Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 614 (ORI)

Tribikram Padhi v. State Of Odisha

2018-06-25

S.K.SAHOO

body2018
JUDGMENT Mr. S.K. Sahoo, J. - The appellants Tribikram Padhi and Smt. Sunita Padhi have filed this appeal under section 13 of the Odisha Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 2011 (hereafter 'O.P.I.D. Act') with a prayer to set aside the impugned order dated 08.08.2017 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Designated Court, O.P.I.D. Act, Cuttack in Interim Application No. 03 of 2017 in rejecting their objection petition dated 18.03.2017 under section 9(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act filed for intervention in the proceeding and for exempting the property of M/s. Hitech Estate and Promoters Pvt. Ltd. as per schedule from attachment, sale and consequently permit for execution of sale deed and transfer of such property in their favour. 2. It is the case of the appellants, as per the objection petition filed before the Designated Court under section 9(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act that they came to know that the State of Odisha, represented through A.D.M. -cum-Competent Authority, Cuttack has filed an application against M/s. Hitech Estate and Promoters Pvt. Ltd. and others under section 4(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act for making the ad-interim order of attachment passed by the Government in respect of schedule properties absolute and for a direction to sell the properties so attached by public auction and to realize the sale proceeds. It is the further case of the appellants that as per agreement executed in between the opposite party no.1 i.e. M/s. Hitech Estate and Promoters Pvt. Ltd. and the appellants in the year 2014, the immovable property as mentioned against Sl. No.1 under the schedule of properties of M/s. Hitech Group of Company and Trust has 3 already been dealt with by the company for transferring the same in favour of the appellants and substantial amount of advance money has already been paid by the appellants to the opposite party no.1 to meet their financial crisis. Thus, there has already been creation of charge over the said immovable property mentioned in serial no.1 of the opposite party no.1 in favour of the charge-holder appellants. It is the further case of the appellants that at the time of presentation of the draft sale deed sought for registration/execution before the Sub-Registrar, Berhampur, it was not accepted by the Sub-Registrar and no registration was allowed. It is the further case of the appellants that at the time of presentation of the draft sale deed sought for registration/execution before the Sub-Registrar, Berhampur, it was not accepted by the Sub-Registrar and no registration was allowed. It is the further case of the appellants that this Court had quashed the letter dated 22.05.2013 of the Superintendent of Police, CID, CB, E.O.W., State of Odisha addressed to Sub-Registrar, Jatni requesting that no sale/transfer of the properties of the opposite parties-company, its Director, is to be made without his clearance, holding that there was no impediment for the Sub-Registrar to deny the registration inasmuch as it was necessary for the opposite parties-company to sale their properties to augment funds to deposit before the Registrar of the Hon'ble Apex Court. It is the further case of the appellants that the property mentioned in Sl. No.1 under the schedule of the application filed by the Competent Authority has been made under an ad-interim order 4 of attachment by the Government of Odisha, Finance Department under Order No.1007 dated 12.01.2017 though there has already been creation of charge of the objectors (appellants) over such property since 2014 by virtue of the agreement. It is the further case of the appellants that there has already been an agreement between the parties on dated 28.06.2014 in pursuance of which the sale deed was drafted and presented for registration. It is the further case of the appellants that Sri Madhusudan Panigrahi has been duly authorized by the Director as per Board resolution dated 07.04.2015 and accordingly, he has signed the drafted sale deed dated 24.01.2017. It is the further case of the appellants that they have already paid the entire consideration money amounting to Rs. 72,00,000/- (rupees seventy two lakhs) to the opposite party no.1 inclusive of the advance consideration already paid at the time of agreement for sale and therefore, the said property should be exempted from attachment and registration of the sale deed should be allowed in favour of the appellants by the opposite party no.1 otherwise they would be put to irreparable loss and irremediable injury. In the petition filed for intervention, the schedule property has been described as a three storied building situated at Nilakanthapur, Berhampur, Ganjam over total area of Ac.0.148 decimal. In the petition filed for intervention, the schedule property has been described as a three storied building situated at Nilakanthapur, Berhampur, Ganjam over total area of Ac.0.148 decimal. The prayer which was made in the petition filed under section 9(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act by the appellants was not only to allow them to intervene in the proceeding but also to exempt the aforesaid property from attachment, sale and consequently to permit execution of the sale deed and transfer of the said property by M/s. Hitech Estate and Promoter Pvt. Ltd. in favour of the appellants. 3. The learned Designated Court considering the petition dated 18.03.2017 filed by the appellants has been pleased to hold that in the intervention petition, the consideration amount of the land has been mentioned to be Rs. 45,12,820/- whereas the appellants claimed to have paid Rs. 72 lakhs and therefore, the consideration amount has been stated differently in two deeds. The learned Designated Court further held that unregistered agreement filed by the appellants along with certain xerox copies of documents cannot confer any right, title etc. in favour of the appellants. It was further held that without acquiring any title to the attached property, claim of interest by the appellants or any stranger has no leg to stand upon to claim any interest under section 9(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act. 4. Mr. Pradipta Kumar Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants vehemently urged that the impugned order suffers from various infirmities and non6 application of mind by the Designated Court. It is contended that in view of the provision under section 9(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act, if any person claims an interest in the attached property, he can file an application before the Designated Court even though no notice has been served upon him, indicating his objection for attachment and in such event, the Designated Court should ordinarily allow the intervention application and give the objector an opportunity of hearing and then can pass the final order in accordance with law. It is further contended that even if it was a draft sale deed sought to be registered but the resolution of Board of Director of the Company dated 07.04.2015 was attached to the application which has created the charge in favour of the appellants over the property in view of section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereafter 2013 Act') and even though it has not been registered within thirty days of the creation of the same with the Registrar of the Company but that does not take away the right of the appellants as per third proviso to section 77(1) of 2013 Act. It is contended that the appellants have acquired the right over the properties prior to the ad-interim order of attachment passed under section 3 of the O.P.I.D. Act by the Government and therefore, it cannot be said to be a collusive transaction within the meaning of section 10 of the O.P.I.D. Act. It is further contended that though there was 7 virtually an unregistered agreement for sale on dated 28.06.2014 in respect of the property mentioned in Sl. No.1 under the schedule of the application filed by the Competent Authority before the Designated Court but such agreement coupled with the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company as per 2013 Act creates charge in favour of the appellants prior to the ad-interim order of attachment under the O.P.I.D. Act. It is further contended that the learned Designated Court has not made any effort by taking evidence from both the parties to find out the interest of the appellants attached to the property in question. It is further argued that since section 13 of the O.P.I.D. Act provides for statutory right of appeal, at the first instance, this appeal is to be admitted, record has to be called for from the Designated Court and notice has to be issued to all the parties and then after hearing the parties, the appeal can be disposed of otherwise the dismissal of appeal at the threshold may deprive the appellants on his valuable claim of right over the attached property. Mr. Dillip Kumar Mishra, learned Addl. Government Advocate on the other hand countered the argument of Mr. Mr. Dillip Kumar Mishra, learned Addl. Government Advocate on the other hand countered the argument of Mr. Mohanty contending that ad-interim order of attachment under section 3 of the O.P.I.D. Act was passed by the Government on 12.01.2017 which was prior to the draft sale deed on the basis of 8 which the appellants claim their interest over the schedule property originated on 24.01.2017 which is clear from the recitation of the draft sale deed. It is contended that after the ad-interim order of attachment was passed by the Government, such a document like drafted sale deed was created by the company in connivance with the appellants just to drag on the proceeding and frivolous application for intervention has been filed under section 9(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act by the appellants who have been set up by the Company by way of an unholy combination and after rejection of the application, this appeal has been filed with an intention to debar the Designated Court to decide the main application on merit at an earliest which has been filed before it for making the ad-interim order of attachment absolute and for a direction to sale the property so attached by public auction and realize the sale proceeds. It is contended by the learned counsel for the State that there is no registration of creation of charge in favour of the appellants with the Registrar and therefore, the learned Designated Court rightly rejected the intervention application and since there is no infirmity and illegality in the impugned order, the appeal should be dismissed. 5. Since this is an appeal under section 13 of the O.P.I.D. Act, let me first deal with the contention raised by the 9 learned counsel for the appellants that every appeal so filed should be admitted as it is a statutory one and the record has to be called for from the Designated Court and notice has to be issued to all the parties and then after hearing the parties, the appeal can be disposed of. Section 13 of the O.P.I.D. Act states that any person including the Competent Authority, if aggrieved by an order of the Designated Court, may prefer an appeal to the High Court within thirty days from the date of such order. The aggrieved party may be any person or the Competent Authority. Section 13 of the O.P.I.D. Act states that any person including the Competent Authority, if aggrieved by an order of the Designated Court, may prefer an appeal to the High Court within thirty days from the date of such order. The aggrieved party may be any person or the Competent Authority. Every order passed by the Designated Court is appealable at the instance of the aggrieved party. In view of section 15 of the O.P.I.D. Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall apply to the proceedings before a Designated Court. Chapter-XXIX of Cr.P.C. deals with appeals. section 384 of Cr.P.C., 1973 states about summary dismissal of appeal by the Appellate Court if such Court upon examining the petition of appeal and copy of the impugned judgment considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering with such judgment. In such an event, a reasonable opportunity of hearing has to be given to the appellant or his pleader and before dismissing the appeal, the Court may call for the record of the case. The 10 Appellate Court has to record its reason for dismissing the appeal summarily. It is pertinent to note that a time stipulation of one hundred and eighty days have been provided under section 9(6) of the O.P.I.D. Act for the Designated Court to pass an order from the date of receipt of an application under section 4(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act either making the ad-interim order of attachment absolute or varying it or canceling it. If the contention of Mr. If the contention of Mr. Mohanty is accepted then a party can go on filing frivolous petitions before the Designated Court one after another and in case of rejection, he will approach this Court in appeal under section 13 of the O.P.I.D. Act against every interim order or interlocutory order against which even the powers of revision is not exercisable and if every such appeal is admitted in a routine manner on the ground that it is a statutory one and lower Court records are called for which would lead to stalling of the proceedings before the Designated Court and notices are issued to all the parties and they are to be provided with opportunity of hearing then there would be no end to it and the statutory period provided for disposal of the application under section 9(6) will be frustrated and the mischievous person would succeed in debarring the Government from taking any further step in the matter even in genuine cases. Avoidable delay is good from the point of view of administration of justice. Therefore, I am not inclined to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that no appeal filed by an aggrieved party against the order of the Designated Court under section 13 of the O.P.I.D. Act can be dismissed at the threshold summarily. I am of the humble view that if the Appellate Court is satisfied that the appeal is a frivolous one and there is no sufficient ground for interfering with the impugned order then after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellant or his pleader, appeal can be dismissed summarily after recording its reason, in other words, the Appellate Court would not be justified in dismissing the appeal summarily without a speaking order which raises arguable questions either factual or legal. However, once an appeal is admitted particularly if it is against the conviction and sentence under section 6 of the O.P.I.D. Act or against the final order passed under section 9(6) of the O.P.I.D. Act, it cannot be dismissed summarily. In case of Siddanna Apparao Potil v. State of Maharashtra reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 977 , it is held that the Appellate Court undoubtedly has power of summary dismissal. If the appeal raises arguable and substantial points, the High Court should give reasons for rejection of appeal. In case of Siddanna Apparao Potil v. State of Maharashtra reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 977 , it is held that the Appellate Court undoubtedly has power of summary dismissal. If the appeal raises arguable and substantial points, the High Court should give reasons for rejection of appeal. Rejection of an 12 appeal by using only one word of dismissal causes difficulties and embarrassment in finding out the reasons which weighed with the Appellate Court in dismissal of the appeal in limine. The right to appeal is one both on a matter of fact and a matter of law. In this case, the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the State was given opportunity of hearing on several dates and they were allowed to file written note of submission and the learned counsel for the appellant in fact filed a date chart and written note of submission which was taken on record. The learned counsel for the State also filed the date chart which was taken on record. Therefore, even if no formal order of admission has been passed and lower Court record was not called for as according to me, to decide the point involved, the same is not necessary but all the relevant documents which were filed by the respective parties have been perused and duly considered before passing this order. 6. The question now arises whether in view of the provision under section 9(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act, if any person claims an interest in the property attached or any portion thereof, his application for intervention before the Designated Court has to be allowed and he will be provided an opportunity of hearing during investigation. The Designated Court has no doubt got power to issue notice to the Financial Establishment or any 13 other person whose property is attached by the Government under section 3 of the O.P.I.D. Act or to all other persons represented to it as having or being likely to claim any interest or title in the property of the Financial Establishment. Even if no notice is served, any person claiming an interest in the property attached or any portion thereof may make an objection to the Designated Court. Even if no notice is served, any person claiming an interest in the property attached or any portion thereof may make an objection to the Designated Court. Therefore, during investigation under section 9 of the O.P.I.D. Act, only such persons or the Financial Establishment whose property is attached or who has got any interest or title in the property of the Financial Establishment are to be provided reasonable opportunity of filing their show cause/objection and to adduce evidence. A person making pseudo claim over the attached property cannot be allowed to intervene in the investigation under section 9 of the O.P.I.D. Act otherwise it would open floodgate for the mischievous elements by filing intervention applications and delaying the investigation to come to a logical end. The Designated Court has got every right to refuse entertaining intervention applications once it is satisfied that those are frivolous and filed with an oblique motive. Only such persons whose claim of interest in the property attached or any portion thereof appears prima facie to be genuine would be allowed to intervene. Therefore, I am unable to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for 14 the appellants that Designated Court should ordinarily allow the intervention application in every case and give the objector an opportunity of hearing. 7. There is no dispute that the draft sale deed on the basis of which the appellants claim their interest over the schedule property originated on 24.01.2017 which is after the ad-interim order of attachment under section 3 of the O.P.I.D. Act passed by the Government on 12.01.2017. The copy of the resolution passed in the meeting of Board of Directors of the company held on 07.04.2015 indicates that the company decided to sell the schedule property situated at mouza Nilakanthapur to the appellants for a consideration amount of Rs. 45,12,820/- and Madhusudan Panigrahi, Director of the Company was authorized to sign and execute papers/documents with regard to sell of the land in question. The consideration amount which is mentioned in the unregistered draft sale deed is Rs. 72,00,000/-. 45,12,820/- and Madhusudan Panigrahi, Director of the Company was authorized to sign and execute papers/documents with regard to sell of the land in question. The consideration amount which is mentioned in the unregistered draft sale deed is Rs. 72,00,000/-. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of section 77 of the 2013 Act, even though the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company dated 07.04.2015 creating charge on the schedule property in favour of the appellants has not been registered within thirty days of its creation, it would still not take away the right of the appellants, is not acceptable. Section 2(16) of 2013 Act defines 15 charge' which means an interest or lien created on the property or assets of a company or any of its undertakings or both as security and includes a mortgage. There is no dispute that under section 77 of the 2013 Act, even if the registration of the creation of charge is not made within thirty days of its creation, it can be done within a period of three hundred days of such creation on the application filed by the company before the Registrar with additional fees and even if the registration is not done within a period of three hundred days of the creation of charge then also the company can seek extension under section 87 of the 2013 Act. As per section 78 of 2013 Act, if the company fails to file form for registration of the charge, then the person in whose favour charge is created will file form for creation of charge. The person is entitled to recover from the company the amount of fees but before filling of form, the person concerned has to give fourteen days notice to the company. If company does not register the charge or show sufficient cause then the person himself will file the form with the Registrar of Companies. This is not responsibility of the person in whose favour charge is created to file form. Therefore, if the company fails to file form for registration of charge and person also not filed form then person will not liable to pay any penalty. Where a charge is registered with the Registrar, the Registrar 16 shall issue a certificate of registration of such charge in Form No.CHG-2. Therefore, if the company fails to file form for registration of charge and person also not filed form then person will not liable to pay any penalty. Where a charge is registered with the Registrar, the Registrar 16 shall issue a certificate of registration of such charge in Form No.CHG-2. Where the particulars of modification of charge are registered, the Registrar shall issue a certificate of modification of charge in Form No. CHG-3. As per section 77(3) of the 2013 Act, if a charge is not registered with the Registrar, the charge shall not be taken into account by the liquidator or any other creditor. Thus, even mere filing of charge with the Registrar would not be sufficient. It has to be actually registered by the Registrar and certificate of registration should be issued. Therefore, I am of the humble view that in absence of registration of creation of charge in favour of the appellants, no right in respect of the schedule property has accrued in favour of the appellants. 8. So far as the draft sale deed annexed to the objection petition is concerned, in case of Guman Singh v. Manga Singh reported in 2016 (3) Recent Civil Reports (Civil) 592 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "14. From the facts narrated above, it becomes manifest that the purported sale deed dated 02.05.1966 was never registered and remained an unregistered document. Even as per the Appellants, consideration for the suit land was Rs. 9000/- i.e. more than Rs. 100/-. The transaction pertains to immovable property. 17 Such a sale deed was compulsorily registerable under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. The consequences of non-registration are provided in Section 49 thereof. Such document cannot be led into evidence and no rights indicated in the said document can be pressed and claimed. The document can be seen only for collateral purposes. In the instant case, on the basis of the said document, the Appellants are claiming ownership which cannot be countenanced. Thus, the Appellants cannot claim that they had become owners of the suit land on the basis of document dated 02.05.1966." In case of Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra reported in (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 532 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "22....The unregistered deed of sale was an instrument which required payment of the stamp duty applicable to a deed of conveyance. Adequate stamp duty admittedly was not paid. The Court, therefore, was empowered to pass an order in terms of Section 35 of the Act. 23. The contention of learned Counsel for the appellant that the document was admissible for collateral purpose, in our opinion, is not correct. In Bondar Singh v. Nihal Singh : (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 161 , this Court was not concerned with the provisions of the Act. 18 Only interpretation of the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 was in question. It was opined: "5. The main question, as we have already noted, is the question of continuous possession of the plaintiffs over the suit lands. The sale deed dated 9-5-1931 by Fakir Chand, father of the defendants in favour of Tola Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, is an admitted document in the sense its execution is not in dispute. The only defence set up against the said document is that it is unstamped and unregistered and therefore, it cannot convey title to the land in favour of the plaintiffs. Under the law, a sale deed is required to be properly stamped and registered before it can convey title to the vendee. However, legal position is clear law that a document like the sale deed in the present case, even though not admissible in evidence, can be looked into for collateral purposes. In the present case, the collateral purpose to be seen is the nature of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land. The sale deed in question at least shows that initial possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land was not illegal or unauthorized." 24. In the present case, by reason of the statutory interdict, no transfer at all is permissible. Even transfer of possession is also not permissible. [See:- Pandey Oraon v. Ram Chander Sahu : A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 195 and Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati : A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 3782] . The Registration Act, 1908 provides for such a contingency in terms of the proviso appended to Section 49 thereof, which reads as under: "49. Even transfer of possession is also not permissible. [See:- Pandey Oraon v. Ram Chander Sahu : A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 195 and Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati : A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 3782] . The Registration Act, 1908 provides for such a contingency in terms of the proviso appended to Section 49 thereof, which reads as under: "49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered.- No document required by Section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered shall- (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877) or as evidence of 20 any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument." 25. Section 35 of the Act, however, rules out applicability of such provision as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, we fail to see any reason as to how the document would be admissible for collateral purposes. 26. The view we have taken finds support from the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand : AIR 1946 PC 51 wherein it was held: "That the words 'for any purpose' in section 35 of the Stamp Act, should be given their natural meaning and effect and would include a collateral purpose and that an unstamped partition deed cannot be used to corroborate the oral evidence for the purposes of determining even the factum of partition as distinct from its terms." The said decision has been followed in a large number of decisions by the said Court. 27. In Bhaskarabhotla Padmanabhaiah v. B. Lakshminarayana : AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 132 , it has been held: "9. 27. In Bhaskarabhotla Padmanabhaiah v. B. Lakshminarayana : AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 132 , it has been held: "9. In this case, the learned Subordinate Judge has observed that what the plaintiff was trying to prove was not the division in status but to show that the property was divided under the partition deed. In any case, the fact that the document is inadmissible due to want of being stamped is clear. For, in Ram Rattan v. Parmanand : AIR 1946 PC 51 their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the words 'for any purpose' in section 35 of the Stamp Act should be given their natural meaning and effect and would include a collateral purpose and that an unstamped partition deed cannot be used to corroborate the oral evidence for the purpose of determining even the factum of partition as distinct from its terms." It was furthermore held: "10. In the result, I agree with the learned Munsif-Magistrate that the document is 'an instrument of partition' under Section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act and it is not admissible in evidence because it is not stamped. But, I further held that if the document becomes duly stamped, then it would be admissible to evidence to prove the division in status but not the terms of the partition." 28. In Sanjeeva Reddi v. Johanputra Reddi : AIR 1972 Andhra Pradesh 373 , it has been held: "9. While considering the scope of section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act we cannot bring in the effect of non-registration of a document under section 49 of the Registration Act. section 17 of the Registration Act deals with documents, the registration of which is compulsory and Section 49 is concerned only with the effect of such non-registration of the documents which require to be registered by Section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act. The effect of non-registration is that such a document shall not affect any immovable property covered by it or confer any power to adopt and it cannot be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power. But there is no prohibition under Section 49 to receive such a document which requires registration to be used for a collateral purpose i.e. for an entirely different and independent matter. But there is no prohibition under Section 49 to receive such a document which requires registration to be used for a collateral purpose i.e. for an entirely different and independent matter. There is a total and absolute bar as to the admission of an unstamped instrument whatever be the nature of the purpose or however foreign or independent the purpose may be for which it is sought to be used, unless there is compliance with the requirements of the provisos to Section 35. In other words, if an unstamped instrument is admitted for a collateral purposes, it would amount to receiving such a document in evidence for a purpose which Section 35 prohibits. There is nothing in the case of B. Rangaiah v. B. Rangaswamy : (1970) 2 Andh WR 181 which supports the contention of the petitioner. That was a case as pointed out by Kuppuswami, J., where there were two instruments though contained in one document one a settlement in favour of the 4th defendant therein and the other a will. It was therefore held that part of the instrument which constitutes a will did not require any stamp and will be admissible in evidence for proving the bequest contained therein. It was for that reason that the learned Judge said that section 35 of the Stamp Act has no application to a case where one of the separate instruments relating to one such matters would not at all be chargeable under the Act as in the case before him." 29. In T. Bhaskar Rao v. T. Gabriel : AIR 1981 Andhra Pradesh 175 , it has been held: "5. section 35 of the Stamp Act mandates that an instrument chargeable with duty should be stamped so as to make it admissible in evidence. Proviso (a) to section 35 of the Stamp Act enables a document to be received in evidence on payment of stamp duty and penalty if the document is chargeable, but not stamped or on payment of deficit duty and penalty, if it is insufficiently stamped. The bar against the admissibility of an instrument which is chargeable with stamp duty and is not stamped is of course absolute whatever be the nature of the purpose, be it for main or collateral purpose, unless the requirements of proviso (a) to Section 35 are complied with. The bar against the admissibility of an instrument which is chargeable with stamp duty and is not stamped is of course absolute whatever be the nature of the purpose, be it for main or collateral purpose, unless the requirements of proviso (a) to Section 35 are complied with. It follows that if the requirements of proviso (a) to Section 35 are satisfied, then the document which is chargeable with duty, but not stamped, can be received in evidence." It was further held: "7. It is now well settled that there is no prohibition under section 49 of the Registration Act, to receive an unregistered document in evidence for collateral purpose. But the document so tendered should be duly stamped or should comply with the requirements of section 35 of the Stamp Act, if not stamped, as a document cannot be received in evidence even for collateral purpose unless it is duly stamped or duty and penalty are paid under section 35 of the Stamp Act." (See also Firm Chuni Lal Tukki Mal v. Firm Mukat Lal Ram Chanda : AIR 1968 Allahabad 164 and Chandra Sekhar Misra v. Gobinda Chandra Das : A.I.R. 1966 Orissa 18) . 30. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which fails and dismissed......" In case of Omprakash v. Laxminarayan reported in (2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases 618 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "16. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that an authority to receive evidence shall not admit any instrument unless it is duly stamped. An instrument not duly stamped shall be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable or in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty together with penalty. As we have observed earlier, the deed of agreement having been insufficiently stamped, the same was inadmissible in evidence. The court being an authority to receive a document in evidence to give effect thereto, the agreement to sell with possession is an instrument which requires payment of the stamp duty applicable to a deed of conveyance. Duty as required, has not been paid and, hence, the trial court rightly held the same to be inadmissible in evidence." 9. The court being an authority to receive a document in evidence to give effect thereto, the agreement to sell with possession is an instrument which requires payment of the stamp duty applicable to a deed of conveyance. Duty as required, has not been paid and, hence, the trial court rightly held the same to be inadmissible in evidence." 9. When the registration of creation of charge in favour of the appellants has not been done with the Registrar either at the instance of the company or at the instance of the appellants as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and a draft sale deed filed by the appellants with the objection petition under section 9(3) of the O.P.I.D. Act does not create any interest or title in the property attached in favour of the appellants, I am of the humble view that the learned Designated Court rightly refused to entertain the objection petition filed by the appellants. In the light of foregoing discussions, I am of the considered view that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned Designated Court and the appellants have not made out sufficient grounds for interfering with the same. Accordingly, the criminal appeal being devoid of merits, stands dismissed. A copy of the order be communicated to the Designated Court at an earliest.