JUDGMENT : SATHISH NINAN, J. 1. The Kerala Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd., its Board of Directors and the Managing Director are in appeal. The first respondent was an employee under the first appellant. While he was working as Assistant Manager (Projects) in the Thiruvananthapuram Dairy, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him levelling the following charges:- "1. Wilful insubordination and disobediance of the personal direction given by the Chief Executive of the organization and the orders issued by the Controlling Officer. 2. Negligence of work and dereliction of duty in speedy execution of balance pending works at Trivandrum Dairy Project by his unauthorized absenteeism thereby creating difficulties in “C.R.” operating the Bank Account of the site and delay in checking the bill submitted by the civil contractor resulting in suspension of civil works at site, especially during the crucial period when the balance works at Trivandrum Dairy Project are to be completed on priority basis racing against time, so as to inaugurate the Dairy by VVIP as scheduled. 3. Evading the responsibility in taking final measurements for the Civil and ETP works at Trivandrum Dairy Site for the contractors to prepare the final bills and verification of final bills at site, thereby creating difficulties to the Federation. 4. Unauthorised absence from Headquarters without permission of superiors.” 2. The enquiry officer found the delinquent guilty of charge No.1. The disciplinary authority imposed punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect. It was confirmed by the Board of Directors. Steps initiated before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Rule 176 of the Co-operative Societies Rules, for rescinding the resolution turned futile. Thereupon, the writ petition was filed. The learned single Judge as per the impugned judgment interfered with the finding of guilt and imposition of penalty. The employer is in appeal. 3. Heard. 4. The first respondent was the engineer in charge of the project at Thiruvananthapuram. One C.K. Jayakumar, who was the Deputy Engineer, was transferred from the Thiruvananthapuram Dairy to the Kannur Dairy. Instructions were given to the first respondent and one K.S. Vijayakumar to take over charge of the duties of Sri. C.K. Jayakumar. The directions given over phone on 12.08.1991 was confirmed as per office order dated 14.08.1991 and was instructed to take charge at the latest by 17.08.1991. Instructions were given to the first respondent and one K.S. Vijayakumar to take over charge of the duties of Sri. C.K. Jayakumar. The directions given over phone on 12.08.1991 was confirmed as per office order dated 14.08.1991 and was instructed to take charge at the latest by 17.08.1991. Since the directions were not complied with, on 31.08.1991 further instructions were given by the Manager (Projects) directing compliance of the earlier order. In spite of the same, the first respondent refused to take charge. Thereupon Managing Director personally instructed the first respondent to comply with the orders already issued by the Manager (Projects). Without complying with the directions, the first respondent went on leave. Thereupon, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the first respondent. 5. As noticed supra, only charge no. (1), regarding insubordination, was found against the delinquent. The same was interfered with by the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge was of the view that the enquiry officer ought to have considered whether the explanation offered by the delinquent for disobeying the instructions of the employer was plausible or not. It was noticed that the first respondent had explained to the employer that without a substitute in the place of Sri. C.K. Jayakumar there would be increase in the volume of work; that he suggested entrustment of the work to one Sri. K.S. Vijayakumar; that he pointed out that there was no framed system for execution of project work; that he is a civil engineer expected to supervise civil works and is not qualified to supervise mechanical or electrical works; and also that he had requested to be relieved from the Thiruvananthapuram Dairy to rejoin his permanent post at Ernakulam. The learned single Judge was of the view that unless these explanations given by the delinquent are found to be unsustainable, the insubordination is justified and therefore, the delinquent could not have been held guilty. The refusal to obey is justified, appears to be the reasoning. With great respect, we are unable to accord with the said view. 6. The term “insubordination” has different facets. The refusal to obey is justified, appears to be the reasoning. With great respect, we are unable to accord with the said view. 6. The term “insubordination” has different facets. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary referring to Jenkins v. Shelley [1939] 2 K.B. 137, 145; R. v. Grant [1957] 1 W.L.R. 906], insubordination has been defined thus:- “Wilful disobedience to a lawful command of a superior officer would commonly and correctly be described as insubordination.” If the direction given is lawful and with authority, it needs to be obeyed. Wilful disobedience to the instruction of the superior officer amounts to insubordination. Disobedience, whether by act or omission, coupled with the necessary intention- mens rea, makes it wilful and amounts to insubordination. While considering as to whether there has been wilful disobedience amounting to insubordination in the instant case, the following clauses of the Staff Regulations of the Federation are relevant:- “Chapter II - (10) (iii). Every employee shall serve the Federation in its business in such capacity and at such place and such manner as directed by the Managing Director or an Officer authorised by him and shall devote his whole time attention to promote the interest of the Federation. In the case of the Managing Director, he shall abide by the decisions of the Board.” Part - III - 1. Scope of an employee's service: Unless in any case it be otherwise distinctly provided the whole time of an employee shall be at the disposal of the Federation and he may be employed in any manner in such capacity and at such place as required by proper authority, without claim for additional remuneration. 2. Liability to abide by the Rules: An employee of the Federation shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, shall conform to and abide by the Rules issued by the Federation from time to time, shall observe, comply with an obey all orders and directions which may, from time to time, be given to him in the course of his official duties by any person or persons under whose jurisdiction, superintendence or control he may, for the time being, be placed.” The directions issued to the delinquent were directions which the superior officer was entitled to issue. Unless the standing orders or the staff regulations specify the nature of work of an employee, the employer is the best person to decide as to the nature of the work to be allotted to an employee. The wisdom of the employer in the said regard cannot be challenged. Whether the employee considers the direction to be prudent or just, is immaterial. The staff regulations clearly spell out that the delinquent was liable to obey the instructions given to him regarding taking over of charge. Necessarily, the enquiry officer needs to consider if the disobedience was wilful. But once wilful disobedience of a lawful authority is found, the justification for disobedience shall not be a defence on the charge. Of course it could be a factor relevant while deciding on the punishment, if any, to be imposed. 7. Coming to the scope of interference with the findings of disciplinary authority, the Apex Court in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [ AIR 2015 SC 545 ] laid down the following principles: “In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” It is not necessary to multiply authorities on the law as stated. None of the grounds enumerated in Gunasekaran's case, exit in the present case. From the very defence set up by the delinquent it is obvious that his attempt is only to justify his act of disobedience. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, we are clear in our minds that the finding of the enquiry officer regarding insubordination at the hands of the first respondent is justified and legal. 8. Smt. Sumathy Dandapani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent-delinquent attempts to support the impugned judgment on various other grounds. It is submitted that the enquiry proceedings are vitiated for the reason of “bias”. The alleged act of insubordination relates to non-compliance with the instructions given by the Managing Director. He is an interested person and could even be a witness in the proceedings. In spite of the same, he had proceeded to issue charge, appoint enquiry officer, and act as disciplinary authority. The entire acts smacks bias, is the submission. Yet another contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel is that the report of enquiry was served to the delinquent only along with the notice to show cause against the proposed punishment; this is in violation of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Mohammed Ramzan Khan [ (1991) 1 SCC 588 ] and Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [ 1993 (4) SCC 727 ]. The Senior Counsel also submits that the Managing Director was a member of the Board which decided on the delinquent's appeal. It violates the principles of natural justice. Another contention urged by the learned senior counsel is the violation of Rule 198 of the Co-operative Societies Rules. The Senior Counsel also submits that the Managing Director was a member of the Board which decided on the delinquent's appeal. It violates the principles of natural justice. Another contention urged by the learned senior counsel is the violation of Rule 198 of the Co-operative Societies Rules. The Rule requires the constitution of a sub-committee as disciplinary authority, which was violated in the instant case. At any rate, the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the offence, the learned Senior Counsel contends. 9. It is not in challenge before us that as per the staff regulation of the Federation, the Managing Director is the disciplinary authority. Till the filing of the writ petition, in any earlier proceeding, the delinquent had not raised any grievance regarding the functioning of the Managing Director as the Disciplinary Authority. There is no allegation of any prejudice having resulted to the delinquent consequent to the functioning of the Managing Director as the disciplinary authority. Under the said circumstances, we find that the said contention is unsustainable. In South Indian Cashew Factories Workers' Union v. Kerala State Cashew Development Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. [ 2006 (5) SCC 201 ], the Apex Court held that, a plea of bias, not raised at the stage of enquiry or in the earlier proceedings, cannot be permitted to be urged later. 10. In Union of India v. Mohd. Ramazan Khan [ (1991) 1 SCC 588 ], the Apex Court mandated that a copy of the enquiry report shall be furnished to the delinquent before punishment is imposed on him. The Apex Court held thus:- “We make it clear that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter.” 11. The Apex Court in the said judgment relied on the decision of a Constitution Bench in Union of India v. H.C.Goel ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ) wherein it was held thus: “..... The Apex Court in the said judgment relied on the decision of a Constitution Bench in Union of India v. H.C.Goel ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ) wherein it was held thus: “..... If the report makes findings in favour of the public servant and the government disagree with the said findings and holds that the charges framed against the public servant are prima facie proved, the government should decide provisionally what punishment should be imposed on the public servant and proceed to issue a second notice against him in that behalf. If the enquiry officer makes findings, some of which are in favour of the public servant and some against him, the government is entitled to consider the whole matter and if it holds that some or all the charges framed against the public servant are, in its opinion, prima facie established against him, then also the government has to decide provisionally what punishment should be imposed on the public servant and give him notice accordingly. It would thus be seen that the object of the second notice is to enable the public servant to satisfy the government on both the counts, one that he is innocent of the charges framed against him and the other that even if the charges are held proved against him, the punishment proposed to be inflicted upon him is unduly severe. .....” In Mohd. Ramazan's case (supra), reference was also made to the judgment of a three Judges Bench in State of Gujarat v. R.G. Teredesai [ 1969 (2) SCC 128 ] wherein it was held that the entire object of supplying a copy of the Final Report is to enable the delinquent to satisfy the punishing authority that he is innocent of the charges and also that the punishment proposed is unduly severe. In ECIL v. B. Karunakar [ 1993 (4) SCC 727 ], the Apex Court held that though supply of a copy of the enquiry report is a rule of natural justice which needs to be complied with, the mere fact that a copy of the report was not furnished to the delinquent by itself need not necessitate an interference with the disciplinary proceedings unless it is shown that prejudice has been caused to the delinquent consequent to the non-furnishing of the report. The Apex Court held thus: “The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.” 12. The said theory of, “necessity of proof of prejudice”, has been reiterated by the Apex Court on several occasions. {See Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. S. Balakrishnan [2003 (11) SCC 734], Divisional Manager, Plantation Division, Andaman and Nicobar Islands v. Munnu Barrick & Ors. [2005 (2) SCC 237], Om Prakash Mann v. Director of Education (Basic) and Ors. [ 2006 (7) SCC 558 ], Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja [(2008) (9) SCC 31], Union of India and Ors. v. Bishamber Das Dogra [ 2009 (13) SCC 102 ] and Sarva Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank v. Manojkumar Sinha [ 2010 (3) SCC 556 ]}. That apart, in the instance case, as noticed supra, a copy of the enquiry report was forwarded to the delinquent, though along with the notice to show cause against the proposed punishment. The punishment was imposed only after serving copy of the enquiry report and hearing the delinquent. Therefore, it could not be found that the delinquent was put to any prejudice. There is no case for the delinquent that he had been put to prejudice in any manner on that account. Further, it could not be demonstrated before us that any prejudice resulted to the delinquent for the above reason. 13. Therefore, it could not be found that the delinquent was put to any prejudice. There is no case for the delinquent that he had been put to prejudice in any manner on that account. Further, it could not be demonstrated before us that any prejudice resulted to the delinquent for the above reason. 13. As regards the contention that the Managing Director was a member of the Board which decided the appeal, in the counter affidavit filed by the Managing Director to the original petition, at paragraph 5 it has been categorically stated that he did not participate in the discussions of the Board when the appeal petition was considered by the Board of Directors. We find no reason not to accept the said statement. Hence, the said contention is also liable to be rejected. 14. Regarding the non constitution of a subcommittee for enquiry in terms of Rule 198 (2A) of the Co-operative Societies Rules, the rule came into force only on 18.08.2010. The disciplinary proceedings in the present case was over and punishment ordered as early as on 10.10.1992. The appeal filed to the Board was disposed of on 26.04.1993. Hence the said contention is also without substance. 15. Finally, coming to the contention regarding dis-proportionality of the punishment imposed, we notice that the delinquent retired from service years back. The facts leading to insubordination has been detailed earlier. We feel that withholding of increments with cumulative effect is disproportionate. At this distance of time, we do not think that the matter needs to be remanded back to the disciplinary authority for consideration regarding punishment. It would suffice if withholding of two increments alone is imposed. The punishment imposed shall stand modified accordingly. The writ appeal is allowed as above.