JUDGMENT 1. By way of this appeal, the appellant-original returned candidate (RC) has challenged the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge which has confirmed the judgment of the election Tribunal dated 22nd December, 2017 by which the election of the appellant-RC as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Hapawas, District Dausa has been quashed and set aside. 2. The facts of the case are that the appellant-petitioner herein contested the election of the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Hapawas conducted on 20th January, 2015. In the election, appellant secured more number of votes and was elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat. The election petitioner filed election petition alleging that counting of the votes were wrongly done, however, the irregularities and counting of the votes was not decided in favour of the election petitioner therefore, it is not a subject matter of the writ petition. Thereafter, another ground was taken in the election petition that the appellant-petitioner was having more than two children born after cut off date 27th November, 1995 as his third child Manisha born on 20th August, 2001 and this objection was taken by the election petitioner before the election officer. The appellant herein filed the written statement and stated that counting was rightly done and at the time of counting no objection was raised by the election petitioner. It is also stated that Manisha who is the daughter of brother of appellant Chouthmal and the same allegations were levelled against while he was elected on the post of Sarpanch in the year 2010, and on enquiry it was held that Manisha is daughter of Chouthmal. The respondent no. 5 also filed reply to the election petition stating that counting was rightly done and the appellant was not having more than two children therefore, he was eligible to contest the election. The Respondent no. 6 & 7 also supported the reply filed by respondent no. 5. The Tribunal framed issue no. 1 with regard to counting of votes and second issue with regard to having third child Manisha. The learned Tribunal after framing issues and appreciating the evidence decided issue no. 1 in favour of appellant. However, issue no. 2 was decided against the appellant and therefore, election of the appellant was set aside vide impugned order dated 22nd December, 2017. 3. It is averred by the appellant that a bare perusal of finding with regard to issue no. 1 in favour of appellant. However, issue no. 2 was decided against the appellant and therefore, election of the appellant was set aside vide impugned order dated 22nd December, 2017. 3. It is averred by the appellant that a bare perusal of finding with regard to issue no. 2 would reveal that already there was a concluded inquiry conducted in the year 2010 which was never challenged before any higher authority holding that Manisha is daughter of Chouthmal, the brother of the present appellant. It is further averred that a perusal of Ex. A-1 would reveal that earlier when the complaint was made, the inquiry was conducted and it was held that the Ramdhan, appellant is having two children. That vide Ex. A-4 the complaint made against the appellant with regard to having third child was finally consigned to record by the Divisional Commissioner vide its order dated 29th October, 2014, holding that the complaint has been made due to political malice. In support of the averment Ex. A-5, mark-sheet of Manisha of Government Adarsh Senior School, Hapawas was also filed revealing that Manisha is daughter of Chouthmal. Likewise copy of bonafide resident certificate and copy of caste certificate were also placed before the Tribunal as Ex. A-6 & A-7 making it clear that Manisha is daughter of Chouthmal. It is to be noted that an FIR was also registered against the appellant alleging to have filed forged documents by which despite having three children, he has contested the election concealing the fact of third child. However, the said FIR was quashed by the High Court in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 704/2015 vide order dated 22nd February, 2017 which was challenged before the Supreme Court but the SLP against the same was also dismissed by the Apex Court vide order dated 3rd July, 2017. It is averred by the appellant that in General Census Register there are only two children of the appellant. The SubDivisional Officer also after enquiry and examining all the facts and circumstances vide enquiry report dated 30th August, 2010 held that appellant is having only two children. In the Ration card as well as in Yogya Dampati Vivaran and Family Survey Book it is also mentioned that appellant is having only two children. In the certificate issued by Gram Panchayat Hapawas, Manisha has been recorded as daughter of Chouthmal in the birth certificate. In the Ration card as well as in Yogya Dampati Vivaran and Family Survey Book it is also mentioned that appellant is having only two children. In the certificate issued by Gram Panchayat Hapawas, Manisha has been recorded as daughter of Chouthmal in the birth certificate. In this regard the copy of certificate issued by Government Girls Secondary School, Hapawas dated 24th January, 2014 would reveal that Manisha is daughter of Chouthmal. 4. The following documents and details was also furnished to show that appellant has only two children, appellant is not father of Manisha and Manisha is daughter of Chouthmal Meena. image 1 5. The Election Tribunal while considering the matter has considered the evidence on record and also appreciated the document Annexure R/1 which has been produced by counsel for the respondents in his reply in appeal which is an application made by one Manisha who is shown to be born on 20th August, 2001 and in the bottom of the application, name of Manohari with a thumb impression which is having inward no. 1058 dated 10th July, 2006 and Annexure R/2 which is prepared on the basis of two witnesses were strongly relied upon by Bhajan Lal and Geeta Kankhediya principal of Government Adarsh Girls Sr. Secondary School Hapawas, Dausa, Bhajan Lal was examined as PW-1 and in his statement, he stated as under:- image 2 6. He submitted that he has not seen the original birth certificate or the mark sheet nor he has examined the original record. He has been cross examined in detail and thereafter, he stated as under:- image 3 7. Counsel for the parties have also taken us to the following evidence which reads as under:- image 4 8. The matter was listed before us for admission on 16th February, 2018 and since the election was already notified therefore, we were not inclined to grant interim relief. However, counsel for the appellant requested to hear the matter finally and we have fixed the matter today. 9. The reply is filed by the contesting respondent. The other respondents have not appeared before the learned Single Judge and private respondent no. 2 to 4 have not even appeared before the Election Tribunal and have not filed their response to the election petition nor they cross examined any other witnesses and therefore, not required to be heard in this appeal. The other respondents have not appeared before the learned Single Judge and private respondent no. 2 to 4 have not even appeared before the Election Tribunal and have not filed their response to the election petition nor they cross examined any other witnesses and therefore, not required to be heard in this appeal. It has been agreed between the parties contesting respondents to hear the matter finally. 10. We have taken us this matter after the counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice that both the authorities namely Election Tribunal as well as authority in Exhibit A/1 dated 17th July, 2014 and enquiry report furnished by SDO Dausa pursuant to the complaint made for the third child and findings of the same are as under:- image 5 10.1.He has also relied upon the letter of State of Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Department where it has been found that the appellant has already two children and the complaint against the appellant was lodged out of political vendatta. He has also relied upon the documents and contended that the documents which are required to be accepted as they were cursorily examined by the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge while summarily dismissing the matter. In this regard the finding of the Tribunal reads as under:- image 6 10.2.Mr. Anuroop Singhi counsel for the appellant has taken us to the election result which has materially affected the appellant and the same reads as under:- image 7 10.3.Thereafter, Mr. Singhi has also taken us to the issues which are framed by the Tribunal mainly issue no. 1 which was decided in his favour and for issue no. 2 he contended that the same is required to be dealt with by us. He has taken us to the relevant finding which reads as under:- image 8 10.4.He contended that the report sought to be relied upon was quashed by this High Court vide its judgment and order dated 11th February, 2016 which was produced before the Tribunal was delivered by the same learned Single Judge who has delivered the judgment in the present case. 10.5.He has also taken us to the interpretation put forward by the Tribunal which reads as under:- image 9 "The petitions are accordingly allowed the enquiry under section 39 of the Act of 1994 read with Rule 23 of the Rules of 1996 and suspension of elected members for allegations of preelection disqualification under section 38[4] of the Act of 1994 except where charges have framed for offences of moral turpitude are quashed." image 10 10.6.Mr. Anuroop Singhi has also taken us to the conclusion reached by the Tribunal which reads as under:- image 11 11. It has been contended that the complaint lodged by the present respondent namely Bhajan Lal Meena against the present appellant was quashed by this court on 22nd February, 2017 wherein the Single Judge has observed as under:- "The counsel for the petitioner, further, refutes the applicability of the precedent law on account of the fact that the offence of disclosing of information was constituted, if at all, only against the public authority and not against a private person who shall have the remedy of filing an election petition and cannot abuse the process by filing Criminal proceedings. This Court is in agreement with the argument made by the counsel for the petitioner that though in the normal course of things there should not be any interference in the investigation but when on the face of it the offence cannot be said to have been committed then the offence would not be constituted on the complaint of private person. After hearing the counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case along with the precedent law cited, in the opinion of this Court, it is absolutely clear that the allegation made in the FIR did not disclose any cognizable offence and at the most, the remedy available to the complainant was to challenge the election at the appropriate forum rather than filing of FIR. This Court is of the opinion that wrong facts and nomination paper cannot be concluded to be considered so as to constitute offence of cheating. This Court is of the opinion that wrong facts and nomination paper cannot be concluded to be considered so as to constitute offence of cheating. Even if the offence was covered by the Section 171 of IPC which is furnishing false information before the public servant then the same can be pursued as an offence by the concerned officer or the concerned public servant as prosecution by other persons would be barred by Section 195(1) (a) of Cr.P.C. Thus from the precedent law cited above it is clear that even if the allegations are admitted, there is no material on the basis of which it can be concluded that the petitioner had committed any offence under Section 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC. Thus on the basis of the aforesaid discussion as well as the precedent law submitted by the counsel for the petitioner, the Miscellaneous Petition is allowed and FIR No. 13/2015 registered at Police Station Nangal Rajawatan, District- Dausa for the Offence under Section 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120-B IPC is quashed and Set aside." 12. Against which the present respondent preferred SLP which came to be dismissed. Apart from that, he has contended that the Ration Card wherein Manisha was shown to be daughter of Chouthmal and he is having only two sons is in the record. Only on the ground that the same was subsequently obtained, the learned Single Judge has held that without proof of statutory compliances before its issue was seen by the Tribunal as not inspiring confidence. The daughter which was found in the family of the appellant was daughter of Chouthmal, brother of the appellant, born on 5th August, 2002 and not on 4th June, 2004 on the basis of report of SDO Dausa dated 30th August, 2010 wherein it has been concluded as under:- image 12 13. It will not be out of place to mention that even another clinching document where the Women and Child Development Department of Rajasthan has made an enquiry wherein Manisha was found in the family of Kajod Mal who is father of Chouthmal alongwith Lali Devi and the said survey report reads as under:- image 13 14. The same department also conducted another enquiry wherein the name of appellant was mentioned at the top alongwith, Manohari Devi, Manraj & Deshraj. 15. The same department also conducted another enquiry wherein the name of appellant was mentioned at the top alongwith, Manohari Devi, Manraj & Deshraj. 15. Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the following decisions:- Baldev Singh Mann vs. Surjit Singh Dhiman , (2009) 1 SCC 633 "20. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh Jassi , (2000) AIR(Supreme Court) 256 has held that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with. Any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law. Though the purity of the election process has to be safeguarded and the court shall be vigilant to see that people do not get elected by flagrant breaches of law or by committing corrupt practices, the setting aside of an election involves serious consequences not only for the returned candidate and the constituency, but also for the public at large inasmuch as re-election involves an enormous load on the public funds and administration. Similar opinion has been expressed in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Ors , (1954) SCR 892 ; Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and Anr. v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe and Ors , (1995) AIR(Supreme Court) 2284. The will of the people who have exercised their franchise in an election in favour of a returned candidate must be respected to protect the interest of the returned candidate." 25. In the instant case, the respondent won by less than 1000 votes out of nearly 70000 polled votes. In the impugned judgment, it is aptly observed that a candidate who loses by such a slight margin finds it hard to accept defeat. Therefore, the candidate who has narrowly lost would ordinarily make all efforts and gather all kind of material against the elected candidate and level all kinds of allegations of corrupt practices whether substantiated or not. In the instant case, this is what seems to have happened. Allegations are that the winner was moving from village to village asking for vote and in this process he had often taken help of Bachhi and Shergill for canvassing for votes in his favour. 29. Before parting with the case, we would like to reiterate that in a democratic country the will of the people is paramount and the election of elected candidate should not be lightly interfered with. 29. Before parting with the case, we would like to reiterate that in a democratic country the will of the people is paramount and the election of elected candidate should not be lightly interfered with. At the same time, it is also the bounden duty and obligation of the court to ensure that purity of election process is fully safeguarded and maintained. Narayan Govind Gavate & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors , (1977) 1 SCC 133 "24. The result of a trial or proceeding is determined by a weighing of the totality of facts and circumstances and presumptions operating in favour of one party as against those which may tilt the balance in favour of another. Such weighment always takes place at the end of a trial or proceeding which cannot, for purposes of this final weighment, be split up into disjointed and disconnected parts simply because the requirements of procedural regularity and logic, embodied in procedural law, prescribe a sequence, a stage, and a mode of proof for each party tendering its evidence. What is weighed at the end is one totality against another and not selected bits or scraps of evidence against each other." Harikrishna Lal vs. Babu Lal Marandi , (2003) 8 SCC 613 19. The appellant submitted that in the election petition it was specifically alleged that the respondent was not an elector belonging to the constituency and that it was further obligatory for the respondent to adduce evidence to show that he was qualified to be a candidate without the need of filing the certified copies of entries in the electoral roll before the returning officer. Such a submission runs counter to basics of election law. The success of a winning candidate is not to be lightly interfered with. The burden of proof lies on the one who challenges the election to raise necessary pleadings and adduce evidence to prove such averments as would enable the result of the election being set aside on any of the grounds available in the law. In an election petition if nobody adduces evidence it is the election-petitioner who fails. The High Court rightly framed the issue placing the burden of proof on the election-petitioner. As no evidence was adduced by the election-petitioner, the High Court rightly dismissed the election petition." Babita vs. Nihaldel & Ors , (2017) 4 RajLW 2966 (Raj.) 14. In an election petition if nobody adduces evidence it is the election-petitioner who fails. The High Court rightly framed the issue placing the burden of proof on the election-petitioner. As no evidence was adduced by the election-petitioner, the High Court rightly dismissed the election petition." Babita vs. Nihaldel & Ors , (2017) 4 RajLW 2966 (Raj.) 14. From the discussions made above, Article 243-0 restricts the interference of Court in electoral matters of Panchayati Raj Institutions and provides that no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such "Authority" and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the legislature of a State. 15. Similar provisions have been made in Section 117 and Section 117-A of Act, 1994 which provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to question the legality of any action taken or of any decision given by the Returning Officer or by any other person appointed under this Act in connection with an election. 16. The above provisions clearly restricts the interference of Civil Courts in the matters of elections of Panchayati Raj Institutions and provides for creation of Authority presided by District Judge. Section 43 of Act, 1994 provides that an election under this Act or the Rules made there under may be called in question by presenting a petition to the District Judge having jurisdiction which may be transferred by the District Judge for hearing and disposal to a Civil Judge or Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) , subordinate to him and the decision of the Judge thereto shall be final. 17. The District Judge can transfer the Election Petition only to a Civil Judge or Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) , subordinate to him and cannot transfer to Additional District Judge. Therefore, the District Judge or Civil Judge or Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) while hearing a Election Petition presented under the "Act, 1994" and "Rules, 1994" acts as "persona designata" and no appeal or revision lies against the orders/judgments passed by them and therefore, High Court in exercise of Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot exercise superintending powers with regard to election disputes under the "Act, 1994" and "Rules, 1994". 18. 18. Therefore, we are convinced with the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondent that Senior Civil Judge, Laxmangarh passed the impugned judgment after hearing the Election Petition under Rule 80 of "Rules, 1994", is a "persona designata" and his action in dealing with Election Petition cannot be examined by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the remedy lies against the impugned judgment is writ of "certiorari" under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." Bhupendra Singh Hada & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. in SBCWP No. 16070/2015 "The petitions are accordingly allowed. The enquiry under Section 39 of the Act of 1994 read with Rule 23 of the Rules of 1996 and suspension of elected members for allegations of pre-election disqualification under Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994 except where charges have been framed for offences of moral turpitude are quashed. It is however clarified that the State Government however would be free, if warranted in specific cases, to conduct only a fact finding enquiry for taking other proceedings in accordance with law including that of lodging a FIR. It is also made clear that for post election misconduct, the State Government will be entitled to take proceedings for removal of the delinquents and suspend the Chairpersons / Members of the Panchayati Raj Institutions by resort to Sections 39 and 38(4) of the Act of 1994. Finally in the event of elected Chairpersons / Members being charged for an offence involving moral turpitude even in respect of the period prior to the elections, the State Government would be free to suspend such Chairpersons / Members of Panchayati Raj Institutions under Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994. 16. Counsel for the appellant has also relied upon Section 35 of the Evidence Act which reads as under:- "35. Relevancy of entry in public 1[record or an electronic record] made in performance of duty. An entry in any public or other official book, register or 1[record or an electronic record], stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or 1[record or an electronic record] is kept, is itself a relevant fact." 17. The respondents have taken us firstly to the allegations which are made in the election petition which reads as under:- image 14 17.1.He has further shown us to the averments made in the affidavit of respondent wherein it has been stated as under:- image 15 17.2.He has also taken us to the order of the Tribunal wherein it has been observed as under:- image 16 allowed the enquiry under section 39 of the Act of 1994 read with Rule 23 of the Rules of 1996 and suspension of elected members for allegations of preelection disqualification under saction 38 (4) of the Act of 1994 except where charges have framed for offences of moral turpitude are quashed" image 17 17.3.He has also taken us to the following evidence which has been discussed by the Tribunal which reads as under:- image 18 18. He contended that the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have concurrently recorded the finding against the appellant and writ of certiorari is not maintainable in such cases in view of the decision of Supreme Court in case of Radheshyam & Anr. vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors , (2015) 5 SCC 423 wherein it has been held as under:- "4. With reference to the observations in Surya Dev Rai for not following the conclusion in Mirajkar, the referring Bench inter alia observed: 25. In our view the appreciation of the ratio in Mirajkar by the learned judges, in Surya Dev Rai, with great respect, was possibly a little erroneous and with that we cannot agree. 26. The two-judge Bench in Surya Dev Rai did not, as obviously it could not overrule the ratio in Mirajkar, a Constitution Bench decision of a ninejudge Bench. But the learned judges justified their different view in Surya Dev Rai, inter alia on the ground that the law relating to certiorari changed both in England and in India. In support of that opinion, the learned judges held that the statement of law in Halsbury, on which the ratio in Mirajkar is based, has been changed and in support of that quoted paras 103 and 109 from Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. (Reissue) , Vol. 1(1) . Those paras are set out below: 103. In support of that opinion, the learned judges held that the statement of law in Halsbury, on which the ratio in Mirajkar is based, has been changed and in support of that quoted paras 103 and 109 from Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. (Reissue) , Vol. 1(1) . Those paras are set out below: 103. The prerogative remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus: historical development.--Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of common law prohibited other courts from entertaining matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the common law courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record of an inferior court into the King's Bench for review or to remove indictments for trial in that court; mandamus was directed to inferior courts and tribunals, and to public officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public duty. All three were called prerogative writs;.... 109. The nature of certiorari and prohibition.-- Certiorari lies to bring decisions of an inferior court, tribunal, public authority or any other body of persons before the High Court for review so that the court may determine whether they should be quashed, or to quash such decisions. The order of prohibition is an order issuing out of the High Court and directed to an inferior court or tribunal or public authority which forbids that court or tribunal or authority to act in excess of its jurisdiction or contrary to law. Both certiorari and prohibition are employed for the control of inferior courts, tribunals and public authorities. The aforesaid paragraphs are based on general principles which are older than the time when Mirajkar was decided are still good. Those principles nowhere indicate that judgments of an inferior civil court of plenary jurisdiction are amenable to correction by a writ of certiorari. In any event, change of law in England cannot dilute the binding nature of the ratio in Mirajkar and which has not been overruled and is holding the field for decades. 27. It is clear from the law laid down in Mirajkar in para 63 that a distinction has been made between judicial orders of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or court which are not civil courts and which cannot pass judicial orders. 27. It is clear from the law laid down in Mirajkar in para 63 that a distinction has been made between judicial orders of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or court which are not civil courts and which cannot pass judicial orders. Therefore, judicial orders passed by civil courts of plenary jurisdiction stand on a different footing in view of the law pronounced in para 63 in Mirajkar. The passage in the subsequent edition of Halsbury (4th Edn.) which has been quoted in Surya Dev Rai does not show at all that there has been any change in law on the points in issue pointed out above. 28. The learned Judges in Surya Dev Rai stated in SCC para 18, p. 687 of the Report that the decision rendered in Mirajkar was considered by the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and wherein the learned Judges took a different view and in support of that, the following para from Rupa Ashok Hurra has been quoted: (Surya Dev Rai case, SCC pp. 687-88, para 18) (i) that it is a well-settled principle that the technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in English law have no role to play under our constitutional scheme; (ii) that a writ of certiorari to call for records and examine the same for passing appropriate orders, is issued by a superior court to an inferior court which certifies its records for examination; and (iii) that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a writ to a different Bench of the High Court; much less can the writ jurisdiction of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in our constitutional scheme. 29. We are constrained to point out again that in Rupa Ashok Hurra the Constitution Bench did not take any view which is contrary to the views expressed in Mirajkar. On the other hand, the ratio in Mirajkar was referred to with respect and was relied on in Rupa Ashok Hurra. 29. We are constrained to point out again that in Rupa Ashok Hurra the Constitution Bench did not take any view which is contrary to the views expressed in Mirajkar. On the other hand, the ratio in Mirajkar was referred to with respect and was relied on in Rupa Ashok Hurra. Mirajkar was referred to in SCC para 8, p. 399 and again in SCC para 11 on p. 402 and again in SCC para 59, p. 418 and also in SCC para 60, p. 419 of Rupa Ashok Hurra. Nowhere even any whisper of a divergence from the ratio in Mirajkar was expressed. Rather passages from Mirajkar have been quoted with approval. 30. In fact the question which was referred to the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra is quoted in para 1 of the judgment and it is clear from the perusal of the said paragraph that the question for consideration in Rupa Ashok Hurra was totally different. Therefore, this Court unfortunately is in disagreement with the view which has been expressed in Surya Dev Rai insofar as correction of or any interference with judicial orders of civil court by a writ of certiorari is concerned. 5. Thus, the question to be decided is whether the view taken in Surya Dev Rai that a writ lies Under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the civil court, which has been doubted in the reference order, is the correct view. 6. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. We have also heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner in SLP (C) No. 25828 of 2013 as the said SLP was tagged to the present appeal and also the intervenor in person in I.A. No. 2 of 2011. 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the view taken in the referring order deserves to be approved for the reasons given in the said order and contrary view in Surya Dev Rai may be overruled. It is submitted that the bench of nine Judges in Mirajkar has categorically held that the order of the civil court was not amenable to writ jurisdiction Under Article 226 and the said view still holds the field. The reasons for not following the said view in Surya Dev Rai are not sound in law. It is submitted that the bench of nine Judges in Mirajkar has categorically held that the order of the civil court was not amenable to writ jurisdiction Under Article 226 and the said view still holds the field. The reasons for not following the said view in Surya Dev Rai are not sound in law. This submission is supported by learned Counsel for the Petitioner appearing in SLP (Civil) No. 25828 of 2013 as also by the Intervenor in person. 8. On the contrary, learned senior Counsel for the Respondent supported the view taken in Surya Dev Rai which is based on decisions of this Court relied upon therein. According to him, the scope of writ jurisdiction was wide enough to extend to an order of the civil court. There was no reason to exclude the civil courts from the expression "any person or authority" in Article 226 of the Constitution. Conceptually, a writ of certiorari could be issued by a superior court to an inferior court. He also pointed out that though the judgment in Surya Dev Rai is by a Bench of two judges, the same has been referred with approval in larger bench judgments in Shail v. Manoj Kumar , (2004) 4 SCC 785 , Mahendra Saree Emporium (II) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy , (2005) 1 SCC 481 and Salem Advocate Bar Assn(II) v. Union of India , (2005) 6 SCC 344 and on that ground correctness of the said view is not open to be considered by this Bench. 25. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King's Court in India and of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King's Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision Under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence Under Article 227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence Under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression "inferior court" is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above. 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari Under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226." 18.1. He has relied upon another decision in case of Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radha Krishnan & Ors , (1964) AIR(Supreme Court) 477 wherein it has been held as under:- "7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or Tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque , (1955) 1 SCR 1104 , Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam , (1958) SCR 1240, and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh , (1960) AIR(Supreme Court) 1168. 8. 8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of a the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened. 9. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of a the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened. 9. In the present case, the question raised by the appellant presents no difficulty whatever. The point which was raised before the High Court by respondent No. 1 lies within a very narrow compass; it is a very short and simple question of fact. It appears that in dealing with the rival claims of the appellant and respondent No. 1 for the second permit on the route in question, the Appellate Tribunal was ultimately influenced by the fact that the appellant had a workshop at Madras which is one terminus of the route in question, whereas respondent No. 1 had a workshop and a place of business only at Cuddalore which is an intermediate station on the route and did not posses a workshop at either of the terminii of the route; the other terminus being Chidambaram. In fact, that appears to be the effect of the finding made by the Authority also. Respondent No. 1 urged before the High Court that in coming to the conclusion that he had no workshop at Chidambaram, the Appellate Tribunal had failed to consider material evidence adduced by him. It is on this narrow ground that a writ has been issued in favour of respondent No. 1. Mr. Setalvad contends that the question as to whether respondent No. 1 had a workshop at Chidambaram is a pure question of fact and the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal and seek to correct it by issuing a writ of certiorari. In this connection, he relies on the fact that both the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal have, in substance, found that respondent No. 1 had no workshop at either of the two terminii on the route and the fact that no reasons have been given in support of the said finding would not justify the interference of the High Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 226. It may be conceded that it would have been better if the Appellate Tribunal had indicated why it rejected the case of respondent No. 1 in regard to his alleged workshop at Chadambaram, but we do not think that the failure of the Appellate Tribunal to five a reason in that behalf, or to refer specifically to the evidence adduced by respondent No. 1, would, by itself, constitute such an error in its decision as to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari under Art. 226. In this connection, we ought to add that it has not been suggested by respondent No. 1 that in dealing with his claim for a permit, admissible evidence which he wanted to adduce had been excluded by the Tribunal from the record; the argument that some evidence was not duly considered by the Tribunal, would normally pertain to the realm of the appreciation of evidence and would, as such, be outside the purview of an enquiry in proceedings for a writ of certiorari under Art. 226. 16. Mr. Pathak has also urged that even if we come to the conclusion that the High Court was not competent to issue a writ in the present proceedings, having regard to the nature of the questions raised before it by respondent No. 1, we should not reverse the decision of the High Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136, though very wide, is exercised by the Court in its discretion, says Mr. Pathak, and he contends that where the order under appeal furthers the ends of justice, we should not reverse the said order on technical grounds. We are not impressed by this plea. It may be conceded that in a proper case this Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 136 where the interests of justice patently indicate the desirability of adopting such a course; but we do not see how a plea of such a kind can be entertained where it is clearly shown that the impugned orders passed by the High Court are without jurisdiction. If Mr. If Mr. Pathak's argument were to be accepted, in a majority of cases if the High Court interfered with questions of fact in issuing writs of certiorari against the decisions of special Tribunals, it may always be urged that what the High Courts have done is in the interests of justice and this Court should not interfere with the decisions of the High Courts. In the circumstances of the present case, we do not see how considerations of justice can really arise. The Tribunals of fact have found that respondent No. 1 does not own a workshop at Chidambaram and having regard to the other relevant circumstances which the Tribunals have considered, the fact that he does not own a workshop at Chidambaram has ultimately proved decisive against respondent No. 1 and in favour of the appellant. If that be so, a decision based on facts found by the Tribunal cannot be reopened on the plausible plea that a further enquiry should be made because that would be just. If findings of fact were allowed to be disturbed by High Courts in such writ proceedings, that may lead to an interminable search for correct findings and would virtually convert the High Courts into Appellate Courts competent to deal with questions of fact. That is why we think, in entertaining petitions for writs of certiorari, it is necessary to remember that findings of fact recorded by special Tribunals which have be clothed with jurisdiction to deal with them, should be treated as final between the parties, unless, of course, it is shown that the impugned finding is based on no evidence. Therefore, we do not think the plea made by Mr. Pathak that in the interests of justice we should refrain from setting aside the order under appeal, can be upheld." 19. He contended that the view taken by the both the authorities may not be interfered and the documents which are sought to be proved by the respondents are to be accepted and the appeal deserves to be dismissed in view of the decisions cited by the respondents and document exhibit-4 having not been disputed by the other side and material witness namely Chouthmal and non examination of Manohari wife of returned candidate and the wife of the Chouthmal are not examined to prove the birth of Manisha is also on the basis of manipulated documents of birth. 20. 20. We have heard counsel for both the sides and carefully gone to the documents available on record. 21. Before proceeding with the matter, it will not be out of place to mention that where the election petitioner namely the respondent has alleged that the returned candidate has a third daughter and the alleged date of birth is 20th August, 2001, which has been produced from the custody of the school, has not been proved that the girl is staying in the family of the returned candidate only on the basis of so called application where thumb impression of Manohari namely wife of the present appellant has not been proved is the only document accepted through principal who was not author of the document when the application was accepted and the document is the basis for disqualifying the person. 22. In our considered opinion, even if the document is believed to be true, the person born on 20th August, 2001 is not staying in the family of present appellant has not been proved. So called Manisha who is subject matter of the election petition, she is born on 5th August, 2002. Though it is registered in 2009, it is alleged in all the issues by the Election Tribunal that all documents are created. The present appellant contested for the first time in 2010 and birth was of 2002, the birth was registered in 2009 and nobody will envisage that the appellant is going to contest and he cannot envisaged that daughter born to his brother will not be accepted. Apart from that two documents which have been referred, the government enquiry by Women and Child Development Department would also show that Manisha was daughter of Chouthmal. 23. Admittedly, Manisha was shown to be part of family where her birth date was shown on 5th August, 2002 and the family of present appellant was shown to be only having four persons namely husband, wife and two sons. The second report which is sought to be relied upon, the enquiry report was set aside by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, basis on which the election is set aside, is not in existence in the eye of law once the report has been quashed and set aside. 24. Apart from that, the two enquiry reports of 2010 and another of 2014 which are Annexure A/1 and A/15. Therefore, basis on which the election is set aside, is not in existence in the eye of law once the report has been quashed and set aside. 24. Apart from that, the two enquiry reports of 2010 and another of 2014 which are Annexure A/1 and A/15. The findings which we have reproduced hereinabove of the original writ petition clearly establish that the appellant has only two children in 2010. 25. Even if believe it to be true which has not been proved by the original election petitioner that she is the daughter and staying with the present appellant merely on surmises and conjuctures, election cannot be set aside in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Hari Kiahsn as the enquiry is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 26. Apart from that, the voluminous document which have come on record at least Adhar Card, even if the appellant/petitioner is Sarpanch, that cannot be manipulated clearly establish that she is daughter of Chouthmal and other voluminous document namely School Certificate which has been signed by the principal certifying her to be daughter of Lohadisi Devi and father Chouthmal which is clearly exhibited and other caste certificate which has been issued by government agency clearly shows that she is daughter of Chouthmal. Even department of education has accepted her to be daughter of Chouthmal and Lohadisi Devi. It is not the case of the appellant that he has not proved that Manisha is not daughter of Chouthmal, it is the burden of the respondent to prove that Manisha who is alleged to have born on 20th August, 2001 is the daughter of the present appellant and she is born out of their wedlock. 27. Taking into consideration, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has seriously committed an error in relying on document R/1 and evidence of Bhajan Lal and principal Geeta Kankhediya. More particularly, when Geeta Kankhediya herself has certified her to be daughter of Chouthmal then there is no question of two opinions. 28. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that where there are serious allegations against the judge in an application for transfer of proceedings, he should not committed such an error. However, we are refraining ourselves from observing anything since we have not called for the original record as the election has been declared. 29. 28. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that where there are serious allegations against the judge in an application for transfer of proceedings, he should not committed such an error. However, we are refraining ourselves from observing anything since we have not called for the original record as the election has been declared. 29. In that view of the matter, the public documents which are accepted, clearly establish that Manisha alleged to have born on 20th August, 2001 is false and in fact she was born on 5th August, 2002 and she is the daughter of Chouthmal. 30. Cardinal principles of Evidence Act clearly says that once on paper document, it has come that Manisha is daughter of Chouthmal namely in Adhar Card, School Leaving Certificate, Caste Certificate, Ration Card and Mark-Sheet of Xth Board issued by the public authority proved so and the Women and Child Department also verified the same, unless otherwise it is proved that she is not daughter of Chouthmal, the presumption remains in favour of the returned candidate that she is not daughter of Ramdhan but she is daughter of Chouthmal. 31. Though the matter requires to be allowed with costs as such litigations are required to be controlled in a systematic manner, therefore, for initiating bogus petition after quashing the complaint by the Division Bench and confirmed by the Supreme Court but we are refraining ourselves from imposing costs. 32. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and both the judgments dated 17.01.2018 passed by learned Single Judge as well as order dated 22.12.2017 passed by Additional Senior Civil Judge, Dausa passed in Election Petition No. 18/2015 are required to be quashed and set aside and the same are quashed and set aside. The judgment of this appeal will be given effect immediately and appellant will be restored as Sarpanch immediately.

Ramdhan Meena v. Bhajan Lal