JUDGMENT : BELA M. TRIVEDI, J. 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants (original defendants) challenging the judgment and decree dated 10.10.1988 passed by the Court No.10, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trial Court') in Civil Suit No. 1196 of 1981, whereby the Trial Court has decreed the suit of the respondent-Plaintiff-Trust by declaring that the appellants-defendants were the trespassers in part of the land admeasuring 100 sq. yds. bearing old Survey No. 99 (new Survey No. 135) situated in Vaghrivas, Sheikhpur, Khanpur, Navrangpura (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit land') and that they were in occupation of the huts constructed in the said land which were illegal and unauthorized. The appellants-defendants were directed to hand over the vacant possession of the suit land and the huts constructed thereon to the respondent-plaintiff. 2. The short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the respondent-Trust had filed the suit alleging interalia that the Trust was registered on 22.01.1980 with the Office of the Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad and the suit land belonged to the said Trust. The defendants earlier were occupying part of the land bearing Survey No. 100 on which subsequently Ushma Flats were constructed, and they had vacated the said land after taking handsome money. Thereafter, the defendants in the year 19771978 had made encroachments, adjacent to the temple of Shri Visat Mataji situated on Survey No. 99, belonging to the Trust. The trustees of the plaintiff-Trust had requested the defendants to vacate the said premises, however they had started quarreling with the trustees and subsequently had filed a criminal complaint. Defendants no. 1 and 2 had also filed a Civil Suit No. 3638 of 1979 seeking injunction against the Plaintiff-Trust. The said suit was disposed of by the concerned Court by restraining the plaintiff-Trust from demolishing the huts of the defendants and from dispossessing them without recourse to the due process of law. The plaintiff-Trust therefore, had filed the suit seeking possession of the suit land from the defendants. 3. The suit was resisted by the appellants-defendants by filing written statement at Exhibit15 denying the allegations made against them in the plaint and contending interalia that the suit was barred by the law of limitation as also by principles of delay, latches, acquiescence and estoppel. It was also contended that the mother of defendants no. 3. The suit was resisted by the appellants-defendants by filing written statement at Exhibit15 denying the allegations made against them in the plaint and contending interalia that the suit was barred by the law of limitation as also by principles of delay, latches, acquiescence and estoppel. It was also contended that the mother of defendants no. 1 and 2 and father of defendant no. 3 were staying in the huts situated in the suit land since more than 30 years, and after the death of the mother of defendants no. 1 and 2, the said defendants were staying there in separate huts since last more than 12 years. The defendant No. 3 was the maternal uncle of defendants no. 1 and 2. Thus, according to the defendants, they were enjoying the peaceful possession of the suit land continuously and uninterruptedly for more than 12 years and thereby had become the owners by adverse possession. The defendants therefore had prayed to dismiss the suit. 4. From the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court had framed the following issues at Exhibit 9: 1. Whether the defendant nos. 1 to 4 trespassed into the suit land in or about the year 1978 as averred in the plaint para 3? 2. Whether the defendant nos. 1 to 4 have become the owners of the suit land by adverse possession as contended in para 24 of the written statement ? 3. Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable without the permission of the Charity Commissioner as contended in para 5 of the written statement? 5. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the suit land? 6. What order? What decree? 5. The Trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record decided all the issues against the defendants and decreed the suit of the Plaintiff Trust vide the judgment and decree dated 10.10.1988, against which the present appeal has been filed by the appellants-defendants. 6. Having regard to the record of the case and more particularly, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the only issue which is required to be considered by this Court is, whether the Trial Court has committed any error in appreciating the evidence on record while deciding the issues against the appellants-defendants? 7. Learned Advocate Mr. 6. Having regard to the record of the case and more particularly, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the only issue which is required to be considered by this Court is, whether the Trial Court has committed any error in appreciating the evidence on record while deciding the issues against the appellants-defendants? 7. Learned Advocate Mr. M.K. Vakharia appearing for the appellants taking the Court to the record of the case, vehemently submitted that the Trial Court had ignored the evidence adduced by the appellants-defendants, and committed an error in holding that they were the trespassers, whereas the defendants had produced cogent evidence to show that they were in possession of the suit land since more than 30 years and thereby had become the owners by adverse possession. Learned Advocate Mr. Vakharia also submitted that the respondent-Trust was not the owner of the suit land and one Shambhubhai was its owner, and that the respondents had no right to file the suit against the defendants. According to him, the Trust was registered pending the earlier suit filed by the defendants and there was no document to show that the Trust was the owner of the suit land. 8. However, the learned Advocate Mr. M.C. Bhatt appearing for the respondent-Trust relying upon the judgment passed in the earlier Civil Suit No. 3638 of 1979 filed by the appellants submitted that the plea of long and adverse possession of the appellants in the said suit was not believed by the said Court and therefore, they were estopped from raising the said plea in the present suit. According to him, though the Trust was registered in the year 1980, the owner-Shambhubhai had permitted the Trust to use the suit land since 1921, as reflected in the revenue records. He also submitted that the appellants and their predecessors were occupying part of land bearing old Survey No. 100 situated adjacent to Survey No. 99, however they had vacated the said land as the Ushma Flats were constructed on Survey No. 100. Subsequently, the appellants had trespassed over the suit land in the year 1978. Respondent-Trust was required to file the suit as in the earlier suit filed by the appellants, the Court had directed not to dispossess the appellants without recourse to the due process of law. 9. Subsequently, the appellants had trespassed over the suit land in the year 1978. Respondent-Trust was required to file the suit as in the earlier suit filed by the appellants, the Court had directed not to dispossess the appellants without recourse to the due process of law. 9. In the instant case, it appears that the appellants-defendants had filed the earlier suit against the trustees of the respondent-Trust in which they were protected to the extent that the respondent-Trust should not dispossess the appellants without following the due process of law. Hence, the present suit was filed by the respondent-Trust. The trustees of the respondent-Trust were examined in the suit on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff Trust and three witnesses were examined on behalf of the appellants-defendants. Having regard to their depositions and documentary evidence adduced by both the parties, it appears that it was not disputed that the trust was registered on 22.01.1980 with the Office of the Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad and the suit land was shown to be in occupation of the Trust at the relevant time. As per the case of the respondent-Trust, though the Trust was registered later, the suit land was already donated to the Trust by the owner-Shambhbhai and the Trust was in possession thereof since 1921. The appellants were occupying part of the land bearing survey no. 100 which was adjacent to the suit land and certain huts were constructed by the appellants in Survey No. 100, however on the construction of Ushma Flats on the said Survey No. 100, the appellants had vacated the said land after taking huge money and had gone to reside at Lakhudi Talavadi. However, the predecessors of the appellants in the year 19771978, made encroachment over the suit land which was open land, by putting up huts thereon. The appellants had taken up the defence that they were in possession of the suit premises since last 30 years, however they had failed to prove the same by producing any documentary evidence. None of the documents produced by the appellants pertained to their huts on Survey No. 99. There was nothing on record to show that they were in legal occupation of the suit premises belonging to the respondent-Trust. None of the documents produced by the appellants pertained to their huts on Survey No. 99. There was nothing on record to show that they were in legal occupation of the suit premises belonging to the respondent-Trust. The Trial Court after elaborately discussing the evidence adduced by the parties has arrived at the conclusion that the appellants were the trespassers over the suit lands, which finding being in consonance with the evidence on record this Court is not inclined to disturb the same. 10. It is very pertinent to note that in the earlier suit of injunction filed by the appellants-defendants against the trustees of the respondent-Trust, they had claimed possession since last 30 years, however the same was not believed by the Court. The Trial Court in the instant case has observed in para. 37 of the impugned judgment that the matter was directly and subsequently in issue also in the former suit No. 3638 of 1979 between the same parties and therefore, the principle of resjudicata would be applicable against the appellants as regards their long possession. The Trial Court has also not accepted their defence with regard to adverse possession after discussing the entire evidence in detail. As stated earlier, there was no documentary evidence, much-less reliable evidence, to show that the appellants were in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit premises adverse to the real owner. As per the settled legal position, possession howsoever long does not result into adverse possession. The Supreme Court in case of Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar reported in (1994) 6 SCC 591 has very aptly observed in this regard as under: “5. As regards adverse possession, it was not disputed even by the trial court that the appellant entered into possession over the land in dispute under a license from the respondent for purposes of brick-kiln. The possession thus initially being permissible, the burden was heavy on the appellant to establish that it became adverse. A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession. A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissive possession into adverse possession. Apart from it, the appellate court has gone into detail and after considering the evidence on record found it as a fact that the possession of the appellant was not adverse. The learned counsel, despite strenuous argument, could not demolish the finding of adverse possession. Attempt was made to rely on the evidence led on behalf of the parties and the evidence of the Commissioner who prepared the map. We are afraid that such an exercise is not permissible even in second appeal, what to say of the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Further, we do not find that the appellant has suffered any injustice which requires to be remedied by this Court.” 11. Similarly in case of Annakili vs. A. Vedanayagam and Others reported in (2007) 144 SCC 308, it was held as under: “24. Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the possession of the defendant should become adverse to the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in the said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more does not ripen into a title.” 12. In the case of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy vs. Revamma reported in (2007) 6 SCC 59 , the Supreme Court considering various facets of the law of adverse possession, laid down various propositions including that “5. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more does not ripen into a title.” 12. In the case of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy vs. Revamma reported in (2007) 6 SCC 59 , the Supreme Court considering various facets of the law of adverse possession, laid down various propositions including that “5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. 6.... 7.... 8. Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required: 1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially “wilful neglect” element on the part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner. 2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distances from the paper-owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property.” 13. The learned Advocate Mr. Vakharia has failed to point out as to how the possession of the appellants was adverse to the true owner and that too open, uninterrupted and continuous for more than 12 years. The Court therefore does not find any illegality or infirmity in any of the findings arrived at by the Trial Court. 14. In that view of the matter, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is confirmed. The appeal is dismissed. The appellants are directed to hand over the possession of the suit land to the respondent forthwith. The Decree be drawn accordingly. 15. At this juncture, Learned Advocate Mr. Vakharia has made request to stay the execution of the decree for some time to enable the appellants to approach the higher Court. The request is rejected for the reasons stated in the judgment.