Sujay Barua, proprietor of S. B. Engineering, son of Late Gopal Barua v. State of Jharkhand
2018-03-13
RAJESH SHANKAR
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of direction upon the respondents to restrain them from interfering with the land of the petitioner appertaining to Khata No. 218, Plot No. 1767, measuring an area of 0.03.8 (Dhur) under Mouza-Dimna, Thana No. 1643 in Ward No. 9, Jamshedpur having purchased by the petitioner, whereupon a house has also been constructed on the land. The petitioner also challenged the e-auction of the said immovable property under the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the SARFAESI Act, 2002”) through sale notice dated 20.06.2015 issued by the respondent-Corporation Bank. 2. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and looking into the contents of the writ petition as well as the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, it appears that the petitioner is aggrieved by the action taken by the respondent-Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The petitioner has also put challenge to sale notice issued by the respondent-Bank dated 20.06.2015 putting the concerned property to e-auction. The said sale notice has been issued under Rule 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. 3. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No. 1281 of 2018 (Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore & Anr. Vs. Mathew K.C.), while considering the earlier judicial pronouncements made in this regard, has held thus: “16. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public.
Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 4.
The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 4. Considering the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case and keeping in view the fact that the petitioner in the present proceeding has challenged the action of the respondent-Bank for realization of dues under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable at this stage. 5. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to take appropriate recourse against the action of the respondents, if so advised, in accordance with law.