Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 607 (GAU)

NIBEDITA BARUAH D/O SHRI UPENDRA KR. BARUAH v. NUMALIGARH REFINERY LTD.

2018-04-09

PRASANTA KUMAR DEKA

body2018
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. K Goswami, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Also heard Mr. J Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents No. 1 to 7 and Mr. K. Patgiri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondent No. 8. 2. In this writ petition, work order dated 15.06.2017 issued by the Numaligarh Refinery Limited (NRL), respondent No. 1 to the respondent No. 8 in terms of Tender No. OC27000019/PRA dated 20.04.2017 for hiring of an Ambulance with facilities of critical care is challenged as the respondent No. 8 is not technically qualified as per the terms and conditions of the tender document. 3. The Numaligarh Refinery Ltd., the respondent No. 1 on 20.04.2017 issued E-tender vide Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) under Tender No. OC27000019/PRA dated 20.04.2017 for ‘hiring of ambulance with facilities of critical care’. The entire tender process was to be carried out online. As per the NIT dated 20.04.2017, the tender process was to be carried out in two stages i.e. Technical Bid and Financial Bid. Clause A specifies the technical qualification requirement which stipulates that the bidders should have experience of successfully executing contract for providing emergency vehicle hiring services for a period of minimum 3 years to Government/ Public Sector Undertaking (PSU)/ private organisation during the last 10 years ending in the last day of the month preceding the month in which bids are invited should be either of the following:- Past Experience Amount One similar work costing not less than Rs. 25 Lakh Two similar works costing not less than Rs. 20 Lakh each Three similar completed works costing Rs. 15 Lakh each 4. The petitioner having experience of supplying ambulance having facilities of critical care to the respondent No. 1 and being duly qualified and eligible in all respects submitted bid to the respondent authorities. 5. The technical bid submitted by the bidders in response to the NIT dated 20.04.2017 was opened on 01.06.2017 and four bidders were found to be technically qualified which includes the petitioner. Out of the said four technically qualified bidders, only 3 bidders including the petitioner’s bid were found to be commercially acceptable and qualified for opening of the price bid. The technical bid submitted by the bidders in response to the NIT dated 20.04.2017 was opened on 01.06.2017 and four bidders were found to be technically qualified which includes the petitioner. Out of the said four technically qualified bidders, only 3 bidders including the petitioner’s bid were found to be commercially acceptable and qualified for opening of the price bid. On 13.06.2017, the financial bids were opened and the price quoted by the respondent No. 8 was found to be L-1 and that of the petitioner’s bid was found to be L-2. Thereafter, the respondent authorities issued the impugned work order dated 15.06.2017 in favour of the respondent No. 8 for providing the ambulance with facilities of critical care. As per the NIT, contractor is required to place the subject vehicle for services under the respondent No. 1 within 60 days from the date of placement of Letter of Intent (LoI) of the work order. 6. The respondent No. 8, after getting the aforesaid work order, approached the petitioner seeking financial help as well as information/guidance for making the subject vehicle ready. It would not be out of place to mention here that the petitioner and the respondent No. 8 entered into an agreement dated 24.06.2017 for investment of capital by the petitioner for the purpose of purchasing the critical care ambulance. 7. The petitioner found that the respondent No. 8 does not possess the experience for providing emergency vehicle hiring services in terms of the bid qualification criteria. The respondent No. 8 in support of his past experience in order to fulfil the bid qualification criteria submitted completion certificate in relation to the Work Order No. 4300020339-SAR dated 25.05.2010 issued by the respondent No. 1, NRL for hiring of Tata Sumo Ambulance 24 hours. 8. The respondent No. 8 in support of his past experience in order to fulfil the bid qualification criteria submitted completion certificate in relation to the Work Order No. 4300020339-SAR dated 25.05.2010 issued by the respondent No. 1, NRL for hiring of Tata Sumo Ambulance 24 hours. 8. Contending that the work completion certificate in order to qualify as per the bid qualification criteria submitted by the respondent No. 8 is with respect to a general ambulance i.e. Tata Sumo Ambulance 24 hours which is a patient transport vehicle and not compatible with emergency vehicle which is required for the transport and treatment of emergency patient and the act of the respondent authorities in selecting and subsequent issuance of the impugned work order to the respondent No. 8 being bad in law, the petitioner filed the instant writ petition on 21.07.2017 seeking interference in the said matter as overwhelming public interest is involved. It is further contended that the respondent No. 1 in total violation of the terms and conditions of the NIT, had selected and issued the subject work order to the respondent No. 8 as he does not possess the requisite past experience. 9. The present petitioner since 2008 has been engaged by the respondent No. 1 to carry out services of hiring of ambulances having facilities of critical care under Work Order dated 30.06.2008 for a period of 3 years and thereafter under Work Order dated 03.06.2011 for another period of 3 years. The said Work Order was further extended till December, 2016 and further extended till 30.06.2017. For providing the ambulance service, the petitioner is using Force Tempo Traveller for providing ambulance with critical care service. The respondent No. 1 issued fresh NIT on 30.09.2016 vide Tender No. OC27000017/PRA for hiring of ambulance with facilities of critical care unit at NRL for a period of 3 years. The present petitioner participated and came out as L-1 bidder. However, considering the cost component involved, the respondent No. 1 requested the petitioner to review her quoted price but finally, the respondent No. 1 informed the petitioner that the aforesaid tender dated 30.09.2016 was cancelled and thereafter the NIT with Tender No. OC27000019/PRA dated 20.04.2017 was floated. 10. Mr. The present petitioner participated and came out as L-1 bidder. However, considering the cost component involved, the respondent No. 1 requested the petitioner to review her quoted price but finally, the respondent No. 1 informed the petitioner that the aforesaid tender dated 30.09.2016 was cancelled and thereafter the NIT with Tender No. OC27000019/PRA dated 20.04.2017 was floated. 10. Mr. Goswami submits that the respondent No. 1 being State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, was bound to give effect to the condition of eligibility set up by it and was not entitled to depart from it without rational justification. The respondent No. 8 had experience of providing Tata Sumo Ambulance 24 hours which is normally a patient transporter vehicle and not an emergency vehicle, does not fulfil the criteria of eligibility. But even then the respondent authorities accepted the tender submitted by the said respondent No. 8 which is invalid, arbitrary and unreasonable. 11. Mr. Goswami referring Clause 3.0 of the National Ambulance Code, 2013 submits that road ambulances are categorised as follows:- (i) Type A: Road ambulance/medical fast responder (ii) Type B: Road ambulance/patient transport vehicle (iii) Type C: Road ambulance/basic life support ambulance, and (iv) Type D: Road ambulance/advance life support ambulance. It is further submitted that the Code also defined ‘patient’ which is distinct with that of emergency patient. Type A, B and C road ambulances are designated for the transport of patient and on the other hand, Type D road ambulance is designated for the transport and treatment of emergency patients. The subject of the NIT dated 20.04.2017 falls within Type D road ambulance. 12. The respondent authorities failed to differentiate its own requirement from the experience certificate submitted by the respondent No. 8 and equated the Tata Sumo ambulance 24 hours which is normally a patient transporter vehicle with the one with facilities of critical care. The emergency vehicle is to be understood as per the terms and definitions stipulated in the National Ambulance Code, 2013 and that must be understood with reference to the requirement of the respondent No. 1. Further it is submitted that after coming into effect of the National Ambulance Code, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘ Code’), the respondent authorities replaced the word ‘ambulance’ by ‘emergency vehicle’ in the past experience qualification clause. Further it is submitted that after coming into effect of the National Ambulance Code, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘ Code’), the respondent authorities replaced the word ‘ambulance’ by ‘emergency vehicle’ in the past experience qualification clause. In fact, prior to June, 2013, the respondent authorities while calling for tender for hiring of critical care ambulance required experience in operation and maintaining similar ambulance. Thus, the respondent authorities had narrowed down the qualifying clause by stipulating only ‘emergency vehicle’ instead of ‘ambulance’ in general. Mr. Goswami, however, admits that ‘emergency vehicle’ is equivalent to an ‘ambulance’ but all ambulances are not an emergency vehicle. Introduction of the expression used in the bid qualification criteria for the past experience as emergency vehicle itself expresses the intention of the respondent authorities to delineate a certain category of persons who alone should be eligible to submit a tender. The respondent authorities cannot depart from the said intention and come up with the act of acceptance of the past experience certificate of the respondent No. 8 drawing equivalency of the experience of operating Tata Sumo Ambulance 24 hours with the one with facilities of critical care. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointing to the tender document in original in respect of the work order dated 25.05.2010 issued in favour of the respondent No. 8 which forms the experience of the respondent No. 8 submits that in the said NIT dated 15.10.2009 resulting in the work order to the respondent No. 8 dated 25.05.2010, the respondent authorities invited application for the job of selection of hiring of 32 numbers of vehicles for NRL duties which includes amongst others the Sumo ambulance. The respondent No. 8 having the experience of providing Tata Sumo ambulance and not emergency vehicle, does not satisfy the essential conditions of the NIT and as such, the decision of the respondent authorities in qualifying the respondent No. 8 is totally unreasonable thereby violating the basic and essential conditions of the NIT. In support of the submission of Mr. Goswami, he relies on the cases of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 . 14. Mr. In support of the submission of Mr. Goswami, he relies on the cases of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 . 14. Mr. Roy, appearing on behalf of the respondents No. 1 to 7, submits that the present petitioner is continuing with the Work Order dated 09.07.2013 extended time to time. The contract commenced on 01.01.2014 and was valid till 31.12.2016. The said contract was for two shift operation only. As the earlier work order with the petitioner was about to expire, a fresh Tender No. OC27000017/PRA 30.09.2016 was floated for hiring of a critical care ambulance with two shift operation of the ambulance. The petitioner qualified and after opening of the price bid it was found that the price was Rs. 131.44 Lacs which is 32% above the in-house cost estimate of Rs. 99.75 Lacs. The petitioner was requested to lower the price which she did not agree and the same was extended till December, 2016 and thereafter extended till 30.09.2017. The respondent No. 1 decided to operate three shift operation of the ambulance service in order to operate the same round the clock. Considering the same, the earlier tender dated 30.09.2016 was cancelled. It is submitted that in the subsequent tender No. OC27000019/PRA dated 20.04.2017 in the qualifying criteria it was stipulated that the bidder should have the experience in successfully executing contract for providing emergency vehicle hiring services for a period of minimum 3 years. Nowhere the word “critical” has been used as a mandatory requirement in the criteria of past experience. The experience criteria was stipulated with an intention to promote local entrepreneurs and effective participation in the tender so that the respondent No. 1 obtained the best competitive price. The qualifying criteria and the specification of the requirement of the vehicle are two different aspects of the tender process which the writ petitioner has misconstrued. Refuting the submission of the petitioner that she could not be present during opening of the technical bid as she was not called by the respondent authorities, Mr. Roy submits that Clause 19(K) of the tender conditions is specific that one authorized representative of the contractor may remain present during the tender opening on the due date, time and venue. Refuting the submission of the petitioner that she could not be present during opening of the technical bid as she was not called by the respondent authorities, Mr. Roy submits that Clause 19(K) of the tender conditions is specific that one authorized representative of the contractor may remain present during the tender opening on the due date, time and venue. The tender was on online process and there was free accessibility to each and every bidder to avail the notice of the opening of the bid. The petitioner could have easily made her access to the information regarding the date and time of the opening of the bid and there is no point in blaming the respondent authorities. The price bid against the techno-commercial acceptable offers were opened on 08.06.2017 and the respondent No. 8 was found to be L-1 bidder at Rs. 1,44,39,038/- which is 4.17% lower than the cost estimate. The Price quoted by the L-2 bidder i.e. the petitioner was Rs. 1,47,38,858/-. Considering the price offered, the respondent authorities placed the Work Order on the L-1 bidder. The respondent No. 8 fulfilled the qualification criteria for past experience and as such, there is no dispute to that effect. 15. Mr. Roy, opposing the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, specifically denied the contention of the petitioner that the respondent No. 8 does not fulfil the qualifying criteria. The special conditions of contract in respect to the tender for critical care ambulance have been incorporated to give an idea for the specific requirement of the vehicle. The selection of respondent No. 8 as L-1 bidder has been purely on the basis of the evaluation of technically qualified bidders keeping in mind the criteria for requisite qualification and not for any extraneous reasons. Referring to the qualifying criteria, Mr. Roy submits that the Tata Sumo vehicle cannot be compared with the Force Tempo Traveller as submitted by the writ petitioner and has no relevancy in the present context and as such, the contention of the writ petitioner that the decision making process holding the respondent No. 8 to be technically qualified in terms of his past service cannot be termed to be arbitrary and unconstitutional and contrary to the terms and conditions of the NIT. The requisite experience does not mention about requisite of the past experience in providing services of the ambulance facilities for critical care only. The job value as mentioned in the qualifying criteria are satisfied by the petitioner and the past work experience submitted by the L-1 bidder is found similar to the pre-bid qualification requirement and the same was accepted by the tender evaluation committee. The whole process was transparent and the respondent authorities adopted E-tender system of CPP Portal and the special tender was floated in the same portal which was open for all. The terms and conditions in the tender are framed as per the prevailing rules and approved policy of the corporation which was duly approved by the Board of Directors. 16. Mr. Roy submits that the scope of judicial review of the decision making process is very limited under the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner is bound to discharge the burden to show that there is a clear and specific violation of the conditions stipulated in the tender. The qualifying criteria do not say that experience of operating emergency vehicle with critical care is required. While challenging the decision making process, the petitioner cannot dictate the respondent authorities what to follow and what not. The question of adherence to the National Ambulance Code, 2013 cannot be sole criteria inasmuch as it is needless to say that after coming into effect of the said Code, 2013, each and every emergency vehicle/ambulance must comply the stipulations made therein the Code. Judicial review of administrative action is to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality etc. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. If the decision relating to awarding contract is bona-fide, court cannot interfere in exercise of powers of judicial review. The respondent authorities while specifying the criteria for qualification kept in mind which criteria would suffice for participation of the eligible bidders. The respondent No. 8 has the experience as stipulated in the qualifying criteria and being satisfied and considering price bid of the respondent No. 8 to be L-1 awarded the said contract. According to Mr. The respondent authorities while specifying the criteria for qualification kept in mind which criteria would suffice for participation of the eligible bidders. The respondent No. 8 has the experience as stipulated in the qualifying criteria and being satisfied and considering price bid of the respondent No. 8 to be L-1 awarded the said contract. According to Mr. Roy, the similar work mentioned in the bid qualification criteria in the tender dated 20.04.2017 mentions the “similar work” which the petitioner has wrongly linked with the requirement of the respondent authorities inasmuch as the same ought to be read with the execution of contract for providing emergency vehicle hiring services but not for hiring of ambulance with facilities of critical care. Accordingly, Mr. Roy submits that the writ petition has no merit. In order to buttress his submission, Mr. Roy relies on the case laws of Michigan Rubber (India) Limited v. State of Karnataka and others reported in (2012) 8 SCC 216 , Joshi Technologies International Inc v. Union of India and others reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728 and Central Coalfields Limited and another v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) and others with PLR-RPL-SMASL (JV) v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) reported in (2016) 8 SCC 622 . 17. Mr. Patgiri, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 8 supported the submission of Mr. Roy, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1. In addition, he submits that once the petitioner had participated in the tender process now she cannot turn around and say that the eligibility criteria ought to be considered in the light of the requirement of the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 8 had already procured the vehicle for its placement as per the order of the respondent No. 1. The petitioner has come before the court belatedly and there is no point in allowing the relief sought for by the petitioner and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 18. Considered the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties. The petitioner has come before the court belatedly and there is no point in allowing the relief sought for by the petitioner and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 18. Considered the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the parties. The bid qualification criteria stipulated in the subject tender is quoted herein for ready reference:- “QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENT: The bidders should meet the qualification as given below: (A) Past Experience: Bidder should have experience in successfully executing contract for providing emergency vehicle hiring services for a period of minimum 03 years to Govt./Public Sector Undertaking/Private Organization during last 10 (ten) years ending last day of the month, proceeding the month in which bids are invited should be either of the following: Past Experience Amount One similar work costing not less than Rs. 25 Lakh Two similar works costing not less than Rs. 20 Lakh each Three similar completed works costing Rs. 15 Lakh each The subject of the Tender No. OC27000019/PRA dated 20.04.2017 is “hiring of ambulance with facilities of critical care”. The special conditions of contract consist of the scope of work, specification for critical care ambulance wherein the vehicle has been stated as Force Tempo Traveller or equivalent with engine power 82 BHP or more, ambulance equipments and the various requirements to operate, the said ambulance with facilities of critical care. The qualifying criteria is with respect to the bidders who are eligible for taking part in the tender process which is objective. The said qualifying criteria cannot be equated with the scope of work as mentioned in the special conditions of contract of the tender in question which is subjective. It is contended by Mr. Roy, that the intent of the management was purely for participation of maximum numbers of bidders and keeping that in view there was no mention of “emergency vehicle with facilities of critical care” for the past experience for the bidders to qualify. On the basis of the response received by the respondent authorities, the respondent No. 8 was allotted the work order after he qualified the requisite criteria for participation in the tender process. The submission of Mr. Goswami that the emergency vehicle needs to be understood in the ambit and scope of the National Ambulance Code, 2013 and the type of classification of ambulance mentioned therein cannot be accepted. If the said submission of Mr. The submission of Mr. Goswami that the emergency vehicle needs to be understood in the ambit and scope of the National Ambulance Code, 2013 and the type of classification of ambulance mentioned therein cannot be accepted. If the said submission of Mr. Goswami is accepted it would violate the terms of the qualifying criteria inasmuch as it has been stipulated that the bidders should have experience in successfully executing contract for providing emergency vehicle hiring services for a period of minimum 3 years to Government PSU/Private Organisations during the last 10 years ending last day of the month preceding the month in which the bids are invited and the National Ambulance Code, 2013 came into effect in the year 2013 only. The said qualifying criteria has not been challenged by the petitioner in order to make it compatible with the said Code, 2013 and if the existing qualifying criteria is left outstanding, there is no point in acceptance of the submission of Mr. Goswami as the 10 years length of time would go back to the year 2008 in which year the ambulance code was not in existence at all. The said explanation would definitely run against the public policy if the word “emergency vehicle” is given its restrictive meaning giving compatibility to the classification of National Ambulance Code, 2013. 19. In Michigan Rubber (India) Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court after considering the various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the scope of judicial review came to the conclusion which is reproduced herein-below:- “23. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge:- (a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities; (b) Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and the courts hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the interference by courts is very limited; (c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the action of the tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference by courts is not warranted; (d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the work; and (e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract, here again, interference by court is very restrictive since no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the Government. 24. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters, in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions:- (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”? and (ii) Whether the public interest is affected? If the answers to the above questions are in the negative, then there should be no interference under Article 226. 20. In the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others (supra), a Notice Inviting Tender was put up by the International Airport Authority of India, a State instrumentality for putting up and running a IInd Class Restaurant and two Snack Bars at the International Airport at Bombay. The qualifying criteria mentioned therein for the tenderers are reproduced herein-below:- “sealed tenderers in the prescribed form are hereby invited from registered IInd Class Hoteliers having at least 5 years’ experience for putting up and running a IInd Class Restaurant and two Snack Bars at this Airport for a period of 3 years” Therein the Hon’ble Apex Court had to examine whether the 4th respondents were eligible to submit a tender. The contention of respondent No. 4 was that different grades were given by the Bombay City Municipal Corporation to hotels and restaurants and though there may be IInd Class Hotel but no such grades were given to persons running hotels and restaurants and hence it would be inappropriate to speak of a person as a registered IInd Class hotelier. Whether for the said reason it would be proper to reject the expression “registered IInd Class hotelier”. The Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:- “7. ..... We do not think such a view would be justified by any canon of construction. It is a well settled rule of interpretation applicable alike to documents as to statutes that, save for compelling necessity, the court should not be prompt to ascribe superfluity to the language of a document “and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word intended to have some effect or be of some use. To reject words as insensible should be the last resort of judicial interpretation, for it is an elementary rule based on common sense that no author of a formal document intended to be acted upon by the others should be presumed to use words without a meaning. The court must, as far as possible, avoid a construction which would render the words used by the author of the document meaningless and futile or reduce to silence any part of the document and make it altogether inapplicable. Now, here the expression used in paragraph (1) of the notice was “registered IInd Class hotelier” and there can be no doubt that by using this expression the Ist respondent intended to delineate a certain category of persons who alone should be eligible to submit a tender. The Ist respondent was not acting aimlessly or insensibly in insisting upon this requirement nor was it indulging in a meaningless and futile exercise. It had a definite purpose in view when it laid down this condition of eligibility in paragraph (1) of the notice. It is true that the phraseology used by the 1st respondent to express its intention was rather inapt but it is obvious from the context that the expression “registered IInd Class hotelier” was loosely used to denote a person conducting or running a IInd Class hotel or restaurant. It is true that the phraseology used by the 1st respondent to express its intention was rather inapt but it is obvious from the context that the expression “registered IInd Class hotelier” was loosely used to denote a person conducting or running a IInd Class hotel or restaurant. It may be ungrammatical but it does not offend common sense to describe a person running a registered IInd Grade hotel as a registered IInd grade hotelier. This meaning is quite reasonable and does not do any violence to the language and makes sense of the provision contained in paragraph (1) of the notice. We must, in the circumstances, hold that, on a proper construction, what paragraph (1) of the notice required was that only a person running a registered IInd Class hotel or restaurant and having at least 5 years’ experience as such should be eligible to submit a tender. This was a condition of eligibility and it is difficult to see how this condition could be said to be satisfied by any person who did not have five years’ experience of running a IInd Class hotel or restaurant. The test of eligibility laid down was an objective test and not a subjective one. ..........” 21. Mr. Goswami wants to submit that the expression “emergency vehicle” in the qualifying criteria must be understood in terms of the Code 2013. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court the respondent No. 1 herein had introduced the said word “emergency vehicle” in order to classify a particular group of persons making them eligible for participation in the tender process. The object of the respondent No. 1 herein is to operate an emergency vehicle with critical care facility which is subjective in nature and objective of the NIT is to operate an emergency vehicle and the group of persons eligible to participate must have experience in operating any emergency vehicle. Keeping in view the aforesaid ratio in Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra), construction of the said term “emergency vehicle” must be in such a way that it does not become meaningless and redundant. Keeping in view the aforesaid ratio in Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra), construction of the said term “emergency vehicle” must be in such a way that it does not become meaningless and redundant. It must therefore be given a plain and simple interpretation of the said term which transpires from the qualification criteria that the emergency vehicle mentioned therein is an ambulance and the bidder must fulfil the criteria of rendering services of an ambulance in the PSU/Private Organisation within 10 years from the last day of the ending month preceding the month which the bids are invited. Mr. Goswami had admitted that emergency vehicle includes ambulance but his only submission is that all ambulances are not emergency vehicles as per the Code of 2013. 22. Now referring to Michigan Rubber (India) Limited v. State of Karnataka and others (supra), whether the process adopted or the decision made by the authority is malafide and whether the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably in accordance with the relevant law could have reached and whether by the said decision making process of the respondent authorities, the public interest is affected or not. In my considered opinion, the respondent authorities without keeping a restricted interpretation, has given a wide meaning to the qualification criteria as apparent from the explanation of the learned counsel for respondents. Moreover, if the view so submitted by Mr. Goswami is accepted, then it would have an impact on the public interest inasmuch the Code came into existence only in the year 2013 and without there being any change made in the qualifying criteria so far the length of the experience is concerned, the same would amount to unreasonableness on the part of the respondent authorities in giving a restrictive meaning and accordingly, I hold that the decision making process of the respondent No. 1 in accepting the qualification criteria of the respondent No. 8 is just, fair and not arbitrary. I find no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed. Interim order, passed earlier, shall stand vacated.