JUDGMENT : (Per Harsh Kumar, J.) The present criminal appeal has been filed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 9/10.5.1991 passed by VIth Additional Sessions Judge, Etah in S.T. No.69 of 1989, convicting all the accused for the offences under Sections 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. and Section 148 I.P.C. and sentencing each of them with life imprisonment and Rs.1,000/- fine under Section 302/149 I.P.C. and with imprisonment for an additional period of six months in case of default in payment of fine and each of the accused was sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year under Section 148 I.P.C. Apart from it accused Sahab Singh was also convicted for the offences under Section 324 I.P.C. and Section 25 Arms Act and was sentenced with one year rigorous imprisonment under each sections 324 I.P.C. and Section 25 Arms Act. All the seven accused/convicts have jointly filed the present appeal and were released on bail during pendency of appeal. During pendency of appeal, appellant nos.3 & 7 Shiv Singh and Mahesh were reported to have died and appeal in their respect was abated vide order dated 12.8.2014. 2. All the seven accused/convicts have jointly filed the present appeal and were released on bail during pendency of appeal. During pendency of appeal, appellant nos.3 & 7 Shiv Singh and Mahesh were reported to have died and appeal in their respect was abated vide order dated 12.8.2014. 2. The brief facts relating to the case are that on the written report submitted by Ram Baran a F.I.R. was lodged against seven accused persons at 11:15 p.m. on 9.11.1987 at Case Crime No.109 of 1987, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 & 324 I.P.C. and Case Crime No.110 of 1987 under Section 25 Arms Act against Sahab Singh with following averments:- "It is submitted that about two months back Ram Khilari and others had kidnapped applicant's brother Bal Mukund on account of arrears of money of which report was made by him at Police Station and since then they are inimical; that today on 9.11.1987 applicant, his brother Bal Mukund, his Bhanja Chob Singh and Bahnoi Raghuveer were around campfire (vkfl;kus ij rki jgs Fks) after dinner, a lantern was on at the hut, and Chob Singh was having torch; that at about 8:00 p.m. seven persons arrived there, Sahab Singh called to catch Bal Mukund, and when Bal Mukund ran towards the house of Shyam Singh by raising alarm, these people chased and fired at him, due to which he fell down; that on alarm raised by Bal Mukund, Muneshwar Singh arrived; that the complainant and his associates chased the miscreants and Chob Singh snatched the ¾th gun ¼ikSuk cUnwd½ of Sahab Singh during scuffle, when Sahab Singh caused teeth-bite injuries to Chob Singh and Chob Singh also gave teeth bites to Sahab Singh; that in the light of lantern and torch they identified miscreants Ram Khilari, Sahab Singh, Shiv Singh, Parsadi, Ram Singh, Hemraj and Mahesh, out of whom Shiv Singh and Ram Khilari were armed with guns while Sahab Singh, Hemraj, Parsadi, Ram Singh and Mahesh were armed with country-made pistols; that on way to Police Station, by tractor of Rambir Singh injured Bal Mukund succumbed to the injuries and they reached Police Station with dead body of Bal Mukund, the snatched pistol of Sahab Singh as well as with injured Chob Singh." The written report to above effect got scribed by Shaym Singh son of Sahab Singh of Nadarmai, was submitted at Police Station. 3. 3. After completing the investigation, charge-sheet was submitted by I.O. against all accused and case was committed to Sessions. The Sessions Judge after hearing the accused persons framed charges for the offences under Section 148, 302/149, 324 I.P.C. and Section 25 of Arms Act against Sahab Singh and under Section 148, 302/149 and 324/149 against the rest 6 accused persons, from which they denied and demanded trial. In order to prove its case the prosecution produced Ram Baran, the first informant and eye witness as P.W.-1, Chob Singh, the injured eye witness as P.W.-2, Gaya Prasad Diwakar and Prem Pal Singh Investigating Officers, as P.Ws.3 & 4, Dr. S.D. Mishra, the Medical Officer, who examined the injuries of Chob Singh as P.W.-5, Dr. K.N. Shukla, who conducted the post-mortem of the body of deceased Bal Mukund as P.W.-6 and Constable Ishwar Singh who sealed the 10 pellets recovered by Medical Officer from the body of deceased at the time of post-mortem, examination ( upon being handed over to him) as P.W.-7. 4. After completion of prosecution evidence the statements of the seven accused persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused-appellants did not produce any evidence in defence and after hearing the counsel for parties, the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide impugned judgment and order convicted all the accused for the offences under Section 148 & 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. and further convicted accused-appellant Sahab Singh for offences under Section 324 I.P.C. and Section 25 of Arms Act and sentenced them accordingly as mentioned earlier. 5. Feeling aggrieved, all the seven convicts preferred this appeal during pendency of which appellant nos.3 & 7 Shiv Singh and Mahesh died and appeal in respect of them was abated. 6. Heard Sri Geetam Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellant nos.1 & 2 Sri Ram Khilari and Sahab Singh, Sri Ram Pal Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for appellant nos.5 & 6 Ram Singh and Hem Raj, Sri Mohd. Waseem, Advocate, Amicus Curiae for appellant no.4 Parsadi, Sri A.N. Mulla, Advocate, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record. 7. Sri Mohd. Waseem, Advocate, Amicus Curiae for appellant no.4 Parsadi, Sri A.N. Mulla, Advocate, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record. 7. Sri Mohd. Waseem, Advocate, learned Amicus Curiae for Parsadi submitted that appellant has been falsely implicated; that as per prosecution case the accused persons were chasing victim Bal Mukund and fired at him from behind while the post-mortem report states of multiple fire arm injuries on his face which makes the prosecution case doubtful as upon firing from behind the injuries on face may not be sustained; that there are material contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses; that scribe of F.I.R. Shyam Singh has not been produced; that the F.I.R. has been lodged after inordinate delay of over 3 hours while the distance between the place of occurrence and Police Station was only 5 Km.; that no overtact has been assigned to appellant Parsadi; that learned Additional Sessions Judge has acted wrongly and illegally in relying on the untruthful evidence of P.W.-1 Ram Baran and P.W.-2 Chob Singh, who were related to deceased and were interested witnesses; that the prosecution failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt; that the impugned judgment and order of conviction of appellant Parsadi is liable to be set-aside and he is liable to be acquitted. 8. Sri Ram Pal Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellants Ram Singh and Hem Raj submitted that 4-5 fires are alleged to have been made by the accused persons but no injury is alleged to have been sustained by the first informant and Chob Singh, the alleged eye witnesses which is quite improbable and indicates that none of them were present at the spot at the time of occurrence; that there was no source of light on the place of occurrence and it appears that miscreants could not be identified and the appellants have been falsely implicated on the basis of suspicion as well as enmity with the scribe of F.I.R.; that there are material contradictions in the prosecution evidence and prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt; that the appellants have been wrongly convicted and sentenced and are liable to be acquitted. 9. 9. Sri Geetam Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellants-Ram Khilari and Sahab Singh submits that F.I.R. has been lodged with inordinate delay of over 3 hours; that the prosecution has not given any plausible reason for delay in lodging F.I.R.; that the prosecution story is absolutely false, incorrect and highly improbable and in view of the fact that despite 7 persons have been assigned with the role of indiscriminate firing, only single fire arm injury is alleged to have been sustained by the deceased; that the first informant and alleged eye witness P.W.-2 Chob Singh are not alleged to have sustained any injury which makes their presence on the spot doubtful; that despite indiscriminate firing at the spot no empty cartridges were recovered from the spot; that the allegations of snatching of pistol from appellant Sahab Singh by Chob Singh, the P.W.-2 are absolutely wrong and incorrect and in fact neither appellant Sahab Singh was carrying any pistol nor the same was snatched from him by Chob singh; that the prosecution witnesses no.1 & 2 are interested witnesses and their testimony is not reliable; that Raghuveer, who is alleged to be present on the spot, and Muneshwar Singh, who allegedly arrived on the alarm raised by the deceased, have not been produced and for not producing the independent witnesses, adverse inference is to be drawn against the prosecution; that the alleged recovery of pistol from appellant by Chob Singh is absolutely false and incorrect and is not admissible in view of provisions of Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act; that the deceased was doing business of goats with appellant Ram Khilari and a sum of Rs.1,500/- of appellant Ram Khilari was due on him in connection with the business; that the deceased had borrowed various amounts from various persons and after leaving his village, was living in another village; that it appears that the fatal injuries were caused to deceased at some other place by some unknown persons, who could not be identified and appellants have been falsely implicated on the basis of suspicion and enmity with scribe of F.I.R.; that Raghuveer, the brother-in-law of first informant was having enmity with co-accused-appellant Shiv Singh while Shyam Singh the scribe of F.I.R. was having enmity with co-accused-appellant Hemraj who was earlier tried for the murder of his father; that learned trial court has acted wrongly and illegally in relying the untruthful evidence of related and interested witnesses and convicting the appellants for the offences under Section 148 and 302 I.P.C. read with Section 149 I.P.C. and also in convicting appellant Sahab Singh for the offences under Section 324 I.P.C. and Section 25 Arms Act; that the appeal is liable to be allowed and the appellants are liable to be acquitted. 10. Sri A.N. Mulla, learned A.G.A. supported the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence and contended that it is fully proved from the evidence on record that the deceased along with first informant, his nephew Chob Singh and brother-in-law Raghuveer were around the campfire (vkfl;kuk&vyko), a lantern was on at nearby hut while Chob Singh was having torch when the appellants, who had earlier kidnapped and confined the deceased about two months back (of which report was made at Police Station), forming an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons, in prosecution of common object of such unlawful assembly, arrived there and appellant Sahab Singh called to catch hold of Bal Mukund, who ran away and the appellants by chasing fired at him and he succumbed to gun shot injury; that during the incident there a scuffle took place between the appellant Sahab Singh and P.W.-2 Chob Singh in which Sahab Singh caused injuries to him with butt of pistol and also made teeth-bites on chin etc. of Chob Singh and in return Chob Singh also made a teeth-bite on the nose of appellant Sahab Singh and also snatched his fire arm; that P.W.-1 & P.W.-2 are natural eye witnesses of the incident and there are no contradictions in their statements and there is no reason to disbelieve them; that P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 are neither interested witnesses nor inimical to accused persons and merely for their relationship with deceased their truthful testimony may not be disbelieved; that it is proved from the evidence on record that there was sufficient source of light at the spot from the lantern as well as the light of campfire (vyko) itself and since the miscreants were previously known and belonged to same village, there may not been any mistake in identifying them; that there was no enmity of Shyam Singh, the scribe of F.I.R. with any of the appellants to falsely implicate any of them; that the fires were made during chase so recovery of empty cartridges was not possible and since the person on run has a tendency of looking back at the miscreants to ensure his safety as well as distance from culprits, the fire appears to have hit him at the time of looking back, resulting in injuries on face; that Raghuveer, the brother-in-law of deceased and father of P.W.-2 Chob Singh is said to be inimical with accused Shiv Singh and Muneshwar Singh is said to have arrived subsequent to the incident of firing, so for non-production of above witnesses the prosecution may not suffer; that the impugned judgment and order is absolutely correct; that the appeal has been filed with absolutely false and baseless allegations and is liable to be dismissed. 11. Sri Geetam Singh, Advocate has also placed reliance on certain case laws which shall be discussed at appropriate place. 12. As per post-mortem report of Bal Mukund Ext. A-22 duly proved by P.W.-6 Dr. K.N. Shukla, who conducted the post-mortem, at 12:30 p.m. on 10.11.1987, the death of 30 years old Bal Mukund was caused about ¾ days before due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of ante-mortem injury no.1 which could have been sustained at about 8:00 p.m. on 9.11.1987 with the firearm viz. A-22 duly proved by P.W.-6 Dr. K.N. Shukla, who conducted the post-mortem, at 12:30 p.m. on 10.11.1987, the death of 30 years old Bal Mukund was caused about ¾ days before due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of ante-mortem injury no.1 which could have been sustained at about 8:00 p.m. on 9.11.1987 with the firearm viz. Katta or gun and following ante-mortem injuries were found on the person of 30 years old deceased:- (i) Multiple fire-arm wound of entry in an area 12 cm X 7 cm on left side of upper part of face and forehead including left eye, size varying from .25 cm x .25 cm to .5 cm x .5 cm and a wound on the middle of left eye brow 1 cm x 1 cm x cavity deep. 3 pellets recovered from the scalp. No blackening and tattooing, margins lacerated and inverted. (ii) Contusions 3 cm x .5 cm on the right side of forehead, 1 cm below interior hairline. Frontal bone of the scalp was fractured and 7 small round metallic pellets were recovered from brain. 13. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of record as well as the original record summoned from court below, we find that in view of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and learned A.G.A. the correctness of the impugned judgment and order of conviction is required to be tested on following points:- (a) Source of light (b) F.I.R. being highly belated (c) Motive/False implication (d) Formation of unlawful assembly and committal of offence in prosecution of common object (e) Reliability of witnesses (i) Being related or interested, having not sustained any injury (ii) Non-production of independent witnesses (f) Recovery of weapon of crime (g) Prosecution sanction (h) Conclusion (a) Source of light As far as the identification of accused persons and source of light on the spot is concerned, it is clearly mentioned in the F.I.R. itself that at the time of occurrence the first informant Raghuveer, Chob Singh and deceased were sitting around the campfire after dinner and the lantern was on at the nearby hut. It is not disputed that before global warming, earlier at the time of incident in 1987 winters used to come as early as since Dashehra in the month of October when the villagers used to sit around the campfire for gossips. It is not disputed that before global warming, earlier at the time of incident in 1987 winters used to come as early as since Dashehra in the month of October when the villagers used to sit around the campfire for gossips. Since supply of electricity in villages was rarity at that times, it was also common practice to keep the lantern on, since sunset till sunrise. It is noteworthy that light of lantern and that of campfire itself may be sufficient enough to identify the miscreants who were not strangers, rather belonged to the same village, were previously known and are not alleged to have been covering their faces. In the circumstances, the fact that memo of torch of Chob Singh was prepared by I.O. after inordinate delay, does not adversely affect the prosecution case. It has also been argued by learned counsel for the appellants that as per memo of lantern Exhibit A-1, the green coloured lantern with long glass was giving good light while P.W.-2 has stated that the lantern was of black colour with round glass. This argument has no force as after a period of about 3 years from the occurrence, a witness may not be expected to give exact description of the lantern or any such petty item which one normally do not notice in ordinary course. The accused have not asked the colour of lantern and shape of its glass from P.W.-1 and the prosecution case can not be thrown out on account of such minor discrepancy, if any. (b) F.I.R. being highly belated The argument with regard to delay in lodging of F.I.R. has also no force as F.I.R. has been lodged within a period of 3 hours and 15 minutes from the time of occurrence, in which all the miscreants have been named and considering the distance of Police Station 5 Kms. it may not be accepted that there was any inordinate delay in lodging of the F.I.R. (c) Motive/False implication As per averments made in F.I.R. accused Ram Khilari is cousin brother of deceased, the two were doing business of goats and there were some dues of accused Ram Khilari over Bal Mukund, deceased in connection with business of goats for which appellant Ram Khilari with his associates had kidnapped and detained the deceased about two months back and the matter was reported to Police. The above fact has not been disputed by the appellants. It is pertinent to mention that two suggestions have been put to first informant, P.W.-1 in cross examination (i) that the accused have been falsely implicated due to enmity with scribe Shyam Singh and (ii) that false case has been made out at the instance of Shyam Singh and police. P.W.-1 has denied both suggestions. It is noteworthy that scribe Shyam Singh is said to be inimical only to accused appellant Hemraj and there can be no reason for him to falsely implicate any other accused persons. There is nothing on record to show that P.W.-1 was dominated by Shyam Singh or local police to falsely implicate any of the accused persons of their choice. It is also pertinent to mention that the accused-appellants Ram Khilari and Sahab Singh were cousin brothers of the first informant and deceased and there is no whisper of any enmity of first informant or deceased with any of the accused-appellants, so there can be no reason for falsely implicating all or any of them by the first informant for the murder of Bal Mukund. (d) Formation of unlawful assembly and committal of offence in prosecution of common object The main argument of appellants is that the prosecution has failed to prove formation of any unlawful assembly by accused-appellants or committal of the offence in question in prosecution of common object of such unlawful assembly. Before proceeding further, we feel it proper to reproduce the provisions of Sections 141 and 149 I.P.C. as under:- "141. Before proceeding further, we feel it proper to reproduce the provisions of Sections 141 and 149 I.P.C. as under:- "141. Unlawful assembly.--An assembly of five or more persons is designated an "unlawful assembly", if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is-- First-- To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1[the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State], or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or Second-- To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or Third-- To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or Fourth-- By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or Fifth-- By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Explanation.-- An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. 149. Explanation.-- An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.-- If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence." From bare reading of above provisions it is clear that any assembly of five or more persons is designated as unlawful assembly if the common object of the persons forming that assembly is to commit an offence, and if any offence is committed by any member of such unlawful assembly in prosecution of common object of that assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew the offence to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that common object, every person who at the time of committal of offence is a member of the same assembly shall be guilty of that offence. From above it is also clear that it is always not necessary that the offence is committed in prosecution of the common object of such unlawful assembly and even if there is likelihood of committal of such offence in prosecution of that object, in the knowledge of members of the unlawful assembly, every person will be equally liable. In the case of Charan Singh and others Vs. State of U.P., (2004) 4 SCC 205 , the Apex Court has held that:- "Direct evidence of common object is generally not available and the same has to be gathered from the acts committed and result therefrom and that Section 149 I.P.C. consists of two parts. The first part of which means the offence to be committed in prosecution of common object and must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was a member. The first part of which means the offence to be committed in prosecution of common object and must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was a member. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 141 I.P.C., if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed and this is what is required in the second part of Section. An object is entertained in the human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence can be available and, like intention, has generally to be gathered from the act which the person commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard and fast rule can be laid down under the circumstances from which the common object can be culled out, it may reasonably be collected from the nature of assembly, arms it carries and behaviour at or before or after the scene of incident. The word "knew" used in the second branch of the Section implies something more than a possibility and it can not be made to bear the sense of "might have been known". In another case of State of Punjab Vs. Sanjiv Kumar @ Sanju and others, (2007) 9 SCC 791 , the Apex Court held that:- "It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of Section 141 I.P.C. A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or few members of assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it." In yet another case of Maranadu and another Vs. It may be formed at any stage by all or few members of assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it." In yet another case of Maranadu and another Vs. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2008) 16 SCC 529 , in which:- "A-1 to A-6 armed with dangerous weapons and country-made bombs allegedly assembled unlawfully with a common motive of murdering the deceased, P.Ws.-1 & 2 and one M-A, wherein upon catching hold of right hand of deceased, A-1, A-2 and A-4 had indiscriminately inflicted incised wounds on his neck, while A-3, A-5 and A-6 allegedly thrown country-made bombs on P.Ws. Challenging their conviction A-3 to A-5 and A-6 contends that since the bomb thrown by A-5 sustained injuries on cheek and left chest of P.W.-2 and bomb thrown by A-6 did not explode, they cannot be convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 149 I.P.C. because no injuries had been caused by them to the deceased." and the Apex Court discussing the principles enunciated through various case laws, held that provisions of Section 149 I.P.C. were clearly applicable as held by courts below and dismissing their appeal upheld their conviction." In the case of Kattukulangara Madhavan (dead) through Lrs Vs. Majeed and others, AIR 2017 SC 2004 , considering the scope of Section 149 I.P.C., the Apex court held that:- "If the object of the assembly is to murder someone, it is possible that the accused as a particular member of the assembly had no knowledge of the intention of the other members whose object was to murder, unless of course the evidence to the contrary shows such knowledge. But having participated and gone along with the others, an inference whether inculpatory or exculpatory can be drawn from the conduct of such an accused. The following questions arise with regard to the conduct of such an accused:- 1. What was the point of time at which he discovered that the assembly intended to kill the victim? 2. Having discovered that, did he make any attempt to stop the assembly from pursuing the object? 3. If he did, and failed, did he dissociate himself from the assembly by getting away? The answer to these questions would determine whether an accused shared the common object in the assembly. 2. Having discovered that, did he make any attempt to stop the assembly from pursuing the object? 3. If he did, and failed, did he dissociate himself from the assembly by getting away? The answer to these questions would determine whether an accused shared the common object in the assembly. Without evidence that the accused had no knowledge of the unlawful object of the assembly or without evidence that after having gained knowledge, he attempted to prevent the assembly from accomplishing the unlawful object, and without evidence that after having failed to do so, the accused disassociated himself from the assembly, the mere participation of an accused in such an assembly would be inculpatory." In above case there was no evidence to show that having participated in the unlawful assembly, which resulted in the death of Suresh Babu, A-1 made any attempt either to stop the incident from taking place or disassociated himself from the assembly upon finding that he can not prevent it due to which he was held guilty of offence with the aid of provisions of Section 149 I.P.C. In the case in hand all the 7 accused persons were armed with deadly weapons and have actively participated in the incident in prosecution of common object of unlawful assembly and also fired at the deceased so merely for the reason that deceased sustained only one gun shot injury, they may not be acquitted. The following case law relied by learned counsel for appellants Sri Geetam Singh are based on different facts and are not applicable to the facts of this case, as per discussion made hereunder. In the case of Allauddin Mian and others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1456 , (relied by the appellants) six persons allegedly formed an unlawful assembly with common object to cause death of Baharan Mian and since Baharan Mian ran into a room, A-1 & A-2 upon being frustrated, caused death of his two innocent daughters, and the Apex Court held that since the common object of unlawful assembly was to commit death of Baharan Mian and not to commit death of his two daughters, so it was sole act of A-1 & A-2 and consequently A-3 to A-6 may not be convicted with the aid of Section 149 I.P.C. In the case of Surinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2003) 10 SCC 66 , (relied by the appellants) where death was caused due to action of only one out of two accused, in absence of any evidence of common intention, the conviction of co-accused under Section 302/34 I.P.C. was set-aside. In the case of Kuldip Yadav and others Vs. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 324 , (relied by the appellants), 11 persons allegedly formed unlawful assembly but no overt act was attributed to any of them except A-1 towards murder of deceased and moreover prosecution witnesses were found not only interested, but also inimical to accused and their highly exaggerated statements were found to be contrary to each other failing to prove the offence having been committed in prosecution of alleged common object of unlawful assembly. Since based on different facts, the above case also does not help the appellants to any extent. In the case of Shaji and others Vs. State of Kerala, (2011) 5 SCC 423 , (relied by the appellants), A-1 had enmity with deceased and out of 6 persons who allegedly formed unlawful assembly only A-1 caused injuries to deceased and in absence of any overt act by others found not guilty. In the case in hand all the accused have been assigned with role of firing and since the facts of this case are different from present case, the above case law is also not applicable to the facts of this case. The case laws relied by the appellants, in cases of Allauddin Mian, Surinder Singh and Kuldip Yadav are distinguishable on the facts and are not applicable to this case. The case laws relied by the appellants, in cases of Allauddin Mian, Surinder Singh and Kuldip Yadav are distinguishable on the facts and are not applicable to this case. The argument of appellants that since (i) the deceased sustained only one gun-shot injury, (ii) no injury was caused to any eye witnesses, either Ram Baran first informant or Chob Singh, and (iii) no empty cartridge was recovered from the spot while 7 persons allegedly made firing at deceased, it makes the prosecution case doubtful also has no force, because when several persons fire at a person during chase it is quite natural that every fire made by each of them may not hit the person who is on run and since the chase was being made through streets upto Qabristan the empty cartridges might have gone to different directions particularly in view of the fact that they are not alleged to have been made at some standstill particular point in same direction. In such circumstances non-recovery of empty cartridges may not be material or detrimental to prosecution case. As far as not sustaining of any injury by P.W.-1 & P.W.-2 is concerned, it is noteworthy that the accused-appellants are alleged to have formed an unlawful assembly with a common object to commit murder of Bal Mukund and since the parties are not alleged to be on inimical terms (rather accused were inimical only to the deceased on account of dues against him) so they were not supposed to cause injury or fire at P.Ws.1 & 2 or anybody else. It is also noteworthy that P.W.-2 is an injured eye witness who had a scuffle with accused-appellant Sahab Singh during which scuffle both of them gave teeth bites to each other and moreover P.W.-2 Chob Singh also snatched the country-made pistol from Sahab Singh. In above circumstances, there is no reason to doubt the manner and place of occurrence in question or the presence of P.Ws.1 & 2 on the spot. The appellants also argued that since single gun shot injury has been sustained by the deceased so it may not be determined as to whose shot, hit him when seven persons were allegedly firing at him so the accused-appellants are entitled for benefit of doubt. The appellants also argued that since single gun shot injury has been sustained by the deceased so it may not be determined as to whose shot, hit him when seven persons were allegedly firing at him so the accused-appellants are entitled for benefit of doubt. It is proved from the evidence on record that all the seven accused-appellants armed with deadly weapons formed an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, committed death of Bal Mukund in the occurrence in question, so it is not material that fire made by which accused hit Bal Mukund and each and every member of such unlawful assembly is liable to be held guilty for causing death of Bal Mukund in view of the provisions of Section 149 I.P.C. Learned trial court has framed the charges under Section 302/149 I.P.C. against all accused-appellants and at the time of framing charge under Section 324 I.P.C. against Sahab Singh, he charged rest accused-appellants under Section 324/149 I.P.C. Moreover in absence of evidence of causing injury of teeth bites and pistol butt to Chob Singh by Sahab Singh in prosecution of common object of such unlawful assembly, has rightly not convicted the other accused-appellants under Section 324 I.P.C. read with Section 149 or 34 of I.P.C., at the time of convicting only Sahab Singh for injuries caused by him to Chob Singh during scuffle. Hence this argument also has no force. It is pertinent to mention that in the case in hand seven persons armed with deadly weapons, fire arms, formed an unlawful assembly and committed the offence in question in prosecution of common object of the assembly, wherein upon chasing Bal Mukund the deceased, they indiscriminately fired at him resulting in his death. As in appeal, the appellants-accused were also represented by three different counsel for 3 different sets of accused, who separately cross examined the prosecution witnesses at length. It is pertinent to mention that no prosecution witness was suggested on behalf of any set of accused that any of the accused was not member of such unlawful assembly or was not armed with fire arm or did not participate in the incident in question or any of them made any attempt to stop the assembly from pursuing the common object or upon failing to stop others, disassociated himself from above assembly. Apart from it none of the 7 accused-appellants has denied his membership to above unlawful assembly in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. (e) Reliability of witnesses It is proved from the evidence on record that at the time of occurrence, when the first informant, deceased, their nephew Chob Singh and Behnoi Raghuveer were taking heat around the campfire (vkfl;kuk&vyko) after dinner, seven accused-appellants forming an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons arrived there and upon call of appellant Sahab Singh to catch the deceased, he ran towards the house of Shyam Singh when all the accused appellants in prosecution of common object of unlawful assembly by chasing Bal Mukund and making indiscriminate fires on him, caused grievous firearm injury to Bal Mukund resulting in his death, on way to Police Station, and during the occurrence there was also a scuffle between appellant Sahab Singh and P.W.-2 Chob Singh in which both of them gave teeth bites to each other and Sahab Singh also sustained injuries to Chob Singh with butt of pistol and the country-made pistol of Sahab Singh was snatched by him. It is settled principle of law that the evidence of related witness may not be discarded merely for his being relative or interested rather his testimony is only required to be scrutinized with greater care and deeper caution. It is settled principle of law that the relative of the deceased will not falsely implicate a person by leaving the real culprit and there can be no reason with the first informant to leave the real culprits and falsely implicate the accused-appellants. In the case of Vijay Kumar Vs. State by Inspector of Police, Madras and another, (2009) 12 SCC 629 , the three judges Bench of Apex Court has held that:- "merely because P.W.-1 is brother of deceased, his evidence can not be rejected when he had no reason to speak falsehood against both accused. It is settled principle of law that relative witness would not allow real culprit to escape and implicate innocent, though his evidence has to be analysed carefully." Recently in the case of Kamta Yadav and others Vs. It is settled principle of law that relative witness would not allow real culprit to escape and implicate innocent, though his evidence has to be analysed carefully." Recently in the case of Kamta Yadav and others Vs. State of Bihar, (2016) 16 SCC 164, the Apex court has held that:- "once it is found that eye witnesses were present and have truthfully narrated the incident as it happened and their depositions are worth of credence, the conviction under Section 302/149 I.P.C. can be based on their testimonies even if they were related to the deceased. Only requirement is to examine and scrutinize their deposition with greater and deeper caution." In the case of Nand Kumar Vs. State of Chattisgarh, 2015 (1) SCC 776 , where several persons allegedly participated to kill the deceased J and his 2 sons B & S, the testimony of wife and daughter of deceased J (mother and sister of deceased B & S) was relied and the Apex Court held that:- "eye witness account of occurrence by wife and daughter of deceased before whom deceased and his sons were killed was consistent, cogent and reliable - Witness closely related to victim not expected to describe the incident in graphic details giving manner of participation of accused - It is not necessary for the prosecution to examine any more eye witnesses or all the eye witnesses for proving its case." The injury report of Chob Singh shows injuries of teeth bites on his nose, chest and left thumb apart from multiple lacerated wounds allegedly caused by appellant Sahab Singh by butt of his pistol during scuffle which corroborates the statement of P.W.-2 as well as the prosecution case. From above material on record and as per discussion made under point (d) and the prosecution has successfully proved that all the accused-appellants (seven in numbers) formed an unlawful assembly and armed with deadly weapons (firearms), in prosecution of common object of such unlawful assembly each of them actively participated in committal of death of Bal Mukund. In order to prove the charges against the accused-appellants the prosecution has produced the first informant Ram Baran as P.W.-1 and Chob Singh as P.W.-2, as the eye witnesses of the incident in question. The above two witnesses of fact have been cross examined at length and numerous suggestions have been put to them which have been denied by them. In order to prove the charges against the accused-appellants the prosecution has produced the first informant Ram Baran as P.W.-1 and Chob Singh as P.W.-2, as the eye witnesses of the incident in question. The above two witnesses of fact have been cross examined at length and numerous suggestions have been put to them which have been denied by them. Upon careful analysis of the statements of above witnesses we find that they are consistent to the prosecution case mentioned in F.I.R. and the injured witness Chob Singh, P.W.-2 corroborates his presence at the spot at the time of occurrence and of making resistance in natural manner as well as corroborates the testimony of first informant P.W.-1. As far as non-production of eye witnesses Raghuveer and Muneshwar is concerned, it is noteworthy that according to the F.I.R. itself Raghuveer was brother-in-law of deceased and first informant and is also alleged to be inimical to accused-appellant Shiv Singh (now deceased) and so upon his production the objection of accused-appellants of his being interested would have remained the same. Muneshwar Singh, alleged independent witness is said to have arrived at the spot subsequently, upon alarm raised by deceased and so he may not be a material witness for corroborating the complete incident and its manner from the very beginning. It is also noteworthy that quality of witnesses and not the quantity makes any difference and there is no reason to draw adverse inference against prosecution for non-production of Raghuveer and Muneshwar. The arguments of learned counsel for the appellants that since the deceased is alleged to have been fired during chase from behind so in natural course he ought to have sustained fire arm injury on his back while the post-mortem report states that he sustained fire arm injury on left side of upper part of his face and forehead including left eye so the incident in question appears to have been committed in some other manner, which could not be seen by the prosecution witnesses, also has no force. It is proved from the evidence on record that deceased was fired at by accused-appellants during run and in such circumstances the eye witnesses who were also taking their own case by taking shadow of hut etc. may not be expected to give video film like description of incident. It is proved from the evidence on record that deceased was fired at by accused-appellants during run and in such circumstances the eye witnesses who were also taking their own case by taking shadow of hut etc. may not be expected to give video film like description of incident. It is natural tendency of a person who is being chased for killing to look back at short intervals so as to ascertain as to how far he has left the miscreants and to which extent he is safe. The seat of injury being on left and upper part of his face and head may be sustained in natural course as bullet could have hit him at the time when he looked back to see distance between him and assailants. The sustaining of fatal injury to the deceased by the fires made by appellants is corroborated by the Medical evidence and is proved from the evidence on record. It is noteworthy that though numerous suggestions have been given to P.Ws.-1 & 2 without any relevancy but neither the place of occurrence has been disputed by the accused-appellants nor snatching of country-made pistol of Sahab Singh by Chob Singh has been disputed. The P.W.-2 has stated on oath that he snatched the country-made pistol from Sahab Singh and has proved the same before the Court as material Exhibit A-1 but to above witness P.W.-2 in cross examination only suggestions has been made to the effect that no mar-pit did take place between him and Sahab Singh to which he has replied that ^^;g xyr gS fd lkgc flag dks eSaus u idM+k gks vkSj mlls esjh ekj&ihV u gqbZ gks** It is noteworthy that the accused-appellants have not dared to suggest P.W.-2 that no country-made pistol was snatched from Sahab Singh. (f) & (g) Recovery of weapon of crime and prosecution sanction The learned counsel for the appellant nos.1 & 2 Ram Khilari and Sahab Singh argued that the recovery of weapon from appellant no.2 Sahab Singh is barred under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act and so the conviction of Sahab Singh under Section 25 of Arms Act is liable to be set-aside. He has also relied on AIR 1979 SC 1262 Bahadul Vs. He has also relied on AIR 1979 SC 1262 Bahadul Vs. State of Orissa, wherein the weapon was allegedly taken out by accused from beneath his cot and handed over to Police, without any statement and in absence of any evidence to show that accused had concealed it at a place which was known to him alone and no one else other than the accused had knowledge of it, the recovery was held to be barred by Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act. In this case P.W.-2 has proved snatching of the country-made pistol from Sahab Singh and of having sustained injuries in scuffle during the incident. Being based on different facts above case law is not applicable to the facts of this case and the appellant may not take any benefit under above case law. We find that there is no illegality or irregularity in prosecution sanction granted by Collector Jacob Thomas merely for the reason that P.W.-3 Gaya Prasad Diwakar has stated that prosecution sanction was obtained by S.I. Raj Pal while, Ext.-5 states to have been obtained by S.I. Gaya Prasad Diwakar, particularly when prosecution sanction has been granted by Collector after perusal of fire arm. In view of discussions made above, we find that the conviction of accused-appellant Sahab Singh under Section 25 Arms Act also does not suffer from any illegality. (h) Conclusion The place of occurrence has not been disputed and there is nothing on record to suggest that there were dues of some other persons on the deceased, who could have caused death of Bal Mukund in the darkness of night. In absence of any such evidence on record the prosecution case can not be looked at with the suspicion that death of Bal Mukund would have taken place in darkness of night and since the miscreants could not be identified, the appellants have been falsely implicated. The accused-appellants are not entitled to take benefit of doubt on this score. In view of the discussions made above, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has fully succeeded in proving the charges against the accused-appellants by reliable, cogent and trustworthy evidence, beyond reasonable doubt and the learned court below after careful analysis of the evidence on record has rightly held the accused-appellants guilty for the offences. In view of the discussions made above, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has fully succeeded in proving the charges against the accused-appellants by reliable, cogent and trustworthy evidence, beyond reasonable doubt and the learned court below after careful analysis of the evidence on record has rightly held the accused-appellants guilty for the offences. The appellants have failed to show any illegality or perversity in the findings of trial court in the impugned judgment and there is no case of non-consideration of any evidence on record by the court below or consideration of any evidence which is not on record. The learned trial court has awarded adequate sentence. There is no sufficient ground to interfere with or for setting it aside the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence. The appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 15. The appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is confirmed. The appellants were on bail. Their bail bonds are cancelled and surviving appellants are directed to surrender before the court below forthwith, and to undergo the remaining period of sentence. 16. The material exhibits shall be disposed off after statutory period in accordance with rules. 17. We appreciate the valuable assistance rendered by learned amicus curiae Sri Mohd. Waseem. 18. Let the lower court record be sent back to court below forthwith along with a copy of this judgment, for ascertaining necessary compliance.