JUDGMENT & ORDER : Sonia Gokani, J. By way of present appeals, the appellant seeks to challenge the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated January 11, 2017, passed by the learned 11th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vadodara in Criminal Appeal Nos.54 and 55 of 2013 respectively, whereby the learned Judge has been pleased to modify the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned 7th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara, to the extent of setting aside of the order of sentence of simple imprisonment for one year imposed by the learned Magistrate. 2. Since both these appeals arise out of the original judgment and order dated May 01, 2013 rendered by the learned 7th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara, while dealing with Criminal Case Nos.8897 and 8898 of 2008 as well as the judgment and order dated January 11, 2017, passed by the learned 11th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vadodara, in Criminal Appeal Nos.54 and 55 of 2013; and since they involve identical questions of facts and law, they are being decided by this common judgment. The facts are drawn from Criminal Appeal No.1622 of 2017. 2.1 The appellant filed a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the respondent Nos.2 and 3 on March 28, 2008, alleging that the appellant-Company and the company of the accused had business relations as regards chemical manufacturing work and the respondent-convict company had purchased Fine Chloride from the appellant-company for which an amount of Rs.9, 14, 122/- was due. The respondent No.3 in his capacity as a Director of the respondent No.2-Company had issued a cheque dated January 25, 2008, bearing No.034895 for Rs.2 lakh in favour of the appellant. 2.2 The said cheque came to be dishonoured by the Bank of the accused with an endorsement "exceeds arrangement" on January 31, 2008 and, hence, a demand notice came to be issued to the respondent-convict on February 14/19, 2008, under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which was served upon the respondents on February 22, 2008. However, the respondents did not pay the amount due to the appellant and, hence, the complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. However, the respondents did not pay the amount due to the appellant and, hence, the complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 2.3 The trial resulted into conviction of the respondent No.3 by the learned 7th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara, vide judgment and order dated May 01, 2013, while dealing with Criminal Case No.8897 of 2008. The respondent-convict was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and was imposed a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 2.4 Aggrieved by the said decision of the trial Court, the respondent-convict challenged the same before the Appellate Court by way of an appeal. The learned 11th Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara, partly allowed the appeal, whereby the judgment and order of sentence of simple imprisonment for one year rendered by the trial Court came to be quashed and set aside. The sentence of fine has been confirmed by the Appellate Court. The Court also directed the amount of Rs.2 lakh to be given to the appellant. 2.5 Gravely aggrieved by this order of setting aside the punishment of simple imprisonment for one year, both these appeals have been preferred. 3. This Court has heard Shri Vipul Sundesha, learned counsel appearing with Shri P.P. Majmudar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in both the appeals. A fortiori, he has argued before this Court that the findings in the impugned judgment are against the appellant and are in no way justified from the evidence adduced by the appellant on record. When legally enforceable debt had been proved by the appellant, who had also established the same from the contemporaneous record, there was no reason for the learned Judge to quash and set aside the order of sentence. 3.1 It is further argued that while upholding the conviction and believing that the cheque was issued by the respondent-convict against the legally enforceable debt, the Appellate Court could not have set aside the order of sentence as the trial Court had justifiably imposed the punishment. 3.1 It is further argued that while upholding the conviction and believing that the cheque was issued by the respondent-convict against the legally enforceable debt, the Appellate Court could not have set aside the order of sentence as the trial Court had justifiably imposed the punishment. 3.2 He has further urged that the statutory presumption available under sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, could not have been overlooked by the Court, especially when the same has not been rebutted by the respondent-convict and, therefore, all the requested ingredients necessary for holding the accused guilty in a case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have been duly established by the appellant. 3.3 It is also argued before this Court that once there had been proof adduced by the appellant, the same needed to be discharged by the respondent-convict, who has failed to discharge such a burden and, therefore, the order of sentence ought not to have been set aside. 4. A contrario sensu, Shri Lalji Mokaria, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-convict, has urged that it is not in dispute that the respondent-Company had purchased Fine Chloride from the appellant-company, for which the amount had been due. It is also not disputed that the Director of the respondent-company had issued a cheque. The endorsement of the Bank indicated "Exceeds arrangement". 4.1 He has further urged that the Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the fact that during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the amount of disputed cheque had already been deposited with the Court. He has further urged that the Court had taken note of the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Kaushalya Devi Massand v. Roopkishore, (2011) AIR(Supreme Court) 2566 that the Negotiable Instruments Act is essentially catering the requirement of the civil law and there is no requirement of punishing a person once the amount of cheque has been deposited. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani, (2000) 7 SCC 183 . 4.2 He has also further relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajneesh Aggarwal v. Amit J. Bhalla, (2001) AIR(Supreme Court) 518 to urge that the deposit can have the same effect on the sentence awarded. 4.2 He has also further relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajneesh Aggarwal v. Amit J. Bhalla, (2001) AIR(Supreme Court) 518 to urge that the deposit can have the same effect on the sentence awarded. He has, therefore, urged that the Appellate Court has rightly quashed and set aside the judgment and order of sentence. 4.3 He has also urged this Court that in absence of any illegality, this Court should not interfere with the impugned judgment and order. 5. Having thus heard the learned counsel for both the sides, a short question that arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether the deposit of cheque amount by the respondent during the pendency of the appeal before the trial Court would absolve the accused of the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 6. It is to be noted that there is no challenge separately made by the respondent-convict to the judgment and order of conviction and sentence. An attempt is made to support the same where the Court has though held the respondent guilty, it has chosen not to sentence him to imprisonment. 7. This Court notices that vide Exhibit 60, an application was tendered before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by the respondent-convict stating inter alia therein that two banker's cheques, each for Rs.1 lakh dated February 03, 2012 and March 20, 2012, had been taken out, however, the complainant had refused to accept the same unless the same is paid with interest. A request was made by the respondent-convict to discharge him in the wake of this non-acceptance. The trial Court after detailed order below Exhibit 60 had refused to accept such a plea and held that no party could be compelled to enter into a compromise, more particularly, when the cheque amount had been offered. Moreover, the matter had been posted for judgment and, therefore, the Court held that it is not the stage for giving discharge. At the best, it can be said that the respondent-convict had offered the principal amount in the year 2012, however, when the complainant refused to accept the same, for non-payment of interest, no attempt had been made by the respondent-convict to deposit the same with the Court. At the best, it can be said that the respondent-convict had offered the principal amount in the year 2012, however, when the complainant refused to accept the same, for non-payment of interest, no attempt had been made by the respondent-convict to deposit the same with the Court. Be that as it may, later on, before the Appellate Court on June 27, 2016, without waiting for the appellant to accept the forcible compromise, the cheque amount of Rs.2 lakh had been deposited. 8. Before this Court adverts to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for both the sides, this Court shall have to record the fact that the cheque had been issued for purchase of chemicals on January 25, 2008. The litigations between the parties had ended before the trial Court in the month of May, 2013, whereby the trial Court held the respondent guilty for the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by sentencing him simple imprisonment for a period of one year. It is to be noticed that thereafter also the appellant had challenged the said judgment and order and had approached the Appellate Court by preferring Criminal Appeal No.54 of 2013 and the deposit of cheque amount had been made on June 27, 2016. Thus, after about 81/2 years of the dishonour of the cheque, the respondent-convict had deposited the amount after losing before the trial Court. In such eventualities, the appellant is aggrieved thoroughly because not only the Court had denied any amount of interest, but it has also not granted any amount of compensation as has been prescribed under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. By quashing and setting aside the order of sentence of imprisonment of one year, the Appellate Court had even upheld the sentence of fine imposed by the trial Court in both the matters. 9. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajneesh Aggarwal deserves a reference at this stage. It was a case of dishonour of cheque under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, wherein the accused deposited the entire amount covered by the cheque during the trial. 9. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajneesh Aggarwal deserves a reference at this stage. It was a case of dishonour of cheque under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, wherein the accused deposited the entire amount covered by the cheque during the trial. The Apex Court held that once the offence of dishonour of cheque is committed, any payment made subsequent thereto will not absolve the accused drawer of the liability of criminal offence, though in the matter of awarding of sentence, it may have some effect on the Court trying the offence. But by no stretch of imagination, a criminal proceeding could be quashed on account of deposit of money in the Court or that an order of quashing of criminal proceeding, which is otherwise unsustainable in law, could be sustained because of the deposit of money in the Court. The Court held, "the so-called deposit of money by the respondent in this Court is of no consequence". 10. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Narsingh Das Tapadia, while considering the mitigating circumstances, at the time of awarding sentence in a case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court held that the accused if pays the amount which includes the cheque amount as well as the interest payable thereon, it would be a mitigating circumstance and the Apex Court when noticed that the accused had paid a sum of Rs.3,94,243.33 ps., which included the cheque amount of Rs.2,30,000/- as well as interest thereon, it had reduced the sentence of simple imprisonment awarded by the trial Court. 11. In the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Lataben Dattraybhai Patil v. Vitthal Damu Chaudhary, 2015 JX 1507 (Guj) this Court was considering the similar set of facts and circumstances, wherein the learned Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence and directed the respondent-accused to pay a particular amount to the original complainant. Referring to various decisions on the subject, this Court referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R. Vijayan v. Baby and another, (2012) 1 SCC 260 wherein the Court had insisted for uniform, practical and realistic approach. Referring to various decisions on the subject, this Court referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R. Vijayan v. Baby and another, (2012) 1 SCC 260 wherein the Court had insisted for uniform, practical and realistic approach. The Court also held that Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides for both traditional punitive provisions as well as compensatory and restitutive aspects. Apt it would be to regurgitate the relevant observations from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R. Vijayan, which read as under : "14. This case relates to dishonour of cheque in the year 1995. Though the complainant-appellant has succeeded in obtaining a conviction, he has virtually lost in the sense he did not get compensation to recover the amount of the dishonoured cheque. As the limitation for filing a civil suit expired during the pendency of the appeal before the Sessions Court, the appellant has also lost the opportunity of recovering the amount by way of civil suit. In view of this peculiar position, we requested Dr. Rajiv Dhavan, senior counsel, to assist us as an Amicus Curiae to suggest methods to improve the disposal of cases under section 138 of the Act and also improve the relief that could be granted in such cases. 15. In the meantime a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663 , addressed the question of reluctance of offenders to compound the cases at earlier stages of the case prosecution leading to a huge pendency of cheque dishonour cases, and issued the following guidelines proposing levy of 'a graded scale of fine' to encourage compounding at earlier stages of the case : "(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any costs on the accused. (b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit. (c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs. (d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque amount. x x x x x The graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the status quo, valuable time of the Court is spent on the trial of these cases and the parties are not liable to pay any Court-fee since the proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though the impact of the offence is largely confined to the private parties. Even though the imposition of costs by the competent court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs has been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance. Bona fide litigants should of course contest the proceedings to their logical end." 16. We propose to address an aspect of the cases under section 138 of the Act, which is not dealt with in Damodar S. Prabhu. It is sometimes said that cases arising under section 138 of the Act are really civil cases masquerading as criminal cases. The avowed object of Chapter XVII of the Act is to "encourage the culture of use of cheques and enhance the credibility of the instrument". In effect, its object appears to be both punitive as also compensatory and restitutive, in regard to cheque dishonour cases. Chapter XVII of the Act is an unique exercise which blurs the dividing line between civil and criminal jurisdictions. In effect, its object appears to be both punitive as also compensatory and restitutive, in regard to cheque dishonour cases. Chapter XVII of the Act is an unique exercise which blurs the dividing line between civil and criminal jurisdictions. It provides a single forum and single proceeding, for enforcement of criminal liability (for dishonouring the cheque) and for enforcement of the civil liability (for realization of the cheque amount) thereby obviating the need for the creditor to move two different Fora for relief. This is evident from the following provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act. (i) The provision for levy of fine which is linked to the cheque amount and may extend to twice the amount of the cheque (section 138) thereby rendering section 357(3) virtually infructuous insofar as cheque dishonour cases. (ii) The provision enabling a First Class Magistrate to levy fine exceeding Rs. 5,000/- (Section 143) notwithstanding the ceiling to the fine, as Rs. 5,000/- imposed by section 29(2) of the Code; (iii) The provision relating to mode of service of summons (section 144) as contrasted from the mode prescribed for criminal cases in section 62 of the Code; (iv) The provision for taking evidence of the complainant by affidavit (section 145) which is more prevalent in civil proceedings, as contrasted from the procedure for recording evidence in the Code; (v) The provision making all offences punishable under section 138 of the Act compoundable. 17. The apparent intention is to ensure that not only the offender is punished, but also ensure that the complainant invariably receives the amount of the cheque by way of compensation under section 357(1) (b) of the Code. Though a complaint under section 138 of the Act is in regard to criminal liability for the offence of dishonouring the cheque and not for the recovery of the cheque amount, (which strictly speaking, has to be enforced by a civil suit), in practice once the criminal complaint is lodged under section 138 of the Act, a civil suit is seldom filed to recover the amount of the cheque. This is because of the provision enabling the court to levy a fine linked to the cheque amount and the usual direction in such cases is for payment as compensation, the cheque amount, as loss incurred by the complainant on account of dishonour of cheque, under section 357(1) (b) of the Code and the provision for compounding the offences under section 138 of the Act. Most of the cases (except those where liability is denied) get compounded at one stage or the other by payment of the cheque amount with or without interest. Even where the offence is not compounded, the courts tend to direct payment of compensation equal to the cheque amount (or even something more towards interest) by levying a fine commensurate with the cheque amount. A stage has reached when most of the complainants, in particular the financing institutions (particularly private financiers) view the proceedings under section 138 of the Act, as a proceeding for the recovery of the cheque amount, the punishment of the drawer of the cheque for the offence of dishonour, becoming secondary." 12. This Court, therefore, in the decision in the case of Lataben Dattraybhai Patil held and observed as under : "7.3 The Apex Court thus held that more often the cases under this Act are be said to be of civil nature rather than criminal cases and the object of Chapter XVII is to encourage the culture of use of cheque and enhance the credibility of the instrument. In fact, according to the Apex Court, the object is both punitive so also compensatory and restitutive. The dividing line between the civil and criminal jurisdiction gets blurred in Chapter XVII of the said Act by providing a single forum and single proceeding for enforcing the criminal as well as civil liability for dishonour of the cheque as well as for realization of the amount of such cheque. It further held that this obviates the need for the creditor to move from one forum to another for the purpose of relief. And therefore, going a step further, the Apex Court dealt with the issue which had been left out in case of Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663 . It further held that this obviates the need for the creditor to move from one forum to another for the purpose of relief. And therefore, going a step further, the Apex Court dealt with the issue which had been left out in case of Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663 . 7.4 It is very clear from this decision that the intention as called for in this judgment is not only of the punishment of the offender, but also of ensuring the restitutive aspect to the complainant who would receive the amount of cheque by way of compensation. The aggrieved complainant is not to be sent from post to pillar to enforce civil liability for recovery of the amount of dishonoured cheque. The Apex Court went on seeing that the provisions of Chapter XVII strongly lead to grant of loss by way of compensation and therefore unless there are special circumstances, a uniform exercise of power for levy of fine upto twice the cheque amount, keeping in view the cheque amount and the simple interest thereon @ 9% per annum, as a reasonable quantification towards the loss. Such direction of payment of compensation by way of restitution for loss incurred by the complainant on account of dishonour of cheque is held to be practical and realistic. The Court was more concerned as these cases are not being concluded within six months from the date of filing of the complaint and the Limitation Act prescribes for filing of the Civil Suits within three years from the date of arising of the cause of action and on account of pendency of criminal case, most of the time, civil suits are not being filed. 8. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case, applying the ratio laid down by the Apex Court; as discussed hereinabove, it could be said that the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Surat has committed apparent error while sentencing the respondent. It chose not to award any sentence for the offence under section 138 of NI Act. The punitive aspect has lost sight off completely. It also committed an error in not grating the entire cheque amount by way of compensation to the applicant-original complainant. The Court of learned JMFC, Surat awarded sentence of one year simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,05,000/-, whereby Rs. The punitive aspect has lost sight off completely. It also committed an error in not grating the entire cheque amount by way of compensation to the applicant-original complainant. The Court of learned JMFC, Surat awarded sentence of one year simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,05,000/-, whereby Rs. 1,00,000/- was granted by way of compensation and the fine of Rs. 5,000/- was to be remitted to the State Government; and in default of payment of fine, fifteen days of simple imprisonment is further directed. It is to be noted that the cheque amount was not deposited till the matter proceeded before the appellate forum and it is almost at the fag end that the amount has been deposited. This attitude on the part of the respondent could not have weighed with the Court to quash the entire order of sentence and the Court ought to have also kept in mind that it was not out of the settlement between the parties that such deposit was made. In fact, both the sides were litigating strenuously to prove their rival claims and in such circumstances, possibly on seeing weighty and unassailable evidence indicating unfavourable result that the respondent herein had chosen to deposit the amount by way of purshis which does not admit non payment part of its legal dues, he continued to contest and argue on merits and the Court needed to adjudicate the lis between the parties. Therefore, even while considering that this is essentially in discharge of civil liability and takes care of the part of restitution and some part of compensation, the deterrent aspect which is inbuilt in introducing these provisions under the NI Act has remained unattended. This balance of both is necessary bearing in mind the object of introducing these provisions under Section 138 of the NI Act as also laid down in case of R. Vijayan v. Baby. 8.1 Moreover, the reasons given by the Court for setting aside the punishment awarded by the trial Court can be said to be sanctuary of errors and there is manifest perversity in as much as being a professional is no ground not to undergo the sentence, if the person is otherwise proved to have committed an offence and is required to undergo the sentence. 8.2 Apex Court in case of State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 , of course in a different context while considering the sentence in a motor accident claim reference, relied upon decision in case of Shyam Narain v. State [NCT of Delhi], (2013) 7 SCC 77 wherein it has been held that, primarily it is to be borne in mind that sentencing for any offence has a social goal. Sentence is to be imposed regard being had to the nature of the offence and the manner in which the offence has been committed. The fundamental purpose of imposition of sentence is based on the principle that the accused must realize that the crime committed by him has not only created a dent in his life but also a concavity in the social fabric. The purpose of just punishment is designed so that the individuals in the society which ultimately constitute the collective do not suffer time and again for such crime. It serves as a deterrent. True it is, on certain occasions, opportunities may be granted to the convict for reforming himself but it is equally true that the principle of proportionality between an offence committed and the penalty imposed are to be kept in view. While carrying out this complex exercise, it is obligatory on the part of the Court to see the impact of the offence on the society as a whole and its ramifications on the immediate collective as well as its repercussions on the victim. 9. Sentencing is a discretion of the Court within the legal parameters and indeed it is a complex process as observed by the Apex Court. The principle of just punishment would require in cases of dishonour of cheques to bear in mind both its civil as well as criminal facets. While restitutive and compensatory aspects are obligatory for the court to be alive of, punitive aspect, unless special circumstances so warrant, cannot be given a complete go-bye. 10. Thousands of cases of dishonour of cheque in the courts of law are pending and their numbers are on rise every year. While restitutive and compensatory aspects are obligatory for the court to be alive of, punitive aspect, unless special circumstances so warrant, cannot be given a complete go-bye. 10. Thousands of cases of dishonour of cheque in the courts of law are pending and their numbers are on rise every year. A system which would allow the person [other than those bona fide] to evade payment of his legal dues under the shelter of litigation for years and does not deter him with any sentence if he pays at the fag end of trial or at appellate proceedings, without entering into compromise, when already considerable time and efforts have been invested, would fail to create any impact in the society. It would also not sub-serve the object of drawing of cheque a regular mode and of making the drawer more responsible. It on the contrary may enhance unscrupulousness in commercial transactions which is bloodline of economy of any nation." 13. In light of above discussed decisions, adverting to the facts of the present case as noted hereinabove, the dishonour of cheque is of the year 2008. First time, the offer for payment of amount was made by the respondent-convict in the year 2012, however, the respondent-convict never chose to deposit the amount before the trial Court. It is only after having faced the judgment and order of conviction and sentence of simple imprisonment for one year rendered by the trial Court concerned, during the pendency of the appeal at the fag end of the same, the respondent-convict has chosen to deposit the amount of Rs.2 lakh i.e. principal amount without bothering to pay the interest part thereof. 14. In the wake of discussion made hereinabove, the Appellate Court has committed serious error in setting aside the order of sentence. With no challenge made to the dishonour of cheque and guilt proved under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the deposit of amount of cheque after a period of eight years from the date of dishonour of the cheque, could not have weighed with the Court in taking away both punitive part as well as restitutive aspect. 15. After having so said, however, this Court also needs to consider the affidavit filed by the respondent No.3, who has stated in his affidavit inter alia as under : "1. 15. After having so said, however, this Court also needs to consider the affidavit filed by the respondent No.3, who has stated in his affidavit inter alia as under : "1. I, the deponent, declare that because due to the loss in the factory, deponent has closed the factory in March, 2007 and because of non-payment of installments, the IDBI Bank has issued demand Notice dated 26.02.2008 U/s 13 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter called "Securitization Act") which is annexed at Annexure-R-1. 2. I the deponent declare that I have given offer to the Manager, IDBI Bank Ltd., Siddanath Road Branch, Vadodara that now I request you for OTC offer for Rs.70 lacs in full and final payment which I humbly request you to consider vide my letter dated 22.03.2013 which is annexed at Annexure-R-2. 3. I deponent declare that the above mentioned offer was accepted by Branch Head, IDBI Bank, Baroda vide letter dated 28.03.2013 that as per Schedule of payment entire crystallized amount of Rs.70 lacs payable immediately on issuance of sanction letter and on or before 31.03.2013. The said letter is annexed at Annexure-R-3. 4. I deponent declare that my friend MANUBHAI BHUPATSINH PADHIYAR purchased my Nandesri GIDC Plot No.155/7 and 8 and had given assurance of payment of Rs.70 lacs. The declaration dated 30.03.2013 on stamp of Rs.100/- is annexed as Annexure-R-4. 5. I deponent declare that I have paid the entire amount as per OTS, therefore IDBI Bank has given clearing certificate dated 12.04.2013 to the deponent which is annexed as Annexure-R-5." 16. This Court had directed vide its order dated February 23, 2018, to declare and disclose as to whether the legal proceedings eventually resulted into the property being sold to third party, leaving nothing for the appellant and the proof of his being out of the business. He had been permitted to bring on record those special circumstances and also to disclose his other assets, over and above the one he had specified in the affidavit-cum-declaration. He had been permitted to bring on record those special circumstances and also to disclose his other assets, over and above the one he had specified in the affidavit-cum-declaration. Except the oral version that he is residing in the ancestral home, which is jointly owned by his three siblings, nothing is brought on record, which may not be sufficient for this Court to hold that he has nothing which could preclude him from paying the amount of fine/compensation which otherwise the complainant deserves, who had lost his amount for nearly eight years and after the year 2016 only, it continued to lie with the Court. 17. In view of aforesaid, the impugned order passed by the Appellate Court deserves to be quashed and set aside by confirming the conviction and modifying the sentence, as also the fine. 18. For the foregoing reasons, both the appeals are partly allowed. The impugned order passed by the Appellate Court in each appeal is quashed and set aside. The respondent-convict in both the appeals is directed to pay twice the amount of cheque to the appellant-original complainant by way of fine, which shall be deposited by the respondent-convict with the Registry of this Court within a period of 12 (twelve) weeks from today, failing which the respondent-convict shall pay interest on the said sum at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the complaint. 18.1 On deposit of such amount by the respondent-convict with the Registry of this Court, the Registry shall forthwith pay the same to the appellant-original complainant by way of an account payee cheque in the name of the appellant. 18.2 It is clarified that if no such amount is deposited by the respondent-convict within the stipulated time, the trial Court concerned shall issue warrant against the respondent-convict directing him to serve the sentence of simple imprisonment for a period of six months for the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Disposed of accordingly. Direct Service is permitted.