JUDGMENT : Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J. 1. Heard Sri Adarsh Bhushan, for the petitioner and Sri Satish Chaturvedi, for State Bank of India. 2. The writ petition has been filed against the order of Central Government Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) dated 21.01.2016, rejecting the application of the petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 3. The petitioner was appointed as Godown Watchman on a temporary post on 18.12.1970, in State Bank of India. His services were terminated on 05.05.1973. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute and the matter was referred to the Tribunal for adjudicating the dispute relating to termination of the service of the petitioner. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties, by award dated 10.05.1985 (published on 30.05.1985), held that termination of the service of the petitioner is not justified. The termination being void ab-initio, the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated in service with full back wages. This award was challenged in Writ C No. 14627 of 1985, which was dismissed by order dated 02.11.1995. Thereafter, Chief Manager issued an appointment letter to the petitioner on 22.04.1996, appointing him on the post of Watchman. Chief Manager issued another letter dated 24.08.1996, stating that the petitioner was reinstated in service in pay-scale of Rs. 1600-3020/- but reinstatement was not upon any vacant post. The petitioner moved an application dated 05.11.1996, claiming bonus and medical reimbursement w.e.f. 05.05.1973, which was rejected by Chief Manager by his letter dated 04.12.1996. Chief Manager issued another letter dated 03.07.1997, appointing the petitioner on the post of Watchman/Co-messenger/Co-cash coolly, for 6 months probation. Thereafter, he confirmed the petitioner by order dated 05.03.1998, w.e.f. 15.01.1998. The petitioner moved Civil Contempt Application before this Court, on the allegation that fresh appointment letter dated 03.07.1997, amounts to contempt as the Tribunal has directed for his reinstatement in service. The contempt application was disposed of by order dated 02.09.2001, with observation that the petitioner has an alternative remedy under the Act to execute his award. 4. The petitioner then filed an application under Section 33-C(1) of the Act before Regional Labour Commissioner, claiming monitory benefits under the award dated 10.05.1985. The application of the petitioner was rejected by Regional Labour Commissioner by order dated 27.09.2005. 4. The petitioner then filed an application under Section 33-C(1) of the Act before Regional Labour Commissioner, claiming monitory benefits under the award dated 10.05.1985. The application of the petitioner was rejected by Regional Labour Commissioner by order dated 27.09.2005. Then the petitioner moved another application Section 33-C(1) of the Act before Regional Labour Commissioner, which was rejected by order dated 05.01.2006, on the ground that the award was fully satisfied. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order in Writ-C No. 13844 of 2007, which was allowed and the matter was remanded by order dated 14.03.2007. After remand, the petitioner filed an application on 09.04.2007, giving details of his claim. Regional Labour Commissioner by his order dated 30.10.2007, held that the application under Section 33-C(1) of the Act was not maintainable. The petitioner filed Writ C No. 56656 of 2007, against aforesaid order, which was dismissed by order of this Court dated 20.03.2009, leaving it open to the petitioner to file an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act or make a reference under Section 10 of the Act or Section 4-K of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thereafter the petitioner moved an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act, on 12.04.2009, before the Tribunal which was rejected by the impugned order dated 21.01.2016 on the ground that in the application interpretation of award of the Tribunal was required, which cannot be done. Hence this writ petition has been filed. 5. I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the parties and examined the record. Some relevant provisions of the Act are quoted below:- Section 2 (rr) "wages" means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment, or of work done in such employment and includes:- (i) such allowances (including dearness allowance) as the workman is for the time being entitled to. (ii) the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity or of any service or of any concessional supply of food-grains or other articles. (iii) any travelling concession. (iv) any commission payable on the promotion of sales or business or both. but does not include:- (a) any bonus. (ii) the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity or of any service or of any concessional supply of food-grains or other articles. (iii) any travelling concession. (iv) any commission payable on the promotion of sales or business or both. but does not include:- (a) any bonus. (b) any contribution paid or payable by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund or for the benefit of the workman under any law for the time being in force. (c) any gratuity payable on the termination of his service. Section 33C. Recovery of money due from an employer:- (1)....... (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; within a period not exceeding three months: Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit. 6. Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Central Bank of India vs. P.S. Rajagopalan, (1964) AIR SC 743, held that it is thus clear that claims made under Section 33-C(1), by itself can be only claims referable to the settlement, award, or the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A. These words of limitations are not to be found in Section 33-C(2) and to that extent, the scope of Section 33-C(2) is undoubtedly wider than that of Section 33-C(1). It is true that even in respect of the larger class of cases which fall under Section 33-C(2), after the determination is made by the Labour Court the execution goes back again to Section 33-C(1). That is why Section 33-C(2) expressly provides that the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1). It is true that even in respect of the larger class of cases which fall under Section 33-C(2), after the determination is made by the Labour Court the execution goes back again to Section 33-C(1). That is why Section 33-C(2) expressly provides that the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1). There is no doubt that the three categories of claims mentioned in Section 33-C(1) fall under Section 33-C(2) and in that sense, Section 33-C(2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding; but it is possible that claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter V-A, may also be competent under Section 33-C(2) and that may illustrate its wider scope. 7. A Bench of Four Hon'ble Judges in R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Labour Court, (1972) 1 SCC 154 , held that Section 33-C(2) took "within the purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers." In MCD vs. Ganesh Razak, (1995) 1 SCC 235 , held that since proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by a workman is in such cases in the position of an Executing Court, the Labour Court like the Executing Court in execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent under Section 33-C(2) to interpret the award or settlement. In State Bank of India vs. Ram Chandra Dubey, (2001) 1 SCC 73 , held that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33-C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33-C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. In A. Satyanarayana Reddy vs. Labour Court, (2016) 9 SCC 462 , held that though there is cessation of relationship between the employee and the employer in VRS but if it does not cover the past dues like lay-off compensation, subsistence allowance, etc. the workman would be entitled to approach the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 8. Supreme Court in Mohan Lal vs. Bharat Electronics Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 225 , held that there are a catena of decisions which rule that where the termination is illegal especially where there is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that the workman concerned continues to be in service with all consequential benefits. In J.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. K.P. Agrawal, (2007) 2 SCC 433 , held that as precondition for a valid retrenchment has not been satisfied, termination of service is ab initio void, inoperative and invalid. He must, be deemed to be in continuous service. If the termination of service is ab initio void and inoperative, there is no question of granting reinstatement because there is no cessation of service and a mere declaration follows that he continues to be in service with all consequential benefits. 9. In the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, the petitioner is claiming continuity of service from his initial appointment dated 18.12.1970 and increments and other benefits as provided time to time to other similar employees. The Tribunal, by its award dated 10.05.1985, held that termination of the service of the petitioner was void ab-initio and the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated in service with full back wages. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. case, the petitioner shall be deemed to be in continuous service. Wages as defined means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment. The increments as provided are included in the wages. Wages as defined means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment. The increments as provided are included in the wages. The petitioner was awarded full back-wages, there is no reason to deny increments and other benefits which are included in wages as defined under Section 2 (rr) of the Act, to the petitioner. The Tribunal has illegally held that relief claimed in the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, does not flow from the award and cannot be decided. From judgments of Supreme Court as noted above it is clear that the Tribunal cannot adjudicate a fresh dispute but can interpret the award for deciding the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 10. Arguments of the counsel for the respondents that the petitioner was given fresh appointment on 03.07.1997, which was accepted by him as such he had acquiesced his right under the award dated 10.05.1985; His claim for increment w.e.f. 18.12.1970, is an industrial dispute and necessarily requires adjudication, which cannot be done without proper reference as held by Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Brijpal Singh, (2005) 8 SCC 58 . Relief not granted by the Tribunal shall be deemed to have been denied, are not liable to be accepted inasmuch as Chief Manager, by his letter dated 22.04.1996, appointed the petitioner and by letter dated 24.08.1996, clarified that the petitioner was reinstated in service. The petitioner was already reinstated in service on 22.04.1996, there was no occasion for his fresh appointment on 03.07.1997. After issue of appointment letter dated 03.07.1997, the petitioner filed Civil Contempt Petition before this Court which was disposed of, by order dated 02.09.2001, giving liberty to the petitioner to execute the award under the provisions of the Act. Thereafter, the applications under Section 33-C were filed. It is incorrect to say that the petitioner has accepted his fresh appointment. In any case, appointment letter dated 03.07.1997 is only absorption on permanent post from temporary post. Terms and conditions of the service could not be changed. The Tribunal, by its award dated 10.05.1985, held that termination of the service of the petitioner was void ab-initio and the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated in service with full back wages. Thus full relief has been granted. 11. Terms and conditions of the service could not be changed. The Tribunal, by its award dated 10.05.1985, held that termination of the service of the petitioner was void ab-initio and the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated in service with full back wages. Thus full relief has been granted. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Tribunal dated 21.01.2016 is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal to decide the application of the petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, on merit in the light of observations made in this judgment as well as in accordance with law, within a period of two months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him.