JUDGMENT : Hon’ble B. Amit Sthalekar, J.—The petitioner in the writ petition is seeking quashing of the order dated 30.12.2017 whereby the Election Tribunal has rejected the application of the petitioner dated 17.11.2016 for summoning of counting supervisors for recording their statements. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that an election for the post of Gram Pradhan of Gram Sabha Pindara, Pargana Kulasala, Block and Tehsil Pindara District Varanasi was notified on 7.11.2015 alongwith Gram Sabha Elections across the State of U.P. The election prgoramme was as under: Date of Nomination 19th to 20th November, 2015 Date of scrutiney 21st to 22nd November 2015 Date of withdrawal 23rd November 2015 Distribution of symbols 23rd November 2015 Date of Election 01st December 2015 Date of counting 12th December 2015 3. 11 persons including the petitioner and respondent Nos. 2 to 11 contested the election for the post of Pradhan in the reserved female category. It is stated that total ballot papers were 6402 out of which 105 were declared invalid and valid ballot papers were 6297. The petitioner was declared a winner by two votes defeating the respondent No. 2 Chhaya. The respondent No. 2 is stated to have demanded recounting which was allowed by the returning officer but the result remained unchanged. Thereupon the respondent no 2 filed an election petition No. 6 of 2016 alleging that she had received 2616 votes but the returning officer has illegally not counted 28 votes polled in her favour and had illegally declared 42 votes as invalid. The election petition was contested by the petitioner and a written statement was filed by her denying the allegations made therein. It is stated that during the pendency of the election petition, the Prescribed Authority by an order dated 10.11.2016 directed summoning of counterfoils of ballots from booths 226 to 240, report diary and election returns prepared in various prescribed format by respondent No. 12/counting supervisor. The petitioner then filed a recall application also dated 10.11.2016 which was rejected by order dated 30.1.2017. Being aggrieved by the order dated 10.11.2016 and 30.1.2017 the petitioner filed civil misc. writ petition No. 15862 of 2017 (Smt. Phula Devi v. State of U.P. and others) but the same was dismissed by the High Court by judgement and order dated 13.11.2017. Being aggrieved by the order dated 10.11.2016 and 30.1.2017 the petitioner filed civil misc. writ petition No. 15862 of 2017 (Smt. Phula Devi v. State of U.P. and others) but the same was dismissed by the High Court by judgement and order dated 13.11.2017. Under the orders of the Election Tribunal dated 10.11.2016 the various returns in their formats showing the time of voting and counting were brought on record. It is stated that the returns of the election in Form 4 were summoned in which it was found that there was overwriting and cuttings which created a suspicion in the mind of the petitioner as to the genuineness of the information recorded therein. The election petition was thereafter transferred to the S.D.M. Sadar, Varanasi and renumbered as Election Petition No. 31 of 2017 (Chhaya v. Phula Devi and others). It is stated that on 20.12.2017 the petitioner submitted an application before the Prescribed Authority for summoning the counting supervisors for the purposes of verification of the entries in the election returns in Forms 4, 5 and 6 and to rebut the presumption of genuineness of the information recorded therein which arises under Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with regard to a document certified by a public servant. It is stated that no objection was filed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 11 to the petitioner’s application but nevertheless by the impugned order respondent No. 1 S.D.M. Sadar has rejected the petitioner’s application. 4. I have heard Shri Alok Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Chandan Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 and the learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 12 and perused the documents on record. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the records were summoned on the application of the respondent no 2 and though the petitioner had filed a recall application on 10.11.2016 for recall of the said order the petitioner’s application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by order dated 30.1.2017and the returns prepared in formats as required under Rule 104 to 107 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj (Election of Members Pradhans and Up-Pradhans) Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1994) was rejected. The election returns in Forms 4, 5 and 6 were produced in the election petition but when the petitioner examined the same he found that there were several overwriting and cuttings creating a doubt as regard correctness and genuineness of the entries therein and therefore it became necessary to summon the counting supervisors to verify the entries made in the election returns in order to rebut the statutory presumption arising out of the provisions of Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that entries made by a public officer would be presumed to be genuine. He submits that the provisions of Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act no doubt raises a statutory presumption but every presumption is ultimately subject to rebuttal and the right to rebut is always available to the petitioner and cannot be denied to him. 6. Reliance has been placed on a judgement of the Supreme Court in M/s. Sodhi Transport Co. and another v. State of U.P. and another, AIR 1986 SC 1099 . Relevant paragraphs 14 and 16 of the said judgement read as under: “14. A presumption is not in itself evidence but only makes a prima facie case for party in whose favour it exists. It is a rule concerning evidence. It indicates the person on whom the burden of proof lies. When presumption is conclusive, it obviates the production of any other evidence to dislodge the conclusion to be drawn on proof of certain facts. But when it is rebuttable it only points out the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence on the fact presumed, and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reassonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed the purpose of presumption is over. Then the evidence will determine the true nature of the fact to be established. The rules of presumption are deduced from enlightened human knowledge and experience and are drawn from the connection, relation and coincidence of facts, and circumstances. 15. - ...... 16. In our opinion a statutory provision which creates a rebuttable presumption as regards the proof of a set of circumstances which would make a transaction liable to tax with the object of preventing evasion of the tax cannot be considered as conferring on the authority concerned the power to levy a tax which the Legislature cannot otherwise levy. 16. In our opinion a statutory provision which creates a rebuttable presumption as regards the proof of a set of circumstances which would make a transaction liable to tax with the object of preventing evasion of the tax cannot be considered as conferring on the authority concerned the power to levy a tax which the Legislature cannot otherwise levy. A rebuttable presumption which is clearly a rule of evidence has the effect of shifting the burden of proof and it is hard to see how it is unconstitutional when the person concerned has the opportunity to displace the presumption by leading evidence.” Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under: “S.79. Presumption as to genuineness of certified copies.—The Court shall presume (to be genuine) every document purporting to be a certificate, certified copy or other document, which is by law declared to be admissible as evidence of any particular fact and which purports to be duly certified by any officer (of the Central Government or of a State Government, or by any officer in the State of Jammu and Kashmir who is duly authorized thereto by the Central Government: Provided that such document is substantially in the form and purports to be executed in the manner directed by law in that behalf. The Court shall also presume that any officer by whom any such document purports to be signed or certified, held, when he signed it, the official character which he claims in such paper.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner therefore submits that even though there is a presumption of genuineness of documents issued by any officer of the Central Government or of a State Government, or by any officer in the State of Jammu and Kashmir who is duly authorised thereto by the Central Government nevertheless such presumption is rebuttable and can be displaced by a person by producing valid evidence to the contrary. 8. Shri Alok Yadav next referred to the documents filed alongwith the supplementary-affidavit which are the photo copies of the election returns filed in the Court below and submitted at page 9 thereof there is cutting and over writing in the documents filed at page 9,10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 22. He further submitted that some information required to be filled in the Form 4 at page 21 was left blank and, therefore, there also there was cuttings and overwriting. 9. He further submitted that some information required to be filled in the Form 4 at page 21 was left blank and, therefore, there also there was cuttings and overwriting. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance upon a judgement of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Udaibhan Singh v. Additional District and Session Judge Ct. No. 5, Varanasi, 2013(5) ADJ 35 and submitted that the facts of that case were quite similar to the facts of the present case and in that case also three applications numbered as 64-C, 65-C and 66-C were filed for summoning counting supervisors of the Polling Centres 271, 273 and 67 to make an effort to establish that there has been cutting and overwriting in the result sheet prepared by the counting supervisor but these applications were rejected by the Election Tribunal and the learned Single Judge held that the Tribunal had erred in rejecting the application for summoning the counting supervisor proceeding on a wrong premise. The relevant portion of the said judgement reads as under: “The submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the ground taken by the Election Tribunal rejecting the applications is untenable in law. According to Sri Alok Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner the Election Tribunal misconstrued the reasoning given by the Counting Supervisors. According to the contents of the applications, once there were allegations that after preparation of the result sheets the same have been tempered with, that can be best testified by Counting Supervisors who have prepared the result sheets and it was not the case where the petitioner was summoning the Counting Supervisors to establish that the result sheets as they exist and had been filed by the election petitioner, respondent No. 2 were correct or not. Further reliance has been placed upon judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Nayini Narasimiha Reddy v. Dr. K. Laxman and others, AIR 2006 SC 2050 , for the purpose that it is not for the Election Tribunal to judge as to what the witness could depose if summoned but the Court must exercise caution before summoning the witness. K. Laxman and others, AIR 2006 SC 2050 , for the purpose that it is not for the Election Tribunal to judge as to what the witness could depose if summoned but the Court must exercise caution before summoning the witness. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has submitted that the only effort of the petitioner is to delay the conclusion of the election petition so that the term may expire and election petition may lose its efficacy. Having considered the submissions, I find that the election Tribunal erred in rejecting the applications of the petitioner for summoning the Counting Supervisors proceeding on wrong premise. The reason given for summoning the witnesses was misconstrued as it had nothing to do with the genuineness of the issuance of the certified copies from the original but it related to genuineness of the original documents, which could be best testified by the Counting Supervisors who had prepared the result sheets.” 10. In rebuttal Shri Chandan Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent no 2, on the other hand, submitted that a perusal of the documents filed alongwith the supplementary-affidavit being the election returns forms though contain some corrections and overwriting but there is no correction or overwriting in the figures showing the total number of votes. He has referred to the documents filed at page 9 of the supplementary-affidavit filed by the petitioner and submitted that even before the correction was made, the total bundles of ballot papers were 17 and the valid votes cast is shown as 450 in respect of Election Center 226 and there is no correction in the same by way of any overwriting, therefore, any correction or overwriting shown in the individual figures did not affect the bundles of ballot papers or the number of votes cast. He submitted that similar is the case in the Form 4 in respect of Election Center, filed at page 10 of the supplementary-affidavit. There is no cutting in the Form 4 for the Election Center 232 (page 15), There is also no cutting in the form for the Election Center 233 (page 16). At page 17 in the Election Center 234, the correction is in respect of the election center but the final tally remains the same. There is no cutting in the Form 4 for the Election Center 232 (page 15), There is also no cutting in the form for the Election Center 233 (page 16). At page 17 in the Election Center 234, the correction is in respect of the election center but the final tally remains the same. At page 18 for the Election Center 235 in which there is no cutting itself shows that cuttings made at page 17 while recording the number of election center was a genuine cutting and any cutting made in the number of ballot papers did not change the final tally. In respect of page 19 also the submission is that the cutting made in the number of valid ballot papers does not change the final tally. So far as page 20 is concerned his submission is that the Form 7 shows that 329 votes were cast out of which 320 were valid but the number of invalid votes has not been mentioned in the column required but he submits that this itself does not affect the result since the final tally remains 322 as regard the votes cast. So far as the column left blank at page 31 in Form 4 for Election Center 238, the submission is that that also does not affect the final tally either of the number of the ballot papers or of the votes cast. In respect of the cutting made at page 22 for the Election Center 239, he submits that though the original figure was shown as 703 votes cast but in the column “No. of Invalid Votes” it was mentioned as 34 and there is no cutting and after deducting 34 from 703 the final figure comes to 669 which has been mentioned separately and in which there is absolutely no cutting. He therefore submits that from a bare perusal of the documents filed by the petitioner alongwith the supplementary-affidavit it could be seen that either there was absolutely no material difference in respect of the bundle of ballot papers or the votes cast in any of the centers of which the documents were summoned and, therefore, the petitioner’s application for summoning of counting supervisor was rightly rejected by the Prescribed Authority. 11. 11. Shri Chandan Sharma, further submits that the application for summoning of counting supervisor was filed by the petitioner on 20.12.2017 whereas the evidence in the case was closed much before that as would be clear from the order sheet of the Prescribed Authority dated 26.9.2017 and therefore submission is that after closing of evidence there was absolutely no occasion for the petitioner to move an application for summoning of the counting supervisor. He further submits that the documents in question were summoned by order of the Prescribed Authority dated 10.11.2016 which was opposed by the petitioner at that time by filing recall application of the same date which was also rejected by the Prescribed Authority by order dated 30.1.2017 and the documents were produced by the Assistant District Election Officer on 23.11.2016 itself, as stated in paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit and therefore the petitioner had ample time to move an application for summoning of the counting supervisors but he sat silent till he moved the application in November, 2017 i.e. after one year and that too after closing of the evidence. 12. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in Bagai Construction through its proprietor Mr. Lalit Bagai v. Gupta Building Material Store, 2013 (14) SCC 1 . Paragraph 12 of the said judgement reads as under: “12. After change of various provisions by way of amendment in the CPC, it is desirable that the recording of evidence should be continuous and followed by arguments and decision thereon within a reasonable time. This Court has repeatedly held that Courts should constantly endeavour to follow such a time schedule. If the same is not followed, the purpose of amending several provisions in the Code would get defeated. In fact, applications for adjournments, reopening and recalling are interim measures, could be as far as possible avoided and only in compelling and acceptable reasons, those applications are to be considered. We are satisfied that the plaintiff has filed those two applications before the trial Court in order to overcome the lacunae in the plaint, pleadings and evidence. It is not the case of the plaintiff that it was not given adequate opportunity. In fact, the materials placed show that the plaintiff has filed both the applications after more than sufficient opportunity had been granted to it to prove its case. It is not the case of the plaintiff that it was not given adequate opportunity. In fact, the materials placed show that the plaintiff has filed both the applications after more than sufficient opportunity had been granted to it to prove its case. During the entire trial, those documents have remained in exclusive possession of the plaintiff, still plaintiff has not placed those bills on record. It further shows that final arguments were heard on number of times and judgment was reserved and only thereafter, in order to improve its case, the plaintiff came forward with such an application to avoid the final judgment against it. Such course is not permissible even with the aid of Section 151 CPC.” 13. So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that under Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act there is no doubt a presumption with regard to the certificate of genuineness granted by an officer of the Central Government or the State Government in respect of documents certified but such presumption is always rebuttable. There is no quarrel on this principle of law nor there can be any quarrel in that regard. It is always open to a party putting a challenge to a certificate, copy of the document issued by the public servant, to show that the said document was not genuine. However, at the same time the Court has also to take into account the conduct of the party as to whether he had ample and sufficient opportunity to doubt the genuineness of the document and give challenge to the same by summoning the author of the document to prove its veracity. There is no dispute on the questions of fact that after the Prescribed Authority has passed the order on 10.11.2016 for summoning of the documents relating to the election returns and had also rejected the petitioner’s recall application by his order dated 30.1.2017, the document had infact been filed by the District Assistant Election Officer on 23.11.2016 itself. There is no dispute on the questions of fact that after the Prescribed Authority has passed the order on 10.11.2016 for summoning of the documents relating to the election returns and had also rejected the petitioner’s recall application by his order dated 30.1.2017, the document had infact been filed by the District Assistant Election Officer on 23.11.2016 itself. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that during this period the petitioner had challenged the order dated 10.11.2016 and 30.1.2017 by filing a writ petition No. 15862 of 2017 but he submitted that when that writ petition came up for admission on 17.4.2017 the Court directed that the operation of the said orders dated 10.11.2016 and 30.1.2017 shall remain stayed till the next date of listing but the election Tribunal shall proceed to decide the matter on merits. 14. He next submitted that on 3.10.2017 the High Court directed that till the next date of listing further proceedings of the election petition No. 6 of 2013 (Smt. Chhaya v. State of U.P. and others) (the original election petition number) shall remain stayed. Therefore, since the proceedings itself remained stayed from 3.10.2017 till dismissal of the writ petition No. 15862 of 2017 on 13.11.2017 there was no occasion for him to file any application for summoning of counting supervisors. 15. In my opinion this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has absolutely no force because the sequence of the orders passed in W.P. No. 15862 of 2017 itself shows that from 30.1.2017 when the petitioner’s recall application was rejected till the filing of W.P. No. 15862 of 2017 on 17.4.2017 for a period of three months there was absolutely no impediment in filing the application for summoning the counting supervisors and even after filing of the said writ petition No. 15862 of 2017. The only stay order was in respect of the order dated 10.11.2016 and 30.1.2017 but the Election Tribunal was permitted to proceed with the matter on merit and from 17.4.2017 till 3.10.2017 there was absolutely no interim order restraining either the election proceedings or the petitioner from filing any application for summoning of counting supervisors. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 26.9.2017 itself shows that the evidence in the case had been closed much prior to that but the petitioner had not availed the opportunity of filing any application for summoning of the counting supervisors. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 26.9.2017 itself shows that the evidence in the case had been closed much prior to that but the petitioner had not availed the opportunity of filing any application for summoning of the counting supervisors. In my opinion the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Bagai Construction (supra) clearly applies to the facts of the present case and after closing of the evidence it was not open for the petitioner to file the application for summoning of counting supervisors on the facts as they stand. 16. So far as the documents filed alongwith the supplementary-affidavit are concerned, it is noticed that whatever cutting or overwriting or omission to fill a particular column there is, the same does not in any manner materially affect the total number of bundles of ballot papers or number of votes cast as there is no cutting or overwriting in the final calculation of the figure showing the bundles of ballot papers or the number of votes cast. 17. So far as the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Udaibhan (supra) is concerned, in my opinion that judgement is on its own facts and has no application to the facts of the present case. 18. For reasons aforesaid, the present writ petition is thoroughly devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.