepted penalty determined by the learned tribunal and that therefore the award may not be disturbed. She submitted that the respondent is poor workman and therefore also the award may not be interfered with. 6. At the outset it is relevant to note that according to the chargesheet issued against respondent, when the superior officer noticed that the respondent, who worked as driver with the corporation, did not get his license renewed since long time and that despite repeated instruction to get license renewed the respondent had not taken any steps, the officer warned him of disciplinary action. The said warning infuriated the workman and he caused assault on the concerned officer who instructed and directed the respondent to get his license renewed. On account of assault, the officer suffered injuries on his right palm and face. 6.1 Therefore domestic inquiry was initiated after issuing chargesheet in connection with the said misconduct of the respondent. 6.2 The fact that the domestic inquiry was conducted is not in dispute. 6.3 Actually the respondent filed purshis before learned tribunal (exh.12) and declared that legal and fair inquiry was conducted and that he does not challenge legality and propriety of the inquiry. 6.4 In view of the said fact there was no reason or basis or justification for the learned tribunal to raise any doubt as to whether domestic inquiry was conducted or not. 6.5 The admission about legality and propriety by the respondent itself proved that the inquiry was conducted. 6.6 The tribunal also ignored the fact that the employer would not maintain and preserve record of domestic inquiry for 16 years. 6.5 The admission about legality and propriety by the respondent itself proved that the inquiry was conducted. 6.6 The tribunal also ignored the fact that the employer would not maintain and preserve record of domestic inquiry for 16 years. 7. In present case it is necessary and appropriate to note that the disciplinary authority concurred with the findings of the inquiry officer and passed order of penalty on 27.2.1998. 7.1 For almost 16 years after the disciplinary authority passed order the respondent did not raise any dispute against the said order of penalty dated 27.2.1998. 7.2 The respondent retired from service on superannuation in June 2014. 7.3 Only two months before the date of superannuation the respondent raised dispute in April 2014. 8. True it is that the respondent kept alive and open the challenge and dispute against the findings by inquiry officer however it is also equally true that during the proceeding before learned Labour Court the respondent filed purshis exh. 12 and admitted legality and propriety of the inquiry. In view of the said admission by the respondent, the dispute with regard to inquiry did not survive. 8.1 Despite this fact the learned tribunal passed impugned award and learned tribunal interfered with the order of penalty on the ground that the corporation failed to place record of domestic inquiry on the file of reference case. 8.2 The witness of the corporation declared that in view of passage of 16 years the corporation has not been able to trace out the record of domestic inquiry which appears to have been misplaced or lost. 8.2 The witness of the corporation declared that in view of passage of 16 years the corporation has not been able to trace out the record of domestic inquiry which appears to have been misplaced or lost. 8.3 Despite such clarification by the corporation and despite the fact that the claimant raised dispute after 16 years and he failed to offer any explanation as to why he did not raise dispute for almost 16 years, learned tribunal by ignoring the fact that with passage of such long period of almost 16 years the dispute, if any, would be dead and stale dispute and also by ignoring the fact that when the claimant does not raise any grievance or dispute against order of penalty for almost 16 years, the employer cannot be expected to maintain and preserve, for 16 years, the record of domestic inquiry and law does not impose or fasten obligation on employer to maintain said record for such long period, the learned Labour Court, surprisingly, found fault with the employer for not placing said material on record of reference case and quashed the order of penalty and action of the corporation only on the ground that the corporation failed to place on record the material / record of the domestic inquiry. The very foundation on which the learned Court built the premise of its findings and decision and direction is faulty and unsustainable. 9. The very foundation on which the learned Court built the premise of its findings and decision and direction is faulty and unsustainable. 9. It is pertinent that on one hand learned Labour Court ignored and overlooked the fact that (i) the claimant raised dispute after gross delay of 16 years; and (ii) he did not care to offer any explanation as regards the cause for delay and he also failed to establish that due to circumstances beyond his control he could not raise dispute within reasonable time; and (iii) in light of passage of almost 16 years coupled with the absence of satisfactory explanation from the claimant about the delay, it was crystal clear that the dispute was dead and not alive and the claim was a stale claim; and (iv) the corporation specifically raised objection against maintainability of reference on ground of gross delay and laches, whereas on the other hand, the learned Tribunal not only entertained the reference despite corporation’s aforesaid objection but the learned Tribunal found fault with the corporation for not placing on the file of reference case the record of domestic inquiry and on that ground learned Tribunal held, on the ground and premise that the corporation did not place before the tribunal record of domestic inquiry, that the corporation failed to justify and prove that the findings of the inquiry officer are correct and based on evidence. Learned Tribunal not only arbitrarily brushed aside the corporation’s objection against reference and the submission that such reference should be rejected but the learned Tribunal created new obligation for the corporation viz. that though the employee may not raise any dispute against corporation’s order during reasonable time and even if the employee initiates the proceedings after gross delay and laches then also the employer must maintain and preserve record of domestic inquiry including findings of the inquiry officer and it must place it before the Court in such inordinately belated proceedings to prove that findings by inquiry officer are just and correct and not perverse. 9.1 In present case besides the fact that the delay of 16 years on the part of the claimant (in raising dispute) is inordinate and gross delay and that the said delay established indolence on the part of the claimant, more relevant and important aspect is that the claimant failed to offer satisfactory explanation for such gross delay and he also failed to make out sufficient cause which could justify the decision to brush aside the delay. Further, from the very fact that for 16 years any dispute was not raised, the dispute should have been considered and treated as stale and dead dispute. 9.2 There was no justification to entertain such stale and dead dispute after delay of almost 16 years. 9.3 Of course, the Industrial Disputes Act does not prescribe period of limitation for raising dispute. However, absence of provision regarding period of delay, does not justify absence of and failure to offer any explanation by the claimant for not raising dispute for such long period of almost 16 years. The claimant, in such circumstances, is bound to satisfy the Court with regard to the delay and laches in raising dispute. Neither law nor equity would entertain any claim by any person who is apparently shown to be indolent in raising claim/dispute. Such claimant is atleast obliged to satisfy the Court about the reasons and circumstances for such inordinate delay. After passage of reasonable time, any claim or any dispute will be deemed to be a dead dispute have been dead. Any dispute which is stale and dead, does not deserve to be entertained. 9.4 In present case, the claimant failed to offer any explanation worth its name for inordinate and gross delay of 16 years. After passage of reasonable time, any claim or any dispute will be deemed to be a dead dispute have been dead. Any dispute which is stale and dead, does not deserve to be entertained. 9.4 In present case, the claimant failed to offer any explanation worth its name for inordinate and gross delay of 16 years. 9.5 Without addressing said aspect and without recording any reasons and without passing any order with reference to such inordinate delay and without recording any justification for ignoring or brushing aside such inordinate and gross delay, learned Labour Court not only entertained the reference but the learned Labour Court, merely because the corporation submitted that the record of domestic inquiry is not available / could not be traced because almost 16 years have passed after the order of penalty came to be passed against the claimant, declared that the corporation failed to prove that the findings recorded by the inquiry officer are correct, just and based on evidence and learned Labour Court also allowed the reference vide impugned award and with impugned direction. 9.6 Learned tribunal has observed in paragraph No. 17, 18 and 19 of the award that since the corporation failed to place record of domestic inquiry on the file of reference case it would not be possible to determine as to whether inquiry was conducted in legal and fair manner or not whether inquiry officer had submitted report or not whether the allegation and charge are proved or not or whether findings recorded by inquiry officer are just and proper or not. 10. On this point learned Labour Court lost sight of the fact that the question about legality and propriety of the inquiry was not open before learned tribunal. 10.1 In this context profitable reference can be had to the observation by Hon'ble Apex Court in case Management of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. M. Mani [ (2018) 1 SCC 285 ] wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:- “18. In our opinion, once the Labour Court upheld the departmental enquiry as being legal and proper then the only question that survived for consideration before the Labour Court was whether the punishment of “dismissal” imposed by the appellant to the respondents was legal and proper or it requires any interference in its quantum. 19. In our opinion, once the Labour Court upheld the departmental enquiry as being legal and proper then the only question that survived for consideration before the Labour Court was whether the punishment of “dismissal” imposed by the appellant to the respondents was legal and proper or it requires any interference in its quantum. 19. In other words, the Labour Court should have then confined its enquiry to examine only one limited question as to whether the punishment given to the respondents was, in any way, disproportionate to the gravity of the charge levelled against them and this, the Labour Court should have examined by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short “the Act”) and the law laid down by this Court in Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. It was, however, not done thereby rendering the order of the Labour Court legally unsustainable.” 11. On plain reading of the award it comes out that on one hand learned tribunal ignored gross and inordinate delay by the respondent in raising dispute and on the other hand the tribunal found fault with the corporation on the solitary ground that it failed to submit record of domestic inquiry. 12. From the award it also comes out that the learned tribunal has interfered with the impugned order of penalty on the ground that the record of domestic inquiry is not submitted on the file of reference case. From the award it also comes out that the learned tribunal has not recorded conclusion that the quantum of penalty is shockingly disproportionate. Learned tribunal has not recorded that the corporation acted malafide and / or respondent has been victimized. Without recording such findings learned tribunal has interfered with the penalty which falls short of discharge and dismissal. 13. In respect of misconduct viz. assault on supervisor the competent authority imposed penalty of stoppage of two increments with permanent effect. The said quantum of penalty is interfered with by the learned tribunal. 14. At this stage it is pertinent to note that the learned tribunal itself has considered it appropriate to impose penalty of stoppage of one increment. 14.1 The said decision by learned tribunal is more than sufficient to establish that even learned tribunal also found that the workman committed misconduct and that therefore deserved penalty. 14. At this stage it is pertinent to note that the learned tribunal itself has considered it appropriate to impose penalty of stoppage of one increment. 14.1 The said decision by learned tribunal is more than sufficient to establish that even learned tribunal also found that the workman committed misconduct and that therefore deserved penalty. Having reached such conclusion learned tribunal imposed penalty viz. learned tribunal considered that stoppage of one increment without future effect. 15. Meaning thereby learned Tribunal weighed the quantum of penalty according to its own standard and learned tribunal substituted its view about quantum of penalty in place of determination of quantum of penalty by employer, that too without recording finding that the quantum of penalty was shockingly disproportionate or that it was in nature of victimization. 16. Unless learned tribunal recorded such conclusion, there would not be any justification for learned tribunal to interfere with the quantum of penalty determined by the employer. 17. In present case learned Labour Court entered into said forbidden territory. Learned Labour Court, without recording any finding that the quantum of penalty determined by the employer is shockingly disproportionate or in nature of victimization, weighed the quantum of penalty by its own standard and substituted the penalty with the penalty which the Court considered just and proper. 17.1 In this context it is pertinent to recall and note that the penalty determined by the competent authority of the corporation (viz. stoppage of two increments with permanent effect) was short of penalty of discharge or dismissal. In that view of the matter learned Labour Court ordinarily should not interfere with the quantum of penalty which is short of discharge or dismissal, more particularly without reaching to the conclusion that the penalty determined by the employer is unjust and shockingly disproportionate or that it hinges on the verge of victimization or it is by way of / in nature of victimization and is such that any prudent employer would not impose having regard to the nature and gravity of the misconduct. Without reaching to and without recording such conclusion, the Court cannot interfere with the quantum of penalty which is short of discharge or dismissal. 18. Without reaching to and without recording such conclusion, the Court cannot interfere with the quantum of penalty which is short of discharge or dismissal. 18. On this count profitable reference can be had to the observation by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of General Secretary, South Indian Cashew Factories Workers Union vs. Managing Director, Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd. [ (2006) 5 SCC 201 ], wherein Honble Apex Court observed that:- “16. The Labour Court had earlier held that the enquiry was properly held and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the findings were not perverse. The vitiating facts found by the Labour Court against the enquiry are erroneous and are liable to be set aside. If enquiry is fair and proper, in the absence of any allegations of victimization or unfair labour practice, the Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed. Section 11A of the Act gives ample power to the Labour Court to re-appraise the evidence adduced in the enquiry and also sit in appeal over the decision of the employer in imposing punishment. Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman as clearly mentioned in the Section itself. Before the introduction of Section 11A in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen [(1958) SCR 667] this Court held that the Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the Management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. on the part of the management. There is no allegation of unfair labour practice, victimisation etc. in this case. The powers of the Labour Court in the absence of Section 11A is illustrated by this Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management [ (1973) 1 SCC 813 ]. When enquiry was conducted fairly and properly, in the absence of any of the allegations of victimisation or malafides or unfair labour practice, Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management [ (1973) 1 SCC 813 ]. When enquiry was conducted fairly and properly, in the absence of any of the allegations of victimisation or malafides or unfair labour practice, Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Since Section 11A is not applicable, Labour Court has no power to re-appraise the evidence to find out whether the findings of the enquiry officer are correct or not or whether the punishment imposed is adequate or not. Of course, Labour Court can interfere with the findings if the findings are perverse. But, here there is a clear finding that the findings are not perverse and principles of natural justice were complied with while conducting enquiry.” 19. In light of above quoted observations by Hon’ble Apex Court as well as observation in paragraph No. 18 and 19 in the decision in case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (supra) the decision and direction by learned Labour Court do not deserve to be sustained. 20. In view of the fact that in present case learned Tribunal arbitrarily and without any justification entertained the dispute raised after gross delay of 16 years it is appropriate to take into account observation by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Anr. [ (2015) 15 SCC 1 ] also fortify the fact that such stale and dead dispute does not deserve to be entertained. In the said decision, Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that:- “8. From the facts narrated above, it becomes clear that for a period of fourteen years no grievance was made by the petitioner qua his alleged termination. Though it was averted that the petitioner had approached the Management time and again and was given assurance that he would be taken back in service. there is nothing on record to substantiate this. No notice was served upon the Management. There is no assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of time. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. Pertinently. even the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind the aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen, namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. 9. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. Pertinently. even the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind the aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen, namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. 9. It may be stated that the question is of utmost importance as it is seen that many times. as in the instant case, the workers raise dispute after a number of years of the cause of action. Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? Or whether it can be said that the dispute does not exist when the workmen concerned after their say termination kept quiet for a number of years and thus acquiesced into the action? 20. At this stage, it may be pointed out that admittedly the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes. The Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled by a series of judgments of this Court. 21. On the reading of these judgments, which are discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there was no time prescribed to exercise power under Section 10 of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of time to revive matters which had since been settled or had to become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. 24. Again in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. State of AR”. the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that reference made nearly six years after in: dispute amounted to being inordinate, unreasonable and unjustifiable. 25. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. KP. Madhavankutty the Court cautioned that power of reference should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a mechanical fashion. Ltd. v. State of AR”. the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that reference made nearly six years after in: dispute amounted to being inordinate, unreasonable and unjustifiable. 25. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. KP. Madhavankutty the Court cautioned that power of reference should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a mechanical fashion. It was specifically observed the power to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory limitation period. The Court not only reiterated that the courts had power of judicial review. though to limited extent, but also made the following pertinent observations on delay: (SCC pp. 460-6l. Paras 6-8) “6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subjectmatter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question. 8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court, In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan" this Court observed: (SCC 13. 393, para 24) ‘24. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court, In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan" this Court observed: (SCC 13. 393, para 24) ‘24. It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act, Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference” 29. If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding the relief only. On the other hand, in some other decisions, this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the reference should be refused. Which parameters are to be kept in mind while taking one or the other approach needs to be discussed with some elaboration, which would include discussion on certain aspects that would be kept in mind by the courts for taking a particular view. We, thus, intend to embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming before it. 34. To understand the meaning of the word “dispute”, it would be appropriate to start with the grammatical or dictionary meaning of the term; “Dispute’. 34. To understand the meaning of the word “dispute”, it would be appropriate to start with the grammatical or dictionary meaning of the term; “Dispute’. to argue about, to contend for, to oppose by argument, to call in question - to argue or debate (with, about or over) -a contest with words; an argument; a debate; a quarrel;” 35. Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., p. 424 defines “dispute” as under: “Dispute-A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other. The subject of litigation; the matter for which a suit is brought and upon which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and witnesses examined.” 36. Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an “industrial dispute” cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of the petitioner on 1-4-1985, the petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for a number of years? Can it still be said that there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after a lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workman did not raise any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workman has accepted his termination and, therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It can be said that workman, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and, therefore, accepted his termination. It can be said that workman, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and, therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a “dispute” what had otherwise become a buried issue. 37. Let us examine the matter from another aspect viz. laches and delays and acquiescence. 38. It is now a well-recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation Period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and nonsuited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity “delay defeats equities”. (emphasis supplied) 21. From above quoted observation it becomes clear that such grossly delayed reference should not be casually entertained when the workman fails to offer any explanation for the delay and fails to satisfy the Court that (i) due to circumstances beyond his control he could not raise the dispute within reasonable time; and (ii) that the dispute is alive and he had been pursuing / representing his claim during the interregnum. 21.1 In present case the claimant miserably failed to establish said relevant aspect and the Court committed manifest error in ignoring this vital aspect and corporation's objection against maintainability of reference. 22. For above mentioned reasons the impugned award cannot be sustained. The award deserves to be set aside. Consequently following order is passed:- The award dated 31.3.2016 in reference No. (IT) 19 of 2014 is set aside. Consequently order of penalty dated 27.2.1998 passed by disciplinary authority would stand restored. The petition stands disposed off. Orders accordingly.