JUDGMENT DR. D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. - The aforesaid appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sambalpur passed under Section 302 of I.P.C. in S.T. No. 94/27 of 2009. FACTS 2. The adumbrated facts leading to the prosecution case is that on 16.2.2009 the deceased being mother of appellant was living in the house of the accused-appellant. It is alleged, inter alia, that due to domestic quarrel between the deceased and the appellant, the latter dealt an axe blow on the person of the deceased and the deceased succumbed to the injuries. One Puspa Yadav after witnessing the occurrence gave information to the villagers, who gathered at the spot, the appellant was found to be sitting by the side of the deceased with the weapon of offence, i.e., axe stained with blood. Thereafter F.I.R. was lodged. During investigation witnesses were examined and police seized the blood stained axe from the spot. After the inquest was over the dead body of the deceased, post-mortem examination was conducted by the doctor on police requisition. After necessary investigation, charge sheet was submitted. 3. The plea of the appellant as revealed from the statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and the suggestion given during cross-examination to the prosecution witnesses, is squarely denial to the occurrence and he plead innocence. 4. The prosecution in order to prove the charge examined 11 witnesses, out of whom P.W. 4 is the occurrence witness, P.W. 1 is the informant, P.Ws. 2 and 3 are son and wife of P.W.1, P.W.6, 7 and 8 are seizure witnesses, P.W. 11 is the Medical Officer and P.W. 10 is the Investigating Officer. 5. Learned trial Court after analyzing the evidence of 11 witnesses sorted out the circumstances established against the appellant and found that chain of circumstance unerringly point out the guilt of the appellant. So, learned trial Court found him guilty and accordingly convicted him under Section 302 of I.P.C. After convicting, he sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default to undergo R.I. for one month. SUBMISSIONS: 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that P.W. 4 is eye witness to the occurrence, but she has not supported the prosecution case. Further he submitted that the circumstances noted in the judgment of learned trial Court have not been proved beyond all reasonable doubts. 1,000/- in default to undergo R.I. for one month. SUBMISSIONS: 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that P.W. 4 is eye witness to the occurrence, but she has not supported the prosecution case. Further he submitted that the circumstances noted in the judgment of learned trial Court have not been proved beyond all reasonable doubts. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Curt has erred in law by finding him guilty merely because they were residing in the same house and he was sitting near the dead body. Even if two persons are living together, but that cannot be a ground to draw inference that the appellant is the assailant without any sort of fact and circumstances to prove the same as a link to the chain of circumstance. If at all the appellant was present near the dead body, the same cannot point out complicity of the appellant, as a culprit would never expose his presence, rather than fleeing away from the spot to avoid his culpability. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the learned trial Court has erred in law in finding the appellant guilty when the blood group on the nail clipping of the appellant has not been proved by the prosecution to show the same blood group found from the wearing apparel of deceased and weapon of offence seized in this case. According to him, the chain of circumstances have not been proved to be completed unerringly pointing out the guilt of the appellant. So, he submitted to acquit the appellant. 9. Learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that there is not error in the judgment of the learned trial Court and the same should be relied on. He further submitted that even if there is eye witness, but she has not supported the prosecution case. In absence of direct evidence the circumstantial evidence have been well chained with each other in this case to prove the guilt of the appellant. He supported the circumstances noted in the judgment of the trial Court. thus, learned counsel for the State has fully supported the judgment of conviction and sentence passed against appellant. DISCUSSION: 10. In absence of direct evidence the circumstantial evidence have been well chained with each other in this case to prove the guilt of the appellant. He supported the circumstances noted in the judgment of the trial Court. thus, learned counsel for the State has fully supported the judgment of conviction and sentence passed against appellant. DISCUSSION: 10. It is reported in A.I.R. 2003 SC 854; Lallu Manjhi and another v. State of Jharkhand where Their Lordships at paragraph-10 observed as follows:- “The Law of Evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the Court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon testimony of a single witness..(See Vadivelu Thevar etc. v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 ).” 11. With due respect to the said decision, it is clear that the evidence of a witness should be assessed to weigh same for discerning truth the Court is required to separate grain from chaff while appreciating the evidence. Apart from this it is well settled in law that conviction can be maintained basing on the sole evidence of a single witness if his evidence if cogent, clear, consistent and above the reproach. As the appellate Court being a Court of fact and law has to re-appreciate the evidence on record to find out whether the trial Court has based his finding on correct appreciation of evidence on record. 12. The evidence of P.Ws. 1, 5 and 9 shows that in their presence the inquest on the dead body of the deceased was made vide Ext. 2. P.W. 10 stated to have sent the dead body for postmortem examination. P.W. 11 who conducted the autopsy over the dead body stated in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the following manner:- “2. 1, 5 and 9 shows that in their presence the inquest on the dead body of the deceased was made vide Ext. 2. P.W. 10 stated to have sent the dead body for postmortem examination. P.W. 11 who conducted the autopsy over the dead body stated in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the following manner:- “2. On my examination, I found the following injuries:- EXTERNAL INJURIES: (i) Cut wound of size 5 cm x 1 CM x bran deep on the left temporal region placed 1 cm above the root left pina and 3 cm above the left mastoid. The margins were cleanly cut. (ii) Cut wound of size 3 cm x 0.5 cm x scalp deep placed 1 cm behind the left parietal eminence with cleanly cut margins. (iii) Cut wound of size 1 cm X 0.5 cm x scalp deep placed 1.5 cm below and behind the left parietal eminence and 0.5 cm below external injury No. ii. 3. On disSection, I found the following internal injuries:- INTERNAL INJURIES (i) Corresponding to the external injury No. i, left temporally muscles were cut and there was a cut fracture of the left temporal bone dura on the left side of the left temporal bone was cut along with intra cerebral haemorrhage into it. A portion of the cerebrum was cut and there was cut fracture of partrous part of temporal bone was cut along with greater wing of spinoid. (ii) Corresponding to the external injury No. ii & iii the under surface of scalp were contused in the left parietal region. (iii) The brain looked pale and the stomach was empty. 4. On my examination, I come to the opinion as follows:- (i) The injuries described above are ante-mortem in nature, fresh in duration i.e., zero to six hours prior to death, could have been caused by a cutting weapon of moderate weight and are combinedly fatal in ordinary course of nature. The external injury No. i along with its corresponding internal injuries is individually fatal in ordinary course of nature. (ii) The death is due to cranio cerebral injuries sustained. (iii) Time since death within 6 to 12 hours prior to the time of autopsy. (iv) Sample scalp hair and blood sample of the deceased duly collected and handed over to police for further examination at S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh. 5. The death is homicidal in nature. 13. (ii) The death is due to cranio cerebral injuries sustained. (iii) Time since death within 6 to 12 hours prior to the time of autopsy. (iv) Sample scalp hair and blood sample of the deceased duly collected and handed over to police for further examination at S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh. 5. The death is homicidal in nature. 13. From the aforesaid clear evidence of P.W. 11 read with the post-mortem examination report vide Ext. 14, it is clear that the death of the deceased was homicidal one. 14. In the instant case P.W. 4 is the star witness as upon her information, other witnesses have reached the spot. She is the lone eye witness as per the prosecution. She stated that she used to reside in the house of the deceased on rent. On the morning of the occurrence she heard the shout of the deceased and after coming of her room, she saw the deceased was lying on the ground with pull of blood on her body. So, she called P.Ws. 1 and 3. She admitted that she had not seen anything more. She has been cross-examined by the prosecution under Section 154 of the Evidence Act. Section 154 of the Evidence Act speaks about the cross-examination by the party to his/her own witness. The purpose of the cross-examination to own witness is to test the veracity of the witness. At the same time the purpose of the cross-examination is to show that the witness is hostile to the prosecution or the party who has called him as a witness. However, in cross-examination denying the suggestion of the defence she denied to have seen the quarrel of the accused with the deceased the accused assaulted her by Tangia blow causing her death. P.W. 10 who is the I.O. affirmed the statement of P.W. 4 witnessing the occurrence. Thus, P.W. 4 has resiled from her earlier statement and became hostile to the prosecution. Her evidence can only be characterized as a post-occurrence witness. 15. The evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5 shows that they reached the spot after the occurrence. The cardinal principle of the Criminal Jurisprudence is that a criminal case can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both. Her evidence can only be characterized as a post-occurrence witness. 15. The evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5 shows that they reached the spot after the occurrence. The cardinal principle of the Criminal Jurisprudence is that a criminal case can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both. Although the direct evidence is fisealed out due to hostile evidence of P.W. 4, but the circumstantial evidence should be searched for to find out whether the appellant is guilty. In order to appreciate the circumstantial evidence the law in this regard is no more res integra. 16. It is reported in 2017 (7) Supreme 377 Ganpat Singh-v- The State of Madhyapradesh where Their Lordships observed at paragraph-9 as follows:- “9. There are no eye-witnesses to the crime. In a case which rests on circumstantial evidence, the law postulates a two-fold requirement. First, every link in the chain of circumstances necessary to establish the guilt of the accused must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Second, all the circumstances must be consistent only with the guilt of the accused. the principle has been consistently formulated thus: “ The normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence” [ See Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 16; Ramreddy Rajeshkhanna Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 10 SCC 681 ; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 ; Venkatesan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2008) 8 SCC 456 ; Sanjay Kumar Jain v. State of Delhi, (2011) 11 SCC 733 ; Madhu v. State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399 ; Munna Kumar Upadhyaya @ Munna Upadhyaya v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 174 ; Vivek Kalra v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 12 SCC 439 : [2013] 2 Supreme 124"].” 17. With due regard to the said decision it has to be found whether chain of circumstances have been completed to point out unerringly the guilty of the appellant. As stated earlier the nature of the death was homicidal in nature. It is one circumstance. 18. From the evidence of P.W. 1, it is revealed that after he reached the spot the accused-appellant came there holding a Tangia in his hand and the Tangia was stained with blood. The accused sat near the dead body of the deceased. In cross-examination at paragraph-7 he stated that the accused did not run away seeing the police. Thus, the evidence of P.W. 1 is clear to show that the appellant was not there, but he came to the spot after the occurrence. Further the evidence shows that the accused stayed there with the Tangia having blood stain. If at all he is guilty he would not have continued to stay at the spot. However, the evidence of P.W. 1 only shows that the accused came there with the blood stained Tangia and sat near the dead body. 19. P.W. 2 revealed that after reaching the spot he saw the appellant was sitting near the dead body of the deceased, but the Tangia with blood stain was lying at the spot. In cross-examination he could not say to whom the Tangia belonged to. His evidence is contradicting with the evidence of P.W. 1 as to the axe being held by the accused-appellant. 20. P.W. 3 revealed that after reaching the spot she found the deceased was there, but the accused came little later. This witness has been cross-examined by the prosecution. Denying the suggestion of the prosecution she stated to have stated before the police that she saw the deceased was lying dead and the appellant was standing there by holding the Tangia and the appellant informed her that he has assaulted the deceased. P.W. 10 admitted abut such fact being stated by P.W. 3 before him. P.W. 3 has also resiled from her earlier statement and became hostile to the prosecution. However, in cross-examination by the defence she stated that while the accused came to the spot he was holding nothing and the Tangia was there near the dead body, but she could not say to whom the Tangia belonged to. P.W. 3 has also resiled from her earlier statement and became hostile to the prosecution. However, in cross-examination by the defence she stated that while the accused came to the spot he was holding nothing and the Tangia was there near the dead body, but she could not say to whom the Tangia belonged to. Thus, the evidence of P.W.3 after being screened shows that the accused came later on to the crime of scene and the axe was there lying. P.W. 3 has thus contradicted P.W.1 as to arrival of appellant with blood stained axe to spot. 21. P.W. 5 revealed that after he reached the spot found the deceased was lying. The accused was there, but the Tangia (axe) was lying on the ground. 22. From the aforesaid cursory visit of the evidence it appears that there is no consistency between the P.Ws. about presence of the appellant with blood stained axe at the spot. Moreover, there is no consistent evidence adduced by the prosecution to show that the appellant sat there out of fear. After thorough scrutiny it is only found that near the dead body of the deceased the appellant came and sat there. There is no cogent evidence to show that the appellant was already there with the blood stained axe in his hand. Thus, this link of circumstance is not proved against the appellant. 23. P.W. 5 stated that on being asked by him the appellant confessed that the deceased refused to pay money on his demand, for which he killed her. In cross-examination he admitted that he has not stated such fact before the police. Thus, it has been brought out by the defence that P.W. 5 for the first time introduced the story of extrajudicial confession by the appellant. On the other hand his evidence is not above the reproach to be relied solely to prove the extrajudicial confession by appellant. 24. P.W. 1 although was there at the spot, did not reveal about the extrajudicial confession by the appellant before P.W. 5. P.W. 3 and 4 also did not disclose about any extrajudicial confession. On the other hand there is no any other witness examined lending corroboration to the evidence of P.W. 5 to prove the extrajudicial confession. Thus, the extrajudicial confession by the appellant has not been proved by cogent, consistent and clear evidence. 25. P.W. 3 and 4 also did not disclose about any extrajudicial confession. On the other hand there is no any other witness examined lending corroboration to the evidence of P.W. 5 to prove the extrajudicial confession. Thus, the extrajudicial confession by the appellant has not been proved by cogent, consistent and clear evidence. 25. P.W. 10 stated that from the spot he seized the axe stained with blood and other materials vide Ext. 3 in presence of witnesses. P.W. 2 stated that in his presence the police seized the blood stained Tangia from the spot vide Ext. 3. P.W. 5 stated that the police seized the blood stained Tangia from the spot vide Ext. 3. So, the blood stained Tangia is proved to be seized from the spot, but not from the accused. Hence, the seizure of the weapon of offence cannot be said to be an incriminating circumstance against the appellant even though he was present at the spot during seizure. 26. It appears from the evidence of P.W. 10 that he has seized the wearing apparels of the deceased and the accused and nail clippings of the appellant. The chemical examination report shows that the seized saree, Saya and the axe with wooden handle have got human blood of “O’ group. Also it shows that the nail clipping of the appellant has got human blood, but the blood group has not been determined as the quantity was insufficient. When the blood group is not available, it is difficult to infer or prove the human blood in the nail clipping of the appellant is the human blood of the deceased. So, the prosecution also failed to prove this circumstance against the appellant. Only it is inferred from the aforesaid analysis that the appellant remained present near the spot, but did not go away. Can it be taken as a circumstance against him or a positive assertion of the appellant that he remained present with his mother during time of her death. 27. From the aforesaid clear analysis it appears that the prosecution has not proved a single circumstance beyond all reasonable doubt to complete the chain of circumstances so as to make it inconsistent with the innocence of the appellant. On the other hand, the chain of circumstance is not being proved to point out unerringly the guilt of the appellant. 28. From the aforesaid clear analysis it appears that the prosecution has not proved a single circumstance beyond all reasonable doubt to complete the chain of circumstances so as to make it inconsistent with the innocence of the appellant. On the other hand, the chain of circumstance is not being proved to point out unerringly the guilt of the appellant. 28. Learned trial Court has jotted down the circumstances, but has misdirected itself about the real circumstances as discussed above. For such inapposite appreciation of the evidence, learned trial Court has not reached the correct conclusion. So we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond all reasonable doubts. Hence, we do not agree with the view taken by the learned trial Court. On the other hand, for the reasons stated above, the appellant is not found guilty of the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. and we acquit him of the said offence. Hence, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is quashed. In the result, the Jail Criminal Appeal is allowed and the appellant be set at liberty forthwith if not detained in any other case. The L.C.R. be returned back immediately. S.K. MISHRA, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.