JUDGMENT : D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. 1. Challenge has been made to the order dated 27.07.2017 passed by the Tahasildar, Chandbali, opposite party no.3 and a further prayer has been made in the writ petition to direct the opposite party no.3 to lease out the fishery sairat, namely, “Galia Nadi Bhasani” in favour of the petitioner. 2. The factual matrix leading to filing of the writ petition is that the petitioner-society, being represented by its President, has filed this writ petition stating that the petitioner-society is in possession of the Sairat in question since last fifteen years and always it is being leased out to the society as the members of the society, being fishermen, are benefited from fishery business. 3. Be it stated that, during the current year of 2017-2018, the sairat was placed before the Collector, Bhadrak, opposite party no.1, to fix up the up-set price of the source and the opposite party no.1 has fixed the up-set price of the source at Rs.99,500/-. While the said sairat was being leased out in presence of local officers including the District Fisheries Officer-cum-CEO, FFDA and BFDA, Bhadrak, opposite party no.2, on the recommendation dated 9.3.2017 of the opposite party no.2 to the opposite party no.3, it was decided to lease out the sairat in favour of the petitioner-society and accordingly, a letter was issued on 19.5.2017 by the opposite party no.3. 4. But, later on under the instruction of the opposite party no.4, the opposite party no.2 informed on 21.4.2017 to lease out the sairat in favour of the petitioner and opposite party no.4 by dividing the same into two parts, which is challenged in this writ petition. Since the petitioner-society has already been leased out the sairat vide order dated 19.5.2017 passed by the opposite party no.3, any subsequent decision is not only illegal but also arbitrary and mala fide. So, the writ petition is filed to quash the order dated 27.07.2017 passed by the opposite party no.3 under which final decision was taken to lease the sairat in question in favour of the petitioner and the opposite party no.4 by dividing it into two parts with a further direction to consider the earlier decision of the opposite party no.3 by leasing out the sairat in favour of the petitioner-society for the year 2017-2018. SUBMISSIONS 5. SUBMISSIONS 5. Mr.Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the members of the petitioner-society depend only on the fishery sairat in question and they have been getting the lease of the same for the last fifteen years and doing the prawn culture there. Since the fishermen of the petitioner-society are maintaining their livelihood basing on the lease and opposite party no.4 was never in possession of the same, the impugned decision for leasing out the same in favour of the petitioner-society and opposite party no.4 by dividing it into two parts is illegal. 6. Mr.Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that when the decision was taken in the statutory meeting to lease out the sairat in favour of the petitioner and accordingly action was taken, the suggestion by the opposite party no.2 to bifurcate the sairat into two parts in favour of the petitioner and opposite party no.4 would amount to review of the earlier decision without the knowledge of the petitioner. Without cancellation of the earlier decision, the decision taken later on suffers from the principles of natural justice of the petitioner. 7. Mr.Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that if the fishery sairat is bifurcated between the petitioner and the opposite party no.4, it would create law and order problem because the opposite party no.4 was never in possession of the fishery sairat. So, he submitted to quash the impugned order dated 27.7.2017 and to affirm the lease of the fishry sairat in favour of the petitioner-society basing on the recommendation of the opposite party no.2 made on 9.3.2017 and the order passed by the opposite party no.3 on 19.5.2017. 8. Mr.Das, learned counsel for the opposite party no.4, relying on the counter affidavit dated 18.8.2017, submitted that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present writ petition and the same is not maintainable as the petitioner is not authorized to file the writ petition on behalf of the petitioner-society. The petitioner has no any absolute right of the fishery sairat in question because the creation of lease over the same in favour of the petitioner in every year does not create any legal right over the same. The petitioner has no any absolute right of the fishery sairat in question because the creation of lease over the same in favour of the petitioner in every year does not create any legal right over the same. He further submitted that only on 28.03.2017, notice was issued to hold a Tahasil Level Committee meeting for settlement of Sairat source and on the same day, there was a meeting and the name of the present opposite party no.4 was recommended for carrying out business in the Sairat in question. So, after the necessary formalities are over, the decision was taken on 27.7.2017 to lease out the Sairat in favour of the petitioner for a bigger portion of the river to the extent of 4.5 Kms (from Dakeswari Jora Muhan to Nadi Muhan) and the opposite party no.4 was leased out over an area of 1.5 Kms (Routray Kuro Khola Joro Muhan to Dakeswari Joro) of the river. So, such lease of the Sairat is neither illegal nor improper. 9. Miss.Ratho, learned Additional Government Advocate, relying on the counter affidavit filed by the opposite parties 1 and 3, submitted that on 9.3.2017, the opposite party no.3 recommended for settlement of the Sairat in favour of the petitioner-society but later on, a joint meeting between the opposite party no.2 and 3 in presence of members of different PFCs conducted on 19.4.2017 and all the recommendations were finalized. Thereafter, the petitioner was asked to deposit a sum of Rs.1,09,450/- but the same was not deposited. In the meantime, the opposite party no.2 again recommended for leasing out 4.5 Kms in favour of the petitioner and 1.5 Kms in favour of the opposite party no.4 from the Sairat in question as the petitioner did not deposit the money whereas the opposite party no.4 deposited the money and took-over the possession of the Sairat between Dakeswari Jora to Nadi Muhan. Relying on the counter affidavit of opposite party no.2 dated 28.11.2017, she further submitted that the petitioner and the opposite party no.4 had applied for grant of right to catch fish from the Sairat but in view of the fact that the Sairat is a very long one, in the joint meeting, it was decided to share the Sairat between the petitioner and the opposite party no.4. Accordingly, the decision was taken on 27.7.2017 and the same was very open, transparent, legal and valid. Accordingly, the decision was taken on 27.7.2017 and the same was very open, transparent, legal and valid. Hence, the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the same. POINT FOR DETERMINATION 10. The point for determination is as to whether the petitioner being President of said society has locus standi to file the present writ petition? DISCUSSIONS 11. Learned counsel for the opposite parties have very much challenged that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present writ petition as the Chief Executive Officer of the society can only file the writ petition under Rule 37 of the Odisha Co-operative Societies Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called as “the Rules”). It is brought to the notice of this Court to the definition of “Chief Executive” defined under sub-rule (n) of Rule-2 of the Rules. So, the President being not statutorily empowered to file the writ petition, the same is not maintainable. Making rival submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the General Body meeting of the society has authorized the petitioner, being the President of the society to file the present writ petition before this Court as there was no Chief Executive available. 12. In order to solve the first dispute, Rule 37 of the Rules is quoted below for reference: “37. The Chief Executive. - The Chief Executive of the Society shall be the officer to sue or to be sued on behalf of the Society and all bonds in favour of the Society shall be in the name of the Chief Executive.” This provision has been added on 23.04.1997. According to this Rule, the Chief Executive of the society is the only officer to sue or to be sued on behalf of the society. In the instant case, admittedly the President of the Society has filed the present writ petition. There is nothing found from the writ petition that the President has been authorized by the Committee to file this case. In course of hearing of the case, the petitioner filed the copy of the resolution of the General Body Meeting of the society vide Annexure-6 series and on going through the same, it appears that a meeting was held on 21.04.2017 under the presidentship of the present petitioner. In course of hearing of the case, the petitioner filed the copy of the resolution of the General Body Meeting of the society vide Annexure-6 series and on going through the same, it appears that a meeting was held on 21.04.2017 under the presidentship of the present petitioner. It further appears that the Secretary, who is the Chief Executive of the society since has not been cooperating in the day-to-day administration of the society, the General Body authorized the Assistant Secretary-Prafulla Pradhan to exercise the duty of secretary under the orders of presidentship of the society. There is another meeting held on 21.5.2017 where the meeting was presided over by the President of the society and the cooperative society expressed its dissatisfaction upon the suspended secretary and finally on 30.05.2017, in absence of Secretary, the Assistant Secretary-Prafulla Pradhan was allowed to work as Secretary. The present writ petition was filed on 8.8.2017. 13. The bye-law of the society has been filed and at sub-clause (c) of Clause-27 of the same shows that it is only the Secretary to sue or to be sued. Reading of both resolution, bye-law and the Rules, it is clear that the secretary or now the Chief Executive under the Rules is only authorized to sue or to be sued. None of the provisions of bye-law authorizes the President or the General Body under bye-law or the Rules has even authorized the President to file the present case. It is rather clear that in absence of secretary, the Assistant Secretary can sue or to be sued. This view has been taken by this Court in the decision reported in the case of Road Transport Organization of India –V- Barunai Powerloom Weavers’ Co-operative Society Limited and another; 1997 (II) OLR 106 where His Lordship, at paragraph-16, has observed in the following manner: “16. The last limb of submission of defendant No. 1 is that the suit was not maintainable since it was filed by the Assistant Secretary of the plaintiff-society and not the Secretary. Rule 37 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Rules, 1965 says that Secretary shall be the officer to sue or to be sued on behalf of the society. The last limb of submission of defendant No. 1 is that the suit was not maintainable since it was filed by the Assistant Secretary of the plaintiff-society and not the Secretary. Rule 37 of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Rules, 1965 says that Secretary shall be the officer to sue or to be sued on behalf of the society. The word "Secretary" defined under Rule 2(n) of the said Rules means a person who subject to the provision of the bye-laws, is entrusted with the management of the affairs of a society and includes a member of a committee or any other person discharging the duties of a Secretary by whatever name called. It is in the evidence of P.W.1 that since the post of Secretary was vacant at the relevant time, he as the Assistant Secretary filed the suit on being authorised by the Managing Director and the Board. In view of such evidence, the contention of defendant No. 1, as aforesaid merits no consideration.” 14. With due regard to the aforesaid decision, it appears this Court, in the aforesaid case, has observed that in view of the clause in bye-law, when the post of Secretary was vacant, the Assistant Secretary can file the suit. 15. Now, adverting to the present case, it appears that when the proceeding under the bye-law has authorized the assistant Secretary-Prafulla Pradhan to work as Secretary, who is authorized to perform his duty as Chief Executive and there is no specific direction by the General Body authorizing the present petitioner to represent the society to file the writ petition pertaining to the Sairat in question, the present President has no locus standi to file the writ petition. Hence, the same is not maintainable being filed by the President of the society. The point is answered accordingly. CONCLUSION 16. In the writ petition, it has been prayed to quash the order dated 27.07.2017 passed in Sairat Case No.68/2017-18 and a further prayer has been made to direct the opposite party no.3 to lease out the Sairat in question in favour of the petitioner as per order dated 19.05.2017. 17. In terms of the aforesaid discussion, when the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present writ petition, the relief to be granted in this case sans merit. On the other hand, the writ petition is dismissed to be not maintainable. S.K.Mishra, J. : I agree.