JUDGMENT K.S. Jhaveri, J. - By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order of the Tribunal [2017 (52) S.T.R. 329 (Tri. - Del.)] whereby the Tribunal has allowed the appeal of the assessee. 2. This court while admitting the matter framed the following question of law :- "Whether the Ld. CESTAT was right in law in holding that the assessee being service recipient was entitled to file the refund claim before its jurisdictional authority instead of jurisdictional authority of the service provider where the service tax was paid?" 3. Thereafter, while allowing the application (43343/17) two more questions were added and the same read as under : "(i) Whether the Ld. CESTAT was right in law in holding that the limitation of one year is to be counted from the date of issue of credit note by the service provider and not from the date of payment of service tax.? (ii) Whether the Ld. CESTAT was right in law in holding that letter of service provider to its jurisdictional officer was sufficient proof of payment of service tax?" 4. Counsel for the appellant contended that the Tribunal has seriously committed an error in referring the matter to the Service Tax Authorities, Kota jurisdiction ought to have been exercised by him since the original order has been passed by Indore Bench therefore, it will be difficult for Central Government to approach at Kota. 5. He has relied upon the following decisions which were confirmed by the Supreme Court :- Oswal Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur - 2015 (318) E.L.T. 617 (S.C.) 9. The second reason given by the CESTAT, as mentioned above, is that the Appellant had preferred this application before a wrong authority. Here we find that the Appellant had filed the refund claim before the Central Excise Authorities at Durgapur. The Appellant had purchased the material from IOCL which is having its refinery at Durgapur. The show cause notice was also issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise at Durgapur. It appears that the CESTAT is influenced by the reason that the depot is located at Haldia and on that ground, it has come to the conclusion that the authorities at Durgapur had no jurisdiction. The aforesaid reason given by the CESTAT is factually incorrect. The show cause notice was also issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise at Durgapur. It appears that the CESTAT is influenced by the reason that the depot is located at Haldia and on that ground, it has come to the conclusion that the authorities at Durgapur had no jurisdiction. The aforesaid reason given by the CESTAT is factually incorrect. We find that the purchases were from depot at Rajbandh under the IOCL refinery at Durgapur and therefore, the Central Excise authorities at Durgapur had the requisite jurisdiction over IOCL Depot located at Rajbandh, as it comes under Durgapur Commissionerate. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Union of India - 2016 (342) E.L.T. 48 (Guj.) 12. Having thus heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, short question that calls for consideration is whether the authorities were justified in rejecting the petitioner's claim for refund only on the ground of limitation. As already noted, Section 11B of the Act and in particular sub-section (1) thereof provides for making a refund claim within one year from the relevant date. The term 'relevant date' has been explained in explanation clause (B) of Section 11B. The present case would fall under sub-clause (a) of clause (B) to the explanation, namely, in the case of goods exported out of India. This would be so since as per Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 pertaining to rebate of duty, the explanation specifically provides that export includes goods shipped as provision or stores for use on board a ship proceedings to a foreign port or supplied to a foreign going aircraft. Resultantly, the relevant date would be the one prescribed in sub-clause (i) of subsection (a) when goods are exported by sea or air, the date on which the ship or the aircraft in which such goods are loaded or leaves India. Accordingly, the relevant date in the present case would be when the fuel was supplied by the petitioner to Air India for its foreign going flight which left the country. In the present case, such supply was made on different dates between April, 2005 and October, 2005. Thus the refund claim which was filed on 22nd March, 2007 was clearly beyond the period of one year. It thus clearly emerges that refund claim was made beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 11B of the Act. 19. In the present case, such supply was made on different dates between April, 2005 and October, 2005. Thus the refund claim which was filed on 22nd March, 2007 was clearly beyond the period of one year. It thus clearly emerges that refund claim was made beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 11B of the Act. 19. In view of the above discussion, we find that the authorities were justified in holding that the refund claim of the petitioner was barred by limitation prescribed under Section 11B of the Act. We find no infirmity in the impugned orders. The petition is therefore, dismissed." Inox Leisure Limited vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai - 2016 (42) S.T.R. 497 (Tri. Mumbai) 7. From the record, it is apparent that the appellant were providing services to CCIPL and received one time 'Signing fees' and 'Pouring fees' on annual basis from each of the properties i.e. Pune, Vadodara, Bangalore, Mumbai and Kolkata. The show cause notice admits this. Only because the 'Pouring fee' from all properties/locations was included in the balance sheet of the appellant in a consolidated manner under the income Head i.e. food and beverages, the DGCEI issued the demand show cause notice answerable to Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai demanding service tax on the fees collected from each location. It is not disputed that each of the locations had separate Service Tax registration. It is also not disputed that the services were provided by the appellant from a Multiplex in each location individually. Therefore there is merit in the contention of the Ld. advocate that the Commissioner of Service tax has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case in respect of services received beyond jurisdiction. The finding in the impugned Order does not address this issue appropriately. The only finding is that it was never brought to the notice of the investigating officer that appellant was registered with the Service Tax department at each location in India. The Commissioner observed that since the centralized accounting system is a matter is within the appellant's control, they cannot be permitted to claim that they made a wrong presentation and therefore the show cause notice should fail on jurisdiction. In our view, the fact remains that, as admitted in the Order by the Commissioner, it was disclosed by the appellant's authorized representative Mr. In our view, the fact remains that, as admitted in the Order by the Commissioner, it was disclosed by the appellant's authorized representative Mr. Rajesh Parte vide his statement dated 27-4-2007 that revenues coming from different locations were accounted as 'Pouring Fees' in the balance sheet. The Commissioner held that appellant did not inform that discharge of service tax liability was left to each individual location and that they were not maintaining centralized accounting. In our view, the issue is not of centralized accounting. It is an obvious fact a company having pan India business locations would have a consolidated Balance sheet showing revenue from all locations. It was up to the department to ascertain whether the services were rendered in different locations with separate service tax registration or whether appellant had taken centralized registration. Nowhere in the proceedings, either in the investigation or in the show cause notice, has it come out that the appellant had taken centralized registration. In fact the Service Tax registration number itself shows that centralized registration was not taken. The Commissioner has erred in mixing the issue of centralized accounting and centralized registration. The Commissioner of Service Tax is appointed under a notification which authorizes him to exercise powers under Service Tax within the jurisdiction of Mumbai. There is no notification which authorizes him to exercise powers in respect of cases originating outside his jurisdiction. Therefore clearly the adjudication order has been passed beyond the jurisdiction of the Commissioner in respect services rendered outside Mumbai. In our view, it would have been appropriate for the Commissioner not to pass the Order in respect of services rendered outside Mumbai jurisdiction. The Commissioner should have refrained from adjudicating and instead could have initiated the process of making show cause notice answerable to the jurisdictional Commissioners or he should have written to the Central Board of Excise and Customs seeking power to adjudicate the case of services rendered pan India just as DGCEI has the power to issue the show cause notice on pan India basis." 8. The Commissioner's reliance in the case of Nokia (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is misplaced. In the case of Nokia, the facts were different. There it was held that, on being show caused, a person could not insist that they be issued show cause notice from all the various places from where it rendered its services. The Commissioner's reliance in the case of Nokia (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is misplaced. In the case of Nokia, the facts were different. There it was held that, on being show caused, a person could not insist that they be issued show cause notice from all the various places from where it rendered its services. The facts were that services were being provided from Delhi office, the agreement provided that all notices, demands and other communication be addressed to the Delhi address. Help desk services were provided from Delhi as well as Hardware repair services. In these circumstances it was held that the Delhi Commissionerate had jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice. In the present case the issue is of extra territorial adjudication by the Commissioner. On the issue of extra territorial jurisdiction the Apex Court in the case of Kiran Singh (Supra) held that : It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that is invalidity could be set upon whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. Reliance is also placed on the Apex Court judgment in the case of Commissioner of Customs vs. Sayed Ali 2011 (265) E.L.T. 17 (S.C.)] . The Hon'ble Court was considering the definition of proper officer under Section 2(34) and the proper officer competent to issue a show cause notice under Section 28 of the Customs Act. The Court held that : 14. From a conjoint reading of Sections 2(34) and 28 of the Act, it is manifest that only such a customs officer who has been assigned the specific functions of assessment and reassessment of duty in the jurisdictional area where the import concerned has been affected, by either the Board or the Commissioner of Customs, in terms of Section 2(34) of the Act is competent to issue notice under Section 28 of the Act. Any other reading of Section 28 would render the provisions of Section 2 (34) of the Act otiose inasmuch as the test contemplated under Section 2(34) of the Act is that of specific conferment of such functions. Moreover, if the Revenue's contention that once territorial jurisdiction is conferred, the Collector of Customs (Preventive) becomes a "proper officer" in terms of Section 28 of the Act is accepted, it would lead to a situation of utter chaos and confusion, inasmuch as all officers of customs, in a particular area be it under the Collectorate of Customs (Imports) or the Preventive Collectorate, would be "proper officers". In our view therefore, it is only the officers of customs, who are assigned the functions of assessment, which of course, would include reassessment, working under the jurisdictional Collectorate within whose jurisdiction the bills of entry or baggage declarations had been filed and the consignments had been cleared for home consumption, will have the jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 28 of the Act. 6. Counsel for the respondent contended that the claim has already dismissed by the Tribunal and it has been rightly decided that the jurisdictional assessing officer can verify the claim made and the amount claimed by the assessee. He relied for this contention on the following decisions :- Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Moonlight Builders and Developers -(2008) 307 ITR 197 (Delhi) "8. Precisely the same thing has happened insofar as these appeals are concerned. The revenue has accepted the primary orders passed by the Tribunal on 14-7-2003 and 14-6-2004 but has chosen to challenge the orders passed by the Tribunal in the present appeals which merely follow these primary orders. There is no reason given by the revenue for this pick and choose attitude or this attitude of accepting favourable orders in respect of one assessed but not accepting the same favourable order in respect of another assessed, without there being any distinction between their cases. Consequently, in view of the arbitrary manner of proceeding in the matter, we do not think that it will be proper or in the interest of justice to allow the revenue to seek to recover tax from one assessed while declining to recover tax from another assessed on identical facts." Commissioner of C.Ex. Nagpur vs. Oriental Explosives (P) Ltd. - 2008 (222) E.L.T. 205 (Bom.) 13. Nagpur vs. Oriental Explosives (P) Ltd. - 2008 (222) E.L.T. 205 (Bom.) 13. In this view of the matter, in our considered opinion, the impugned orders passed by all three authorities under Central Excise Act cannot be said to be illegal or contrary to law. In our opinion, the impugned orders have been passed following correct legal principles governing refund of duty. In our considered opinion, no substantial question of law is involved in all these appeals as required under Section 35G(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, we find no merit in any of the appeals. Hence, the appeals are dismissed." Commissioner of Customs C. Ex. and S.T. vs. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Coop. Ltd. - 2014 (35) S.T.R. 492 (All.) 14. The Tribunal was clearly, in our respectful view, correct and justified in following this principle. The assessee is the recipient of the taxable service provided by RGTIL and had borne the incidence of service tax. Hence, the assessee is entitled to claim a refund of excess service tax paid consequent upon the downward revision of the transmission charges payable by the assessee to RGTIL in terms of the determination made by the Regulatory Board. The entire record would indicate that the only objection of the revenue was to the maintenance of the refund application at the behest of the assessee. The fact that the assessee has not passed on the burden has been amply established in the order of the adjudicating authority. This finding was not challenged by the revenue in the grounds of appeal before the first appellate authority or for that matter in the form of cross objections before the Tribunal. The finding of fact of the first appellate authority to the effect that the prices of urea are prescribed by the Government and that the final product manufactured by the assessee is exempted from the payment of excise duty and there would be no occasion for unjust enrichment has not been questioned." Jindal Steel and Power Limited vs. Commercial of Cus. and C. Ex., Raipur -2016 (42) S.T.R. 694 (Tri. - Del.) 6. The fact that the recipient of the service is also entitled to file a claim for refund is no longer res-integra. The issue stand concluded by the Constitution Bench decision in Mafatlal Industries Limited vs. Union of India 1997 (89) E.L.T. 247 (S.C.) . and C. Ex., Raipur -2016 (42) S.T.R. 694 (Tri. - Del.) 6. The fact that the recipient of the service is also entitled to file a claim for refund is no longer res-integra. The issue stand concluded by the Constitution Bench decision in Mafatlal Industries Limited vs. Union of India 1997 (89) E.L.T. 247 (S.C.) . This decision was followed in Indian Farmer Fertilizer Co-op. Ltd. vs. CCE, Meerut-II 2014 (35) S.T.R. 422 (Tri. Del.) . If the appellant which is a recipient of a service which is admittedly not taxable files a claim for refund within the prescribed period of limitation, it is axiomatic that it is entitled to do so before the Commissionerate under whose jurisdiction it pursues its taxable activities, business or is a registrant; or before the Commissionerate having authority over the provider of the service. That would be a matter of a legitimate choice for a claimant of refund. In this case, the appellant had initially filed a claim before the Delhi Commissionerate which rejected the same on the ground that it had no jurisdiction since the appellant was pursuing business outside its jurisdiction. The Bilaspur Commissionerate also rejected the refund claim on the ground that the provider of the service is not within its jurisdiction. The rejection by both Commissionerates is in my view unsustainable." Padmini Polymers Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise - 2004 (163) E.L.T. 52 (Tri.-Delhi) 6. We have considered the submissions of both the sides. Section 11B of the Central Excise Act clearly provides that any person claiming the refund of duty of excise, may make an application for refund of such duty to the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise before the expiry of six months from the relevant date in such form and manner as may be prescribed. It is not in dispute that M/s. Padmini Polymers have filed their refund claim in the prescribed form as per the provisions of Rule 173S of the Central Excise Rules, which has not been disputed by the Revenue that Rs. 50 lakhs were deposited by them. It is not in dispute that M/s. Padmini Polymers have filed their refund claim in the prescribed form as per the provisions of Rule 173S of the Central Excise Rules, which has not been disputed by the Revenue that Rs. 50 lakhs were deposited by them. This fact has been confirmed by the Assistant Chief Accounts Officer of Delhi-I, in his letter dated 5-2-2003 addressed to the Chief Accounts Officer of Central Excise Commissionerate, Meerut, wherein he mentioned that "this office verified the deposit challans at the mentioned address from Punjab National Bank, Okhla Industrial Estate Branch, New Delhi." In view of this position, the Department cannot deny the refund claim merely on the ground that the amount was deposited in a Bank in Delhi and not in a Bank at Meerut. The duty amount, whether it is deposited in Kashmir or Kanya Kumari, goes to the Consolidated Fund of India. A refund of any duty will also take place from the said Fund only. We observe that the Learned Commissioner (Appeals), has dealt with the entire aspect in details in the impugned order and we are in agreement with his findings that the refund cannot be rejected on the ground that the payment was made by the registered office at Delhi and not by the factory at Ghaziabad. We, therefore, uphold the refund of Rs. 50 lakhs to M/s. Padmini Polymers. Accordingly, Appeal No. E/787/03-NB(C), filed by the Revenue, is rejected." Commissioner of C.Ex., Tirupati vs. Kurool Cylinders Pvt. Ltd. - 2007 (219) E.L.T. 473 (Tri. Bang.) 5. We have gone through the records of the case carefully. There are many decisions of the Tribunal holding that when there is price escalation, the assessment would be deemed provisional and the refund claim would not be hit by time-bar. This Bench itself in the following cases has allowed the appeals of the assessee for refund of the amount on account of downward revision of the prices : (a) CCE, Hyderabad vs. R.M. Cylinders (P) Ltd. and Hyderabad Cylinders (P) Ltd., Final Order Nos. 1933 and 1934/2005, dated 22-11-2005. (b) Nagarjuna Constructions Co. Ltd. vs. CCE, Hyderabad, Final Order Nos. 324 and 325/2006, dated 15-2-2006. The various case laws cited by the appellants are relevant. It is pertinent to note that when there is upward revision, the Respondent has to pay the differential duty to the Government. 1933 and 1934/2005, dated 22-11-2005. (b) Nagarjuna Constructions Co. Ltd. vs. CCE, Hyderabad, Final Order Nos. 324 and 325/2006, dated 15-2-2006. The various case laws cited by the appellants are relevant. It is pertinent to note that when there is upward revision, the Respondent has to pay the differential duty to the Government. As regards the question of unjust enrichment, the Commissioner (Appeals) has clearly given a finding that even though the Respondents pay high duty, the actual bill is settled only on the correct price finalized. In other words, when there is downward revision of prices, the respondents collect only the appropriate duty from the oil companies and not the higher duty which they had paid to the Government. This clearly indicates that there is no unjust enrichment. In these circumstances, rejection of refund claim on account of time-bar and unjust enrichment cannot be sustained. There is no merit in the Revenue's appeals. Hence the same are rejected." Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin vs. Virudhunagar Textile Mills Ltd. -2008 (230) E.L.T. 411 (Mad.) 16. It is on record that in the cross-objection dated 15-7-2006 filed by the respondent their stand was that the warping machine imported by them was installed in the respondent's premises for being used in relation to the manufacture of textile products. The machine was not sold nor was it imported for sale and is very much available in the textile mill of the respondent. Apart from that, the Chartered Accountant has furnished a certificate to the effect that the duty element paid for importation of the capital goods has not been passed on to any person and the balance sheet of the respondent company was also produced before the authorities in which the differential duty has been shown as duty recoverable from the Customs Department. The legal presumption (Section 28D of the Act) relied on has thus been rebutted with the above materials which can well be regarded as corroborative evidence. Even to the worse, if the Department is not satisfied with the certificate of the Chartered Accountant and the balance sheet of the respondent company, they would have very well made a physical verification as to the availability of the capital goods with the respondent textile mills. 17. Even to the worse, if the Department is not satisfied with the certificate of the Chartered Accountant and the balance sheet of the respondent company, they would have very well made a physical verification as to the availability of the capital goods with the respondent textile mills. 17. On the above said undisputed fact, we have come to the conclusion that there is no possibility for the respondent or there is no material on the part of the department to contend that by refund of the differential duty, the respondent has unjustly enriched. The authorities under the Act with closed mind have mechanically applied the concept of unjust enrichment against the respondent." 7. We have heard counsel for both the sides. 8. Taking into account, the Tribunal while considering the case has rightly observed as under :- "9. In the present case, the transportation charges were determined by PNGRB in terms of the 2008 Regulations, which itself provides that the prices are provisional. The appellant as well as Gail were aware of this fact and on later revision of price by PNGRB vide its pricing circulars, the adjustment of prices was made through credit notes. Since, only on issuance of credit note by Gail on 20-9-2010, the provisional prices were finalised, the said date in our opinion, will be considered as relevant date in terms of clause (eb) of Explanation-B to Section 11B ibid. The refund claim filed before the jurisdictional authorities on 17-1-2011 and subsequently filed before the authorities of service provider on 24-2-2011, will not hit by limitation of time as prescribed under Section 11B ibid. 10. In view of the foregoing, the appellant's eligibility for refund of service tax is prima facie sustainable on legal grounds. Since the appellant is located in the jurisdiction of service tax authorities of Kota, before whom the refund application was filed on 17-1-2011, the required verification of documents may be carried out by the jurisdictional Assistant commissioner of Service Tax, who is directed to examine the claim and dispose the same in view of the findings above." 9. In our considered opinion, it is always better to allow the assessee to claim from his jurisdictional Commissioner since it is very easy to claim the same and it is settled preposition that the person who paid the amount to an authority, must claim the refund from the same authority. 10. In our considered opinion, it is always better to allow the assessee to claim from his jurisdictional Commissioner since it is very easy to claim the same and it is settled preposition that the person who paid the amount to an authority, must claim the refund from the same authority. 10. In that view of the matter, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal. 11. For the jurisdiction, we are of the opinion that if question is decided to keep open for the assessee to claim on two places, will lead to criminal wastage of time inasmuch as the non-jurisdictional Commissioner has to verify from the Commissioner for the payment made and instead of that it is always better for the convenience of the Central Government to keep it with the jurisdictional Commissioner. 12. In that view of the matter, all the issues are answered in favour of the assessee against the department. 13. The appeal stands dismissed.