JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ajay Bhanot, J.—Petitioner made a request to the respondent No. 2-U.P. Khadi & Village Industries Board, Lucknow for grant of loan facility to set up a unit for manufacture of handmade hard paper. The respondent-Board acceded to the aforesaid request of the petitioner and sanctioned the loan facility for the aforesaid purpose. A contract was made between the petitioner and the respondent-Board on 31.12.2005 wherein the respondent-Board agreed to disburse a loan to the petitioner to the extent of Rs. 13,50,000/-. The terms and conditions agreed to between the parties and duly embodied in the loan agreement, which bear relevance to the controversy, are reproduced hereunder: “2. The Hypothecated property is hypothecated as security by way of first charge [unless property is already hypothecated with a State Government or Khadi & Village Industries Commission in which case the lender will have a second charge on the hypothecated property and if one of them has a second charge the lender will have the next charge] for the due repayment by the Borrower/s to the lender of the said sum of Rs. 13.50 Lacks or the balance due to the lender at any time and the interest thereon all costs, charges and expenses incurred by the lender for the preservation, protection, defence and perfection of this security or for attempted or actual realization thereof and also for due repayment of all present and future indebtedness and liabilities of the Borrower/s to the Lender of any kind and in any manner whether solely or jointly, primary of collateral accrued or accruing with all relative interest, charges, costs and expenses. The expression “balance due to the Lender”. In this and subsequent clauses of this agreement shall be taken to include the principal money from time to time due by the Borrower/s to the lender and also all interest thereon calculated at the rate specified in the schedule II hereto and the amount of all charges and expenses which the lender may have paid or incurred in any way in connection with the hypothecated property or the sale or disposal thereof. 3. 3. The Lender may give to the Borrower/s the Loan by such instalments and at such times as the lender may deem fit and the lender may at anytime without assigning any reason whatsoever discontinue to give any further Loan of the Borrower/s although the total of loans given under this agreement does not reach said limit of Rs. 13.50 Lacks. 4. The said principal sum of Rs. 13.50 Lakhs or so much thereof as may have actually been lent to the Borrower/s under these presents shall be repaid by the Borrower/s to the lender at office of the lender in the instalments mentioned in schedule II, hereto together with interest on the outstanding amount at the rate mentioned in the said schedule II. 5. If there shall be any breach on the part of the Borrower/s of any of the terms of these presents or any one instalment of principal or interest is in arrears after the due date or if there is a reasonable apprehension (of which the lender shall be the sole judge) that the Borrower/s is/are unable to pay its/their debts or that liquidation or winding up proceedings may be commenced against the Borrower/s, the Lender may notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Deed order the Borrower/s to repay in full-forthwith the outstanding amount of the loan and interest and all costs and expenses. SCHEDULE-II Rate of interest and repayment instalments (To be filled in as per details given in sanction order) Sl. No. Nature of Loan Tenure Rate of Intersest Particulars of Instalment 1. Loan for working Capital Rs. 3.90 Lacks First Year 15 ½ % per annum (quarterly) Not less than 20% is to be repaid at the beginning of the 2 nd and 3 rd year 20% at the end of the 4 th year and the balance 40% at the end of the 5 th year. 2. Temporary Loans Rs. Nil 6 to 12 months 15 ½ % per annum (quarterly) The total loan is to be repaid at the end of Prescribed period. 3. Loan for Kachacha structure Rs. Nil Seven year 15 ½% per annum (quarterly) Shall be repaid in 24 equal quarterly instalments, the first instalment being due at the beginning of the 2nd Year. 4 Loan for Pucca Structure Rs. 3. Loan for Kachacha structure Rs. Nil Seven year 15 ½% per annum (quarterly) Shall be repaid in 24 equal quarterly instalments, the first instalment being due at the beginning of the 2nd Year. 4 Loan for Pucca Structure Rs. 3.00 Lacks Seven Year 15.5% per annum (quarterly) Should be paid in 24 quarterly  instlaments, the first instalment being due at the beginning of the 2nd year. 5 Loan for Machinary Rs. 6.60 Lakhs Seven Year 15.5% per annum (quarterly) Balance should be repaid in 24  quarterly installments the first installment being due at the beginning of the 2nd year. 6 Loan for Share Capital or Capital Formation Five Years 15.5% per annum (quarterly) 5 equal annual installments. If it is not utilized for the purpose/s noted below within one year/6 months as the case may be from the date of receipt thereof the amount shall immediately be refunded with interest as due. Final interest at the rate of 5% will be paid in addition to the interest due in case the funds are misutilized/not utilized for the purpose or for the instalments not paid in time.” 2. Pursuant to the execution of the loan agreement, the first instalment of Rs. 9,60,000/- was released in favour of the petitioner. It is asserted in the writ petition that a sum of Rs. 3,90,000/- was not released by the respondent-Board. This balance amount of Rs. 3,90,000/- was to be released towards working capital. The averments in the writ petition further state that due to non-availability of the working capital, the production could not commence. The petitioner defaulted in the payment of loan instalments. The authorities adopted distraint proceedings against the petitioner for recovering the amounts due under the loan agreement. A recovery certificate of Rs. 11,81,768/- alongwith interest was issued to the petitioner. 3. The petitioner being aggrieved by the initiation of recovery proceedings brought civil action against the respondent-Board. The petitioner instituted a civil suit before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Firozabad, which was registered as O.S. No. 134 of 2005, Rao Shiv Nath Singh Memorial v. U.P. Khadi & Village Industries Board. The reliefs sought in the aforesaid suit as produced in paragraph-16 of the writ petition are as under: “A. That by means of a prohibitory injunction order the defendants, their officers and officials be restrained from realizaing and recovering from plaintiffs Rs. The reliefs sought in the aforesaid suit as produced in paragraph-16 of the writ petition are as under: “A. That by means of a prohibitory injunction order the defendants, their officers and officials be restrained from realizaing and recovering from plaintiffs Rs. 11,81,768/- and any kind of interest therein or any other kind of amount sum either as arrears of land revenue or by any other kind of means of coercive means or in any other manner whatsoever through whomsoever till the payment and release to plaintiffs the remaining working capital Rs. 1,68,323/-. B. That by means of a mandatory injunction order the defendants be directed to pay and release to plaintiffs the margin money Rs. 3,37,500/- within such time/period as is deemed fit and proper by the Hon’ble Court. C. That by means of a declaratory decree it be declared that defendants are not entitled to recover any kind of interest from the plaintiffs till the release and payment of remaining working capital Rs. 1,68,232/- to plaintiffs. D. That costs of the suit and such other relief as is deemed fit and proper in the eye of law be also awarded to the plaintiffs against the defendants.” 4. The learned trial Court put the petitioner to terms and directed payment of a security amount. In the opinion of the petitioner, the security amount required by the learned trial Court was excessive. The petitioner carried the order of the trial Court in appeal before this Court by instituting the First Appeal From Order No. 564 of 2006. The aforesaid appeal was disposed of by this Court by order dated 3.3.2006. The operative portion of the aforesaid order is reproduced hereunder: “Considering the facts of the case, it is provided that in case the appellants give security of the amount in question other than cash or bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the trial Court within one month, no recovery shall be made from the appellants. The suit filed by the appellants be decided by the Court below in accordance with law within six months from the date a certified copy of this order is presented before the concerned Court below. This appeal is disposed of as above.” 5. In compliance of the order passed by this Court dated 3.3.2006 the petitioner submitted a personal security bond before the learned trial Court. This appeal is disposed of as above.” 5. In compliance of the order passed by this Court dated 3.3.2006 the petitioner submitted a personal security bond before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court rejected the aforesaid personal security bond by order dated 20.11.2006. Subsequently, to cure the defect the petitioner filed a personal security bond alongwith an affidavit which too was rejected by the learned trial Court on 27.11.2006. The petitioner again approached this Court seeking modification of the order dated 3.3.2006 passed in First Appeal From Order No. 564 of 2006. The application for modification of the order dated 3.3.2006 was rejected by this Court by order dated 9.3.2017 which reads as under: “Under these circumstances, this application is not maintainable and is accordingly rejected. However, it is provided that in case the appellant complies with the order dated 3.3.2006 in another one month, the interim order shall remain operative.” 6. The trial Court yet again rejected the security bond supported by an affidavit submitted by the petitioner vide order dated 16.4.2007. The petitioner carried the order passed by the trial Court dated 16.4.2007 in revision. The revision was instituted before this Court as Civil Revision No. 192 of 2007. The aforesaid Civil Revision No. 192 of 2007 was rejected vide order dated 10.7.2015. There is no averment in the writ petition that the order dated 10.7.2015 passed by this Court is in jeopardy before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, it is safely concluded that the order of rejection of revision has attained finality as it has not been recalled or set aside by the competent Court or the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the meantime, the O.S. No. 134 of 2005 instituted by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 27.7.2017. Again there is no averment in the writ petition nor was any submission made that the order passed dated 27.7.2017 passed by the learned trial Court is under challenge before any competent Court. On 11.12.2017 a recovery citation dated 11.12.2017 bearing an amount of Rs. 87,14,710/- was issued to the petitioner. 7. The petitioner has assailed the recovery certificate dated 11.12.2017 and the consequent recovery citation dated 4.12.2017 in this writ petition. 8. On 11.12.2017 a recovery citation dated 11.12.2017 bearing an amount of Rs. 87,14,710/- was issued to the petitioner. 7. The petitioner has assailed the recovery certificate dated 11.12.2017 and the consequent recovery citation dated 4.12.2017 in this writ petition. 8. Heard Shri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondent No. 1 as well as Shri Rajiv Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 9. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 regarding the maintainability of the instant writ petition. The contention of the learned counsel was that the cause of action, on which the instant writ petition is founded, is very much, the same cause of action on which O.S. No. 134 of 2005, Rao Shiv Nath Singh Memorial v. The U.P. Khadi and Village Industries Board was instituted before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Firozabad. The writ petition is not maintainable. 10. Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner on his part made a consolidated submission to meet the preliminary objection and also to assail the recovery proceedings on merits. Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel contends that a fresh cause of action arose upon the issuance of recovery certificate dated 11.12.2017, which is the subject-matter of challenge in the instant writ petition. The recovery certificate impugned in this writ petition seeks to recover an amount of Rs. 87,14,710/-, while the amount sought to be recovered in the first recovery certificate was only to the extent of Rs. 11,817,68/-. The first recovery certificate was impugned before the learned trial Court. He further contends that much larger issue of law is at stake in the instant writ petition. This issue goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the authorities issuing the recovery certificate. It will have a wide socio economic impact on the poor agricultural classes, who struggle under debt cycles from which they are unable to extricate themselves. Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel elaborating his contention submits that interest amount in excess of the principal amount, which is lent to the borrower, cannot be recovered. Realization of such excess amount is prohibited by the principal of Damdupat. According to Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, the principal of Damdupat is squarely applicable to the facts of the case. Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel elaborating his contention submits that interest amount in excess of the principal amount, which is lent to the borrower, cannot be recovered. Realization of such excess amount is prohibited by the principal of Damdupat. According to Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, the principal of Damdupat is squarely applicable to the facts of the case. The principal of Damdupat is a salutary principal, which restricts recovery of interest on loans disbursed to borrowers, to save them from debt traps. Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel relies on the law laid down by this Court in the case of Chander v. State of U.P. and others, 2007(8) ADJ 133 : 2007(4) ESC 2522 (All). 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is appropriate to decide the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. The writ petition, in sum and substance arises out of the same cause of action on which the proceedings of the suit registered as O.S. No. 134 of 2005, Rao Shivnath Singh Memorial Khadi Gram Udhyog Samit and another v. The U.P. Khadi and Village Industries Board and others before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Firozabad were founded. The proceedings arising out of the aforesaid suit have attained finality. This writ petition being instituted on the same cause of action which has already been adjudicated finally by this Court is not maintainable. The cause of action is the same which arose on the issuance of the first recovery certificate. Merely because the updated interest is added to the pre-existing dues, the cause of action is not altered. 12. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. However, we will also deal with the second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the applicability of the principles of damdupat to bank loans. 13. Customary laws have held the field as legitimate sources of law over centuries. Their origins are shrouded in antiquity. But they represent standards of conduct accepted by the society over the centuries. The sources of customary laws are held in reverence and authors of commentaries on customary laws command wide respect. Customary laws have imparted stability to society and contributed to the evolution of rule by law. In modern times some customary laws have been formalized and written in the form of statute. This is called statutorization. The sources of customary laws are held in reverence and authors of commentaries on customary laws command wide respect. Customary laws have imparted stability to society and contributed to the evolution of rule by law. In modern times some customary laws have been formalized and written in the form of statute. This is called statutorization. Customary laws became part of the formal legal system in British India and continue to be so in independent India. Customary laws owe their existence to the sanctity of the scripture and not the sovereignty of the legislature. 14. Systems of law realize their purpose by being agents of change and anchors of stability. Change without continuity is a recipe for instability and stability without change is the cause of stagnation. Failure of any legal system to understand the importance of stability and to achieve the imperative of change, would call into question the legitimacy of the system. 15. Customary laws have not been immune to change but often reluctant to adapt. Like scriptures of their origin they exist as fixed revelations, unlike the evolving tradition of case laws or the adapting method of legislation. An institutional mechanism of change is virtually non-existent. 16. Though it must be conceded that incremental changes have come about in customary laws by the commentators interpretations. 17. In Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage (16th Edition) (hereinafter Mayne’s Treatise), the learned author commented as under: “The Smritis were in part based upon contemporary or anterior usages, and, in part, on rules framed by the Hindu jurists and rulers of the country. They did not however purport to be exhaustive and therefore provided for the recognition of the usages which they had not incorpored. Later Commentaries and Digests were equally the exponents of the usages of their times in those parts of India where they were composed. And in the guise of commenting, they developed and expounded the rules in greater detail, differentiated bewteen the Smriti rules which continued to be in force and those which had become obsolete; and in the process, incorporated also new usages which had sprung up.” 18. And in the guise of commenting, they developed and expounded the rules in greater detail, differentiated bewteen the Smriti rules which continued to be in force and those which had become obsolete; and in the process, incorporated also new usages which had sprung up.” 18. The judgement of the Calcutta High Court in Jagdamba Koer v. Secretary of State for India in Council, (1889) 16 Cal 367, as cited in Mayne’s Treatise: “The truth is that Commentaries and Digests, like the Mitakshara and Viramitrodaya, owe their binding force not to their promulgation by any sovereign authority, but to the respect due to their authors, and still more to the fact of their being in accordance with prevailing popular sentiment and practice. Their doctrines may often have moulded usage, but still more frequently they have themselves been moulded accoding to prevailing usage of which they are only the recorded expression.” 19. Inability to change and failure to adapt to changed circumstances, poses a challenge to the legitimacy of customary laws. 20. It is for a fact that many customary laws have remained impervious to change and over the years have become archaic or even oppressive. To insist on implementation of such customary laws without regard to the socio economic conditions and the legal system of the day would be fatal to governance by law. 21. The pace and the face of change in modern times also needs a deeper look. Pace of socio economic change hastened after the 18th century. In the age of IT, AI and globalization the pace of socio economic change has accelerated even more. A fundamental challenge to any legal system is the ability to cope with the fruits of technological advance and manage socio economic change. Today’s world and socio economic conditions are substantially different from the times of the origin of many customary laws. The purpose sought to be achieved by such customary laws may not exist in current times. Or the purpose of such customary law may provoke a result it is trying to prevent. 22. Some of the constituent elements of our legal systems are the Constitution, legislation and Courts of law. This framework legitimizes customary law by recognition and limits it by oversight. 23. In today’s age legal relations often exist between parties which have not adopted the same customary law. 22. Some of the constituent elements of our legal systems are the Constitution, legislation and Courts of law. This framework legitimizes customary law by recognition and limits it by oversight. 23. In today’s age legal relations often exist between parties which have not adopted the same customary law. Another facet of contemporary times are legal compacts between a person professing a religion and a juristic entity like and incorporated company or bank or statutory body which is entirely secular and has no religious affiliation. 24. Customary laws cannot be invoked as a matter of rule and cannot be implemented as a matter of right against all individuals irrespective of their religious denomination and against all entities irrespective of their legal purpose. 25. The question to be determined, in the facts of this case is whether the customary laws adopted by one party can be enforced against a juristic entity like an incorporated bank or a statutory body or an instrumentality of state, which is secular in character and has no obligation, moral or legal to obey the customary laws of the former. 26. The controversy can be resolved by assistance from judgements rendered by Courts in analogous situations. This issue of enforcement of the customary laws adopted by one party against party of a different religious persuasion professing separate customary laws came to be decided in a number of judgements handed down by different Courts in the country. The principles of law laid down therein would to an extent guide the decision in this case. 27. The Calcutta High Court was seized of an issue of entitlement of a Mohammedan to enforce the Mohammedan custom of pre-emption against a Hindu purchaser from a Mohamedan vendor. The question was answered in the negative. In the said case Shaikh Kudratulla v. Mahini Mohan Shaha in Special Appeal No. 512 of 1868, reported at 4 BLR 805 = MANU opined as under: “1.......................That the Mahomedan law is not the law of the land is, I believe, a proposition beyond all dispute; and it follows, therefore, that the mere fact that the subject-matter of this suit is immoveable property, is no ground whatever for holding that it is necessarily governed by the provisions of the Mahomedan law as the law of the place in which that property is situated. If, therefore, we are at all bound to apply the Mahomed an law of pre-emption to a case of this description, it must be either because the application of that law has been made obligatory upon us by some positive legislative enactment, or because the principles upon which it is founded are so eminently consistent with those of justice, equity, and good conscience, that the Courts of this country are, by their very constitution, bound to follow them, in the absence of any express legislative declaration to the contrary. Section, Regulation VII of 1832, however, appears to me to be conclusive on this point. That section runs as follows : It is hereby declared that the above rules are intended, and shall be held, to apply to such persons only as shall be bona fide professors of those religions at the time of the application of the law to the case, and designed for the protection of the rights of such persons, not for the deprivation of the rights of others. Whenever, therefore, in any civil suit, the parties to such suit may be of different persuasions, where one party shall be of the Hindu and the other of the Mahomedan persuasion, or where one or more of the parties to the suit shall not be either of the Hindu or Mahomedan persuasion, the laws of those religions shall not be permitted to operate to deprive such party or parties of any property to which but for the operation of such laws they would have been entitled. In all such cases, the decision shall be governed by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.” Now the present suit is admittedly a suit of a civil nature, and it is also a suit the parties to which are of different religious persuasions. Under such circumstances, it is perfectly clear, that the decision of such a suit must be governed by the section above referred to, and that section not only requires that we should follow the rule of justice, equity, and good conscience as our only guide in cases of this description, but it absolutely forbids us to apply the Hindu or the Mahomedan law to those cases, if we find that the result of such application would be to deprive any one of the parties of a property to which he would have been otherwise entitled........................”. 28. 28. The Bombay High Court, in Robasa Khanum v. Khodadad Bomanji Irani, AIR 1947 Bom. 272, faced the issue of conflict of personal religious laws, in a matrimonial dispute. The Court declined to apply the personal religious laws of either party, but relied on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The Bombay High Court held as under: “4. The more difficult and the more interesting question that arises for determination is: what are the consequences of the plaintiff’s conversion to Islam? Muslim law makes a distinction between conversion to Islam of one of the spouses talcing place in a country subject to the laws of Islam and in a country where the law of Islam is not the law of the land. In the first case, when one of the parties embraces Islam, he or she must offer Islam to the other spouse; and if the latter refuses to adopt Islam, then the Judge should separate the couple. In the latter case, after the lapse of a period of three months after the adoption of Islam by one of the parties, the marriage is automatically dissolved. It is not possible to take the view that India is a country subject to the laws of Islam. It is true that the Courts in British India administer the Muslim law as altered and amended by statute law to Muslim parties. But the Courts of Jaw do so pursuant to the directions contained in the laws of India. Complete religious neutrality obtains in our country and our Courts administer laws irrespective of the creed of the parties who appear before them. The Courts do not administer the laws of any particular community, but they administer such laws as are valid in British India. Muslim law is administered only in those cases where it happens to be the law of British India in cases where the parties are Muslims. 8. If parties appearing before the Court were governed by the same personal law, it would be easy to say what justice and right was according to which the case should be decided. Ordinarily it would be according to the personal law of the parties. But a serious difficulty arises when the plaintiff and the defendant have different personal laws and there is a conflict between those personal laws. Ordinarily it would be according to the personal law of the parties. But a serious difficulty arises when the plaintiff and the defendant have different personal laws and there is a conflict between those personal laws. “We have here a Muslim wife according to whose personal law conversion to Islam, if the other spouse does not embrace the same religion, automatically dissolves the marriage. We have a Zoroastrian husband according to whose personal law such conversion does not bring about the same result. The Privy Council in Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin, expressed the opinion that if there was no rule of ‘Indian law which could be applied to a particular case, then it should be decided by equity and good conscience, and they interpreted equity and good conscience to mean the rules of English law if found applicable to Indian society and circumstances. And the same view was confirmed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Muhammad Baza v. Abbas Bandi Bibi. But there is no rule of English law which can be made applicable to a suit for divorce by a Muslim wife against her Zoroastrian husband. The English law only deals and can only deal with Christian marriages and with grounds for dissolving a Christian marriage. Therefore we must decide according to justice and right, or equity and good conscience independently of any provisions of the English law. We must do substantial justice between the parties and in doing so hope that we have vindicated the principles of justice and right or equity and good conscience. 11. As far as we can see from the cases cited at the Bar, only two High Courts have had occasion to consider this question-the High Court of Calcutta and the High Court of Madras. There have been several conflicting decisions of the Calcutta High Court which we shall briefly review. Mr. Justice Panckridge in an ex parte case made a declaration that the marriage of a Hindu woman who had been converted to Islam stood dissolved. He followed an iinreported decision of Buckland J. to the same effect. (See Musst. Ayesha Bibi v. Bireshwar Ghosh Mazumdar clxxix). But the judgment contains no reasons which led the learned Judge to come to that conclusion. He followed an iinreported decision of Buckland J. to the same effect. (See Musst. Ayesha Bibi v. Bireshwar Ghosh Mazumdar clxxix). But the judgment contains no reasons which led the learned Judge to come to that conclusion. In Haripada Boy v. Krishna Benode, the husband, a Hindu, filed a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights against his wife who had been converted to Islam. It seems that she had obtained an ex parte decree for dissolution of her marriage on the ground of her conversion. The husband’s suit for the restitution of conjugal rights had been dismissed by the two lower Courts and the matter came in second appeal before the High Court. It was not necessary to decide whether conversion led to dissolution of marriage because the Court expressly decided the appeal on the ground that as the ex parte decree had not been challenged, a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights could not be maintained. In Noor Jehan v. Eugene Tiscenko, MANU/WB/0057/1941 : AIR 1941Cal 582, the wife sued her husband who was a Russian subject for a declaration that her marriage stood dissolved on the ground of her conversion to Islam. Mr. Justice Edgley who tried the suit refused to apply the rule of Muslim law stating (p. 594) that it was not the law of India that a marriage which had been duly celebrated according to the lex loci contradus and contemplated a lifelong union, could be dissolved by having recourse to some provision of the personal religious law of one of the parties to the marriage in a case in which the parties belonged to different religious communities. He went to the length of saying that the rule of Mahomedan law, on which the plaintiff relied, must be regarded as obsolete and contrary to public policy. Mr. Justice Edgley dismissed the suit and there was an appeal from his decision. In Noor Jehan Begum v. Eugene Tiseenho, a bench consisting of Derbyshire C.J. and Ameer Ali and Nasim Ali JJ. confirmed the decision of Mr. Justice Edgley on the ground that as the husband was domiciled in Russia and as the wife took the domicile of her husband, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for dissolution of their marriage. It is not necessary for us to go. to the same length as Mr. confirmed the decision of Mr. Justice Edgley on the ground that as the husband was domiciled in Russia and as the wife took the domicile of her husband, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for dissolution of their marriage. It is not necessary for us to go. to the same length as Mr. Justice Edgley went and say that the particular rule of Muslim law on which the plaintiff is relying is obsolete and contrary to public policy, but it is sufficient for us to agree with Mr. Justice Edgley that that rule of Muslim law does not apply where only one of the parties to the suit is a Muslim. Them in Musstt. Ayesha Bihi v. Subodh Chakravarty, Mr. Justice Ormorid had a similar case before him, We agree with Mr. Justice Ormond in his conclusion that the law to be administered in cases like the one before him and the one before us is to administer justice and right; but, with respect, we entirely disagree with him when he comes to the conclusion that justice and right demands that conversion from Hinduism to Islam should put an end to the marriage. In passing we may observe that the learned Judge has taken the same view of Section 112 of the Government of India Act of 1915 as we have done earlier in this judgment. In the same volume of the Calcutta Weekly Notes is also reported a decision of another single Judge of the same High Court, Mr. Justice Lodge, and that learned Judge has dissented from the view taken by Mr. Justice Ormond (Sayed Khaioon v. M. Obediah). The learned Judge took the view that India was not a Mahomedan country and the Mahomedan law was not the law of the land. The learned Judge further observed that he could find no authority for the view that a marriage solemnized according to one persona law could be dissolved according to another personal law simply because one of the two parties had changed his or her religion. He held that it could not be just and right to grant a declaration of dissolution of marriage on the ground of conversion of one of the parties to the marriage to Islam. With respect, we entirely agree with the decision of that learned Judge. 12. He held that it could not be just and right to grant a declaration of dissolution of marriage on the ground of conversion of one of the parties to the marriage to Islam. With respect, we entirely agree with the decision of that learned Judge. 12. The Madras High Court has held in Budansa Bowther v. Fattna Bi that when a Hindu married woman was converted to Islam and during the lifetime of her Hindu husband married a Mahomedan and had several children by the second marriage, the second marriage was illegal and the children who were born of this union were illegitimate. The Court held that where a conflict occurs between persons belonging to different religions, it must apply the rules of justice, equity and good conscience. The Court further held that in testing whether the first marriage of a Hindu woman with a Hindu husband was subsisting or not at the time of her second marriage with a Muslim after she became a convert to Islam, the principles of Hindu law should be applied; but in testing the validity of her second marriage, the principles of Mahomedan law should be applied. 14. We, therefore, hold that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the Original Side. We further hold that the law which must be applied is not the Muslim personal law, but we must decide the case according to justice and right. We further hold that it is not in accordance with justice and right that on the conversion of one of the parties to the marriage to Islam it should be held that the marriage stands dissolved.” 29. The Mayne’s Treatise (16th Edition) sums up the restricted scope of applicablity of Hindu Law customs and the locus to invoke them in the following manner: “The Courts are required to apply Hindu law in cases where the parties are Hindus in deciding any question regarding succession, inheritance, marriage or caste or any religious usage or institution.” 30. Damdupat cannot be considered in isolation. It has to be seen in the context of the position of debt in Hindu Law. 31. Hindu law customs maintain that the duty to discharge the debt of the father is a pious obligation of the son. There was a socio economic perspective to the religious obligation of discharging the debt. Damdupat cannot be considered in isolation. It has to be seen in the context of the position of debt in Hindu Law. 31. Hindu law customs maintain that the duty to discharge the debt of the father is a pious obligation of the son. There was a socio economic perspective to the religious obligation of discharging the debt. The sacrosanct duty of debt repayment, created a system of sureties for the debt. However, it also posed a danger of an endless cycle of debts binding generation after generation. The concept of Damdupat reduced the rigours of the rule of debt repayment and made it just and equitable. 32. The rule of damdupat is a branch of the Hindu Law of debts. The rule is stated by Gautam in these words. “If (the loan) remains outstanding for a long time, the principal may be doubled (after which interest ceases).” Sacred Books of the East, Vol. II, Chapter XII, 31, page 242". 33. In Manu the rule is stated thus: “In money transactions interest paid at one time (not by instalments) shall never exceed the double (of the principal)....” Laws of Manu, Chapter VIII 51, page 280". 34. These ancient authorities have been cited as above in the judgement of the Bombay High Court, in Bapurao Lalji v. Anant Kashinath, AIR 1946 Nag 210. The said judgement, based on various judicial authorities, defines the rule as under: “According to the rule of Damdupat the amount of interest recoverable at any one time cannot exceed the principal.” The rationale behind the rule of damdupat was described in Bapurao Lalji (supra) in the following terms: “The reason of this rule has been stated by Kanhaiya Lal J. in his judgement in 46 ALL 75 (AIR 1924 All 551, Gajadhar v. Jagannath)”. 35. According to the rule of damdupat the amount of interest recoverable at any one time cannot exceed the principal: 1 Bom. H.C.R. 47, 14 Cal. 781 at page 789. The reason of the rule has been stated by Kanhaiyalal J. in his judgment in 46 All. 775 at page 782 in these words: “The Hindu law did not recognize any rule of limitation for the recovery of debts. H.C.R. 47, 14 Cal. 781 at page 789. The reason of the rule has been stated by Kanhaiyalal J. in his judgment in 46 All. 775 at page 782 in these words: “The Hindu law did not recognize any rule of limitation for the recovery of debts. Every debt which was lawful was binding and recoverable from the debtor irrespective of the period which may have elapsed since the original liability was incurred, and no restriction on its recovery was recognized beyond this that at no time more than double the amount of the principal money could be claimed.” 36. This Court in Gajadhar v. Jagannath, AIR 1924 All 551, considered this question and held as under: “6. In the view of the Hindu lawyers a debt due is not merely an obligation but a sin, the consequences of which follow the debtor in the next life. Vrihaspati says, “He who, having received a sum lent or the like, does not repay it to the owner will be born hereafter in his creditor’s house a slave, a servant, a woman, or a quadruped “ Narada similarly says, “when a devotee or a man who maintained a sacrificial fire, dies without having discharged his debt, the whole merit of his devotions or, of his perpetual fire, belongs to his creditors.” 7. The duty of relieving a person from the evil consequences of his debts, remaining unpaid, therefore, lies very heavily upon his sons and grandsons; and the only limitations, which the law recognizes, are that the debts must not be illegal or immoral and that the obligation would only be enforceable against the family estate. Narada says that “Fathers desire offspring for their own sake, reflecting that ‘their sons will redeem them from every debt whatsoever due to superior and inferior beings.’ In fact the older the debt the greater the responsibilities on the descendants of the man who leaves the debt unpaid. Narada says that “Fathers desire offspring for their own sake, reflecting that ‘their sons will redeem them from every debt whatsoever due to superior and inferior beings.’ In fact the older the debt the greater the responsibilities on the descendants of the man who leaves the debt unpaid. Vrihaspati accordingly lays down, “ The father’s debt must be first paid and next the debt contracted by the man himself but the debt of the paternal grandfather must even be paid before either of these.” To the same effect is a dictum of Katyayana who declares: “The Judge shall compel a son to pay the debt of his father, provided he be involved in no distress, be capable of property and liable to bear the burden, but in no other case shall he compel the son to pay his father’s debt.” 37. Hindu law did not recognize any rule of limitation for recovery of debts. The restraint created by statutes of limitation on recovery of debts, restricted the space of customary Hindu law. The issue was considered in the case of Gajadhar (supra) and the statutory checks on customary laws were approved. The Court in Gajadhar (supra) held as under: “8. A further restriction has now been introduced by the law of limitation. A son is not liable for the payment of a debt due by his father, if it was not legally recoverable from him, had he been alive. But a time-barred debt may be revived by father, and when so revived, it stands on the same footing as a debt enforceable against him in his life-time, Under Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, IX of 1872, it is open to a person against whom a debt has become barred by time to make a promise in writing to pay that debt, and such a promise would form a good consideration for a sale made to pay that debt. Under Sections 60 and 61 of that Act, a creditor can law fully appropriate a payment not made for any specific purpose, towards a debt, barred by time. A contract in writing to pay such a debt may for certain purposes be treated as an independent contract; but the liability, which it renews, is a liability, which existed from before, though for the time being it may have ceased to be enforceable. A contract in writing to pay such a debt may for certain purposes be treated as an independent contract; but the liability, which it renews, is a liability, which existed from before, though for the time being it may have ceased to be enforceable. The Hindu Law did not recognize any rule of limitation for the recovery of debts. Every debt which was lawful was binding and recoverable from the debtor irrespective of the period which may have elapsed since the original liability was incurred, and no restriction on its recovery was recognized beyond this that at no time more than double the amount of the principal money could be claimed. 9. A debt may become irrecoverable under the law now in force by reason of the lapse of the period of limitation, but the debt exists all the same, and if a person chooses to pay a time barred debt in the manner permitted by Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, the debt which he chooses to pay remains the same debt, though by reason of the contract, which he enters into, it assumes a new garb and gains a fresh vitality.” 38. Restrictions posed by statutes on customary laws have been upheld by Courts. The applicability and scope of the rule of damdupat and indeed customary laws is always subject to the regime of the statutes. 39. The substantial difference in the contemporaneous times when the rule of Damdupat is invoked and the times of yore when the rule of Damdupat was evolved is too obvious to be stated. 40. Unlike the times of antiquity, today capital is in vast supply and not restricted inn limited hands. Banking industry is well developed and credit is readily available to common man. The State also supports welfare schemes which disburse credit without discrimination. The evolution of the law of contracts, rule of law and administration of justice by Courts has also materially altered the social perspective on debt and its recovery. Banking contracts have watertight assurances of sureties and collaterals. The legal system provides for third party enforcement of law. Unconscionable terms of contract are reversed and struck down by Courts and cannot be enforced. The cumulative effect of these is that credit is available to common man. Common man can avail credit without fear of exploitation by unequal bargaining power of the lending party. The legal system provides for third party enforcement of law. Unconscionable terms of contract are reversed and struck down by Courts and cannot be enforced. The cumulative effect of these is that credit is available to common man. Common man can avail credit without fear of exploitation by unequal bargaining power of the lending party. The lending institutions can advance credit, the recovery of which is secured by law. 41. The evolution of the corporation and incorporated companies as recognized legal entitles, to do business has increased the volume of trade and business. The integration of the nation into one economic unit, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the institution of the Central Banker, R.B.I., the nationalization of banks carried in them seeds of far reaching changes. Loans became accessible to common man, as a vehicle of economic empowerment. The back of usurious money lenders was broken and the exploited many were liberated from unending cycles of debt. The law provides for recovery of loans from defaulters through transparent processes with assistance of state/third party. Interest rates or rates at which bank credit is offered are regulated by Reserve Bank of India and have macro economic consequences. Fixing of such interest rates have passed into the domain of statutory bodies having technical expertise over the subject. 42. In the field of banking, the sacred and the secular are well separated. 43. Financial institutions like banks, cannot apply customary laws of parties to financial transactions at the instance of the parties, contrary to the norms of financial prudence, RBI guidelines, terms of loans agreements and other provisions of fiscal regulations. If the amount of interest and hence the rate of interest chargeable on bank loans are to be fixed by the stipulations of Damdupat, it would produce adverse macro economic consequences. The oversight of loans, interests on loans disbursed by banks and other financial institutions, by the RBI undertaken on statutory mandate cannot be displaced by the rule of damdupat. The wisdom of contemporary bodies of expert knowledge, working under statute, cannot be substituted by customs like Damdupat of a sect or a religious groups. The autonomy of financial institutions granted by law, cannot be curbed except by procedure laid down by statute. 44. We hold that the Hindu law of Damdupat cannot be applied to the loans advanced by banks and financial institutions regulated by statute. 45. The autonomy of financial institutions granted by law, cannot be curbed except by procedure laid down by statute. 44. We hold that the Hindu law of Damdupat cannot be applied to the loans advanced by banks and financial institutions regulated by statute. 45. The rise of the welfare State and the advent of governance by law are characteristic features of independent India. Various schemes are run by the State, to promote economic growth and entrepreneurship. 46. The scheme in issue is statutory in origin and reflects policy of the Government. The scheme run by the Khadi Board is relatable to U.P. Khadi & Village Industries Board Act, 1960. The rates of interest are crystallised in the agreement between the parties. 47. The mandate of the statute and the terms of the scheme, contemplate equal application of the benefits to all. 48. Applying the rule of Damdupat to the scheme and agreement in issue would alter the rates of interest set in the agreement. This would be contrary to the intendment of the statute, the scope of the scheme and terms of the agreement. Further the consequences would transcend the dispute between the parties. Damdupat is the customary law of Hindus and does not govern the affairs of other religious communities. The rule of Damdupat will cause a reduction in the amount of interest which is payable. However, this benefit will accrue only to a particular class which adopts Damdupat as a customary law, to the exclusion of others. This classification is unreasonable and discriminatory. 49. This classification which would benefit a particular religious community because it follows a specific customary law, and denies the same benefits to other religious communities because they follow different customary laws, does not bear any relevance to the object sought to be achieved by the scheme. In fact, it provokes the contrary result and is arbitrary. 50. Such classification offends the assurance of equal application of laws enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Such action also reneges from the promise of eschewing discrimination on grounds of religion, entrenched in Article 15 of the Constitution of India. 51. The application of Damdupat to the scheme in issue and the loan agreement in controversy would violate Article 14 and Article 15 of the Constitution of India. Such action also reneges from the promise of eschewing discrimination on grounds of religion, entrenched in Article 15 of the Constitution of India. 51. The application of Damdupat to the scheme in issue and the loan agreement in controversy would violate Article 14 and Article 15 of the Constitution of India. Damdupat would create a discriminatory regime which would be contrary to the intent and terms of the policy at hand. Applying Damdupat to the scheme in issue would be inconsistent with principles of equity, justice and good conscience. We hold the rule of Damdupat is not applicable to the schemes of Khadi Gramodyog and the financial assistance, provided thereunder. 52. The judgement of the learned Single Judge, entered in the case of Chander v. State of U.P. and another, 2007(8) ADJ 133 : 2007(4) ESC 2522 (All), applying the principle of Damdupat to bank loans does not lay down the correct law and is overruled. 53. The petitioner is held liable to pay the interest liability accruing in terms of the contract. 54. The writ petition dismissed.