JUDGMENT : Hrishikesh Roy, J. Heard Mr. S. Choudhury, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. The respondent Nos. 1-5 are represented by Mr. B.K Das, the learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the Railway. RELEVANT FACTS 2. The challenge here is to the award dated 3.6.2009 (page-52), in the Reference Case No. 14/2006, whereby the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Guwahati (in short ‘the Tribunal’) has held that the workman was rightly terminated by the management and thus the termination order was affirmed. 3. The workman was engaged as a Substitute Group-D employee and she rendered service from 31.3.2004 till 17.12.2004, until her service was discontinued by the communication dated 15.12.2004 (Annexure-4). The aggrieved employee raised an industrial dispute and when the conciliation failed, the Tribunal was asked to adjudicate on the following reference, formulated under Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the I.D Act’): “Whether the action of the management of the N.F Railway, Maligaon in discontinuing the service of Km. Supriya Bhattacharjee from service w.e.f 17.12.2004 on the plea of non production of Physical Handicapped Certificate and/or no work for her is justified? If not, to what relief Km. S. Bhattacharjee is entitled to?”. 4. The employment documents reflect that the petitioner made an application on 22.1.2004 (Annexure-1), for a job with the Railways and in that application, she had disclosed that her age is 30+ years and she suffers deformities in her lower limb. According to the workman she never applied for a post reserved for the physically handicapped category. Therefore, she contended before the Tribunal that the justification for her termination cannot be based upon the non-furnishing of the requisite disability certificate in the prescribed format, as was asked by the employer. 5. The learned Tribunal noted that the bone of contention relates to whether the appointment is to open category post or physically handicapped quota vacancy. In this context it was noted that the petitioner's date of birth is 28.2.1965 and she was aged around 39 years, when she applied and then engaged on 31.3.2004 Therefore, she was over aged for the general category vacancies, where maximum age for appointment is 30 years. The endorsement of the Railways General Manager for appointment against the handicapped quota, was also noted by the Tribunal. The failure of the workman to produce the disability certificate was taken into account. The endorsement of the Railways General Manager for appointment against the handicapped quota, was also noted by the Tribunal. The failure of the workman to produce the disability certificate was taken into account. With this aspects in consideration, it was concluded that the petitioner being over aged for open category post, was considered for the physically handicapped category and on this basis, it was held by the learned Tribunal that the workman was rightly terminated for her failure to produce the disability certificate. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS 6. Assailing the legality of the Tribunal's award, the learned counsel, Mr. S. Choudhury, submits that the petitioner never specified in her application that she should be considered for physically handicapped quota post but she had mentioned about her deformity in the lower limb, only to present a clear picture of the applicant. Therefore, it is argued by the petitioner that she should be considered to have been appointed against an open category vacancy and in that case, her termination for failure to produce the disability certificate, would not be justified. 7. The petitioner submits that her discontinuation ordered on 15.12.2004, reflected the want of available work to justify the termination. The counsel accordingly relies on Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 , to contend that the validity of the termination order must be judged by the reason disclosed in the discontinuation order and not by referring to any other undisclosed ground. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS 8. On the other hand, Mr. B.K Das, the learned Counsel for the Railway submits that when a Writ Court exercise certiorari jurisdiction, for the award rendered by the Tribunal, the High Court should not interfere with the finding on fact, recorded by the Industrial Tribunal. 9. According to the Railway lawyer, the Industrial Tribunal being a creature of the reference, cannot adjudicate on a matter outside the purview of the dispute actually referred to it by the order of reference. Since no objection on the formulated reference was ever raised by the workman, the respondents argue that the validity of the award cannot be tested on the basis of fresh plea, raised before the Writ Court. 10. Referring to the LCR, Mr. Since no objection on the formulated reference was ever raised by the workman, the respondents argue that the validity of the award cannot be tested on the basis of fresh plea, raised before the Writ Court. 10. Referring to the LCR, Mr. B.K. Das, the learned Counsel submits that that General Manager had made the endorsement on the petitioner's application for appointment in the physically handicapped quota and this vital endorsement dated 25.2.2004 was marked as Exhibit No. 1, before the Industrial Tribunal. Most significantly, the workman in her cross-examination on the Exhibit No. 1, had acknowledged the General Manager's endorsement to the effect that her appointment was approved against the physically handicapped quota vacancy. Thus the bonafide of the argument of the petitioner is questioned by Mr. Das. DISCUSSION AND DECISION 11. It may be noted at the outset that the appointment of the petitioner was not preceded by any advertisement or selection and in fact, no formal appointment letter was issued to her. She was engaged in the Substitute Group-D post, on the basis of the application filed by her on 22.1.2004, where the General Manager of the N.F Railway had made the endorsement on 25.2.2004, for her engagement against the physically handicapped quota vacancy. The petitioner's service started from 31.3.2004 but she was asked to produce the disability certificate in the prescribed format. The required certificate was never furnished and eventually, the discontinuation notice was issued on 15.12.2004 (Annexure-4), to her with one month's remuneration, in lieu of notice. The termination letter however does not specify the failure of the appointee, to produce the disability certificate. 12. In a similar case of reference under Section 10 of the I.D Act, the Supreme Court in Mukand Ltd. v. Mukand Staff and Officers' Association, reported in (2004) 10 SCC 460, had declared that the Industrial Tribunal is a creature of the reference and therefore, it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate matters not within the purview of the referred dispute, as specified in the order of reference. If the contour of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is such, the validity of the impugned award in the Reference Case No. 14/2006, will have to be judged on the basis of the referred dispute and to test the validity of the verdict on any other point, argued by the workman's counsel, would not be legally correct. 13. If the contour of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is such, the validity of the impugned award in the Reference Case No. 14/2006, will have to be judged on the basis of the referred dispute and to test the validity of the verdict on any other point, argued by the workman's counsel, would not be legally correct. 13. On the issue of the finality of the decision of the Tribunal on facts, in the Mukand Ltd. (Supra) itself, the earlier judgments in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, reported in AIR 1957 SC 264 and the decision in Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhakrishnan, reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 , were quoted with approval by the Supreme Court, in its later judgment. 14. To understand the power of the Writ Court, exercising certiorari jurisdiction for an award rendered by the Industrial Tribunal, we may benefit by extracting the paragraphs 43 and 44, in Mukand Ltd. (Supra) which approves the ratio in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. (Supra) and Syed Yakoob (Supra): “43. Relying on these observations, this Court in the case of Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (supra), observed as under: “It is equally well settled that the decision of the Tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless at the least it is shown to be fully unsupported by evidence.” 44. In the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhakrishnan (supra), the Constitution Bench of this Court observed as under: “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226, has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said findings, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh. 8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately, described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not, an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.” 15. If we proceed with the above understanding, it is seen here that the Tribunal was required to adjudicate on whether the termination of the workman was justified for non-production of the disability certificate. If this was the referred issue to be adjudicated, it is necessary to first determine whether the petitioner was engaged in a physically handicapped category post or in an open category vacancy. As can be seen from her application, the petitioner was over-aged for appointment in an open category post. She had also mentioned about the deformities in her lower limb in her application dated 22.1.2004 (Annexure-1). This may have prompted the General Manager to make the endorsement on the application that the applicant be appointed against physically handicapped quota vacancy. The concerned endorsement made on 25.2.2004, by the General Manager was proved as Exhibit No. 1, in the Industrial Tribunal and knowledge of the workman about such endorsement, can be seen from her cross-examination made on 14.11.2007 (page-49). 16. In the above circumstances, even though the petitioner may not have specifically applied for a physically handicapped category post, it is clear enough that she was over-aged for appointment as an open category candidate. Only because the applicant had mentioned about the deformities in her lower limb, her application was processed for appointment against handicapped quota vacancy, where her over-age, will not be a factor. 17. That apart the workman in her evidence had acknowledged that she received the employer's letter dated 7.7.2004, requiring her to submit the physically handicapped certificate in the prescribed format. 17. That apart the workman in her evidence had acknowledged that she received the employer's letter dated 7.7.2004, requiring her to submit the physically handicapped certificate in the prescribed format. It is also clear that no such disability certificate was ever produced by her. On this basis, the termination of the Substitute Group-D employee was found to be justified by the learned Tribunal and this finding of fact, in my perception is the correct one and the same does not suffer from any infirmity. In any case, on the ratio of Mukand Ltd. (Supra), the finding of fact by the Tribunal on the reference made before it, should not ordinarily be disturbed by the Writ Court, exercising certiorari jurisdiction. 18. The petitioner was aged about 39 years, when she applied for a job with the Railways and therefore, she was ineligible for appointment to a general category vacancy, where the prescribed age limit is 28 years, under the Railways Master Circular No. 12/1991, dated 29.1.1991 Thus it was logical to sympathetically consider her against a physically handicapped quota vacancy where age will not be a bar, by taking into account the deformation in lower limb, mentioned by the petitioner in her application. The records reflects that the appointee was given notice and also adequate time to furnish the disability certificate but she failed to produce the certificate in the required format. In such circumstances, the Tribunal answered the reference against the workman by declaring that the termination (for the failure to produce the disability certificate) should be affirmed. 19. If we reflect upon the question referred for adjudication and consider the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the learned Tribunal, it must be said that the impugned award does not suffer from any infirmity which would require interference by this Court. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed by leaving the parties to bear the cost of the proceeding.