JUDGMENT Kh. Nobin Singh, J. - Heard Shri B.P. Sahu, learned Senior Advocate; Shri S. Biswajit Meitei, learned Advocate; Shri N. Mahendra, learned Advocate and Ms. K. Neeru, learned Advocate appearing for the applicants/ appellants and Shri M. Hemchandra, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Th. Rohitkumar, learned Advocate; Shri Kh. Tarunkumar, Advocate; Shri A. Mohendro, Advocate; Shri Th. Khagemba, Advocate; Shri I. Denning, Advocate appearing for the private respondents and Shri N. Kumarjit Singh, learned Advocate General, Manipur assisted by Shri P. Tamphamani, learned Advocate appearing for the State respondents. 2. The above four writ appeals are directed against the common judgment and order dated 05-04-2018 passed by the learned Single Judge and since the appellants were not arrayed as party in the writ petitions, the said writ appeals have been preferred by them along with the applications for leave to prefer the same as third party. All the applications are being disposed of by this common judgment and order, as the same have arisen out of a similar set of facts. 3.1. Facts and circumstances which have led to the filing of the said applications for grant of leave to prefer the writ appeals, are that the Home Department, Government of Manipur initiated a process for filling up of 2000 vacancies in the posts of Police Constables (Male/ Civil) in the Police Department, for which a requisition was made by the DGP, Manipur through the employment exchanges vide its advertisement dated 1001-2013. The recruitment process consisted of three stages-one, Physical Efficiency Test; two, Written Examination and three, Viva-Voce. As many as 37,260 candidates including the applicants/ appellants applied for the said posts and after the Physical Efficiency Test having been held from 01-02-2013 to 20-05-2013, about 30,000 candidates were declared successful to sit in the written examination. The written examination was held on 16-06-2013 and after the result thereof being declared, 10,287 candidates were found qualified for the viva voce which was notified to be held on 16-09-2015. 3.2. In the midst of the recruitment process, three candidates filed a writ petition being WP(C) No.861 of 2015 praying for quashing the result of the written test declared on 1309-2013 on the ground that there had been large scale malpractices and irregularities. 3.2. In the midst of the recruitment process, three candidates filed a writ petition being WP(C) No.861 of 2015 praying for quashing the result of the written test declared on 1309-2013 on the ground that there had been large scale malpractices and irregularities. The Home Department suo moto intervened in the matter by issuing an order dated 1910-2015 for holding an enquiry, for which the Principal Secretary, Government of Manipur was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to make an enquiry and submit a report thereof. A report was submitted to the Government on 06-01-2016 stating therein that there were serious malpractices and irregularities and after having examined it, the State Government vide its order dated 10-05-2016 decided to resume the recruitment process by holding viva voce test. However, there seemed to be a change in the course of action towards recruitment process with the result that the State Government took a decision to cancel the recruitment process and accordingly, the Addl. Chief secretary (Home), Government of Manipur issued an order dated 20-08-2016 cancelling the recruitment process and for holding a fresh recruitment process, followed by another order dated 2008-2016 issued by the Under Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur by which the Selection Board was re-constituted. On the same day i.e., 20-08-2016, the dGp, Manipur issued a notification declaring the schedule for the fresh recruitment process to be held in respect of nine districts by fixing the date and time of Physical Efficiency Test to be held w.e.f. 30-08-2016. On the next day, ie., 21-08-2016 a press release was issued by the DGP, Manipur clarifying that no new application be entertained and the criteria as laid down in the Notification dated 10-01-2013 would be followed in the fresh recruitment process. 3.3. On the next day, ie., 21-08-2016 a press release was issued by the DGP, Manipur clarifying that no new application be entertained and the criteria as laid down in the Notification dated 10-01-2013 would be followed in the fresh recruitment process. 3.3. Being aggrieved by the said orders dated 20-08-2016 and the Notification dated 2008-2016, as many as 13 writ petitions being WP(C) 861 of 2015; WP(C) No.627 of 2016; WP(C) No.635 of 2016; WP (C) No. 641 of 2016; WP(C) No.666 of 2016; WP(C) No.691 of 2016; WP(C) No. 717 of 2016; WP(C) No.804 of 2016; WP(C) No.807 of 2016; WP(C) No. 902 of 2016; WP(C) No.948 of 2016; WP(C) No.950 of 2016 and WP(C) No. 427 of 2017 came to be filed by some of the candidates questioning the validity and correctness thereof on many grounds, some of which mention may be made, are that the report was very vague; that no irregularities and illegalities which could form the basis for cancellation of the recruitment process, were detected in the enquiry; that the cancellation was not in accordance with law but on the dictates of the high officials and that there was no question of any use of unfair means, mass copying or any other violation of the instructions of the examining body and therefore, the decision for cancellation was illegal, unjust and unconstitutional. 3.4. During the pendency of the said writ petitions, the fresh recruitment process was continued with the written test being held on 14-10-2016 and the viva voce also had been duly held later. On 07-10-2016 when the writ petition being WP(C) No.627 of 2016 was listed for consideration of interim prayer, the learned Addl. Advocate General, Manipur prayed for some time to file counter affidavit on behalf of the State respondents with the submission that the result of the fresh recruitment process would not be declared and accordingly, the learned Single Judge granted time till 21-10-2016 with the direction that the final result of the new recruitment process should not be declared by the authorities. The interim order granted on 07-10-2016 appears to have been continued until further order vide order dated 15-05-2017 passed by the learned Single Judge. 3.5. The interim order granted on 07-10-2016 appears to have been continued until further order vide order dated 15-05-2017 passed by the learned Single Judge. 3.5. On 17-8-2017, at the time of hearing, there appeared to be certain unanimity on the part of the parties that one of the solutions in the imbroglio was to get the matter examined by a Committee as to whether there was any large scale irregularities in the recruitment process. Since the exercise would involve examination of records, it was suggested that a commission be constituted and in case irregularities were found/ detected, the Commission would examine as to whether it would be possible to segregate those candidates who were not affected by such irregularities so that the process could be allowed to proceed further. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge vide its order dated 24-08-2017 appointed a Commission which submitted its report in three volumes. On 0602-2018 the learned Single Judge directed that copies of the said report be made available to the counsels appearing for the parties on payment of Rs. 2500/- so that they could give their suggestions thereto before 20-03-2018. 3.6. On 05-04-2018 when the writ petitions came up for consideration and disposal, the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners therein unanimously submitted that since the majority of the candidates who had appeared in the viva voce, were found to be not tainted by the Commission, it would be fitness of things that the recruitment process be allowed to be proceeded and the appointments be made from amongst those successful candidates in order of merit on the basis of the recruitment process initiated in terms of the Notification dated 10-01-2013. However, Shri Phungyo Zingkhei, Advocate appearing for the caveators in some of the writ petitions submitted that it would be in the interest of justice that the entire recruitment process be scrapped as there had been findings of irregularities in respect of about 3000 candidates. The learned Advocate General, Manipur submitted that the learned Single Judge might pass an appropriate order in the light of the findings arrived at by the Commission and that the State Government would have no objection if the recruitment process was allowed to be proceeded by weeding out the candidates who had been found to be tainted. The learned Advocate General, Manipur submitted that the learned Single Judge might pass an appropriate order in the light of the findings arrived at by the Commission and that the State Government would have no objection if the recruitment process was allowed to be proceeded by weeding out the candidates who had been found to be tainted. After having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties in length, the learned Single Judge found no material not to act upon the findings arrived at by the Commission and accordingly, accepted the same with the directions mentioned therein. Consequently, all the writ petitions except the writ petition being WP(C) No.861 of 2015 were allowed and the orders dated 20-08-2016 issued by the Addl. Chief Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur and the Under Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur stood quashed. Being aggrieved by this common judgment and order dated 05-04-2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in the said 13 writ petitions referred to herein above, only four writ appeals being WA No.8 of 2018; WA No.12 of 2018; WA No.13 of 2018 and WA No.14 of 2018 were preferred by the appellants along with the applications for leave to file the same on the grounds mentioned therein. 4. The objections have been raised as regards the maintainability of the said applications and therefore, this court deems it appropriate to consider and decide the same before going into the merits of the writ appeals. It has been submitted by Shri B.P. Sahu, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the applicants in applications being MC(WA) No.19 of 2018 and MC(WA) No.25 of 2018 that since the applicants/ appellants were not made party in the said 13 writ petitions, they had no occasion to contest the same; that the common judgment and order had been passed by the learned Single Judge, without giving them an opportunity of being heard, is violative of the principles of natural justice and that the applicants/ appellants' rights to be considered for appointment as Police Constables had been adversely affected by the common judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. In support of his contention, Shri B.P. Sahu, the learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J.S. Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh anr., (2011) 6 SCC 570 . The submissions of Shri 5. In support of his contention, Shri B.P. Sahu, the learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J.S. Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh anr., (2011) 6 SCC 570 . The submissions of Shri 5. Biswajit Meitei, the learned Advocate and Ms. K. Neeru, the learned Advocate appearing for the applications being MC(WA) No.12 of 2018 and MC(WA) No.23 of 2018 respectively are similar to that of Shri B.P.Sahu and therefore, the same are not repeated here for the sake of brevity. 5. Combating the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the applicants/ appellants, Shri Kh. Tarunkumar, Advocate submitted that the applicants were aware of the pendency of the said writ petitions and even some of the applicants were present in the court while the said writ petitions were being listed for consideration by the learned Single Judge. While the enquiry was being conducted by the Commission, a wide publicity was given in the newspaper and therefore, the applications are not maintainable. Moreover, the applicant No.2 in application being MC(WA) No.26 of 2018 is a successful candidate and therefore, there is no need for him to file it and the affidavit filed in support of the application is incorrect and misleading. Shri M. Hemchandra, Senior Advocate submitted that the applicants/ appellants are those candidates who had failed in the recruitment process and since they approached this court by concealing material facts, no indulgence should be given to them. Although a common judgement and order was passed by the learned Single Judge allowing 13 writ petitions, four writ appeals had been preferred by the applicants/ appellants only in respect of four writ petitions which is impermissible. The order dated 20-08-2016 and the notification dated 20- 08-2016 were under challenge in the said 13 writ petitions and since the applications/ appellants were not yet born at the time of filing the writ petitions, there was no question of their being impleaded as party therein. Copies of the report submitted by the Commission were made available to all on payment of Rs. 2500/- and if they really wished to contest the writ petitions, they could have done so by moving applications for their impleadment as party in the writ petitions. Shri A. Mohendro, Advocate submitted that the applications are not maintainable, as the applicants/ appellants have failed to challenge the report of the Commission. 2500/- and if they really wished to contest the writ petitions, they could have done so by moving applications for their impleadment as party in the writ petitions. Shri A. Mohendro, Advocate submitted that the applications are not maintainable, as the applicants/ appellants have failed to challenge the report of the Commission. Shri Th. Khagemba, Advocate endorsed the submission of Shri M. Hemchandra, Senior Advocate that all the petitioners have not been arrayed as party in the writ appeals and moreover, no writ petitions have been filed by them for declaring the result of the new recruitment process. He has placed reliance in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Poonam v. State of Uttar Pradesh ors., (2016) 2 SCC 779 . Shri I. Denning, Advocate submitted that the applicants did not disclose their identities nor did they produce documents to prove their bonafide and genuineness. In tune with what has been submitted by Shri M.Hmechandra and Shri Th. Khagemba, he also submitted that they did challenge the judgment and order only in respect of four writ petitions but did not challenge it in respect of the remaining writ petitions. 6. From the aforesaid pleadings and submissions, facts which are not in dispute between the rival parties, are that a recruitment process was initiated by the State Government pursuant to the Notification dated 10-01- 2013. The recruitment process which consisted of three stages, was duly completed but in the meantime, a writ petition being WP(C) No.861 of 2015 was filed making allegations of large scale malpractices and irregularities therein. The Home Department issued an order dated 19-10-2015 for holding an enquiry and the Principal Secretary, Government of Manipur who conducted the enquiry, submitted a report dated 06-01-2016 stating therein that there were serious malpractices and irregularities and after having examined it, although the State Government vide its order dated 10-05-2016 decided to resume the recruitment process by holding viva voce test, cancelled it vide its order dated 20-08-2016 issued by the Addl. Chief Secretary (Home) and declared that a new recruitment process be held, followed by another order dated 20-08-2016 issued by the Under Secretary (Home) re-constituting the Selection Board. Chief Secretary (Home) and declared that a new recruitment process be held, followed by another order dated 20-08-2016 issued by the Under Secretary (Home) re-constituting the Selection Board. On the same day i.e., 20-08-2016, the DGP, Manipur issued a notification declaring the schedule for the recruitment process to be held in respect of nine districts by fixing the date and time of Physical Efficiency Test to be held w.e.f. 30-08-2016. On the next day, a press release was issued by the DGP, Manipur clarifying that no new application be entertained and the criteria as prescribed in the Notification dated 10-012013 would be followed in the new recruitment. The said order dated 20-08-2016 and the notification dated 20-08-2016 were challenged in the said 13 writ petitions and during the pendency thereof, the new recruitment process was not stopped from its continuation, except the order that the final result thereof should not be declared by the authorities, with the result that the new recruitment process stood duly concluded. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the said writ petitions, quashed and set aside the order dated 20-08-2016 and the notification dated 20-08-2016. 7. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties, this court is of the view that the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the respondents are correct and convincing to the extent that at the time of filing the writ petitions, the question of impleadment of the applicants/ appellants as party did not arise at all. But the fact remains that during the pendency of the writ petitions, the new recruitment process did continue and did remain duly concluded with the result that the right to be considered for appointment as Police Constables had accrued to the applicants/ appellants also before the impugned judgment and order being passed by the learned Single Judge. Since the order dated 20-08-2016 and the notification dated 20-08-2016, issued by the State Government, were prima facie found to be liable to be quashed and set aside, the learned Single Judge, before doing that, ought to have directed the petitioners to implead them as party or ought to have informed the applicants/ appellants by substituted service by way of publication of notices in the newspaper. In this regard, the decision rendered in J.S. Yadav case and relied upon by Shri B.P. Sahu is relevant wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that no order can be passed behind the back of a person adversely affecting him and such an order, if passed, is liable to be ignored being not binding on such a party as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The principles enshrined in the proviso to Order 1, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 provide that impleadment of a necessary party is mandatory and in case of non-joinder of necessary party, the petitioner-plaintiff may not be entitled for the relief sought by him. It may be noted at this juncture that the knowledge earned by the applicants/ appellants about the pendency of the said writ petitions either through the public platform or through the newspapers cannot be said to be a proper notice and a formal notice ought to have been issued to them. Moreover, on perusal of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, it is seen that there was no discussion at all in it about the validity and correctness of the said order and the notification and no observation thereof was made by the learned Single Judge except quashing them on the ground that the report submitted by the Commission was acceptable to it. No reason was assigned by the learned Single Judge for quashing them. Therefore, there seems to be a prima facie case in favour of the applicants/ appellants for the reason that the principles of natural justice have not been followed by the learned Single Judge while deciding the said writ petitions. 8. But the core issue which has arisen for consideration by this court, is as to whether the applications for leave to prefer writ appeals are maintainable, when all the writ petitioners in whose favour the judgment and order was passed by the learned Single Judge, are not arrayed as party in the writ appeals. 8. But the core issue which has arisen for consideration by this court, is as to whether the applications for leave to prefer writ appeals are maintainable, when all the writ petitioners in whose favour the judgment and order was passed by the learned Single Judge, are not arrayed as party in the writ appeals. In other words, when the common judgment and order was passed by the learned Single Judge allowing 13 writ petitions, only four writ appeals arising out of four writ petitions, have been preferred and therefore, the question is as to whether only the four writ appeals, or for that matter, the four applications accompanying them, can be considered in the absence of the petitioners of the remaining nine writ petitions. The answers are in the negative. The judgment and order being a common and non-severable one, it may not be appropriate for this court to set aside a few of it, even assuming that it is found to be bad in law because the judgment and order passed in favour of the petitioners of the said other nine writ petitions would, by now, have attained finality. In such a situation, even assuming the writ appeals are allowed, then there is a likelihood of a dilemma cropping up before the State Government as it will face with different orders in identical cases. Relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/S Shenoy Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle-II, Bangalore ors., (1985) 2 SCC 512 , Shri B.P. Sahu, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for some of the applicants/ appellant has submitted that the applications are maintainable and there is no need of making all of them as party. In m/s Shenoy Co case, the facts, in brief, are that in order to augment the resources of the local bodies, an Act called the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into the Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979 was enacted by the State Government which came into force with effect from June, 1, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act, 1979"). The constitutional validity of the Act, 1979 came to be challenged in as many as 1590 writ petitions which were referred to a Division Bench which, vide its common judgment and order dated 24-08-1979, struck down the Act, 1979. The constitutional validity of the Act, 1979 came to be challenged in as many as 1590 writ petitions which were referred to a Division Bench which, vide its common judgment and order dated 24-08-1979, struck down the Act, 1979. The State Government preferred only one appeal in respect of Hansa Corporation before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the common judgment and order of the High Court which was allowed by it vide its judgment and order dated 25-09-1980. During the pendency of the said appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, an ordinance was promulgated removing the infirmities pointed by the High Court which was replaced by an Act. After the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Hans Corporation case, another ordinance was promulgated by the Governor, which came into force and was replaced by Karnataka Act, 1981, as a result of which the Act, 1979 was made operative from 01-101980. The authorities appointed under the Act issued notices to all the dealers including those who had filed writ petitions calling upon them to register themselves under the Act, to file returns and pay the amount of tax due payable by them. Being aggrieved by the said notices, the original writ petitioners filed some writ petitions before the Hon'ble High Court which were dismissed by the learned Single Judge and the appeals preferred against it before the Division Bench also failed. The main thrust of the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that the writ of mandamus issued by the High Court in their favour, was not challenged by filing appeals before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would apply only against the Hansa Corporation case, against whom alone the State Government had filed the appeal. This submission was not accepted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and accordingly, the same were dismissed holding that the decisions rendered by it in Joginder Singh case and Makhanlal Waza case, laid down the identical principles and there was nothing to distinguish between them. The relevant paras thereof are as under: "22. Though a large number of writ petitions were filed challenging the Act, all those writ petitions were grouped together, heard together and were disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment. The relevant paras thereof are as under: "22. Though a large number of writ petitions were filed challenging the Act, all those writ petitions were grouped together, heard together and were disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment. No petitioner advanced any contention peculiar or individual to his petition, not common to others. To be precise, the dispute in the cause or controversy between the State and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in it or anything personal or peculiar to each petitioner. The challenge to the constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical grounds common to all petitioners. This challenge was accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and it was this common judgment that was the subject-matter of appeal before this Court in Hansa Corporation case. When the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporation case alone, but petitions in which the High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It is, therefore, idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that judgment would bind only the Hansa Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so is to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. Article 141 reads as follows: "The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. A mere reading of this article brings into sharp focus its expanse and its all pervasive nature. In cases like this, where numerous petitions are disposed of by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed, the parties to the common judgment could very well have and should have intervened and could have requested the Court to hear them also. They cannot be heard to say that the decision was taken by this Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the fact that an appeal had been filed by the State against the common judgment. They cannot be heard to say that the decision was taken by this Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the fact that an appeal had been filed by the State against the common judgment. We would like to observe that, in the fitness of things, it would be desirable that the State Government also took out publication in such cases to alert parties bound by the judgment, of the fact that an appeal had been preferred before this Court by them. We do not find fault with the State for having filed only one appeal. It is, of course, an economising procedure." 23. The judgment in Hansa Corporation case rendered by one of us (Desai, J.) concludes as follows: "As we are not able to uphold the contentions which found favour with the High Court in striking down the impugned Act and the notification issued thereunder and as we find no merit in other contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondent for sustaining the judgment of the High Court, this appeal must succeed. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the petition filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed with costs throughout." To contend that this conclusion applies only to the party before this Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory. But setting aside the common judgment of the High Court, the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered ineffective not only in one case but in all cases. 24. A writ or an order in the nature of mandamus has always been understood to mean a command issuing from the Court, competent to do the same, to a public servant amongst others, to perform a duty attaching to the office, failure to perform which leads to the initiation of action. In this case, the petitioners appellants assert that the mandamus in their case was issued by the High Court commanding the authority to desist or forbear from enforcing the provisions of an Act which was not validly enacted. In other words, a writ of mandamus was predicated upon the view that the High Court took that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. In other words, a writ of mandamus was predicated upon the view that the High Court took that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. Consequently the Court directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear from enforcing the provisions of the Act qua the petitioners. The Act was subsequently declared constitutionally valid by this Court. The Act, therefore, was under an eclipse, for a short duration; but with the declaration of the law by this Court, the temporary shadow cast on it by the mandamus disappeared and the Act revived with its full vigour, the constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having been removed by the judgment of this Court. If the law so declared invalid is held constitutionally valid, effective and binding by the Supreme Court, the mandamus forbearing the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become ineffective and the authorities cannot be compelled to perform a negative duty. The declaration of the law is binding on everyone and it is therefore, futile to contend that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties against whom appeals were not filed. 25. The fallacy of the argument can be better illustrated by looking at the submissions made from a slightly different angle. Assume for argument's sake that the mandamus in favour of the appellants survived notwithstanding the judgment of this Court. How do they enforce the mandamus? The normal procedure is to move the Court in contempt when the parties against whom mandamus is issued disrespect it. Supposing contempt petitions are filed and notices are issued to the State. The State's answer to the Court will be: "Can I be punished for disrespecting the mandamus, when the law of the land has been laid down by the Supreme Court against the mandamus issued, which law is equally binding on me and on you?" Which Court can punish a party for contempt under these circumstances? The answer can be only in the negative because the mandamus issued by the High Court becomes ineffective and unenforceable when the basis on which it was issued falls, by the declaration by the Supreme Court, of the validity of 1979 Act." 9. The answer can be only in the negative because the mandamus issued by the High Court becomes ineffective and unenforceable when the basis on which it was issued falls, by the declaration by the Supreme Court, of the validity of 1979 Act." 9. As is evident from the above decision, three points have been emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the said appeals-one, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not find fault with the State Government for having filed only one appeal, as it had followed an economising procedure and moreover, the State Government took out a publication to alert parties bound by the judgment that an appeal had been preferred by it before the Hon'ble Supreme Court; two, the controversy therein between the State and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in it or anything personal or peculiar to each petitioner and three, Article 141 of the Constitution mandates that the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts. However, the facts of the present case are not identical to that of the case referred to here in above and therefore, the said decision will have no application in it. In the present case, the validity and correctness of such an Act is not involved at all and the writ petitioners challenged the executive orders dated 20-08-2016 and the notification dated 20-082016, issued by the State Government, by way of 13 writ petitions which were allowed by the learned Single Judge quashing the said order and notification. While allowing the said writ petitions, the learned Single Judge had issued various writs of mandamus directing the State Government to act upon the report of the Commission resulting in the accrual of rights to be considered in favour of all the petitioners. The State Government did not have any grievance at all, even though its order and notification had been quashed by the learned Single Judge and therefore, no appeal had been preferred by it against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. The State Government did not have any grievance at all, even though its order and notification had been quashed by the learned Single Judge and therefore, no appeal had been preferred by it against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. The subject matter in issue being a service matter, relates to the appointment of Police Constables, for which the recruitment process was duly completed and after the judgment and order having been passed by the learned Single Judge, the right to be considered had accrued to all the writ petitioners which could not be disturbed by anyone without the same being interfered with by the court in an appeal. In fact, the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge can be said to have attained finality, so far as the petitioners of the said nine writ petitions are concerned. Secondly, the concept of economising procedure as mentioned in the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S Shenoy and Co. (supra), is not applicable to the private individuals like the applicants/ appellants herein but only to the Government for the reason that the money held by it is public money which needs to be spent in public interest in accordance with the financial norms. Similar is not the case with the private individuals like the applicants/ appellants who cannot be equated with the Government in matters relating to spending money and cannot take the plea that in order to economise its spending money, they did not file writ appeals in respect of all the writ petitions and by doing that, the applicants/ appellants had committed a great blunder. The non-joinder of necessary parties has rendered the writ appeals as well as the applications as not maintainable. The same ground which is being taken by the applicants/ appellants that they have not been arrayed as party in the writ petitions, is available with the present respondents to contend that all the writ petitioners have not been made party in the writ appeals which are, therefore, not maintainable. In other words, the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge cannot be interfered with by this court in the absence of all the writ petitioners. Thirdly, Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the territory of India. In other words, the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge cannot be interfered with by this court in the absence of all the writ petitioners. Thirdly, Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the territory of India. This mandate as enshrined in Article 141 of the Constitution is available with the Hon'ble Supreme Court only and not with the High Courts in the country. By virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, what the Supreme Court lays down is the law of the land. The principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is applicable to every person including those who were not parties to that order. Such powers are not conferred upon the High Courts in the country and any decision given by the High Court is binding between the parties who are before it. 10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated herein above, this court is of the view that the applications for leave to prefer appeals which are devoid of any merit, are dismissed and consequently, the writ appeals stand dismissed.