JUDGMENT : R.DEVDAS, J. These two appeals arise out of a common judgment and decree passed by the Fast Track Court V, Tumakuru in RA No.47/2006 and RA No.48/2006. 2. The parties shall be referred to as ‘Plaintiffs’ and ‘Defendants’, as in the original suit. 3. O.S No.489/1991 was filed by Linganna and Abdul Sammad seeking a declaration that they are the owners of plaint ‘A’ schedule property, sought injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaint ‘A’ schedule property and mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the stone crusher installed in plaint ‘A’ schedule property having acquired title by way of Government grant. The plaintiffs claim that plaint ‘A’ schedule property bearing Sy.No.39 of Amalapura Village, Kasaba Hobli, Tumakuru Taluk measuring 27 acres 36 guntas is apportioned by way of an arrangement between plaintiff No.1 and 2. The northern portion measuring 13 acres 38 guntas which is described as plaint ‘B’ schedule property was enjoyed by plaintiff No.1 Sri.Linganna and southern portion described as plaint ‘C’ schedule property to an equal extent was enjoyed by plaintiff No.2 – Abdul Sammad. It is alleged in the plaint that the defendants are committing acts of trespass on the schedule property having installed a stone crusher on the northern-western corner of the suit schedule property. It is further alleged that the defendants were making arrangements to put up a building near the stone crusher. 4. The defendants filed their written statement denying the title and ownership of the suit schedule property to the plaintiffs. It is contended by the defendants that the suit schedule property was never a government land, except the stone mountain situated within Sy.No.39 and the said stone mountain was sanctioned by way of lease for quarrying stones. It is stated that the government had granted Quarry Lease to many persons. It is also claimed that the defendant No.1 who was an educated and unemployed person made an application for sanction of Quarry Lease in Sy.No.35 of Tippanahalli village which is adjacent to Sy.No.39 of Amalapura. It is also averred in the written statement that one Abdul Jaleel, a close friend of plaintiffs had established a stone crushing unit in Sy.No.39 and Sy.No.35. It is also averred in the written statement that one Abdul Jaleel, a close friend of plaintiffs had established a stone crushing unit in Sy.No.39 and Sy.No.35. It is further averred that when the first defendant made an application seeking quarry lease, at the instance of the plaintiffs the said Abdul Jaleel filed objections before the sanctioning authority. It is stated that the Tahsildar granted ‘No Objection Certificate’ for quarry lease, after having considered the objections filed by Abdul Jaleel. Thereafter, the Department of mines and Geology granted quarry lease to the first defendant. Subsequently, mandal panchayat also granted the license to establish the stone crushing unit. Subsequently, power connection was secured and from then on the defendants are running the stone crushing unit by employing 2030 labourers. 5. It is emphasized by the defendants that quarry activity was conducted in Sy.No.35 of Tippanahalli Village and the access to Sy.No.35, more particularly, the stone crushing unit was through the road which was formed on Sy.No.39. It is further emphasized that the defendants and other lease holders are making use of the road passing through Sy.No.39 for transport of men and material. The defendants aver that the suit was filed in order to harass the defendants out of professional jealousy and by concocting documents. The written statement categorically states that the plaintiffs have no manner of right, title or interest in the suit schedule property and in order to harass the defendants who were using the access for carrying men and material to Sy.No.35, the plaintiffs have filed a frivolous suit and therefore sought dismissal of the suit by imposing exemplary costs. 6. The trial court framed five issues as follows: (1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are owners in possession of the suit properties and acquired title to it by Government grant? (2) Whether the plaintiffs further proves that defendants have interfered with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the plaintiffs? (3) Whether the defendants prove that plaintiffs have concocted the documents, for the sake of this suit? (4) Whether the defendants prove that suit is not maintainable and is bad for misjoinder and nonjoinder of necessary parties? (5) What order or decree the parties are entitled? 7. The plaintiffs examined five witnesses including plaintiffs themselves and got marked 17 documents. (3) Whether the defendants prove that plaintiffs have concocted the documents, for the sake of this suit? (4) Whether the defendants prove that suit is not maintainable and is bad for misjoinder and nonjoinder of necessary parties? (5) What order or decree the parties are entitled? 7. The plaintiffs examined five witnesses including plaintiffs themselves and got marked 17 documents. On behalf of defendants, the first defendant got himself examined as DW1 and got marked 10 documents. Though the plaintiffs were not able to produce the grant certificate, they laid emphasis on the entries made in the revenue records like the Record of rights, tenancy and crops (RTC) from the year 1968-69 to 1989-90, Ex.P7 to P9 which are tax paid receipts, Ex.P10 which are the extracts of the registry maintained with respect to unauthorized holdings of government land. On the basis of the revenue entries, the trial court concludes that the plaintiffs were in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, but records a finding that in the absence of title deeds, the court cannot grant declaratory relief to the plaintiffs. 8. It is relevant to note that after OS No.489/1991 was filed by the plaintiff, the first defendant filed OS No.244/1992 against plaintiff No.1 – Lingaraju for the relief of declaration and perpetual injunction. OS No.244/1992 was decreed and there is an order of perpetual injunction operating against the first defendant herein from interfering in his right to use the pathway in Sy.No.39 of Amalapura subject to conditions as mentioned in the lease agreement and also to makegood whatever damage which may be sustained by the defendant therein. Though the trial court took note of the judgment and decree in OS No.244/1992, the trial court proceeded to permanently restrain the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property (plaint ‘A’ schedule property) and further directed the defendants to remove the stone crusher installed in plaint ‘B’ schedule property within four months from the date of decree. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendants filed an appeal in RA No.47/2006, while the plaintiffs being aggrieved of the denial of declaration, filed an appeal in RA No.48/2006. Both the appeals were heard together and disposed of by common judgment dated 23.08.2006. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendants filed an appeal in RA No.47/2006, while the plaintiffs being aggrieved of the denial of declaration, filed an appeal in RA No.48/2006. Both the appeals were heard together and disposed of by common judgment dated 23.08.2006. During the course of first appeal, certain additional documents were also brought on record, more particularly, the dismissal of the Regular Appeal filed by plaintiff No.1 herein against judgment and decree in OS No.244/1992. The Regular Appeal stood dismissed for non-prosecution on 23.09.2005. Having taken note of the judgment and decree in OS No.244/1992, the dismissal of RA No.124/2006 and taking note of the fact that plaintiffs have not produced any document which would evidence the source of acquisition of title to the suit schedule properties, the first appellate court has allowed the appeal filed by the defendants and rejected the appeal filed by the plaintiffs. 10. Heard Smt. Nalina K, learned counsel appearing for plaintiffs-appellants and Sri M B Chandrachooda, learned counsel appearing for defendants-respondents. The substantial question that arises for decision making in this appeal is, “Whether the lower appellate court was justified in holding that the plaintiffs have failed to establish their lawful possession, on the ground that on the date of the suit they were not in possession, though the documents produced by them show their uninterrupted possession from the year 1968-69 to 31.03.1990?” 11. On the question of non production of documents to evidence the fact of the grant being made by the Government, learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that the original grant certificate was lost and therefore an application was made before the granting authority to supply a certified copy and that an endorsement has been issued stating that the file is lost. Learned counsel vehemently contends that the trial court was justified in granting an order of injunction since the possession of the plaintiffs with respect to the suit schedule property was proved. It is emphasized that the revenue records and more particularly, the tax paid receipts which are marked as Ex.P7 to P9 evidence the fact that the plaintiffs continued to have possession of the suit schedule property as on 02.07.1991, the day when the suit was filed and continued to remain in possession. It is emphasized that the revenue records and more particularly, the tax paid receipts which are marked as Ex.P7 to P9 evidence the fact that the plaintiffs continued to have possession of the suit schedule property as on 02.07.1991, the day when the suit was filed and continued to remain in possession. Learned counsel also lays emphasis on Ex.P10 which is a ledger extract evidencing the factum of grant being made in favour of the plaintiffs. Learned counsel further submits that as per Section 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a plaintiff in possession of suit property can on the strength of his possession resist interference from the defendants who has no better title than himself and get injunction restraining the defendant from disturbing his possession. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ambika Prasad Thakur and Others vs. Ram Ekbal Rai (dead) by his Legal representatives and Ors. reported in AIR 1966 SC 605 . It is her contention that this court can draw inference on the basis of the revenue entries and the tax paid receipts that the plaintiffs are in continuous possession of the suit schedule property from 1968-69 till day. It is therefore her contention that the first appellate court has erred in not considering the documentary evidence which supports the contention of the plaintiffs that they are in possession of the suit schedule property and the defendants have no better title over the suit schedule property and therefore the plaintiffs are entitled to resist the overtact of the defendants in interfering with the suit schedule property. 12. On the other hand, Sri M B Chandrachooda, learned counsel seeks to support the judgment of the first appellate court on the following grounds: (i) That both the lower courts have given a categorical finding that the plaintiffs have failed to produce any document to substantiate their title to the suit schedule property. Both the courts were right when they held that the plaintiffs are not entitled for a declaratory relief when they failed to establish their title. (ii) The first appellate court has rightly come to a conclusion that there is no evidence on record to establish that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule property after 31.03.1990 and more particularly, as on the date of the filing of the suit. (ii) The first appellate court has rightly come to a conclusion that there is no evidence on record to establish that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule property after 31.03.1990 and more particularly, as on the date of the filing of the suit. (iii) That there is a judgment and decree operating in favour of the defendants herein, in OS No.244/1992 and the trial court has mislead itself in granting an order of mandatory injunction against the defendants directing the defendants to remove the stone crushing unit. 13. So far as the question of granting declaratory relief is concerned, both the lower courts have rightly come to a conclusion that the plaintiffs have failed to substantiate their title to the suit schedule property. If the plaintiffs averment is that the original grant certificate is lost, there are other modes of establishing their title but the plaintiffs have thoroughly failed to establish the same in any manner. It is his contention that the plaintiffs could have summoned the grant register and ledgers to substantiate that the grant was made by government. His contention that the plaintiffs have failed to produce a copy of the application made before the concerned authority seeking issuance of a certified copy of the grant certificate is wholly justified. 14. This court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs, having failed to produce any documentary evidence to establish their title to the suit schedule property, they are not entitled for a relief of declaration. 15. As regards the next question as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a relief of perpetual injunction as against defendants based on their continued possession of the suit schedule property is concerned, the contentions of the plaintiffs do not hold any water. Heavy reliance has been placed by the plaintiffs on the revenue records i.e., RTC from the year 1968-69 to 1990-91. Ex.D9 is the RTC of year 1990-1991 to 1992–1993. The name of the plaintiffs are not reflected in the RTC for the years 1991, 1992 and 1993. Ex.D5 is an endorsement issued by the Tahsildar which says that no part of Sy.No.39 of Amalapura village is granted to the plaintiffs. Ex.D9 is the RTC of year 1990-1991 to 1992–1993. The name of the plaintiffs are not reflected in the RTC for the years 1991, 1992 and 1993. Ex.D5 is an endorsement issued by the Tahsildar which says that no part of Sy.No.39 of Amalapura village is granted to the plaintiffs. This goes to the root of the matter emphatically denying title of the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiffs and that all the other revenue entries is of no consequence once it is established that the suit schedule property was not granted by the government to the plaintiffs. In the light of this endorsement, reliance which was placed by the trial court on Ex.P10 seems wholly unjustified. The learned counsel’s emphasis that Ex.P10 could be a concocted document since there is interpolation of the names, more particularly, of the first plaintiff seems to be justified. He has also pointed out that there is a mention of mutation being made on the basis of the ‘Sale’ in favour of the plaintiffs i.e., MR No.09/1970-71 dated 08.11.1971 and MR No.08/1970-71 dated 08.11.1971. In other words, the mutation in favour of Linganna and Abdul Sammad is made on the basis of a sale deed being executed in their favour. This is an important piece of evidence which demolishes the foundation made by the plaintiffs. Nowhere in the plaint have the plaintiffs stated that they have purchased the suit schedule property. They base their title only on the grant being made by the government. The plaintiffs cannot blow hot and cold. If their claim that the government has made a grant in their favour is true, Ex.P10 is a document which could have come to their rescue showing that the grant was made and a mutation in the revenue records was based on the grant made by the government. Learned counsel is also justified in pointing out that the RTCs from the year 1968-69 to 1992-93 do not reflect either the grant or the mutation made in favour of the plaintiffs based on the grant. 16. In the light of the above discussion, the substantial question of law stands answered in the ‘negative’. The plaintiffs have failed to prove that they were in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing the suit. 17. 16. In the light of the above discussion, the substantial question of law stands answered in the ‘negative’. The plaintiffs have failed to prove that they were in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing the suit. 17. Learned counsel for respondents has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nagar Palika, Jind vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate reported in 1995 3 SCC 426 and Ram Das vs. Salim Ahmed and Anr. reported in 1998 9 SCC 719 . In Nagar Palika case, their lordships held, “In a suit for ejectment based on title, it was incumbent on the part of the court of appeal first to record the finding on the claim of title to the suit land made on behalf of the respondent. The court of appeal never inquired or investigated that question which was at issue saying that the title on the plaintiff-respondent was admitted by the appellant. This was a serious error of record. The title and possession of the respondent had always been disputed by the appellant from the stage of written statement. In this background, suit of the respondent could not have been decreed merely on the basis of entries in the revenue records during the pendency of the earlier suit filed in the year 1971.” 18. In the other case of Ram Das, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that plaintiff cannot establish his title to the suit property on the weakness of the defendant’s title. It is also held that the plaintiff was not entitled to get declaration of title if such title could not be established by the plaintiff by leading convincing evidence. 19. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for appellants on Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, more particularly, Illustration D is not appealing to this Court. Based on the evidence of record, this Court cannot presume that the plaintiffs continued to be in possession of the suit schedule property and therefore their prayer for grant of relief of perpetual injunction against the defendants naturally fail. 20. For the foregoing reasons, these appeals stand dismissed with costs. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court is upheld, while the original suit stands dismissed.