JUDGMENT : ANNIE JOHN, J. 1. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 18.3.2016 in I.O.P.1/2015 on the file of the Sub Court, Ernakulam. The appellant herein is the plaintiff in the above I.O.P. The parties are referred to as in the IOP. 2. The appellant filed a suit for declaring her title over the suit properties and for declaring that the document Nos.1378/2013 and 2925/2013 of SRO, Thrikkakara, executed in the name of respondents 2 and 3, are nominal documents, which were given as security for the loans advanced to the appellant by the first respondent. The suit was valued at Rs.75,00,000/-and the court fee fixed was Rs.7,78,192/-. It is the case of the appellant that she has insufficient means to pay the court fee, as her only asset is the suit property and the movables listed in I.O.P. 3. The appellant was examined as PW1 and the respondent as RW1. Exts.B1 to B4 were marked. Appellant has deposed that she has no job or income of her own and her only property is the suit property. While appellant was in the box she has admitted that she has received Rs.42,00,000/-, as the sale consideration from the respondents. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the first respondent is only a money lender and the documents were executed as securities in favour of respondents 2 and 3, for which she has filed a suit for recovery of the properties covered by those documents on repayment of the loan amount. When respondents 1 to 3 started asserting title over the suit properties, on 14.12.2014, she has demanded the respondents to reconvey the properties. The respondents demanded payment of Rs.42,00,000/-with interest from the appellant for reconveying the property. Hence, appellant/plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondents from forcefully evicting her from the plaint schedule properties and for passing a decree fixing the liability of the appellant at Rs.17,67,397/-with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the IOP is not maintainable, either in law or on facts. According to the respondents, the appellant was having property to an extent of 21.79 cents in Vazhakkala village. The third respondent purchased about six cents of property from the appellant in the year 2006. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the IOP is not maintainable, either in law or on facts. According to the respondents, the appellant was having property to an extent of 21.79 cents in Vazhakkala village. The third respondent purchased about six cents of property from the appellant in the year 2006. In the year 2013, the third respondent purchased 3.647 cents of property and the remaining extent of the property owned by the appellant was 10 cents with a double storied building. In the year 2013, the appellant again approached the respondents 2 and 3 and agreed to sell the balance 10 cents of land and an agreement for sale was executed on 13.5.2013. Thereafter the appellant executed a sale deed in favour of respondents 2 and 3 for a total consideration of Rs.40,00,000/-. The respondents had availed a loan of Rs.30,00,000/-from State Bank of India to mobilize the sale consideration. 5. Now the respondents contend that the appellant is in possession of the aforesaid sale consideration and also receives rent from the fourth respondent/tenant. She occupies the ground floor of the building on a rental arrangement. But, even after the expiry of 11 months, the appellant has not vacated the ground floor, for which respondents 2 and 3 filed a suit as O.S.282/2015 before Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam for recovery of possession. 6. Heard Smt.Ranju A.T., the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Martin K.Jose, the learned counsel for the respondents. 7. The only question to be considered is, whether the appellant is having sufficient means to pay the court fee of Rs.7,78,192/-. The suit has been filed as IOP by invoking Order 33 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Order 33 is an enabling provision which allows filing of a suit by an indigent person without paying the court fee at the initial stage. If the plaintiff ultimately succeeds in the suit, the court would calculate the amount of court fee, which would have been paid by the plaintiff if he had not been permitted to sue as an indigent person and that amount would be recoverable by the State from any party ordered by the decree to pay the same. The main intention of Order 33 CPC is to help the poor litigants, who are unable to pay the requisite court fee, to file a suit because of poverty. The main intention of Order 33 CPC is to help the poor litigants, who are unable to pay the requisite court fee, to file a suit because of poverty. 9.'Indigency' also means the right to sue in 'forma pauper' is restricted to 'indigent persons'. A person may proceed as poor person only after a court is satisfied that he or she is unable to prosecute the suit and pay the costs and expenses. A person is indigent, if the payment of fee would deprive one of basic living expenses, or if the person is in a state of impoverishment that substantially and effectively impairs or prevents the pursuit of a court remedy. 10. We have heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the impugned order dated 18.03.2016. 11. According to the respondents, the appellant is not an indigent person or pauper as she is holding sufficient funds; movable as well as immovable properties. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously argued that the appellant has no sufficient means to pay the court fee, which was calculated at Rs.7,78,192/-. It has also come out in evidence of PW1 that certain part of the property has been sold out by the appellant and at last she has sold ten cents of property to the respondents on receipt of Rs.42 lakhs as admitted in her deposition. When a question was asked by the learned counsel for the respondents, she was unable to establish how Rs.42 lakhs had been spent by her. In addition to that, admittedly, she was working in 'Carmel Kuries' as brought out by the evidence of the respondents. But, this fact has been denied by the appellant by deposing that, about four years back she has resigned from the said 'Carmel Kuries' and at present she is having no job and residing along with her husband, who is an advocate and she is fully depending upon him. Over and above, the respondents' counsel brought out that appellant is a shareholder of the kuri company. But, this fact also has been denied by the counsel for the appellant by stating that the shares were already transferred before filing of the IOP. The respondents' counsel has pointed out that the appellant was holding the shares of the 'Carmel Kuries' and subsequently she has sold some shares. Even after that the balance share in her possession is about 2147. 13. The respondents' counsel has pointed out that the appellant was holding the shares of the 'Carmel Kuries' and subsequently she has sold some shares. Even after that the balance share in her possession is about 2147. 13. In order to contradict the argument of the respondents' counsel, the appellant's counsel argued that the appellant has no 'sufficient means' to pay the court fee. The burden is upon the appellant to establish this fact. At the time of argument, the learned counsel for the appellant was not able to substantiate the fact as to how the appellant had spent Rs.42 lakhs which she received after executing sale deed with respect to the property. Appellant has argued that she has spent Rs.10 lakhs for her daughter's marriage, Rs.10 lakhs for getting a loan. There was no cogent explanation about the balance amount in her hand. Apart from her oral evidence that she has a bank account evidencing her dealings, no pass book was produced to substantiate the said contention. At the fag end she has produced some records of the bank account. But, it would only show that she has accepted Rs.30 lakhs. No satisfactory explanation was brought out by the appellant to establish that she has insufficient income to pay the court fee. 14. In Sebastian Karukapkarambil v. J.M.J. Silverstar and others ( 2017 (1) KHC 684 ), it was held that what is required to be proved is that, the plaintiff has no independent income or properties from which he can derive income to pay the requisite court fee and he had not disposed of any property within two months of filing of the petition, so as to claim the benefit; and that there was cause of action for the plaintiff to file the suit against the defendants. 15. It was held in Mathai M.Paikeday v. C.K.Antony [ (2011) 13 SCC 174 ] that a person is 'indigent' if the payment of fees would deprive one of basic living expenses, or if the person is in a state of impoverishment that substantially and effectively impairs or prevents the pursuit of a court remedy. At the same time, a person need not be a destitute. At the same time, a person need not be a destitute. Factors considered when determining if a litigant is 'indigent' are similar to those considered in criminal cases and include the party's employment status and income, including income from government sources, such as social security and unemployment benefits, the ownership of unencumbered assets, including real or personal property and money on deposit, the party's total indebtedness and any financial assistance received from family or close friends. It was also held that where two persons are living together and functioning as a single economic unit, whether married, related, or otherwise, consideration of their combined financial assets may be warranted for the purposes of determining a party's indigency status in a civil proceedings. 16. Here, the respondents' counsel pointed out that the appellant's husband is also a practising lawyer and this fact has not been denied by the appellant. When the appellant pleads that she has no sufficient means, the burden is heavy on the appellant to prove that she is incapable of paying the court fee. The expression "not possessed of sufficient means" mentioned in explanation 1 to Order 33 Rule 1 CPC while defining the word 'pauper' refers to the plaintiff's capacity to pay the court fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such a suit. What is contemplated is not the possession of the property but the sufficient means with capacity to raise money to pay the court fee. This has been reiterated in Manjulata v. Sidhkaran (2005 KHC 5996). The expression “not possessed of sufficient means” mentioned in Explanation 1 to Order 33 Rule 1 CPC that while defining the word “pauper” refers to plaintiff's capacity to pay the court fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such a suit – What is contemplated is not possession of the property but sufficient means with capacity to raise money to pay the court fee. 17. It was held in Mathew v. State of Kerala ( 1996 (2) KLT 363 ) that when an applicant does not disclose an asset held by him in his application, whatever be the reason on the wording of Rule 1 Order 33, it is clear that the application is liable to be rejected in terms of Order 33 Rule 5(a) of the Code. It was held in Dr. It was held in Dr. D. Hemachandra Sagar and another v. D. Prithviraj and another (2004 KHC 3808), that in an application to sue as an indigent person, in cases where the defendants have evidence, they can certainly produce it; but it is not their duty to disprove the case of the applicants. It is very necessary to record that the scheme of law is to the effect that two basic ingredients are predominant, the first being that it is a condition precedent for the plaintiff-applicant to make a full and true disclosure of all their assets and resources. Where this is not done or where it is evident to the court that the disclosures are untrue or unreliable or incorrect which boils down to the inference that they are half truths or totally false, the application will have to be dismissed on this ground alone. 18. If the appellant is in possession of the property or money sufficient enough to raise cash for the payment of the court fee, she or he can be deemed to have sufficient means to pay the court fee and she would not be considered to be a 'pauper'. It is true that no injustice is likely to be caused to the respondents, if the appellant is allowed to contest the suit without payment of court fee. The sum total of the averments in the petition is up to the position that the court fee is massive and that the plaintiff do not have either the assets or the resources to meet that requirement. 19. It must be borne in mind that the payment of court fee is a matter between the appellant and the State and not between the contesting parties. Thus, if the appellant is allowed to file an appeal as forma pauperis, no injustice would be caused to the respondents, except that the appellant will be allowed to contest the legality and the validity of the decree passed by the trial court against her. 20. Here, the appellant did not disclose the fact that she was having the sale consideration with her and she has not produced the documents before the court below at the time of filing of IOP. 21. Order 33 Rule 5 deals with the rejection of application for permission to sue as an indigent person. 20. Here, the appellant did not disclose the fact that she was having the sale consideration with her and she has not produced the documents before the court below at the time of filing of IOP. 21. Order 33 Rule 5 deals with the rejection of application for permission to sue as an indigent person. Clause (a) of Order 33 Rule 5 thereof says that the application shall be rejected where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by Rules 2 and 3. Sub rule (b) calls for rejection where the applicant is not an indigent person. 22. Order 33 Rule 2 clearly provides that every application for permission to sue as an indigent person shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits, a schedule of movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof shall be annexed thereto and it shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings. In other words, what Rule contemplates is a scheduling of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof. 23. In this case, the appellant has failed to incorporate all these facts in her petition and during evidence she has not given any proper explanation how she has expended the entire amount which she had at the time of filing of the petition. Over and above, there is no evidence to prove as to on which month and date she has resigned from the Carmel Kuries and in which date she has transferred the shares etc. 24. We have already held that she is still holding the shares with her. There is no evidence on the part of the appellant that she has omitted to mention all these facts in the petition as well as in evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued to establish the fact that the appellant has no sufficient means to pay the court fee. It is true that in certain circumstances the court can take a liberal view to allow the parties to pay the court fee. But, here, the appellant has suppressed the real material facts before the court below. So, the court below has evaluated the evidence adduced by either side and ultimately came to a conclusion that the appellant had sufficient means to pay the court fee. But, here, the appellant has suppressed the real material facts before the court below. So, the court below has evaluated the evidence adduced by either side and ultimately came to a conclusion that the appellant had sufficient means to pay the court fee. Accordingly, the prayer to permit the appellant, to file a suit, by invoking Order 33 Rule 1 of the CPC, was rejected by lower court. We do not find any materials in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. What is required to be proved is that the appellant has no independent income or property and that she is incapable of deriving the income to pay the court fee. The appellant has failed to establish this fact. It is true that the Village Officer has given a certificate stating that the appellant is a permanent resident of Vazhakkala village and that she was the owner of 6.39 ares together with a two storied building and she has alienated her properties in the year 2013 and she was residing in the building even after alienation. So under such circumstances, the court below was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that nondisclosure of the account details of the appellant is fatal. Hence, we find that the court below is perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that non-disclosure of assets in the hands of the appellant is fatal to her to continue to sue as an indigent person. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the parties and having perused the record, we are of the opinion that the order of the lower court is consistent. We do not find any reason to interfere with the findings of the court below. 25. The appeal is hence dismissed. All the pending interlocutory applications will stand closed.