JUDGMENT : 1. A preliminary point is taken that the application has been wrongly filed under the provisions of Order IX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but ought to have been filed under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code, which provides that the Court must record the reasons for restoring the suit. 2. Admittedly a proceeding under Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 was taken out by the landlord/opposite party for fixation of fair rent. The petitioner is a tenant and naturally is aggrieved by every action of the landlord, which has a resultant effect in increasing the monthly rent. 3. Unfortunately the application was dismissed, as the landlord/opposite party could not take steps on the said fateful day. An application is taken out for restoration of the said proceeding. The Rent Controller has found the explanations to be sufficient and allowed the said application for restoration ex debito justitiae. 4. It is ardently submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that there is a variance in the findings as well as the ultimate decision taken by the Rent Controller in the impugned order. 5. It is no longer res integra that the Court should encourage the proceeding to be decided on merit than to be nipped on a technical ground. If a proceeding was dismissed for default for the laches and lapses of the learned advocate representing the landlord, the party should not suffer. 6. The learned advocate for the petitioner is very much vocal in his submission that the Court must record its satisfaction on sufficient cause, which is one of the paramount ingredients for condonation of delay or for restoration of the proceeding, which was dismissed for default. The sufficient cause cannot be squeezed within the straitjacket formula, it varies from case to case and depends upon the circumstances and events pleaded in the application. 7. If the Court finds from the materials before it that sufficient cause has been made out; it can proceed to condone the delay or to restore the proceeding, which was dismissed for default. If the Court, in this case the Rent Controller, allowed the said application, it implies that he found the cause to be sufficient though may not have expressed in elucidate or elaborate manner. 8. If the Court, in this case the Rent Controller, allowed the said application, it implies that he found the cause to be sufficient though may not have expressed in elucidate or elaborate manner. 8. I had an occasion to peruse the application for condonation of delay appearing at page 23 of the revisional application. This Court finds that because of the lapses and laches on the part of the learned advocate or his clerk the matter was dismissed and the delay occurred in applying the application for restoration. It appears that similar grounds have been taken both in an application for condonation of delay as well as in an application for restoration. 9. The learned advocate for the petitioner relies upon a judgment of this Court in case of A.B.B.Marine Products Private Limited vs. Indian Bank reported in 1999 (2) CHN 156 in support of the contention that the opposite party, being the Private Limited Company, should not be permitted to take shelter under the laches and lapses of the learned advocate representing it as a ground for condonation of delay or for restoration of a proceeding. 10. My attention is drawn to the observations made in paragraph 18 of the said judgment, wherein the order dismissing the matter for default is quoted. The learned Judge did not find such explanations to be sufficient enough for the purpose of restoration of the proceeding. In paragraph 20 of the said Report, the learned Judge held that since a political party has called Bandh on a particular date, which cannot be a sufficient ground either for non-attendance of the learned advocates or the Court staff. Interestingly the Court though refused to restore the proceeding, yet permitted the applicant therein to institute a fresh suit subject to the period of limitation. 11. This Court does not find that the case involved in the above noted Report can be put on equal pedestal with the given case and to apply the proposition of law laid down therein. 12. It is no longer res integra that the length of delay is not a deciding factor but the sufficiency of cause is. The delay of longer period may be condoned by the Court, if there is sufficient cause made out by the applicant; on the other hand, the Court may refuse to condone the delay of a shorter period in absence of sufficient cause. 13. The delay of longer period may be condoned by the Court, if there is sufficient cause made out by the applicant; on the other hand, the Court may refuse to condone the delay of a shorter period in absence of sufficient cause. 13. It is axiomatic to record that the Court must apply its judicial mind in finding out the sufficiency of the causes shown by the person applying for restoration of the proceeding or for condonation of delay in filing the same. 14. The learned advocate for the petitioner harps on the provisions contained under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code because of the fact that the petitioner was present on the fateful day, when the proceeding was dismissed for default. 15. The wrong quoting of the provisions in an application is not fatal; even if the dismissal is treated to have been made under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code, if the Court finds that there is sufficient ingredients or pleading in the application for the aforesaid purposes, it can treat the said application under the said provision, as the technicality should not defeat or destroy the right of adjudication on merit. 16. Furthermore, Order IX Rule 8 of the Code debars a fresh suit to be filed for the self-same reliefs based upon the same cause of action. Such bar does not apply in case of a dismissal under Order IX Rule 4 of the Code. A decision is what is decided on the facts of a case and the Court should not apply such decision without matching the parity in facts. A little difference or an additional fact may invite diametrically opposite decision to what was taken in a particular case based upon the facts involved therein. 17. The learned advocate for the petitioner strenuously argues by taking me to different paragraphs of the application for condonation of delay as well as the application for restoration of the said proceeding. According to the learned advocate the facts pleaded therein would not justify any lenient approach nor the same could be treated as a sufficient cause for the purpose of condonation of delay or for restoration of the proceeding. This Court feels to examine those facts in such perspective and to find out whether the same constitute a sufficient cause or not. 18. This Court feels to examine those facts in such perspective and to find out whether the same constitute a sufficient cause or not. 18. It is not in dispute that the proceeding was dismissed for default on 24th November, 2014 by the Additional Rent Controller. It is stated in the said application that the said matter was fixed on 14th July, 2014, but due to mistake on the part of the clerk the said date was wrongly incorporated in the dairy maintained by the lawyer as 14th December, 2014. Naturally there was no steps taken on 14th July, 2014 and the Additional Rent Controller adjourned the matter and fixed the same on 24th November, 2014 prior to the date, which was noted in the diary. 19. Obviously the person being unaware of another date being fixed could not take any steps on the said date when the Additional Rent Controller dismissed the matter for default. The pleadings would further reveal that the steps was taken on 14th December, 2014 and it was brought to the notice of the learned advocate that the said matter was already dismissed for default on 24th November, 2014. In paragraph 5 of the application it is stated that though the learned advocate was aware of the dismissal of the matter on 24th November, 2014 on 14th December, 2014, when the steps were taken by him, yet he informed the petitioner of the aforesaid facts to take appropriate steps in the matter. 20. It is further stated that due to intervention of the Christmas holidays the learned advocate could not be contacted, as he was not in town. The said learned advocate could only be contacted on 14th January, 2015 and an instruction was given to him to file an application for restoration of the said proceeding. As per the advice of the learned advocate the petitioner participated in the conference with him and it was advised that the application for restoration can be filed after receiving the copy of the impugned order. The order was obtained but the petitioner fell sick and could not contact the learned advocate until second week of February, 2015. As per the advice of the learned advocate the petitioner participated in the conference with him and it was advised that the application for restoration can be filed after receiving the copy of the impugned order. The order was obtained but the petitioner fell sick and could not contact the learned advocate until second week of February, 2015. Thereafter the matter was discussed and the learned advocate, upon whom the petitioner reposed confidence, could not file the application due to his preoccupation and that he went out of the town and returned only in the last week of February, 2015. Subsequently the learned advocate drafted the application, which was engrossed subsequently and came to be filed upon a delay of 77 days. 21. According to the learned advocate for the petitioner the delay is more than what is pleaded in the said application. 22. As indicated above, the length of delay is immaterial, if the Court finds that there is sufficient explanation offered in the application for condonation of delay. It is not necessary that the applicant should plead the explanations of delay on day to day basis. If the circumstances pleaded therein form the chain of events, which is more probable and reasonable, the Court should not adopt hyper technical approach in dismissing the application for condonation of delay or restoration of the proceeding. 23. The learned advocate for the petitioner arduously submits before this Court that the ultimate decision taken by the Additional Rent Controller is not supported by the findings recorded therein. 24. I am not impressed with the aforesaid submissions. The High Court can substitute the findings, provided the ultimate decision taken by the subordinate Court is correct. 25. In view of my findings recorded hereinabove, this Court does not find that the ultimate decision suffers from any infirmity or illegality. 26. I would be failing in my duty if I do not deal with other submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner on the provisions contained under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code. 27. According to him the said provision mandates the imposition of condition in any form before the Court restores the proceeding. 28. Upon reading the aforesaid provision, this Court has no hesitation to say that it is a discretion of the Court to impose costs or other conditions as it thinks fit. 27. According to him the said provision mandates the imposition of condition in any form before the Court restores the proceeding. 28. Upon reading the aforesaid provision, this Court has no hesitation to say that it is a discretion of the Court to impose costs or other conditions as it thinks fit. The aforesaid discretion, if exercised by the Court, which does not appear to be unreasonable or irrational, the High Court should seldom interfere with such discretionary order. It is somewhat settled law that the Court must encourage the litigation to be decided on merit than to be dismissed on the anvil of limitation. Precisely there cannot be any case that there is no laches on the part of the applicant, but the Court must visualize the case on overall facts and the approach should be ex debito justitiae. 29. In the present case the tenant, who does not want the rent to be enhanced or fixed under the provisions of the said Act, is obviously taking a chance in challenging the impugned order, by which the proceeding for fixation of fair rent is restored by the Court. 30. In view of the above the revisional application is dismissed. 31. There will be no order as to costs. 32. Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied within three days from the date of such application.