JUDGMENT : Hitesh Kumar Sarma, J. 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 4.7.2007 passed by the Special Judge CBI, Assam by which the appellant stands convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 6 (months) for the offence under Section 7 and rigorous imprisonment for 1 year for the offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the PC Act). Both the sentences are ordered to run concurrently. The facts of the case may be briefly stated as follows: On 24.3.2003, one Keshab Sarma lodged a complaint with SP, CBI, alleging that appellant Anup Kr Singha, Sr. Accountant, Pension-IV Section, O/o. Accountant General (A & E) demanded an amount of Rs. 1000/- to clear the pensions papers of one Sujendra Lal retired Grade-IV employee, PWD Road Division, Majuli. According to the complainant Sujendra Lal had requested him to take steps to clear the pension paper. On receipt of the complaint, a verification was done by Inspector N.G. Khamrang and since the allegations was found true, a case vide RC No. 6(A)/2003-GWH u/s. 13(1)(d) read with Section 7 & 13(2) of the PC Act was registered. Thereafter, a trap was laid, and Manoj Banerjee, Inspector, was directed to make arrangements for the trap. Accordingly an amount of Rs. 1000/- treated with phenolphthalein was handed over to the complainant The trap team of CBI along with the complainant reached the AG office. The complainant met the appellant in the AG office and when the appellant demanded the money the complainant took out the tainted money and handed it over to the appellant who received if and kept it in his left side shirt pocket. The moment appellant took the money the complainant gave the signal. The trap team and the independent witnesses rushed to the appellant. Thereafter, a sodium carbonate solution was prepared, and on being required, the appellant dipped his right hand on the solution which turned pink. Thereafter, necessary seizure and other formalities were made. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was laid against the appellant for the offences u/s. 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. 2. In due course, charges u/s. 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act were framed against the appellant who pleaded not guilty to the charges. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was laid against the appellant for the offences u/s. 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. 2. In due course, charges u/s. 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act were framed against the appellant who pleaded not guilty to the charges. Prosecution examined 12 witnesses to substantiate the charges. At the closure of prosecution evidence, all the incriminating materials were put to the appellant who denied the allegations. The defence examined two witnesses. 3. After hearing rival arguments, the impugned judgment was delivered by the learned trial Court. 4. Heard Mr. GC Phukan, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. SC Keyal, learned Standing Counsel, CBI. 5. I have perused the impugned judgment and gone through the evidence of the witnesses recorded by the learned trial court. I have also perused the memorandum of appeal. 6. The genesis of the trial against the appellant lies in the complaint of Sri Keshab Sarma, examined as PW 2 in the case. He deposed that he is the Secretary of Muster Roll Labour Union of PWD at Majuli. One of the members of said Union Sri Sujindra Lal had retired from services and he had requested PW 2 to get the pension papers cleared. Since Sujindra Lal had no knowledge of the office procedure, PW 2 went to the AG Office where he met the appellant who demanded Rs. 5000 as a consideration for the work. According to PW 2, since he did not have money and as Sujindra Lal is a poor person, refused to pay bribe the accused-appellant, and then, approached the CBI Office and lodged a written complaint, Ext 2, with the SP, CBI. As deposed to further by the PW 2 a trap was designed to nab the appellant red-handed while accepting bribe in the presence of two independent witnesses, namely, Sri Talukdar and Sri Kalita. In pursuant to the trap plan PW 2, again approached the appellant and paid him Rs. 1000 as demanded. The amount of Rs. 1000 was already treated with phenolphthalein and the moment appellant kept the money in his pocket the trap team along with independent witnesses appeared and apprehended the appellant. The appellant was made to dip his hand in a water solution and when he dipped his hand the solution turned pink. 7. 1000 as demanded. The amount of Rs. 1000 was already treated with phenolphthalein and the moment appellant kept the money in his pocket the trap team along with independent witnesses appeared and apprehended the appellant. The appellant was made to dip his hand in a water solution and when he dipped his hand the solution turned pink. 7. In cross-examination PW 2 denied the defence suggestions that he had kept the money in the drawer of the appellant and that appellant had never demanded any money as bribe. 8. The cross-examination of PW 2 does not, in any manner, impeach the credibility of the PW 2 so as to cast a doubt on the allegations that appellant had demanded money from the PW 2 and that hand of the appellant had turned pink after being dipped in the chemical solution. 9. PW 10, Sujindra Lal Sinha, deposed that he had requested PW 2 Keshab Sarma to process his pension papers in the Office of AG. He also deposed that he had authorised the PW2 to that effect vide the authority letter, marked Ext. 23. 10. PW 9, Manoj Banerjee, is the Inspector, CBI, CAN, Guwahati. He deposed that, on 24.3.2003 he was entrusted with the duty of laying down a trap around appellant against whom a case was registered. PW 9 constituted a trap team and it was this trap team which was deployed to trap the appellant while taking the alleged bribe. The evidence of PW 9 on the point that the appellant received money from the PW 2 is in complete corroboration with the evidence of PW 2. 11. The cross-examination of the PW 9 does not impeach his credibility so as to discard his testimony on the vital issue of laying the trap as well as nabbing the appellant red-handed. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant argued with reference to the following case laws:- i. M. Narsinga Rao Vs. State of A.P., reported in AIR 2001 SC 318 . ii. Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 211 iii. Panalal Damodar Rathi Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1191 . iv. G.V. Nanjudiah Vs. State reported in AIR 1987 SC 2402 v. T. Subramanian Vs. State of T.N. reported in AIR 2006 SC 836 vi. Ayyasami Vs. State of T.N. reported in (1992) 1 SCC 304 vii. Panalal Damodar Rathi Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1191 . iv. G.V. Nanjudiah Vs. State reported in AIR 1987 SC 2402 v. T. Subramanian Vs. State of T.N. reported in AIR 2006 SC 836 vi. Ayyasami Vs. State of T.N. reported in (1992) 1 SCC 304 vii. State of A.P. Vs. T. Venkateswara Rao reported in (2004) 13 SCC 227 factual viii. State Vs. K. Narasimhachary reported in (2005) 8 SCC 364 ix. Union of India Vs. Purnandu Biswas reported in (2005) 12 SCC 576 no relevance x. State of Rajasthan Vs. Bhawani reported in (2003) 7 SCC 291 xi. Hiteswar Borah Vs. CBI reported in 2010 (4) GLT 517 and Shankar Biswas Vs. State of Tripura, reported in 2012 (4) GLT 466 13. Relying on Ganga Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 211 , learned counsel for the appellant submits that that in a trap case the duty of the officer to prove the allegations made against a government officer for taking bribe is serious, and therefore, the officers must seriously endeavour to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspires confidence in the mind of the court and the court is not left in any doubt whether or not any money was paid to the public servant by way of bribe. 14. It may be stated that in Ganga Srivastava (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not laid down a proposition of law that in all cases of trap charge must be proved by the independent witnesses. In any view of the matter the evidence of PW 2, the complainant, is unimpeachable, that he was asked for bribe by the appellant and while the latter paid the bribe the pre-laid trap apprehended the appellant. 15. In Panalal Damodar Rathi Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1191 it was held that the evidence of the complainant should be corroborated in material particulars. After introduction of Section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code making the person who offers bribe guilty of abetment of bribery the complainant cannot be placed on any better footing than that of an accomplice and corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime has to be insisted upon. 16. After introduction of Section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code making the person who offers bribe guilty of abetment of bribery the complainant cannot be placed on any better footing than that of an accomplice and corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime has to be insisted upon. 16. Though the facts of the Panalal Damodar Rathi (supra), were entirely different yet it may be stated that in the present case the complainant, PW 2, had not paid the bribe in the first instance. When he was asked for bribe he reported the matter to the CBI and a trap was laid. The bribe was paid as a part of the pre-laid trap. Hence, in the present case PW 2 cannot be considered to be a bribe giver. Even otherwise the evidence of PW 2 has been corroborated in material particulars by the other trap witnesses. 17. In G.V. Nanjundiah Vs. State (Delhi Admn.), reported in AIR 1987 SC 2402 the prosecution could not prove that the accused had demanded money from the complainant, hence, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on facts of the case, held that the very foundation of the prosecution case is shaken to a great extent since the question as to the handing over of any bribe and recovery of the same from the accused should be considered along with other material circumstances one of which is the question whether any demand was at all made by the appellant for the bribe. When it is found that no such demand was made by the accused and the prosecution has given a false story in that regard, the court will view the allegation of payment of the bribe to and recovery of the same from the accused with suspicion. 18. In the present case the tainted money was recovered from the possession of the appellant and when at the instance of the CBI he dipped his hands in two separate solutions of sodium carbonate one after another, his right hand turned pink because of the phenolphthalein powder. It would be for the appellant to establish in what context the money was found in his possession. 19. In T. Subramanian Vs. State of T.N., reported in AIR 2006 SC 836 , the accused had offered an explanation which gave rise to two probable views. It would be for the appellant to establish in what context the money was found in his possession. 19. In T. Subramanian Vs. State of T.N., reported in AIR 2006 SC 836 , the accused had offered an explanation which gave rise to two probable views. It was held that it is too well settled that in a case where the accused offers an explanation for receipt of the alleged amount, the question that arises for consideration is whether that explanation can be said to have been established. It is further clear that the accused is not required to establish his defence by proving beyond reasonable doubt as the prosecution, but can establish the same by preponderance of probability. In the present case no such explanation has been offered by the appellant rather; his case is of complete denial. Therefore, this decision is not applicable in the instant case. 20. In Ayyasami Vs. State of T.N., reported in (1992) 1 SCC 304 neither there was any independent evidence to show that the appellant demanded bribe nor did the chemical solution inculpate him. The appellant was acquitted on these facts. None of these facts are applicable to the present case. 21. The case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Bhawani, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 291 deals with the evidence of hostile witness. In this case it was held that the fact that the witness was declared hostile by the Court at the request of the prosecuting counsel and he was allowed to cross-examine the witness, no doubt furnishes no justification for rejecting en bloc the evidence of the witness. But the court has at least to be aware that prima facie, a witness who makes different statements at different times has no regard for truth. His evidence has to be read and considered as a whole with a view to find out whether any weight should be attached to the same. The court should be slow to act on the testimony of such a witness and, normally, it should look for corroboration to his evidence. The High Court has accepted the testimony of the hostile witnesses as gospel truth for throwing overboard the prosecution case which had been fully established by the testimony of several eyewitnesses, which was of unimpeachable character. The approach of the High Court in dealing with the case, to say the least, is wholly fallacious. The High Court has accepted the testimony of the hostile witnesses as gospel truth for throwing overboard the prosecution case which had been fully established by the testimony of several eyewitnesses, which was of unimpeachable character. The approach of the High Court in dealing with the case, to say the least, is wholly fallacious. In the present case, even if the evidence of hostile witnesses are kept aside the prosecution been able to bring home the charge in view of the clinching evidence of PW 2 and PW 9 along with other witnesses. 22. The other cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant are not found relevant to the facts of the present case. 23. In view of the evidence of the principal witnesses, discussed above, it would to proper to discuss herein the provisions of Section 20 of the PC Act, 1988 which deals with a rebuttable presumption. Section 20 provides as follows:- "20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration (1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be Inadequate. (2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 12 or under clause (b) of section 14, it is proved that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) and (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn." 24. The presumption under Section 20 is a legal presumption which can be rebutted only by a convincing evidence either that the money was not received or that the money received was a part of official transaction. 25. In the case of in the case of M. Narsinga Rao Vs. State of A.P., reported in AIR 2001 SC 318 the Hon'ble Supreme Court while discussing the presumption under Section 20 observed that the expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" are defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act. The presumptions falling under the former category are compendiously known as "factual presumptions" or "discretionary presumptions" and those falling under the latter as "legal presumptions" or "compulsory presumptions". When the expression "shall be presumed" is employed in Section 20(1) of the Act it must have the same import of compulsion. When the sub-section deals with legal presumption it is to be understood as in terrorem i.e. in tone of a command that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act etc., if the condition envisaged in the former part of the section is satisfied. The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption under Section 20 is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption under Section 20 is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. The section does not say mat the said condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its only requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fact can be proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged in the Evidence Act. 26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held in M. Narsinga Rao (supra) that the word "proof need be understood in the sense in which it is defined in the Evidence Act because proof depends upon the admissibility of evidence. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for the word "proved" in the Evidence Act. What is required is production of such materials on which the court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. 27. In the present case when the incriminating evidence were put to the appellant he merely denied those evidence. The defence evidence adduced by the appellant does not dislodge the prosecution evidence in any manner. Thus, the presumption raised by the prosecution evidence that the appellant demanded money from the PW 2, that, subsequently the appellant was caught red handed by laying a trap, that the hand of the appellant was dipped in sodium solution and hand turned red when so dipped, raises an irrefutable presumption that the appellant demanded money from the PW2. 28. I have perused the impugned judgment in this regard. Not only the factual evidence has been discussed at length but the legal proposition has also been discussed in detail. 28. I have perused the impugned judgment in this regard. Not only the factual evidence has been discussed at length but the legal proposition has also been discussed in detail. The judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial court is based on the evidence on record and the consequent sentence imposed upon the appellant is also found to have been within the prescription of law. Therefore, the judgment of the learned trial court requires no interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 29. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. 30. The appellant is directed to surrender before the learned trial court to serve out the sentence within 1 (one) month. Send down the LCR along with a copy of this judgment.