JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner tenant is aggrieved of the order dated 23.02.2011 passed in Title Eviction Suit No.39 of 2001 by which amendment in paragraph no.9 of the written statement has been declined. 2. Briefly stated, on 16.04.1996 an agreement of tenancy for five years was executed between the parties under which the petitioner was inducted as tenant on monthly rent of Rs.851/-, payable on the last date of each month. On an allegation of default in payment of rent a notice was issued to the petitioner on 17.03.2001 terminating the tenancy with effect from 16.04.2001. Title Eviction Suit No.39 of 2001 was instituted by the landlords on the ground of default in payment of rent since October, 1999 and personal necessity of plaintiff no.1 and his son. The plaintiffs have pleaded that the defendant has violated the conditions of tenancy for which several notices were issued to the defendant through the plaintiff 's advocate. In the suit besides seeking a decree for eviction of the defendant from Schedule-A premises, a decree for arrears of rent as described in Schedule-B has also been sought. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement on 03.01.2002. The defendant has denied the allegation of default in payment of rent and personal necessity of the plaintiff no.1 and his son for ejection of the defendant from the tenanted premises. The defendant has specifically pleaded that the plaintiff no.1 is residing in his village and the plaintiff no.2 is gainfully employed under M/s BCCL. The defendant has also asserted that the plaintiffs are in possession of the second floor of a triplestoreid market complex consisting of fourteen shops on the ground floor and six shoprooms as well as a nursinghome at the first floor of the said building. Denying the claim for personal necessity of the son of plaintiff no.1, the defendant has pleaded that the son of plaintiff no.1 namely, Ranjit Kumar Singh is a minor still pursuing his studies. 3. During trial of the suit, after the parties led their evidence, an application for amendment in the written statement was filed on 20.11.2010. 4. Denying the claim for personal necessity of the son of plaintiff no.1, the defendant has pleaded that the son of plaintiff no.1 namely, Ranjit Kumar Singh is a minor still pursuing his studies. 3. During trial of the suit, after the parties led their evidence, an application for amendment in the written statement was filed on 20.11.2010. 4. Contending that in an eviction suit instituted on the ground of bonafide requirement of the plaintiff, subsequent development regarding vacation of another premise can always be incorporated in the written statement, for it would assist the Court in deciding the real issue, that is, personal necessity of the plaintiff, involved in the suit, and referring to the decisions in “M.M.Quasim vs Manohar Lal Sharma & Others” reported in (1981) 3 SCC 36 and “Shiv Sarup Gupta vs Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta” reported in (1999) 6 SCC 222 , Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on a wrong notion that the landlord has an unfettered right to seek eviction the learned trial Judge has rejected the application for amendment which must be found illegal. 5. As against the above, Mr. Birendra Kumar, the learned counsel for the respondents contending that the application for amendment in the written statement is an afterthought and when the defendant has not shown her bonafide, the alleged subsequent development cannot be incorporated in the written statement. 6. In the application for amendment the defendant has sought following amendments in paragraph no.9 of the written statement: “Two paragraphs may be allowed to be added after paragraph 9(iv) of the written statement as follows: (v) Recently about 23 months back one of the tenants namely Khem Chand Agarwalla occupying a shop in the ground floor of the suit building vacated the same and the said shop become available to the plaintiffs and hence the necessity, if any, of the plaintiffs can be satisfied by occupying the said shop. (vi) Recently the plaintiffs have come in possession of another building on the flank of the road and lying just opposite the suit building and the said premises has sufficient accommodation on the ground floor for satisfying the necessity, if any, of plaintiffs. (vi) Recently the plaintiffs have come in possession of another building on the flank of the road and lying just opposite the suit building and the said premises has sufficient accommodation on the ground floor for satisfying the necessity, if any, of plaintiffs. It is learnt that said premises was earlier in occupation of one Kailash Soni and the plaintiffs obtained the possession thereof by virtue of the decree of the court though the details of the case is not yet known to the defendant.” 7. Order VI Rule 17 CPC confers powers upon the Court to permit amendment in the pleadings. Amendment in the pleadings can be permitted at any stage of the suit, even at the stage of final hearing, however, proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC has put a statutory limitation upon the powers of the Court to permit amendment in the pleadings. This provision contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC has been held mandatory. It provides that after the trial in the suit has commenced normally amendment in the pleadings shall not be permitted. On the basis of the allegations in the plaint and the written statement issues were framed and the trial proceeded, and after the parties led their evidence and the suit was posted for final hearing, without disclosing the source of information a bald application for amendment is filed by the defendant. The suit for eviction instituted on the ground of bonafide requirement of the plaintiffs is adjudicated on the basis of the cause of action disclosed on the date of institution of the suit. In the written statement the defendant has pleaded that there were vacant premises in possession of the plaintiffs, and on that ground the plea of bonafide requirement of plaintiff no.1 and his son has been denied. 8. Now the defendant through the amendment application intends to incorporate a new fact which, according to the defendant, is a subsequent development. In the written statement the defendant has pleaded that there were vacant premises in possession of the plaintiffs, and on that ground the plea of bonafide requirement of plaintiff no.1 and his son has been denied. 8. Now the defendant through the amendment application intends to incorporate a new fact which, according to the defendant, is a subsequent development. In the application for amendment, except stating that one Khem Chand Agarwalla who was occupying a shop on the ground floor has vacated the shop about 23 months back and one Kailash Soni who was occupying another premises situated just in front of the suit building consisting of the suit premises has also evicted the shop in his possession, the defendant has failed to aver necessary particulars with respect to the alleged tenancy of Khem Chand Agarwalla and Kailash Soni. The aforesaid allegations in paragraph nos.4 and 5 of the amendment application have been specifically denied by the plaintiff. No doubt, the landlord may not have an unfettered right to seek eviction and a material subsequent development in a suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity of the landlord may be incorporated in the written statement, but then the application for amendment must disclose specific details of tenancy of the shop which has been vacated such as, shop number, nature of business/ name of the shop, adjoining shops etc., which if proved during the trial would assist the court in arriving at a conclusion on the personal necessity of the landlord. 9. Besides the statutory limitation on the powers of the Court to permit amendment in the pleadings, if the procedure adopted by the defendant is permitted it would not only be an unending process in the trial of the suit, in the present case it would be a futile exercise only delaying disposal of the suit. Considering the aforesaid facts, the trial Judge has rightly declined to permit amendment in the written statement. Merely because the reasons assigned by the trial Judge in the impugned order may not be perfect, in view of the facts pleaded by the parties, this Court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India shall not interfere with the impugned order. 10. Finding no substance in the challenge to the impugned order dated 23.02.2011, the writ petition is dismissed.