JUDGMENT : The appellant-convict is before this Court in this appeal assailing the judgment dated 27.11.2012 passed in Sessions Case bearing SC No.27/2010. Through the said judgment the Court below has held the appellant to be guilty of committing the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. Accordingly, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.20,000/and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. 2. The appellant was proceeded against for the offence of causing the death of Seethe who was living with the appellant as his wife. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased Seethe had earlier married one Jenukurubara Chinnappa and they had three sons out of the wedlock. However, she had left the company of the said Jenukurubara Chinnappa about a year back and was in a livein relationship with the appellant and the relationship was considered as that of the husband and wife. When this was the position, on 21.11.2009 at about 9.00 p.m. the deceased Seethe after serving food to the appellant had asked him to put kerosene to the lamp, to which the appellant is stated to have told her that he would not put kerosene to the lamp but would pour kerosene on her and set her ablaze. So saying the appellant is stated to have executed the same by pouring kerosene and setting her ablaze. The case is also that even earlier to the said incident the appellant was always quarrelling with the deceased and a week earlier to the said incident the appellant had threatened to kill the deceased by attempting to assault her with a kathi. 3. On the earlier occasion when there was such attempt, the owner of the estate viz., Sri B.M.Mani Uthappa under whom the appellant and the deceased were working had intervened and pacified the appellant. On 21.11.2009 when she was set on fire, the deceased ran to the house of the estate owner with fire over her body complaining that the appellant had set her on fire with an intention to kill her. The estate owner with the help of one Putta who was stated to be present there at that time had extinguished the fire and took her to the Government Hospital, Madikeri for treatment and also informed the Police. The estate owner with the help of one Putta who was stated to be present there at that time had extinguished the fire and took her to the Government Hospital, Madikeri for treatment and also informed the Police. The Police had accordingly recorded the statement of the deceased and registered the case in Crime No.288/2009 for the offence under Section 307 of IPC. On the next day, the Taluk Executive Magistrate had also recorded the declaration of the said Seethe who had suffered the burn injuries. Subsequent thereto, despite the treatment the said Seethe did not survive and accordingly succumbed to the burn injuries on 07.12.2009. The case was thereafter converted to one under Section 302 of IPC and the further investigation was carried and the charge sheet was filed against the appellant. 4. In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the prosecution had examined the witnesses as PWs.1 to PW.16. The documents at Exhs.P1 to P12(a) were relied upon and the material objects at MO.1 to MO.4 were produced. On appreciation of the said evidence and material, the Court below was of the opinion that the charge alleged against the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and has accordingly sentenced the appellant to undergo imprisonment for life. The said judgment is assailed in this appeal 5. Heard Sri Venkatesh P.Dalawai, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms.B.G.Namitha Mahesh, learned Government Advocate. In that background we have perused the material on record. 6. As noticed, the incident had taken place at about 9 p.m. on 21.11.2009 and soon thereafter the injured Seethe was shifted to the Government Hospital, Madikeri by her employer who is examined as PW9. The doctor namely Dr. S. Manju who was on duty at the hospital at that point as the medical officer is examined as PW16. The said doctor on admitting the patient had intimated the police as per Ex. P10. The law was accordingly set in motion. Pursuant thereto the statement of the injured was recorded by the police and the Crime bearing No.288/09 under Section 307 IPC was registered during the intervening night of 21st and 22nd of November 2009. The statement of the injured Seethe thus recorded is marked as Ex.P8. Sri. A.Devaraju, the Tahsildar has thereafter at 4.10 p.m. on 22.11.2009 recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. The statement of the injured Seethe thus recorded is marked as Ex.P8. Sri. A.Devaraju, the Tahsildar has thereafter at 4.10 p.m. on 22.11.2009 recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. She subsequently died on 07.12.2009 and the case was therefore converted as one to try the accused under Section 302 IPC. The said Tahsildar is examined as PW8, he has stated about recording the declaration and the dying declaration is marked as Ex. P5. 7. The statement and the dying declaration at Ex.P8 and P5 respectively would indicate that the deceased has stated that the appellant was always quarrelling with her and that a week prior to the present incident had attempted to assault her with a kathiand at that point their employer (PW9) had intervened and came to her rescue. About the present incident of setting her on fire she has stated in no uncertain terms that the appellant with the intention of killing her had poured kerosene on her and lit fire to her. She therefore ran to her employer's house screaming with fire over her body and her employer on putting off the fire had taken and admitted her to the hospital. In the declaration at Ex.P5 made to the Tahsildar she has reiterated the same. Dr. Parvathi who was on duty at the point when the dying declaration was recorded, has been examined as PW7. She has stated about the fitness of the injured to make the statement. 8. In the background of the above statement and declaration made by the deceased herself, a perusal of the evidence tendered by the employer of the deceased as PW9 discloses that he has narrated the incident in the same manner as has been stated by the deceased herself and there is absolute corroboration. He has referred to the repeated quarrel between the appellant and the deceased, the earlier incident which occurred about a week earlier when the appellant had attempted to assault her with the kathiand he having intervened is also stated. The manner in which the deceased had come running to his place in the present instance, he and one Putta having put off the fire and having taken her to the hospital is also referred. The manner in which the deceased had come running to his place in the present instance, he and one Putta having put off the fire and having taken her to the hospital is also referred. Though the said Putta who was examined as PW1 has not supported the case of the prosecution, the same does not take away the effect of prosecution case, as seen from the other material and the evidence that is referred to above when it is evident that PW.9 was the one who had taken her to the hospital with burn injuries. The evidence of PW9 in any event has not been discredited in the cross examination in so far as the incident where the appellant had poured kerosene and lit the deceased on fire which lead to her death due to the act of the appellant. The evidence of the other witnesses including that of her former husband and the sons who were examined as PWs3, 4 and 5 as also that of the police officers as PW12, 13 and 15 will clearly indicate that the incident had taken place, she was admitted to the hospital and the deceased succumbed to the burn injuries inflicted by the appellant. 9. During the course of the argument, though the learned counsel for the appellant was not in a position to demolish these aspects in so far as the incident leading to the death of the deceased, the attempt of the learned counsel was to contend that there was no intention on the part of the appellant to kill his wife and the incident had occurred in a drunken stupor and as such the same be brought under the exemption to Section 300 IPC which is punishable as provided under Part II of Section 304 IPC. Though such contention is put forth at this point, there was no such attempt made to that effect before the Court below. Learned counsel for the appellant has however in that regard referred to the cross examination of PW.3 viz., the former husband of the deceased to point out that he has stated that when he visited the hospital on the next day the deceased was not in a position to speak. Learned counsel for the appellant has however in that regard referred to the cross examination of PW.3 viz., the former husband of the deceased to point out that he has stated that when he visited the hospital on the next day the deceased was not in a position to speak. In that light it is contended that the statement made by the deceased either in the document at Ex.P8 or the dying declaration at Ex.P5 to the effect that the attempt of the appellant was to kill her and about the earlier instance relating an attempt to attack her with Kathi cannot be relied upon since such statement could not have been made by her when she was not even in a position to speak as per the evidence of PW3. We are however not in a position to accede to such contention for more than one reason. 10. Firstly, the reference as made in the cross examination about the visit of PW.3, the former husband of the deceased to the hospital though stated to be on the next day, there is no details as to whether it was exactly on 22.11.2009 or a general reference as being on the next day on which he gained knowledge of the incident. Further the reliable evidence on record on this aspect is that of PW.7, the doctor who had certified about her fitness to speak and also the evidence of PW.8, the Tahsildar who had recorded the statement after ascertaining about her capability to understand and answer the questions. The statement was accordingly recorded by PW8 on 22.11.2009 and the death had occurred only on 07.12.2009. The deceased therefore had survived for nearly 15 days from the date on which the statement was recorded and as such it cannot be disbelieved that she was able to speak, merely because there is a stray sentence in the cross examination of PW.3. 11. Prosecution has relied upon Ex.P5 – dying declaration. If the person who records the statement is satisfied that the person giving the statement was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, the said statement can be relied upon. In that backdrop evidence of PW8 fully supports Ex.P5. Though there are minor contradictions in the evidence of prosecution, the Court can solely rely upon the dying declaration and convict the accused, if it inspires the confidence of the Court. In that backdrop evidence of PW8 fully supports Ex.P5. Though there are minor contradictions in the evidence of prosecution, the Court can solely rely upon the dying declaration and convict the accused, if it inspires the confidence of the Court. We have carefully and cautiously gone through Ex.P5 – dying declaration and evidence of PW8 – Tahsildar who recorded the statement of the deceased. The same inspires the confidence of this Court as the dying declaration is voluntary, not tutored and concocted. It clearly points out the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. In that light, there is no force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and the same is liable to be rejected. 12. That apart what cannot also be lost sight is that PW.3 is the estranged husband of the deceased and when he has also spoken ill about her character when she was with him, it would indicate that there had been no cordiality in the relationship of PW3 and the deceased. If that be the position, when she was suffering from the burn injuries and at that point when PW.3 had visited the hospital, the natural conduct would be that there will be no conversation nor will there be any inclination to speak, which by itself cannot be an assumption that she was in a state where she was unable to speak. In that view, the dying declaration would be a strong piece of evidence to show the intention of the appellant and an act done with knowledge and not merely a drunken stupor. 13. In addition, as already stated no attempt is made before the Court below to bring out the aspect relating to the drunken stupor and about the appellant being oblivious to the consequences, except making certain stray suggestions in the cross examination of PW.9 to the effect that the persons working in the coffee plantation would consume alcohol and that the appellant and the deceased used to consume alcohol together. It is no doubt further suggested to PW9 that on the day when the wages are disbursed, alcohol is consumed and also that the appellant used to usually go to Chettahalli and consume alcohol. Even if the same is taken note, the mere consumption of alcohol by the appellant if admitted by PW9 would not change the complexion of the case. Even if the same is taken note, the mere consumption of alcohol by the appellant if admitted by PW9 would not change the complexion of the case. On the other hand, what was required to be established is that at the time of the incident he was in such drunken state that he was unable to fathom the consequences of his act. In this regard there is no attempt whatsoever. 14. In that background, the fact that the appellant did not make any attempt to put off the fire if he had no intention to kill her and that when the deceased ran to her employer’s place the appellant did not even follow her there and provide any assistance to PW9 in taking her to the hospital, but he had absconded would indicate that he was in a position to know the consequences. Therefore, in that circumstance also we are of the opinion that the conduct of the appellant cannot be brought under the exception so as to alter the punishment as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. 15. In the above background, on reappreciation of the evidence and consideration of the contentions as put forth, a perusal of the judgment passed by the Court below would indicate that the learned Judge has taken into consideration all the factual aspects, weighed the evidence on record, kept in perspective the law prevailing and has arrived at the conclusion that the appellant is to be convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC and has accordingly sentenced him. Hence we find no reason to interfere with the judgment assailed in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.