JUDGMENT BISWANATH RATH, J. - This writ petition involves a challenge to the orders passed, vide Annexure-12, 13 and 14. Annexure-12 is a demand involving the petitioner on the non-payment of the outstanding amount indicated therein towards payment of Octroi involving five consignments. Annexure-13 is an order passed by the Executive Officer considering the objection of the petitioner in the matter of collection of Octroi from the petitioner on particular head following a development through O.J.C. No. 2887/1992 and Annexure-14 involves again a demand for payment of outstanding dues of Octroi involving the petitioner. 2. Short facts involving the case are that the petitioner is a Government of India undertaking having its Head Officer at Bhilai in erstwhile Madhya Pradesh, presently, in Chhattisgarh and having one of its Plant Office at Rourkela in the district of Sundargarh in the State of Odisha. Petitioner-company is mainly based for collection and processing of scrap, which is ultimately used by the respective Steel Plants for production of steel. The petitioner-company for processing its plant within the premises of different Steel Plants and one of such plants situates within the premises of Rourkela Steel Plant. For using in its factory premises, petitioner-company purchased a lot of machineries/equipments and the said machineries/equipments are purchased from different machinery manufactures and uploaded in the factory premises of the petitioner at Rourkela. After being transportation of items/equipments by the Manufacturing Company, the petitioner-Company is plying such machineries inside its factory premises in Odisha. Dispute herein involves transportation of equipments in question of the work site of the petitioner-company at Rourkela and a consequential demand taking place in the year 1990 when Octroi Department of Notified Area Council (Steel Township), Rourkela alleged to have been demanded payment of Octroi on the consignments without any reason, basis and foundation. One of such consignments was not allowed to enter into the Notified Area Council area of Rourkela. Petitioner-company compelling with the situation gave an undertaking to deposit the duty, if any, is found to be leviable after verification and sent its officials to the office of the opposite party no.3 for having necessary; discussion. In the process, the petitioner was issued with a demand notice levying 1% of the value as Octroi Tax, vide Annexure-2. Petitioner-company compelling with the situation gave an undertaking to deposit the duty, if any, is found to be leviable after verification and sent its officials to the office of the opposite party no.3 for having necessary; discussion. In the process, the petitioner was issued with a demand notice levying 1% of the value as Octroi Tax, vide Annexure-2. Finding difficulty in receiving the consignment at its premises, the petitioner was also compelled to give undertaking to the effect that payments as and when required for making over will be after discussions with the opposite party no.3 on the legality of the claim arrived amicably. While the matter stood thus, opposite party no. 3 wrote a letter to the petitioner indicating therein that the consignment brought inside the Notified Area Council is leviable with Octroi by issuing correspondence at Annexure-5. Petitioner-company wrote back seeking for extension of time. In the meantime, there have several correspondences involving the demand. Finding no resolve on the issue involved and seeing opposite party no. 3 determined to collect Octroi Tax and on the petitioner’s failing to make the opposite party No. 3 understand that the consignments involved are not leviable with Octroi Tax, the petitioner-Company filed a writ petition in this Court in O.J.C. No. 2887 of 1992, which was disposed of on 5.11.1992, directing the parties to work out their differences on verification of the materials to be supplied by the petitioner. Consequent upon such development, the matter was discussed in between the petitioner and the opposite party no.3. On rejection of the claim of the petitioner, the opposite party No. 3 went on communicating its resolve on the validity in charging of the Octroi Tax. Consequently, a demand notice was also issued vide Annexure-14 resulting filing of the present writ petition. 3. Sri S.D. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner reiterating all the developments taken place in between and as narrated hereinabove, challenging to the demand of the opposite party no.3 submitted that the opposite party no.3 levying Octroi by including the petitioner’s earth moving equipments as Motor Vehicle, is contrary to the definition involving Orissa Municipal Act and Section 2, Clause 28 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1983. Besides, the claim also remains contrary to the Orissa Gazette dated 22nd June, 1984 where the notification clearly includes the items involved in the demand on the premises that the equipments involved herein should be termed as off road equipments. Sri Das, learned senior counsel submitted that levy of Octroi on the items involved becomes bad. Sri Das also contended that for the protection in the Constitution of India at Article 14 for equality before law or equal protection of law within the territory of India being overlooked by the opposite party no. 3, particularly, when there is exemption of such equipment to Rourkela Steel Plant under Section 133 of the Orissa Municipal Act, involving the similar equipments making a demand involving the petitioner attracts violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Sri Das, learned senior counsel further also submitted that in the event the demand of the opposite party no.3 is encouraged, it will lead to detrimental to the growth of the industry. It ultimately also affects the public at large, as stated by Sri Das. Taking this Court to the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1989, Sri Das, learned senior counsel contended that for the specific exemption involving Industrial Policy Resolution, 1989, the Notified Area Council is stopped by law from withdrawing or not enforcing the provision contained in the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1989. Taking this Court to decisions in the case of M/s. Central Coal Fields Ltd. v. State of Orissa and others, 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 133, Messrs Bolani Ores Ltd. and another v. State of Orissa represented by the Collector, Keonjhar, AIR 1968 Orissa 1 (V 55 C 1) and M/s. Binayak Sabatho & Sons v Municipal Council, Berhampur and others, AIR 1985 Orissa 263, Sri Das, learned senior counsel contended that the decisions have the direct application to the case of the petitioner. In the above premises, Sri Das, learned senior counsel prayed this Court for interfering with the impugned demand and setting aside the same. 4. In the above premises, Sri Das, learned senior counsel prayed this Court for interfering with the impugned demand and setting aside the same. 4. Sri Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no.3 on the other hand taking this Court to the Gazette Notification at Annexure-10 and for the detailed discussion held by the Executive Officer, Notified Area Council (Steel Plant), Rourkela appearing at Annexure-13 contended that for the nature of the instrument involved herein strictly comes under Clause 12 and Clause 15 of the Gazette Notification dated 30th May 1984 issued by the Housing and Urban Development Department and, therefore contended that the petitioner has not escape from the liability involved herein. Petitioner’s claim on the basis of the benefit of the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1989 available at page 35 of the brief, Sri Nayak submitted that the benefit of Industrial Policy Resolution, 1989 is provided a matter of inception to the new industrial unit and as such, has no application to the industries existed long since. Therefore, there is no question of application of Industrial Policy Resolution, 1989 to the case at hand. So far the petitioner’s claim on the basis of decisions is concerned , Sir Nayak oppose the claim of the petitioner on the premises that the decisions cited by the learned counsel are all involving the issue in relation to Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, 1975 or the Motor Vehicle Act involved therein. Sir Nayak, learned counsel also contended that the decision cited herein above have no application to the case at hand. In the circumstances, Sri Nayak, learned counsel submitted that there being no infirmity in the impugned order and the demand, there is no scope for this Court for interfering in either of the impugned orders. 5. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, this Court finds the matter strictly involves herein is with regard to levy of the Octori Tax by the Notified Area Council (Steel Township), Rourkela on the entry of five consignments, vide Annexure-13 for use of the same inside the Notified Area Council area. From the documents appended to the writ petition, this Court finds the consignments involved in the assessment of Octroi of levy is either loader, dozer, bulldozer or heavy earthmoving equipments. It is at this stage since relevant this Court takes note of certain provisions from the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950. From the documents appended to the writ petition, this Court finds the consignments involved in the assessment of Octroi of levy is either loader, dozer, bulldozer or heavy earthmoving equipments. It is at this stage since relevant this Court takes note of certain provisions from the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950. Section 3(3) of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 reads hereunder:- “Section 3(3)- “Carriage” means any wheeled vehicle with springs or other appliances acting as springs, which is used for conveyance of human beings and includes any kind of bicycle, tri-cycle, rickshaw, cycle-rickshaw, but does not include a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Act, 4 of 1939" Section 3(29) of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 reads hereunder:- “3(29) “Public road” means any; street, road, square, Court, allay, passage or riding path over which the public have a right or way, whether a thoroughfare or not, and includes- (a) the roadway over any public bridge or causeway; (b) the footway attached to any such road, public bridge or causeway; and (c) the drains attached to any such road, public bridges or causeway and the land, whether covered or not by any payment verandah or other structure, which lies on either side of the roadway up to the boundaries of the adjacent property whether that property is private property or property belonging to the State; Section-131 (I)(KK) of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 reads hereunder “131(I)(kk)- An Octroi on goods brought within the limits of a Municipal area for consumption, use of sale therein.” The definition at Sections 3(3) and 3(29) of the Orissa Municipal Act no doubt did not include motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But however reading of Sub-Section (29) of Section 3 of the Orissa Municipal Act, it is observed, it has a wider inclusion. Similarly, coming to the provision at Sub-Section (1) of Section 131 of the Orissa Municipal Act this provision gives a right to the Municipal Authority the power of imposition of different types of taxes including Octroi Tax as specifically provided in Section 131(kk) but however with a rider that no such imposition of Octroi shall be made without sanction of the State Government. This Court here finds, the document at Annexure-10 appended to the writ petition by the petitioner lacks no doubt that Government on the department of Housing & Urban Development exercising the power conferred on it by proviso the Clause-kk of Sub-Section (1) of Section 131 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 has accorded sanction of imposition of Octroi on goods brought within the limits of the district of Sundargarh for consumption, use or sale therein of the items indicated therein. Clauses-12, 15 & 64 of the Government’s order dated 30th May, 1984 appearing at Annexure-10 bring the following:- “12. Motor vehicles, Motor Car, Jeep, Tractor, Rickshaw and Trailer Motor Cycle, Scooter, Auto Rickshaw etc. 15. Spare parts of Motor car, Trucks, Motor cycles and other vehicles as detailed in item 12 not including dozers and dumpers and heavy earth moving machinery. 64. All kinds of cycles and watches and their parts, tyres, tubes, flaps, except for heavy vehicles for industrial use.” Reading of serial no. 12 therein, it appears, Government has sanctioned the imposition of Octroi Tax on motor vehicles etc. similarly, reading of serial no. 15 makes it clear that there shall be no Octroi Tax in respect of spare parts involving dozers, dumpers and heavy earth moving machineries. Reading of the above two provisions makes it clear that the word ‘motor vehicle’ has a wider inclusion and also includes dozers, dumpers and heavy earth moving machineries for its clear indication in the Section 15 taken note herein above, Similarly, reading of serial no. 64, the same only prescribes exclusion of charging of Octroi Tax for spare parts, tyres, tubes, flaps etc. used in heavy vehicles for industrial use. A microscopic scan of the provision at serial no. 64, it further claries that this item keeps the parts, tyres, tubes and flaps only involving heavy vehicles for industrial use away from Octroi Tax. 6. 64, the same only prescribes exclusion of charging of Octroi Tax for spare parts, tyres, tubes, flaps etc. used in heavy vehicles for industrial use. A microscopic scan of the provision at serial no. 64, it further claries that this item keeps the parts, tyres, tubes and flaps only involving heavy vehicles for industrial use away from Octroi Tax. 6. Now coming back to the definition of “motor vehicle” under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Sub-Section 28 of Section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act defines as follows:- “2- Definitions (28) “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity or not exceeding [twenty-five cubic centimeters]” This Court also finds that this definition has a bearing on the case for the followings:- For the petitioner’s claiming exemption of Octroi Tax for the items involved herein on the premises that for the particular type of item involved herein and more specifically for being utilized only in industrial premises and not coming to road, this Court taking a similar claim on similar situation in the case of M/s. Bolani Ores Ltd. & another vrs. State of Orissa & others, AIR 1968 Orissa 1 (v 55 C1) but however involving a question of registerability of such items under the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly taking the case of dumpers, bull-dozers and scrappers engaged to remove the overburdened earth and are pushed by bull-dozers. Shovels as already said are used to dig the ore. Paragraph-17 of the said decision the Hon’ble Court observed as follows:- “17. xxx xxx From the evidence it appears that Trax Cavetrors (item No. 4) are used for loading dumpers and bulldozers (items Nos. 5 and 6). The scrapers are engaged to remove the over-burdened earth and are pushed by bulldozers. Shovels (item No. 9) as already said are used to dig the ore. xxx xxx From the evidence it appears that Trax Cavetrors (item No. 4) are used for loading dumpers and bulldozers (items Nos. 5 and 6). The scrapers are engaged to remove the over-burdened earth and are pushed by bulldozers. Shovels (item No. 9) as already said are used to dig the ore. Thus, none of these machineries are adapted or suitable for any use on the roads, nor have they any purpose to serve on the roads. These items Nos. 4 to 9, that is (4) Caterpillar 955 Trax Cavtror, (5) Caterpillar D/7 Tractor Bull-dozers, (6) Caterpillar D/6 Bull- dozers, (7) Caterpillar 619 Scrapers. (8) Euclid 8/7 scraper and (9) Unikop one cubic Meter shovel do not therefore come within the ambit of the definition of motor vehicle and are not liable for registration under Section 22 of the Act.” From the reading of the aforesaid paragraph, it clearly appears, this Court in its Division Bench vide the above judgment has already held that rockers and dumpers must, therefore, be held to be motor vehicles within the meaning of the Act. The Hon’ble Division Bench on the items such as Trax Cavetrors, bull-dozers and scrapers observed that there may not be coming within the ambit of definition of Motor Vehicle. The view of this High Court is based on analysis that since these items are not adapted or suitable for any use on the roads and not having any purpose to serve on the roads are not motor vehicles. This Court clarifies here that the contingency involves in the aforesaid writ petition was registerability of the items involved therein under the Motor Vehicles Act and nothing beyond and as there is no such question of Octori Tax involved therein, as such this decision is of no much relevance to the case at hand for the case at hand involves imposition of Octroi Tax. In a subsequent development, Hon’ble apex Court in a batch of cases reported in 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 133 taking up the question whether dumpers and rockers with rubber tyres used for transportation of goods within the enclosed factory premises are liable for taxation in paragraphs-7 & 9 observed as follows:- “7. In a subsequent development, Hon’ble apex Court in a batch of cases reported in 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 133 taking up the question whether dumpers and rockers with rubber tyres used for transportation of goods within the enclosed factory premises are liable for taxation in paragraphs-7 & 9 observed as follows:- “7. Learned counsel for the appellants in these appeals have not challenged the view of the High Court regarding vires of the impugned Act before us or to its retrospectivity but have addressed us only on the fact situation to contend that the Dumpers (which includes Rockers) are vehicles not adapted for use upon roads and, therefore, they are outside the scope of Section 2(b) of the impugned Taxation Act, 1975 and hence not within the ambit of the charging Section. Section 3(1) provides that subject to the other provisions of the Act, on and from the date of commencement of the Act, there shall be levied on motor vehicles, used or kept for use within the State, a tax at the rate specified under the Schedule. It is evident that the tax is chargeable on using or keeping for use a motor vehicle a motor vehicle adapted for use on roads. Now it has to be seen whether Dumpers and Rockers are motor vehicle adapted for use on roads.” 9. It would be appropriate now to mention that some documentary material was sent to us by the appellants by means of an affidavit after we had reserved judgment. That material is suggestive of the fact that Dumpers in some States are granted permission to run on public roads at a speed not exceeding 16 kms. per hour and on bridges and culverts at a speed not exceeding 8 kms. per hour. From this it is suggested that they gave a minimum weight and safe laden weight fixed on some principles. Pictures of various types of Dumpers have also been sent to us which indicate prominently one factor that these Dumpers run on tyres, in marked contrast to chain plates like caterpillars or military tanks. By the use of rubber tyres it is evident that they have been adapted for use on roads, which means they are suitable for being used on public roads. By the use of rubber tyres it is evident that they have been adapted for use on roads, which means they are suitable for being used on public roads. The mere fact that they are required at places to run at a particular speed is not to detract from the position otherwise clear that they are adopted for use on roads. The very nature of these vehicles make it clear that they are not manufactured or adapted for use only in factories or enclosed premises. The mere fact that the Dumpers of enclosed premises. The mere fact that the Dumpers or Rockers as suggested are heavy and cannot move on the roads without damaging them is not to say that they are not suitable for use on roads. The word ‘adapted’ in the provision was read as ‘suitable’ in Bolani Ores case by interpretation on the strength of the language in Entry 57, List-II of the Constitution. Thus on that basis it was idle to contend on behalf of the appellants that Dumpers and Rockers were neither adaptable nor suitable for use on public roads. Thus on the fact situation, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court was right in concluding that Dumpers and Rockers are vehicles adapted or suitable for use on roads and being motor vehicle per se, as held in Bolani Ores case, were liable to taxation on the footing of their use or kept for use on public roads; the network of which, the State spreads, maintains it and keeps available for use of motor vehicles and hence is entitled to a regulatory and compensatory tax (Exemptions claimable apart). The appellants, therefore, in our view, have no case for grant of any relief in these appeals. Here the Hon’ble apex Court ultimately in confirmation of subsequent view of the Orissa High Court involved therein deciding the dumpers and rockers whether need registration thereby come under the definition of “Motor Vehicle” held on the fact situation, therefore, it must be held that dumpers and rockers are vehicles adapted or suitable for use on roads and being motor vehicles per se were liable to tax on footing of their use or kept for use on public roads. It appears, by this judgment of the Hon’ble apex Court, the decision of the Orissa High Court in M/s. Bolani Ores Ltd. (supra) has lost its force. It appears, by this judgment of the Hon’ble apex Court, the decision of the Orissa High Court in M/s. Bolani Ores Ltd. (supra) has lost its force. In view of the above development in the Hon’ble apex Court, there remains no doubt that the items involved, particularly, the dumpers and rockers come within the definition of ‘Motor Vehicle’. 7. It is at this stage, considering a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Nabin Chandra Narayan Das vrs. Dhenkanal Municipality & another reported in AIR 1989 Ori 76 , this Court taking into consideration as to whether there can be levy of Octroi on cinematograph films brought from outside for exhibition in the cinema halls in different towns in Orissa considering the point involved herein after observing that the cinematographic films are brought within the Municipal Area for use/consumption, justified the notification bringing such item within the Clause-kk of Section 131(I). 8. This Court here involving the dispute involved herein likes to take note of certain other decisions of various Courts, which are as follows:- In the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. India Ltd. Vrs. The Belgaum Borough Municipality reported in AIR 1963 SC 906 involving a question of levying Octroi on its petroleum products brought inside the Octroi limits for sale, the Hon’ble apex Court held “It is sufficient if the goods are brought inside the area to be delivered to the ultimate consumer in that area because the taxable event is the entry of the goods, which are meant to reach an ultimate user and consumer in the area. In the aforesaid case, Hon’ble apex Court again discussing the word, “terminal tax” was a kind a Octroi, observed as follows:- “The word, “Octroi” comes from the word “Octroyer” means ‘to grant’ and in its original use meant “an import”, or “a toll” or “a town duty” on goods brought into a town. At first Octrois were collected at ports but being highly productive, towns began to, collect them by creating Octroi limits. They came to be known as “Town duties”. These were collected not only on ‘imports’ but also on ‘exports’. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court while discussing the word ‘use’ has observed as follows:- “There may be certain commodities which though put to use are not ‘use up’ in the process. They came to be known as “Town duties”. These were collected not only on ‘imports’ but also on ‘exports’. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court while discussing the word ‘use’ has observed as follows:- “There may be certain commodities which though put to use are not ‘use up’ in the process. A motor car brought into an area for use is not used up in the same sense as foodstuffs. The two expressions use‘ and ‘consumption’ together, therefore, connote the bringing in of goods and animals not with a view to taking them out again but with a view to their retention either for use without using them up or for consumption in a manner which destroys, wastes, or uses them up. In this context., the word ‘consumption’, as has been shown above, must receive a larger meaning then merely the act of consuming in the generally understood sense. “ It is considering the applicability of the above case to the case at hand, this Court observed, for the facts involving the case at hand, the particular items involved herein are not only brought to the Notified Municipal Area within the Sundargarh District but are also brought for the purpose of use by the industry. Therefore, the decision has a direct application to the case at hand. In another decision in Jafarabad Municipality vrs. Kathiawar Industries Ltd., AIR 1969 Gujarat 344, Gujarat Court considering the question as to whether the salt manufactured by the plaintiff-company at its salts works and exported uncrushed or crushed was liable to Octroi Duty. Therefore, the decision has a direct application to the case at hand. In another decision in Jafarabad Municipality vrs. Kathiawar Industries Ltd., AIR 1969 Gujarat 344, Gujarat Court considering the question as to whether the salt manufactured by the plaintiff-company at its salts works and exported uncrushed or crushed was liable to Octroi Duty. The Gujarat High Court held as follows:- “… Therefore, “considering the purpose for which the uncrushed salt is brought and the effect on that salt of the accomplishment of that purpose there is no doubt that uncrushed salt is brought in for use by the factor and Octroi is leviable on the uncrushed salt so brought to the factory for crushing.” In another unreported decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.M. Ram Lal & Co., a case involving wool sent for dyeing by the Head Office in Delhi to their factory in Faridabad township in the district of Gurugaon, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that unless it is shown that the wool was brought within the limits of the Notified Area Council, Faridabad Township, with the object of converting it into a different commercial commodity, it is not liable to Octroi. The decision, vide AIR 1985 Orissa 263 as relied upon by Sri S.D.Das, learned senior counsel for the petitioner for the change in the facts situation has no application to the case at hand. 9. Taking into account the aforesaid decisions and further considering the admission of the petitioner in the case at hand that the items involved therein since claimed to be utilized in the industrial premises of the petitioner, the decisions referred to herein above including S.M.Ram Lal (supra) have a direct application to the case at hand. 10. Taking the whole above into consideration, this Court finds, there remains no dispute that each of the items involves herein is in the use of the petitioner-Company after being brought the petitioner for being used and/or consumed within the Notified Council Area and further looking to the provision at Section 131(1) of the Act and the proviso therein, the State Government has the power to charge Octroi. It is as a consequence, Government in its legislative wisdom has brought a Notification for charging Octroi involving the particular item as clearly appearing in Annexure-10 not being challenged by anybody as of now has a binding force on all parties concerned, and therefore, there has been right demand of Octroi involving the items involved by the Municipal Authorities, O.Ps.2 and 3. 11. Therefore, this Court while declining to interfere with the demand involved herein, vide orders under Annexure-12, 13 & 14 since valid and refusing the prayer involved herein by the petitioner dismisses the writ application. 12. Since the petitioner is enjoying a conditional stay order against the Municipal Authorities not enforcing the demand under Annexure-14 subject to the petitioner’s depositing a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- on furnishing bank guarantee for Rs. 2,00,000/-, this Court since dismissing the writ application directs the Municipal Authorities to receive the balance amount after deduction of Rs. 1,50,000/- being already paid by the petitioner following the interim direction of this Court along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of deposit of the conditional amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- only on the balance amount. The petitioner is also directed to deposit the balance amount within a period of fifteen days from the date of this order. The writ application stands dismissed with the above direction. However, in the circumstances, there is no order as to cost. Application dismissed.