ORDER 1. The present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 9.12.2014 (Annexure P-1) passed by JMFC, Gwalior whereby a private complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Acts, 1881 (for short “the Act”) filed by the petitioner/ complainant has been returned back in view of the mandate of the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharasthra and Another [ (2014) 9 SCC 129 ], wherein interpretation in respect of section 142 of the Act was made and it was held that the complaint would be filed only in the Court of jurisdiction where drawer has issued the cheque. Since in the present case, drawer i.e. respondent No. 2-Rama Hardware issued the cheque at Sidhi (M.P.) therefore, complaint was returned back to the petitioner/ complainant for filing before appropriate Court. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised two grounds; one is the exception carved out in the case of Dasrath Rupsing (supra), in para 22 wherein the apex Court has categorically excepted those cases where evidence has been started. From the order-sheets filed by the petitioner, it is submitted that the evidence was started in the trial and the counsel for respondent No. 2/accused sought time to cross-examine the complainant's witness, therefore, the case falls under the exception as carved out in para 22 and, therefore, the case could not be transferred. 3. Another ground raised by the petitioner was in respect of amendment made in the Negotiable Instruments Act subsequently. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent-State opposed the prayer made by the petitioner. 5. Nobody appeared on behalf of respondent No. 2 though served. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with the petition. 7. The jurisdiction in respect of complaint under section 138 of the Act is being taken care of by section 142 of the Act. For ready reference, provision of section 142 of the Act are reproduced as under : “142 Cognizance of offences. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with the petition. 7. The jurisdiction in respect of complaint under section 138 of the Act is being taken care of by section 142 of the Act. For ready reference, provision of section 142 of the Act are reproduced as under : “142 Cognizance of offences. — Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the case of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 [ Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. (c) no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.” 8. While interpreting the said section, the apex Court in the case of Dasrath Rupsing (supra), has held that the complaint would be maintainable only at the place where the drawer has issued the cheque but in para 22 of the said judgment, it has been clarified that only those cases, where post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place, therefore, by the exception carved out in para 22 of said judgment, case of the petitioner could not have been transferred. Later on, by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 whereby section 142A has been carved out for validation for transfer of pending cases wherein the position as prevailed prior to passing of the judgment by the apex Court has been bestowed. 9. Considering the fact situation as well as position that the judgment on which the trial Court relied upon itself carved out an exception which was not taken care of and, therefore, impugned order deserves to be set aside. 10. 9. Considering the fact situation as well as position that the judgment on which the trial Court relied upon itself carved out an exception which was not taken care of and, therefore, impugned order deserves to be set aside. 10. In the case of Mandvi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, [ 2010 (3) MPLJ 42 ], the apex Court has considered the scope of section 145 of the Act and treated the affidavit of the complainant in the nature of examination-in-chief, therefore, for procedural purposes, once the affidavit of the complainant is filed at the evidence stage, it is to be treated as examination-in-chief and here in the present case, counsel for the respondent No. 2-accused sought time to cross-examine the complainant's witness and, therefore, the evidence was started therefore, the case falls under “exception” carved out by the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Dasrath Rupsing (supra). Even otherwise, by the effect and implication of section 142A, validation for transfer of pending case has been made therefore, on this count also, petitioner's case deserves to be proceeded at JMFC, Gwalior under whose jurisdiction, the cheque has been dishonourned. 11. Resultanlty the impugned order dated 9.12.2014 (Annexure P-1) is hereby set aside and the matter is relegated back to JMFC for reconsideration from the stage where the thread was left out and to start at the stage of evidence. 12. Court below is directed to issue fresh notice/ summons for appearance of respondent No. 2-accused in the litigation. Petition stands disposed of.