JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 4th November, 2011 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhalawar (for short ‘the trial court’) in Sessions Case No. 14/2010 whereby the accused appellant has been convicted and sentenced for the offence under Section 396 IPC to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default whereof, to further undergo one year simple imprisonment. 2. Facts of the case are that a written report (Ex.P17) was submitted at 3.15 AM on 17/9/2005 by one Trilochan Singh (PW7) to the Station House Officer, Police Station, Jhalarapatan to the effect that at 2:00 A.M., driver of the truck No. RJ-20G-3278 came to his Dhaba and informed that one person in injured condition was lying at Raipur Road. He then made a telephonic call to control room and reached the place of occurrence where he saw one person lying along side the road. At that time, police party also reached there. He immediately took that person to Jhalawar Hospital in a truck No.RJ 20 G 4276. The injured was heard saying that he gave lift to four about 100 yards, before the place of incident, who were in acquaintance to his Khallasi. The Khallashi and other four persons threw chilli powder in his eyes, gave beating to him and snatched money from his pocket. They were also saying that he would not be left alive otherwise he might be a witness of the case. He requested them with folded hands that they should take money but should not kill him. These four persons then threw him on the road and thereafter the Khallasi ran the truck over his body. When the police reached the hospital, he was unconscious. Thereafter, he succumbed to the injuries and died. 3. Police on receipt of the written report (Ex.P17) chalked out FIR No. 300/2005 (Ex.P26) for the offences under Sections 147 and 302 IPC. After completion of the investigation, police submitted challan against the accused appellant. The learned trial court framed charges for the offence under sections 302/149 and 395 & 396 IPC against the accused appellant. Accused appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 26 documents. Defence produced only one witness Birmal (DW1) and exhibited two documents. The learned trial court framed charges for the offence under sections 302/149 and 395 & 396 IPC against the accused appellant. Accused appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 26 documents. Defence produced only one witness Birmal (DW1) and exhibited two documents. After conclusion of the trial, the trial court convicted and sentenced the accused appellant as stated above. 4. Mr. Santosh Kumar Jain, learned counsel for the appellant argued that conviction of the appellant has been recorded without there being any iota of evidence against him. Conviction of appellant was not legal one as there was no justification for convicting him alone for offence under Section 396 IPC. The law requires that minimum five persons should be there for committing such an offence. There is no evidence to show as to whether there were actually five persons who committed the crime. Other four persons were not identified. It is argued that Trilochan Singh (PW7) and Sukhdev Singh (PW10) deposed that deceased in his oral dying declaration named Khallasi but did not mention the name of four persons, who were acquaintance of khallasi, whom he gave lift and also did not give name of the Khallasi. As per the case of the prosecution, Khallasi was not engaged by the truck owner but by the driver and even if that be so, there is no evidence whatsoever that accused appellant was hired as Khallasi by the deceased driver. He argued that only if it was proved that there were actually five persons involved in the dacoity or murder, even then the appellant’s conviction for offence under Section 396 IPC cannot be sustained, particularly when the trial court acquitted the accused appellant for offence under Section 302/149 IPC. Learned counsel has referred to the statement of the owner of the truck Dusandh Singh (PW3). Even this witness was not aware of the name of Khallasi. When he was asked to clarify as to on what basis, he mentioned the name of Prakash in response to the notice received under Section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act, he stated that his son Guruvendra Singh (PW9) told him about the name of the Khalasi as Prakash @ Chandra Prakash and therefore he mentioned the name in reply to the notice under Section 133 of the said Act sent to the SHO concerned. It is contended that it is a case of circumstantial evidence. When there is no eye witness, charge against the appellant has to be proved by clinching and cogent evidence and each incriminating circumstances against him should form such a chain of circumstances against the accused-appellant so complete as to rule out every single hypothesis that may be compatible with his innocence. Learned counsel argued that the possibility of deceased being looted by other miscreants on the highway and causing his murder could not be ruled out. When viewed from this perspective, it becomes doubtful whether he could be held guilty of alleged offence. Learned counsel submitted that Gurvendra Singh (PW9) son of the truck owner has claimed that he was driving another truck of his father and for quite some time he was following the truck of the deceased and thereafter when he saw his truck parked near Patan, he asked for the reason from the deceased Satnam Singh, who told that he would give lift to the boys who were native of his village. Therefore, it becomes doubtful whether the accused would be responsible for decision of the truck driver to give lift to four persons. 5. Mrs. Soniya Shandilya, learned Public Prosecutor however opposed the appeal and submitted that Guruvendra Singh (PW9) told deceased Satnam Singh that these persons were acquaintance of his Khallasi Om Prakash. She submitted that evidence against the accused appellant is sufficient to prove the charge against him for the offence under Section 396 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. She further referred to the statements of Surendra Kumar (PW1), Chhotulal (PW2) and Sarbjeet Singh (PW5), who have proved recovery of currency of Rs. 6,000/- from possession of the accused appellant. Out of aforesaid amount, Rs. 200/- were found to have blood stained (Ex. C1). Learned Public Prosecutor also referred to the statements of Trilochan Singh (PW7), Tara Singh (PW8), Sukhdev Singh (PW10) and the statement of Dr. Gauri Shankar (PW11) who is author of post mortem report (Ex. P21). 6. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by learned counsel for both the parties and perused the relevant record. 7. Learned Public Prosecutor also referred to the statements of Trilochan Singh (PW7), Tara Singh (PW8), Sukhdev Singh (PW10) and the statement of Dr. Gauri Shankar (PW11) who is author of post mortem report (Ex. P21). 6. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by learned counsel for both the parties and perused the relevant record. 7. First and foremost argument which the learned counsel for the appellant has raised in assailing the impugned judgment is whether the evidence in the present case proves the appellant as Khallasi of the truck, which was driven by deceased Satnam Singh. The written report (Ex.P17) submitted by Trilochen Singh (PW7) owner of the dhaba is to the effect that he was approached by the driver of Truck No. RJ 20-G-3278 informing that a person was lying in a serious condition of the side of the truck No. RJ-20-G4276 and then he further stated that after informing the Police Control Room, he went at the place of occurrence and the Police also simultaneously reached there. On their query, injured person told that about 100 yards before the place, he gave lift to four persons who were known to khallasi. Such alleged oral dying declaration can not be believed as in his earlier version Trilochan Singh (PW7) had deposed that he did not know the name of khallasi. In other words, the deceased also did not name the khallasi either to the owner of the “dhaba” or to the police personnel. Surendra Singh ASI (PW1) who reached the place of occurrence was also present when the alleged oral dying declaration was uttered by the deceased Satnam Singh as also similar statement that the deceased was told by his khallasi that he should give lift to four persons who were known to him. Thereafter khallasi threw chilli powder in his eyes and started beating the driver and then snatched away an amount of Rs. 10,000/- and ran truck over his body. Even this witness did not disclose the name of the khallasi. Thereafter khallasi threw chilli powder in his eyes and started beating the driver and then snatched away an amount of Rs. 10,000/- and ran truck over his body. Even this witness did not disclose the name of the khallasi. When the owner of the truck Dusandh Singh (PW3) was served with a notice under Section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act on 17/9/2009 by the police, therein for the first time, he gave information about the name of Khallasi as Chandra Prakash as he did not know the name of khallasi and in fact in the statement, he stated that when the Police enquired from him, he could not give the name of khallasi as he was not aware about his name. It was his son who later-on told him that name of Khallasi was Prakash @ Chandra Prakash and it was on that basis, he mentioned the name of Khallasi as Chandra Prakash. 8. The case of defence is that the name of accused appellant was Om Prakash and not Chandra Prakash, which fact is stated by Guruvendra Singh son of truck owner and the basis of which he claimed was that the name of Khallasi written on his hands. In fact, the identity of the accused appellant in identification parade was not established because except Guruvendra Singh (PW9), no one else claims to have identified him. Guruvendra Singh, in his examination-in-chief, stated that while he was driving his own truck following the truck being driven by deceased Satnam Singh, he saw the truck of the deceased stationed near Patan. He stopped his truck and enquired the reason why he had stopped the truck. Satnam Singh told him that he had to give lift to four boys who were residents of his native place. Then he moved forward and in later sentence he stated that Satnam Singh told him that they were residents of native village of khallasi. He then moved ahead and after some time he stopped the truck on petrol pump but the truck of the deceased did not come. Thereafter, Trilochen Singh owner of the dhaba, told him that khalasi had looted the truck of Satnam Singh after beating him and running the truck over the body of Satnam Singh. Trilochan Singh (PW7) has not mentioned the name of khallasi either in the written report Ex. P/17 or in his court statement. Thereafter, Trilochen Singh owner of the dhaba, told him that khalasi had looted the truck of Satnam Singh after beating him and running the truck over the body of Satnam Singh. Trilochan Singh (PW7) has not mentioned the name of khallasi either in the written report Ex. P/17 or in his court statement. He rather stated that the deceased, in his oral dying declaration, told that he stopped the truck at the askance of khallasi and gave lift to four boys who were residents of his native Village. In such circumstances, all the afore-discussed evidence clearly show several missing links not only about the identity of khallasi, which could not be established beyond reasonable doubt but also whether they were actually three or four persons, who looted the truck on invitation of Khallasi. In the present case, it makes it doubtful that if there was one offender i.e. Khallasi and no other person then offence under Section 396 IPC cannot be held to have been made out as the requirement of law as per Section 395 IPC in dacoity is that there should be minimum five persons. And even if the evidence of Trilochan Singh (PW7) were to be believed that the deceased told in his alleged dying declaration that there were three to four persons, this again does not lead to a necessary assertion that there were three or more persons and that number cannot be reached to the five. Only evidence now remains is that of recovery of currency notes. In the facts like there, recovery or currency notes was purportedly made on the information of the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to the Investigating Officer from the house of appellant in polythene bag. As recovery memo (Ex. P9), the currency notes valued of Rs. 6,000/- in the denomination of Rs. 100/- were recovered from the house of the accused appellant at his instance. Two notes of them were containing blood stained and remaining currency notes were sealed in separate packets which were marked as F to G. 9. Two attesting witnesses of the memo of recovery of Rs.6000/- are Nand Lal and Sabarjeet Singh who have been respectively produced as PW4 and PW5, have stated that they were called by the Police in the Police Station and showed currency notes of Rs. Two attesting witnesses of the memo of recovery of Rs.6000/- are Nand Lal and Sabarjeet Singh who have been respectively produced as PW4 and PW5, have stated that they were called by the Police in the Police Station and showed currency notes of Rs. 6000/-, one of which was containing blood stains and got their signatures at Ex. P9. These witnesses have thus not fully supported the recovery. Nand Lal (PW4) in cross examination deposed that currency notes were brought by Trilochan Singh (PW7). Sabarjeet Singh (PW5), who happens to be son of owner of dhaba Trilochan Singh (PW7), has also stated that his father had shown currency of Rs. 6,000/-. 10. The law on question of circumstantial evidence is well settled that an accused can be convicted in a case of circumstantial evidence only if the chain of circumstances against him is so complete as to rule out every single hypothesis that may be compatible with his innocence. Standard of proof in a criminal matters is always beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the prosecution in every such case is required to prove guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If there is any scope of reasonable doubt, benefit of such doubt has to be extended to the accused. The rival submissions have to be therefore tested on that yardstick to find out whether alleged offences against the accused appellant have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 11. The Supreme Court in Ashish Batham v. State of M.P., (2002) 7 SCC 317 , in Para 8 of the judgment, held as under:- "Realities or Truth apart, the fundamental and basic presumption in the administration of criminal law and justice delivery system is the innocence of the alleged accused and till the charges are proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of clear, cogent, credible or unimpeachable evidence, the question of indicting or punishing an accused does not arise, merely carried away by heinous nature of the crime or the gruesome manner in which it was found to have been committed. Mere suspicion, however, strong or probable it may be is no effective substitute for the legal proof required to substantiate the charge of commission of a crime and grave the charge is greater should be the standard of proof required. Mere suspicion, however, strong or probable it may be is no effective substitute for the legal proof required to substantiate the charge of commission of a crime and grave the charge is greater should be the standard of proof required. Courts dealing with criminal cases at least should constantly remember that there is a long mental distance between 'may be true' and 'must be true' and this basic and golden rule only helps to maintain the vital distinction between 'conjectures' and 'sure conclusions' to be arrived at on the touch stone of a dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case as well as quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record." 12. It may be noted that in Ashish Batham, supra, the case was entirely based on circumstantial evidence in which recovery of chain of the deceased and knife used in the commission of offence as well as blood stained clothes of the accused crept suspicion about role of the accused but recovery being delayed, having been made after second remand of the accused, was itself held to be doubtful and the factum about motive that accused was in love with the deceased also not accepted. It was held that only for this reason it cannot even remotely presumed that this could be the cause of murder unless it was substantiated by credible evidence that affair broken beyond redemption. Motive factor was held to have no legal basis to constitute sufficient circumstance to connect the appellant with the crime. The accused was therefore acquitted. 13. In Mohd. Arif v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2011) 13 SCC 621 , the Supreme Court held that each of the circumstances has to be assessed on its own merits. Quality rather than quantity of evidence is crucial factor in a case of circumstantial evidence. The court has to be cautious against imaginary inferences or its prejudices, which may unwittingly creep in. Its verdict must be based on clear and irrefutable logic. Responsibility of the prosecution in a case of circumstantial evidence is more as compared to the cases where ocular testimony or the direct evidence is available. 14. The court has to be cautious against imaginary inferences or its prejudices, which may unwittingly creep in. Its verdict must be based on clear and irrefutable logic. Responsibility of the prosecution in a case of circumstantial evidence is more as compared to the cases where ocular testimony or the direct evidence is available. 14. In Kulvinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2011) 5 SCC 258 , also it was held by the Supreme Court that in exceptional cases, conviction of accused can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but in that case the prosecution has to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot derive any strength from weakness of defence put up by accused. Circumstances from which guilt is to be drawn should be fully established and should be of a conclusive nature and exclude all possible hypotheses except the one to be proved. Facts so established must be consistent with hypothesis of guilt of accused and chain of evidence must be so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence of accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by accused and none else. 15. In Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. John David, 2011 (5) SCC 509 , also the Supreme Court sounded a word of caution that the court must be cautious against conjectures and surmises taking place of proof. Circumstances so proved must form a chain of events pointing to guilt of accused beyond all reasonable doubt without there being possibility of any other hypothesis. Each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence, and the circumstances so proved must form chain of proof from which natural and irresistible conclusion could be drawn as to the guilt of accused and no other hypothesis against guilt is possible. It was further observed by their Lordships that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjectures and surmises may take place a legal proof. The court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such complete chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of innocence of the accused. The court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal proof. The court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such complete chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of innocence of the accused. The court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal proof. There is a long mental distance between 'may be true' and 'must be true' and the same divides conjectures from sure conclusions. It was further observed that when important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped. This is what has happened in the present case because of failure of the prosecution to conclusively connect the accused with the crime. 16. It is thus trite that in a case of circumstantial evidence there must be complete chain of evidence, which should lead to conclusion that the accused was the only person, who could have committed offence and none else. Each of circumstances that is proved against the accused should form a chain so complete so as to rule out every other hypothesis, which may be compatible with innocence of the accused. Analysis of the evidence that we have made above, makes it evident that there are several missing links in the chain of circumstances, which cannot be accepted to be so complete as to point to the guilt of the accused and none else and when every single possibility of accused being innocent is ruled out. 17. Analysis of the evidence that we have made above, makes it evident that there are several missing links in the chain of circumstances, which cannot be accepted to be so complete as to point to the guilt of the accused and none else and when every single possibility of accused being innocent is ruled out. 17. The Supreme Court in a recently delivered judgment in Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 1 SCC 253 , held that the five golden principles, which have been stated to constitute the "panchsheel" of the proof of the case based on circumstantial evidence, are (i) that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must or should be and not merely "may be" fully established; (ii) that the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (iii) that the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (iv) that they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and, (v) that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 18. In view of the above discussion, we are not inclined to uphold conviction of the accused-appellant, which is entirely based on circumstantial evidence for the reason that chain of circumstances sought to be proved against him has several missing links, which cannot be said to exclude every reasonable possible hypothesis that may be compatible with his innocence. 19. In the result, the present appeal deserves to succeed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment & order dated 4/11/2011 passed by the trial court in Sessions Case No.14/2010 is set aside. The accused-appellant is acquitted of the charge under section 396 IPC. The accused-appellant Om Prakash @ Prakash is in jail. He shall be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in relation to any other case. 20. The impugned judgment & order dated 4/11/2011 passed by the trial court in Sessions Case No.14/2010 is set aside. The accused-appellant is acquitted of the charge under section 396 IPC. The accused-appellant Om Prakash @ Prakash is in jail. He shall be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in relation to any other case. 20. Keeping, however, in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.20,000/-, and a surety bond in the like amount, before the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months, undertaking that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of leave, the appellant aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court.