JUDGMENT & ORDER : To question the legality of the judgment and order dated 26.04.2017 delivered in R. C. C. (Revision) 02 of 2015, by the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the tenant. The sole respondent filed a petition under Sections 12(2) and 12(3) of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 for eviction of the petitioner from the premises rented out to him by the respondent-landlord. Even though, it is insignificant of the legal perspective but for purpose of placing on record it is noted that the petitioner is the younger brother of the respondent. 2. The said petition for eviction being RCC 02 of 2013 was instituted in the Court of the Rent Control, Agartala, West Tripura on the ground of bona fide need and being defaulter in payment of the rent. 3. Despite notice for vacating the proceeding premises as described in the schedule appended to the said petition for eviction, the petitioner did not vacate the proceeding premises, even he did not reply to the said notice for vacating the proceeding premises. 4. The petitioner by submitting the written objection against the said petition filed by the respondent under Sections 12(2) and 12(3) of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975, has categorically asserted that the respondent landlord had no bona fide requirement inasmuch as he had a suitable accommodation in Kolkata. Bona fide need as projected in the petition is a pretext. 5. That apart, the petitioner had also projected in the said objection that the immense difficulties would visit if he had to vacate the proceeding premises as his daughter was prosecuting the course of Engineering in the T. I.T. at Agartala, whereas the respondent’s daughter has already joined the legal profession in Calcutta High Court. 6. Further, it has been submitted by the petitioner that even though the petitioner approached to deposit the rent, but the person who was authorized by the respondent was refusing to accept the rent and as such, the petitioner cannot be treated as defaulter in payment of the rent. He has categorically stated in paragraph 21 of the written objection as under : “21. He has categorically stated in paragraph 21 of the written objection as under : “21. He is ready to deposit the same in the account of the learned Court and continue to make such deposit till the petitioner as agrees to receive the rent directly from him so a suitable order in that regard may kindly be passed by this learned Court”. 7. However, the petitioner has admitted that the proceeding premises is a part of the joint property and the property that he received has been sold to liquidate a loan as taken from the Bank of India and as such, he is also financially not very sound to make an alternative accommodation. 8. Having regard to the evidence, the Rent Control Court [the Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Court No. 1] Agartala, West Tripura, has returned the findings that the petitioner has admitted that he has not paid the rent by money order, for which, it can be found that the opposite party, the petitioner herein failed to pay rent to the petitioner, the respondent herein as per provision of the RCC Act and hence is liable to be evicted. 9. It has been also referred in the judgment dated 09.10.2013 that by the order dated 25.06.2013, the RCC Court directed or allowed the opposite party for making payment of all the arrears rent within 45 days from the date of the said order. But from the rent receipt submitted by the petitioner by firisti dated 23.08.2013, it is found that the petitioner deposited rent from the month of August 2011 to July 2013 on 17.08.2013 i.e. after expiry of 45 days and from the rent receipt submitted by the firisti dated 05.10.2013, it can be further found that the rent for the month of August, 2013 to October, 2013 was filed at a time, meaning thereby, not within two weeks from the date on which the rent had become due and this Court by order dated 25.06.2013 directed the petitioner for making payment of all subsequent rent within two weeks from the date on which the rent would become due. Thus, the vice of default is not removed by making payment. 10. The Rent Control Court has therefore observed that the petitioner could have sent the rent regularly by money order in terms of Section 10(2) of the R.C.C Act. Thus, the vice of default is not removed by making payment. 10. The Rent Control Court has therefore observed that the petitioner could have sent the rent regularly by money order in terms of Section 10(2) of the R.C.C Act. or to the bank account after serving a notice to the landlord. But the petitioner, the opposite party in the petition for eviction did not do the same and as such, it has been held by the Rent Control Court that the petitioner is defaulter in payment of rent. 11. Thereafter, on appreciation of the evidence, the Rent Control Court has returned the findings that the proceeding premise is required to the petitioner-respondent for residential purpose. Even though the petitioner has a flat in Kolkata, but there is no bar in having two residential houses. The landlord is the best judge to his need. But the need of the respondent of having a residential house at Agartala, is bona fide one. 12. That apart, the plea as raised by the petitioner herein, the opposite party in the proceeding for eviction, that the landlord has got another room adjacent to the proceeding premise. It is however cannot escape the notice that for the said adjacent room he might have required the proceeding premise as well for better living. The better living as an element cannot be excluded from bonafide need. 13. Accordingly, the said petition for eviction was allowed directing the petitioner, the tenant-opposite party in the petition for eviction to vacate the premise within 60 (sixty) days and to put the landlord, the respondent herein, within a period of 60 days from the date of the judgment. The tenant-petitioner was further directed to put the landlord, in possession by removing all obstructions within 60 (sixty) days from the day of the judgment. 14. Against the said judgment dated 09.10.2013, the tenant, the petitioner herein, filed an appeal before the appellate authority of the Rent Control [the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No. 2] being RCC Appeal 14 of 2013. 14. Against the said judgment dated 09.10.2013, the tenant, the petitioner herein, filed an appeal before the appellate authority of the Rent Control [the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No. 2] being RCC Appeal 14 of 2013. But the said appeal was dismissed by the judgment dated 16.12.2014 on affirmance of the findings of the Rent Control Court and having observed as under: “As stated earlier, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the question of insufficiency of space in the rented premises which disqualifies the bona fide need of the respondent has sufficiently answered by the learned Trial Court vide the reasoning as quoted herein above. Therefore, I did not find any justified ground to interfere with the findings as to the bona fide need of the rented premises.” 15. It has been further observed that since the deposit of rent was not made as per direction of the trial court, taking recourse to Sub-Section 1 of Section 13 of the Act, 1975, the trial court has held that the appellant is defaulter in making payment of the rent. The appellate court has returned the findings that the order of eviction passed by the trial court on account of nonpayment of the rent as per direction of the Court is well supported by reasons. 16. That apart, noncompliance of Section 20 of the said Act, as has been referred by the appellate authority, it has been observed on such reference that unless the tenant makes payment of the rent, the challenge in the appeal may not be entertained. The appellate authority has categorically observed that there was no such initiative from the tenant to establish before the appellate authority that he had paid the arrear rent or the rent due during the appellate proceeding. 17. Being aggrieved by the said judgment dated 16.12.2014, the tenant-petitioner filed a revision under Section 22 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 being RCC (Revision) 02 of 2015 in the court of the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala. The grounds of objection as advanced in the said revision petition can briefly be noted: (a) non-appreciation of the evidentiary materials by the appellate authority while passing the judgment of affirmance. (b) Failure of exercising jurisdiction. However, there had been no illustration to make the grounds of objection more eloquent. The grounds of objection as advanced in the said revision petition can briefly be noted: (a) non-appreciation of the evidentiary materials by the appellate authority while passing the judgment of affirmance. (b) Failure of exercising jurisdiction. However, there had been no illustration to make the grounds of objection more eloquent. The revisional authority by the judgment and order dated 26.04.2014 has dismissed the said petition observing thus : “It cannot be said that the O.P. petitioner who is a tenant has any bona fide requirement. Rather it can be said that the learned courts below rightly came to a findings that the petitioner respondent has the bona fide need of the rented premises. There are two grounds for eviction, one is bona fide need and another is also becoming defaulter and it is admitted that the O.P. petitioner has become a defaulter and he also did not comply the provision of Section 13 of the Act which disqualifies a tenant for contesting an application for eviction and to prefer any appeal under Section 20 of the Act. Both the courts below gave a specific findings that the O.P. petitioner is found to be a defaulter in making payment of rent and he also failed to pay or deposit rent and is liable to be evicted from the rented premises.” 18. Now the said judgment as stated earlier is under challenge in this petition. Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. P. Sen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the area of the proceeding premise is so small that it is unfit for residential purpose or for opening a chamber of lawyer. 19. That apart, the judgment of the RCC Court is flawed inasmuch as there has been no direction to make payment of the arrear of the rent within the time specified in terms of Section 12(2) (b) of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975. 20. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has quite emphatically submitted that the findings regarding default in making payment of the rent by the petitioner is not sustainable inasmuch as the petitioner has paid the full amount of the rent and has deposited the rent in the account of the RCC court regularly to avoid the default. But Mr. 20. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has quite emphatically submitted that the findings regarding default in making payment of the rent by the petitioner is not sustainable inasmuch as the petitioner has paid the full amount of the rent and has deposited the rent in the account of the RCC court regularly to avoid the default. But Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel did not venture further to question the specific finding in respect of not making payment within the stipulated time as prescribed by the RCC court. 21. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has further submitted that need of the tenant and the bona fide need of the landlord has to be comparatively assessed to strike a balance so that the tenant’s right as espoused by the said Act is not put to jeopardy. Mr. Chakrbaorty, learned senior counsel has placed his reliance on a decision in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal reported in (2001) 5 SCC 705 where the Apex Court has observed as under: “15. From the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs, the question that arises for determination is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in interfering with the concurrent judgments of the courts below in holding that the plaintiff required the premises bona fide for use of his son? Section 12(1) (f) of the Act under which the eviction of the tenant was sought and granted by the lower Courts, reads as follows : "Sec.12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only namely : (a)(e) ****** (f) That the accommodation let for nonresidential purposes is required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;" The section, on a plain reading, is clear and specific. The criteria to be fulfilled for an order of eviction under the provision are : (i) That the nonresidential accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons; and (ii) That the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable nonresidential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. [Emphasis supplied] The Legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to avoid any arbitrary or whimsical action of a landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must be bona fide which is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The 'bona fide requirement' must be in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made further clear by making the provision that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in sub-section (e) of Section 12(1) of the Act in respect of accommodation let for residential purposes. Thus, the legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the Court is duty-bound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also whether any other reasonably suitable nonresidential accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is available. The judgment/order of the court/authority for eviction of a tenant which does not show that the court/authority has applied its mind to these statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the superior court will be justified in upsetting such judgment/order in appeal/second appeal/revision. Bona fide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a question of fact. But in recording a finding on the question the court has to bear in mind the statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(1)(f). Bona fide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a question of fact. But in recording a finding on the question the court has to bear in mind the statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(1)(f). If it is found that the court has not applied the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its proper perspective then the finding regarding bona fide requirement would cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous finding illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment. In such case the High Court cannot be faulted for interfering with the finding in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 22. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has further submitted that the legislature has clearly laid down that the court is duty bound to examine not merely requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also whether any other suitable nonresidential accommodation in the city/town is available. He has further contended that the bona fide requirement at the first instance is a question of fact. But in recording a finding on that question, the court has to bear in mind the statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(1) (f). 23. On the other hand Mr. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-landlord has stated that the fora below did not exceed their jurisdiction nor their finding can be stated as perverse. What the petitioner has stated in this petition is that there was no appreciation of the materials and emphasized on the fact that the proceeding premises, having a very little space for accommodation or for any other purpose. Such plea cannot be acceded to, inasmuch as the tenant-petitioner has himself admitted that there is another adjacent room of the landlord, the respondent herein and as such, the proper utility is discernable from such admission made by the tenant-petitioner . 24. Hence, in the objection on the small space, there is no substance at all. So far the objection raised on the touchstone of Section 12(1) (b) of the said Act, Mr. Pal, learned counsel has quite categorically stated that despite a specific order having been passed by the RCC court, the tenant-petitioner has failed to do away with the vice of defaulter. So far the objection raised on the touchstone of Section 12(1) (b) of the said Act, Mr. Pal, learned counsel has quite categorically stated that despite a specific order having been passed by the RCC court, the tenant-petitioner has failed to do away with the vice of defaulter. Having due regard to the jurisdictional ambit under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court may not make re-appreciation of the evidence or the findings based on the evidence. 25. Mr. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has referred a decision of the Apex Court in R.C. Tamrakar and Another v. Nidi Lekha reported in (2001) 8 SCC 431 . In the said report, the Apex Court has laid down the law without any ambiguity. It has been held in R. C. Tamrakar and Another (supra) that regarding bona fide requirement of the landlady [in that case], the Trial Court after appreciation of the evidence on record held that the premises in question were required by the landlady for bona fide occupation for residential purpose for herself. The First Appellate Court set aside the finding on the ground that need of the landlady was not bona fide as her son has constructed a house where she could stay. Though the tenant left the suit premises on his transfer to a place called Sivani where he has been provided accommodation by his employer and where he is living with his wife. Moreover, the tenant has a house at Sivani. Despite that the First Appellate Court erroneously took into consideration that the suit premises is required for accommodation of his ailing grandmother and his son who is doing business in the suit premises. These are absolutely extraneous elements for consideration of the bona fide need of the landlord under the Act. The court need not take into consideration those facts. It has been held in R.C. Tamrakar and Another (supra) as follows : “10. Law is well settled that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. In deciding the question of the bona fide requirement, it is unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else landlord could have adjusted himself. 11. Law is well settled that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. In deciding the question of the bona fide requirement, it is unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else landlord could have adjusted himself. 11. Though the son of the landlady is doctor and has constructed his own house, the landlady wants to stay in the suit premises. It is not the case of the tenant that landlady has any other suitable accommodation. Therefore, the High Court rightly set aside the finding of the First Appellate Court holding that landlady could not be compelled to reside with her son as her case was that she wanted to stay by herself in the suit premises because of her health condition and the climatic condition of that place suits her.” [Emphasis added] 26. Mr. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has not failed to point out that in the case in hand the landlord-respondent does not have any accommodation in his ancestral place and his daughter, who is a lawyer has a plan to start a lawyer chamber at Agartala. Even though, she is practicing in the Kolkata High Court, she may also setup another chamber at Agartala for her professional requirement. These facts can be taken for consideration whether the proceeding premise is required for bona fide need by the landlord-respondent. 27. Mr. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has placed his reliance on a decision of the Apex Court on the aspect of the default and payment of the arrears of rent or the rent. In Jabal C. Lashkari and Others v. Official Liquidator and Others reported in (2016) 12 SCC 44 where the Apex Court has laid down the law that even though Section 12 (2) (b) and 12(3)(b) of the said Act confers protection to a tenant who is regularly paying the rent or is ready and willing to pay the rent. However, mere readiness and willingness to pay without actual payment cannot entails to the benefit of the tenant in perpetuity. However, mere readiness and willingness to pay without actual payment cannot entails to the benefit of the tenant in perpetuity. Further, what is required under Section 12(2) is service of a notice in writing by the landlord by raising a demand of rent and only on the failure of the tenant to comply with such notice within a period of one month, the filing of a petition for eviction is contemplated. 28. Having appreciated the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the solitary question that falls for consideration in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is that whether the finding in respect of the fact is tainted by perversity or whether there was any misconstruction of the statutory provision to defeat the right of the tenant. 29. This Court on scrutiny of the records is of the considered opinion that the RCC court had directed the tenant to pay the arrear of rent within a period of 45 days which the tenant did not comply. Even he is found regularly defaulting in paying the current rent within 15 days as directed by the RCC court. The said default was never waived by the court. Even when the appeal was filed before the appellate authority, the tenant-petitioner did not raise that aspect of the matter that he has paid the arrear rent and has been paying the current rent as per direction of the RCC court. 30. Thus, the appellate authority did not exercise its jurisdiction to take away the vice of the default by its order. The revisional authority by way of its affirmance has upheld the judgment of the appellate authority. This Court does not find any perversity in the finding inasmuch as the plea as raised by Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner. In respect of narrow space of the proceeding premises is not based on very sound reasoning inasmuch as the said narrow space is being utilized by the tenant-petitioner and on the other hand the landlord, the respondent has got another room adjacent to the proceeding promises. Hence, the landlord-respondent is in better position to utilize the space. The statement as projected is plausible one as the petitioner did not raise any objection regarding non-availability etc. Hence, the landlord-respondent is in better position to utilize the space. The statement as projected is plausible one as the petitioner did not raise any objection regarding non-availability etc. Now the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise all these objections for questioning the judgment passed by the fora below. 31. The Apex Court in Jabal C. Lashkari and Others (supra) has observed that service of notice giving an opportunity to the tenant to pay the unpaid rent is the first chance/opportunity that the Rent Control Act contemplates as a legal necessity incumbent on the landlord. Admittedly, in that case, no such notice as contemplated by Section 13(2) has been issued by the landlord, at least none was brought to the notice of the Apex Court. Here, the fact is substantially different. 32. In this case, despite the notice of demand for paying the rent and also for vacating the premise on bona fide requirement, the tenant-petitioner did not pay the arrears of rent, even it is observed by the fora below that the tenant did not pay the arrear of rent within the period as prescribed by the petitioner. As such, in the considered opinion of this Court and in the given circumstances of the case, the tenant-petitioner is not entitled to get any protection as provided under the RCC Act. Having observed thus, this court does not find any merit in this petition and accordingly, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.